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PREFACE. 
The scope of the thesis, as given in the title, requires some 
explanation: 404 B. C. is largely a nominal cut-off point, 
since, although authors whose entire oeuvre falls after that 
date are excluded, except for incidental references, it 
seemed better to consider the whole of Aristophanes, even 
though his last two plays take us well into the fourth cen- 
tury; in the case, too, of the fragments of Demokritos, much 
of the material considered may be of fourth century date, 
but the corpus as a whole is included for the sake of the 
light which the fragments shed on fifth century controversies. 
I should like to thank my supervisors, Professor D. M. MacDowell 
and Mr. A. F. Garvie, especially for their generosity and sup- 
port during the period of my research, but also more generally 
for the excellent education I received at their (and their 
colleagues') hands as an undergraduate. The debts which one 
owes to one's teachers, perhaps, may never be repaid, but I 
should like to go some way towards that end by mentioning 
also two most inspirational schoolmasters, A. C. Jones and 
A. H. Murray, without whose example I should probably never 
have considered pursuing the study of classics. Thanks must 
also go to my wife, who endured my unsociability and read 
many parts of my work in the (fruitful) search for errors. I 
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The introduction deals briefly with the question of the 
classification of societies as shame or guilt-cultures, and 
is 
the position4taken that, firstly, such a distinction has no 
real basis in human psychology and, secondly, that its 
application to the differences between ancient Greek culture 
and our own is largely superficial. The challenge to the 
shame-culture/guilt culture antithesis continues in the 
chapter on Homer, of which one of the central topics is the 
extent to which Homeric man possesses an internal conscience. 
The fundamental association of aidos with popular opinion is 
noted, and the terms which describe both the kind of situ- 
tion or conduct which merits censure and the censure itself 
are studied, with a particular view to their relevance to 
competitive and co-operative standards. It is concluded that 
there is no basis for a subordination of the co-operative to 
the competitive in the vocabulary of the poems, although it 
is certainly the case that many characters are more concerned 
with failure in the latter sphere. This, however, is in no 
way part of the moral ideology of either the poet or his 
characters. 
The main areas of operation of a dos are identified: its role 
in battle and as fear of disgrace in general, its relevance 
to the co-operative standard of philia, its concern with 
positive regard for others, especially suppliants and guests, 
and the particular form which the concept takes with regard 
to sex, especially in women. These are broadly the categories 
which also obtain in subsequent chapters. 
Instances of the relevant terms in the poetry from Hesiod to 
Pindar are largely heterogeneous, but particularly worthy of 
note are Hesiod's remarks on the ambivalence of aidos (a 
notion also present in Homer), Solon's application of the 
verb, aideomai, to his lack of concern for the misguided opi- 
nions of others, and the association of qualities like aidos 
and loyalty to one's friends, itself promoted by i s, with 
arete, both moral and social, in Theognis. 
iv 
In the Tragedians, attention is paid first of all to the role 
of aidos etc. in the motivation of characters, then to its 
importance in the thematic structure of the plays, and only 
then, and with some caution, to the possibility that the 
usage of the tragedians may reflect changes in the society 
outside the plays. In Aeschylus, the operation of the concept 
in the above-mentioned categories is, briefly, surveyed, but 
the bulk of the chapter is concerned with its role in the 
psychology of characters faced with an acutely difficult 
choice: here the inhibitory force of aidos is apparent, as 
it frequently provokes crises of indecision. Such indecision, 
moreover, is often an important sign that all is not well. 
The psychological insight of Aeschylus, it is argued, is very 
far from elementary, but, of the three tragedians, it is 
Sophokles who makes most use of aidos in the psychology and 
motivation of his characters. In all but two of the extant 
tragedies aidos etc. have a central thematic importance: the 
possibility of conflicting ideas of i s, a topic perhaps 
suggested by sophistic relativist theory, is frequently 
explored, and one demand of traditional aid os is often set 
against another. Sophistic discussions of the nature of aidos 
are particularly in evidence in two plays, the Ajax and the 
Philoktetes, which both reveal the operation of the concept 
as an internal form of conscience which can work without 
reference to the "other people" whose judgement is often 
mentioned in the context of the aid os-reaction. This appre- 
ciation of the internal aspect of corresponds with 
Demokritos' view of its operation in the conscience of the 
individual. 
Sophistic ideas are even more readily apparent in Euripides, 
although they are much less closely integrated into 
the 
than 
psychology of individual characters they are 
in Sophokles. 
Relativism is also important in the younger poet, and a 
particular feature of his work 
is the exploration of the 
extent to which the character of a given act may vary accor- 
ding to circumstance: aidos is relevant in this context, 
since it frequently appears that aidos is now appropriate, 
V 
now inappropriate. This is the burden of Phaidra's famous 
doubts about the subject in Hipp., and the importance attached 
to the kairos in that passage might be taken as an indication 
of the dramatist's interest in relativism of this kind. 
The abundance of instances of our terms in Euripides recalls 
their frequency in Homer, and the tragedian's work affords 
us an opportunity, comparable to that offered by the Odyssey, 
to observe the working of aidos over a wide range of everyday 
applications. Euripides, like Sophokles, is aware of the 
internal aspect of ads, and an important topic in this 
chapter is the large number of retrospective uses of the 
verbs, aideomai and aischunomai, and the extent to which 
these circumscribe the concepts of guilt and remorse. The 
element of the retrospective, "bad" conscience in several 
such uses is accepted, but more often, it is argued, there 
is a natural combination of motives, of both conscience of 
wrong done and prospective fear of criticism on that account; 
neither of these cancels the other. Particular notice is 
taken of the importance of aidos in Euripides' work, and of 
its frequent association with education, something which 
again reflects sophistic interest in the origins of society, 
the nature of political communities, the reasons why people 
do wrong and the respective roles of heredity and environment 
in the development of skills and character. 
In Herodotos, the historian's view of the operation of stan- 
dards of honour and shame in historical causation, largely 
in the context of individual resentment of wrongs and the 
desire for vengeance, is noted, as is his belief that the 
victory of the Greeks against the Persians has its roots in 
Greek laws, customs and social organization, since aidos, as 
the impulse to conform to the standards of one's own society, 
is of great importance in this connexion. Aidos occurs only 
once in Thucydides, but this fact belies the importance of 
the concept in his work, both where it occurs as aischune or 
T; IJ and in passageslwhich no such term occurs. Honour 
is a frequent motive at both the individual and the interna- 
tional level, and particular attention is paid to the ways 
in which standards of honour and shame operate both competi- 
vi 
tively, in the conflict between states, and co-operatively, 
as part of the obligation owed by one state to another. 
Many uses of the relevant terms in Aristophanes are of only 
minor interest, but the bulk of the chapter is taken up with 
an investigation of the opportunities for anaideia afforded 
by the festivals at which the plays were performed and the 
role of this comic licence in both the celebration of the 
freedom of the restraints of society enjoyed by the comic 
hero and the exposure of breaches of conventional morality 
by those figures who are the comedian's targets. A certain 
familiarity with concepts of conscience, expressed as aischune 
and as syneidesis, is noted. 
The final chapter is largely taken up with the role of aidos 
in the thought of Protagoras, Antiphon and Demokritos, and 
the central topic is the dialectic which seems to take place 
between a view which takes aidos and the impulse to obey the 
law (perhaps to be related to aidos and dike in the myth of 
Plato's Protagoras) as simple responses to external sanctions 
like legal punishment or public humiliation (this view 
appears to be represented by Antiphon) and another (represen- 
ted by Demokritos) which sees aidos as an internal corrective 
mechanism which can operate without reference to the fear of 
detection by others. Demokritos' view, it is argued, is the 
more sophisticated. Demokritos' ideas of conscience are also 
examined (as are, earlier in the chapter, the instances of 
syneidesis which occur in Antiphon "the orator"), and related 
to his view of aidos. Two short appendices, on the speech of 
Kallikles in Plato's Gorgias and the Dissoi Logoff, are added 
to conclude the survey. 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
Aidos is notoriously one of the most difficult of Greek 
words to translate; there is no English equivalent, and 
indeed many renderings are positively misleading. Von 
Erffa1 is right to point out that aidos is "eine eigene 
Kraft für die uns das Wort fehlt, " yet in his account he is 
constantly concerned to identify separate meanings; the 
deficiencies of this approach are well set out by Scott2 
and, at greater length, by Adkins3. Accordingly, no single 
universal definition will be offered here, although every 
effort will be made to discover the essence of the concept 
itself. Aidos and its direct derivatives, however, are not 
the only Greek words we shall have to consider: the group of 
terms centred on aischron, aischune, etc. will also be 
important, as will those words which refer directly to 
popular disapproval, such as nemesis (in Homer), oneidos 
etc.. In addition, there exists a number of other terms 
which can, on occasion, operate within the same field of 
usage as a'do ; these, too, must be taken into account, and 
points of similarity or difference noted.. It has not, 
however, been my intention to conduct an entirely lexico- 
graphical study, and accordingly, certain passages in which 
none of the relevant terms occur, but which seem to shed 
light on our theme, or to reveal the operation of standards 
of behaviour other than aidos, will also be considered. 
The most common translation of aidos is "shame", and to a 
considerable degree it is with shame as a psychological and 
cultural entity that we shall be concerned. As is already 
suggested by the observation that no translation can cover 
the entire range of the word aidos, the possibility 
that our idea of shame and that of the ancient Greeks may 
not be co-extensive is a real one; nevertheless, it 
should be taken as read that, in general, aidos does relate 
to the feeling we describe as shame; we find that characters 
in Greek literature often refer their aidos explicitly to 
"what other people will say", and that, surely, is 
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an important manifestation of at least one kind of shame. 
The anxiety of aidos, moreover, can be accompanied by 
physiological symptoms, such as blushing, or by instinctive 
behaviour patterns, such as lowering of the eyes or the 
desire to hide oneself from view; these are typical concomi- 
tants of the shame reaction4 and further suggest the 
relationship between shame and "other people". A psycho- 
logical definition of shame, however, is almost as elusive 
as an adequate translation of aidos. Piers5summarizes the 
definitions of his psychoanalytical predecessors and rejects 
most of them as too narrow; explaining (p. 18) that shame 
can be thought of as an affect, an emotion like fear, rage, 
hope etc., or as a neurotic symptom, such as shyness or 
self-effacingness, or as a character trait, like modesty6, 
he goes on (23-4) to offer his own definition, naming 
four criteria which differentiate shame from guilt. 
These criteria, however, operate largely at the level of the 
unconscious, and, in consequence, do not take us very far. 
For example, in dealing with the ways in which ancient 
authors portray or describe the conscious anxiety of aidos, 
it will be no great advantage to know that, "the uncon- 
scious, irrational threat impl lied in shame anxiety is 
abandonment, and not mutilation (castration) as in guilt. "ý 
Piers' distinction, however, between guilt as a product of 
tension between the ego and the superego, and shame as a 
product of similar tension between the ego and the ego ideal 
(p. 24) does have its value, provided we accept the distinct- 
ion between superego (an internal source of reference based 
on the interdictions of punitive parents) and the ego ideal 
(the idea of one's social röle based on identification 
with the ideals of loving parents and of the sibling and 
peer groups)8. This distinction has the following con- 
sequence, which forms one of the criteria for the differ- 
entiation of shame and guilt: 
9 
"Whereas guilt is generated whenever a boundary (set by 
the superego) is touched or transgressed, shame occurs when 
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a goal (presented by the ego ideal) is not being reached. It 
thus indicates a real shortcoming. Guilt anxiety accompanies 
transgression, shame, failure. " 
10 
Perhaps this definition is useful for preserving a proper 
distinction between the psychological states of shame and 
guilt, but as a guide to the linguistic behaviour of real 
individuals it has its limitations. Anyone, for example, 
might regard a transgression as a failure, or may see the 
requirement not to fail as an injunction to be obeyed, a 
limit not to be transgressed. A given action, then, may be 
accompanied by either guilt or shame, depending on the indi- 
vidual. Furthermore, as Piers himself points out (p. 29), 
Parental punishment may take the form of humiliation: thus 
the creation of a sense of guilt may encompass the creation 
of a sense of shame, and it is possible that the same action 
may be attended by both senses. The closeness of shame and 
guilt is further demonstrated by Piers' discussion (31-9,44) 
of the ways in which guilt can conceal shame (and vice versa) 
or in which the one can lead to the other. The association 
of shame with failure and guilt with transgression, then, 
fails to provide an adequate criterion for a distinction. 
This, it seems to me, is partly because Piers is thinking 
mainly of guilt and shame felt with regard to one's own 
actions: when an individual experiences a sense of shame 
retrospectively at his own conduct, while he may simply be 
reacting to the prospect of others' disapproval of that con- 
duct, he may equally be accepting responsibility for what he 
has done, and the shame reaction may encompass a degree of 
remorse or repentance. In such a context, then, the distinc- 
tion between shame and guilt would be very hard to pin down. 
But a more empirical and workable distinction may be found 
in the fact that shame does not always relate to one's own 
conduct, and need not, unlike guilt, presuppose some sense 
of responsibility. One may, for example, feel shame at some- 
thing someone else does, at something which happens to one- 
self, or at being thought to have done something which, in 
fact, one has not. In short, shame need not encompass a sense 
of one's own resonsibility, while guilt, even irrational 
4 
guilt usually does. (Even here, however, the distinction 
should not be too rigidly applied: we often hear, for example, 
of the guilt experienced by whole nations at the transgres- 
sions of previous generations, and certain religions believe 
in a kind of guilt which adheres to the human race as a whole 
and which one inherits at birth. ) 
It should be noted, however, that Piers' discussion presup- 
poses that both guilt and shame are internal states of con- 
science: 
11 both operate in the context of the internalized 
prescriptions and ideals of the individual and both are 
v 
acquired early in the process of socialization. This, in turn, 
brings us to the often quoted distinction between "shame- 
culture" and "guilt-culture". 
12 Piers' collaborator, M. B. 
Singer, investigates the conventional justifications for this 
distinction at some length, and comes to the conclusion that, 
as a means of characterizing whole cultures, it is scarcely 
tenable. Important here is the classification of cultures 
into two categories: those whose morality is enforced by so- 
called "external sanctions", i. e. punishments, including dis- 
grace or humiliation, and those which rely on the "internal 
sanction" of individual conscience, the sense of guilt. 
13 
Yet, as we have seen, the sense of shame may also be inter- 
nalized, and indeed is likely to be so sooner than guilt, 
given that children will identify positively with their 
parents and others in their environment before they begin to 
internalize parental prohibitions. 
14 Margaret Mead, quoted by 
Singer (p. 65), is aware that shame may refer to an internal 
standard, but attempts to preserve the distinction between 
external and internal sanctions by claiming that shame re- 
quires a (real) audience to be effective. 
15 But if the shame 
felt by the individual really does stem from a discrepancy 
between the act contemplated or committed and his own inter- 
nalized ideals or goals, then clearly no audience is required. 
It may be a characteristic of shame that it is often expres- 
sed with reference to other people, but the audience thus 
implied may be present only in fantasy, or may not be present 
at all, if the ideal being challenged is one which has been 
internalized completely. The "other people" may simply be the 
5 
expression of the internalized standard, a "generalized" or 
"eidetic" other. 
16 
If, then, there is no possibility of an absolute distinction 
between shame and guilt in terms of internal and external 
sanctions, it follows that the distinction between shame- 
culture and guilt-culture cannot be maintained in the form 
in which it was first conceived. In particular, since shame 
and guilt can be so close, the possibility arises that the 
criteria for differentiating the two senses may differ from 
one researcher to another. On pp. 71-83 of his study Singer 
discusses the results of comparative "moral ideology" tests 
carried out among groups of American Indian children and 
white Protestant children from the conservative Midwest. 
Several of the criteria employed by the researchers17 to 
distinguish shame from guilt must surely seem questionable 
to the reader familiar with the application of the shame- 
culture/quilt-culture antithesis in the ancient Greek context. 
In particular, one reads that guilt/conscience is to be 
regarded as a feeling of unworthiness, of falling below the 
ideals set by parents. 
18 In Greek culture, however, the idea 
that one should be unworthy of one's parents, especially one's 
father, is regarded as occasion for aidos. 
19 Again, we are 
told that, "The midwestern children definitely show a greater 
expressed concern about personal achievement and about per- 
sonal failure than most of the Indian children. "20 This is 
intended to concede that the shame-culture of the Indians 
does differ from the guilt-culture of the midwesterners in 
important respects; but it is well known, especially from the 
writings of A. W. H. Adkins, that classical Greeks were also 
distinguished by an acute concern for personal achievement 
and personal failure, and this is one of the features of 
their society which is commonly believed to mark it out as a 
shame-culture; we remember, too, Piers' definition, 
21 that, 
"Guilt anxiety accompanies transgression, shame, failure. " 
Is this feature, then, of the midwestern children's response 
a guilt feature or a shame feature? 
The shame-culture/guilt-culture antithesis, then, is fraught 
6 
with difficulties, and it may be, as Dover says, 
22 that the 
essential difference lies in the way people talk rather than 
in the way they feel. This difference, however, is no trivial 
one: the way people talk is part of the way they think, and 
they way they think is part of the way they are. Clearly, 
the way our ancient Greek subjects talk marks them out as 
different from us, and it is therefore unsafe to assume that, 
whatever they say, they mean exactly the same as we should 
in the same circumstances. In dealing with aidos, it is 
necessary to realize that the power of popular disapproval 
was greater for them than it is for us, and we should also 
be ready to admit the prudential aspect of their morality; 
at the same time, we should be prepared to allow them, as 
human beings like ourselves, their internal awareness of the 
standards of their society; a middle way between total ali- 
enation and an excessive attitude of familiarity must be 
forged. 23 
NOTES TO INTRODUCTION. 
(For full details of works cited by author's name and short 
title see bibliography. ) 
1. P. 9. 
2. Acta Classica 1980, p. 13. 
3. Man , 2-6. 
4. See Piers in Piers and Singer, Shame and Guilt, P. 19. 
Aristotle (EN 1128b) recognizes the psychological nature of 
aid os and its physiological effects when he describes it as 
a Pathos rather than a hexis (and so not an ae) and relates 
it to the sensation of blushing: see also Wilamowitz, Gau e 
I, p. 348. 
5. op. cit., 18-21. 
6. We shall meet aidos in all these capacities. 
7. P. 24. 
8. Piers discusses this distinction on pages 25-30. 
9. Piers, p. 24. 
10. Lloyd-Jones, JZ, p. 25, quotes a similar definition from 
J. K. Campbell, but points out, correctly, that Campbell's idea 
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of transgression as transgression of the laws of God alone 
does not adequately account for all forms of guilt. 
11. Piers argues for the internal sense of shame at pp. 28 
and 39. 
12. On these terms, see Singer in Piers and Singer, Part Two. 
For their use in classical Greek contexts, see Dodds,, 
c. 2,28-63, Adkins, MR, 48-9,154-6,170n. 10,312n. 5,353n. 12; 
Lloyd-Jones, JZ, 2,15,24-7,55-6,171n. 102. 
13. See Singer, 63-70. 
14. See Piers, p. 46. 
15. That this is true of aidos in Homer is the position of 
Scott, Acta Classics 1980, p. 15: "(aidos) needs other people 
to impose it. " 
16. Singer, p. 67. 
17. Kluckhohn and Leighton. 
18. Singer, p. 76. 
19. See below, p. 28 etc.. 
20. Singer, p. 79. 
21. P. 3 above. 
22. GPM, p. 220n. 3; cf. O. Seel, _"Zur 
Vorgeschichte des Gewis- 
sens Begriffs", p. 297. On this subject, one general observa- 
tion suggests itself. Members of a shame-culture are supposed 
to have no objective moral standards, but simply to adjust 
to their environment (see Singer, p. 75); but if this was the 
case in classical Greece (and see here Lloyd-Jones,, p. 26, 
"Greek culture continued to be a shame-culture until well 
after the fifth century"), why did the dissemination of the 
notion that all nomoi were conventional, man-made, cause 
such a stir? The reaction of ordinary people, the kind of 
people for whom Aristophanes wrote Clouds, to the nomos/ 
Physis controversy suggests that the Greek saw his standards 
of law and morality as objective rules to be obeyed. A large 
amount of the objectivity of those values must have resulted 
from the fact that, from Homer onwards, the gods share and 
underwrite human standards. 
23. See Seel, 293-8,319 on this (against the approach of 
Snell and others). 
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1. AIDOS IN HOMER 
In Homer the range over which aidos is employed is at its 
widest, and to a great extent, the subsequent history of the 
concept is one of refinement of its uses and diminution of its 
power. Syntactically, however, the usage of the verb aideomai 
is at its simplest in Homeric epic: it takes only two 
constructions, either governing a direct object in the 
accusative (and this object is always personal in Homer, and 
thus never refers to an action; hence there is no possibility 
that aideomai could mean, "I am ashamed of x, " i. e. of 
having done x: aideomai is always used prospectively in 
Homer) or being followed by a prolative infinitive. 
As a preliminary to a detailed examination of the concept in 
the poems, let us first get some idea of the nature of aidos 
by looking briefly at a few characteristic passages. In 
I1.7.93 the reaction of the Greeks to Hektor's challenge to 
single combat is as follows: 
ai1, EÖOEJ 44tJ äVýjJatAaý 
ýEiýocJ ýý U-71 C- X 
Compare Od. 20.343-4, where Telemachos explains, ' 
ctL r, 0Xt S p(E KoJ(a'I ado MEýaCoýa cStEý9ac 
11A Vew D(V Kv,, 1xc w 
In both these passages aidos is inhibitory, it prevents the 
performance of the action expressed in the infinitive. 
1 This 
inhibitory force is most clearly shown at 11.15.657-8, where 









Aidos is thus clearly a check of some kind; it modifies the 
conduct of those affected. 
2 Its restrictive nature is recog- 
nized in those few passages where its abandonment is advised. 
In O d. 3.14, Athene, urging outspokenness on the youthful 
Telemachos tells him he has "not the slightest need of 
aidos"; later, at line 96 of the same book (=4.326) it is 
9 
recognized that aidos may cause one to keep back information 
in order to spare another's feelings; 
3 
at 0d. 17.347 




oýK äyD Aq KExeIý, 
ývw äV, 
C1'L >raec vac . 
Finally, at 11.10.237-8 Agamemnoton urges Diomedes to ignore 
any fee ling of aidos which may cause him to choose his 
accomplice on the spying mission on grounds of status rather 
than of merit. In circumstances, then, in which an absence 
of restraint is desirable, aidos is specifically excluded. 
4 
That the restraint provided by aidos is an emotional one 
is suggested by its situation in the thumos at 11.15.561 and 
661.5 If aidos is an emotion, we need not be surprised if 
it is not effective on each and every occasion. 
6 As an 
emotion, it is often coupled with pity or fear. 
7 In 
these cases the very fact that aidos and pity or fear are 
named together shows that they are not identical, yet the 
combination does suggest that aidos does work on the 
emotional plane. Where aidos does occur together with one of 
these emotions, it is generally true that pity accompanies 
aidos for the helpless or less fortunate, while fear accom- 
panies aidos for one's superiors. 
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Simple instances of aidos with a direct, personal object 
(the type of passage in which it is generally rendered as 
"respect") tell us virtually nothing about the essence of 
the concept. Often, however, the reference to the personal 
object is amplified by a clause giving the grounds for the 
character's aidos. For example, at 11.22.105-6 Hektor 
explains, 
ai a. c IW PCs Kä( wäJX vTte -h0V 
)&I Ta r& -t' lS Cr 
c'irvJ (l Ka K WTEc aS öc »h o Cý"c a 
K-rwc Kr h. 
Thep -clause further suggests the relationship of dos 
to fear; the warrior's ads here takes the form of appre- 
hension at the prospect of what other people, even inferior 
people may say. At 11.6.442-3 he expresses a similar 
concern, but this time the reference to "what other people 
10 
will say"is not explicit: 
a)O&r0'aL Cwas KAc (t X600 CýKfrc. -rr-ThouS, 
'0 le 0AL K& Ka. Kös WS voIr¢'. '/ , hvrkäSw TioX 0C0 
Nevertheless, it is certain that his prima ry concern is 
that the Trojans should not see him acting in the way that 
he shuns, and it is clear that it is their disapproval that 
he fears. There is a definite link, then, between aidos and 
popular opinion, a, link which we shall now explore in more 
systematic fashion. 
SANCTIONS 
Popular opinion in Homer is most clearly expressed by 
dß/10v ¢ °C? tS or ºý ý5 . At 11.9.459-61 
avj/ou fonts and 
OVEtýeoc occur together, and the context is clearly one in 
which aidos might be present: Phoinix explains that he was 
restrained from killing his father by Tcs a a'fiQV, 
5j 06 ¬v'(. OU'4'%w 
cývjý. uý Eý ºý Kf ý änJ Kx c 
öV t%oc -Tra» äVO( 
LJS /t%vý ýtº c1 v cfOs ý, ET 
ArXat, 
oc. tcJ KaýSEd ºý . 
Phoinix is concerned about his reputation, and envisages 
popular disapproval: this looking forward to "what people 
will say" parallels exactly the reaction of Hektor in the 
9 le Vt4OU passages quoted above, and it seems likely that  
.11 tt and ö VFCfbcare a periphrasis for aidos here. At Od. 16. 
} Oc 
75 ( =19.527) 
6º Aoto 1h 
Ls occurs as the object of the 
participle oüSa/FYh 
0 
while at 21.323 
JPMV 
ocYýW" VI 
YVVO o(W is the object of occgr va tVoc. , which must be 
11 
synonymous with pciýOVMtcVat- here. 
The most important expresyion of Popular disapproval for our 
purposes, however, is nemesis. 
12 The relationship between 
aidos and nemesis is so close that many instances of the 
latter will be considered individually in the main 
discussion below; at this point a few remarks on the nature 




One indication of the closeness of aidos and nemesis is the 
fact that they frequently occur together; see, for example, 
I1.13.121-2, 
atO Q'KPc . vc , erýv 
CK C6TO$ 
and Od. 2.64-6, 
V C-ývý. ý a'ý vý e ºýTe Kai c ap Toi. ý 
X Xhovs T pc i cýEC 
ývýTF 'fýEe ý tcTiovýs 
ä v0c trOU3 
at LYA c&Ta 0V6L 
The nature of the relationship becomes clearer when we 
examine I1.17.91-5: 
VJ 1vw 
e d, ýt Ev KE I NC-1r(A) Ka-roc T un faK, cX c 
0&" 'rC/K 1 rCo K)ýov os KE-rfx c d;,, ývtýS 6V-6K 6V 
/vc, ac Lj oc sac 
wJ vE (vt (lItöS KE Vi ýý/. ac 
FE KEJ EW-roec /, ouvos C W4 KA( 
e W« äA 7ct 
oc i 6F6 ýEcS , 
vý 
-IF S /IILE- nE- c6T 
w(' C V#( ltd oý 
The alternatives which Menelaos considers are as follows; 
either he can leave behind the arms14 and body of Patroklos 
and risk. the nemesis of his fellows, or he can give in to 
the aidos which the thought of their disapproval arouses in 
him and remain where he is, in spite of the danger. Aidos, 
then, foresees and, if it is not ignored, forestalls 
nemesis. We should notice also the connexion between aidos 
and being seen by others (ös iav 
t9v'r'(. ). 
A similar example of the interaction of aidos and nemesis is 
given by von Erffa. 
15 At Od. 20.343 Telemachos explains his 
reluctance to send his mother away in terms of aidos 
( 0< %I wc. 0 of 
E 
i<ov V o(ýö/µEYä(oco d 
c. 
e ucc) , while at 2.136-7 
he refers to nemesis as his reason for not doing so ((e fl. $ 
t /A4 
"S W(torwv 
/eire. -rxt- ). 
In the passage from Iliad 17 the object of nemesis was an 
action which could have been viewed as cowardice, as it was 
in the other passage quoted above from Iliad 13. The term 
has a similar reference in 11.6.351,13.117-9,292-3,10.129 
-30.16 We shall also encounter passages in which warriors 
are urged to feel nemesis lest the body or arms of a fallen 
colleague be captured by the enemy. 
17 But nemesis does not 
12 
operate entirely within the "competitive" sphere. 
18 
In the 
lines cited from Od. 2 it was imagined as directed at a 
breach of the loyalty expected in a son towards his mother, 
while in the previous passage quoted from the same book it 
was invoked against the excessive behaviour of the suitors. 
There is also a link between nemesis and loyalty in those 
places where Penelope's sensitivity to nemesis is given as a 
reason for her desire to finish Laertes' shroud before 
choosing one of the suitors as her husband. 
19 
In fact, the range of usage of nemesis is very wide: it is 
frequently employed in condemnation of violence or excess, 
20 
and also in a number of minor, social contexts, where it 
censures infringements of decorum. 
21 In some cases, 
moreover, it seems to signify little more than anger, 
although, as Redfield points out, 
22 it always connotes anger 
in which the subject feels himself justified, that is, it is 
always directed at some transgression or deficiency on the 
part of someone else. There is always the possibility, then, 
that nemesis may refer to a breach of ads, even when the 
latter is not mentioned, and in cases in which it does not 
obviously refer to one of the particular contexts in which 
aidos normally occurs. Hence von Erffa's list of passages23 
in which nemesis is not the correlate of aidos seems rather 
over-inclusive. _ 
In a number of passages nemesis is explicitly denied or 
i 
disclaimed (in the form 0ul Ve, t6d tS or O) V KLSo)/koct. etc. ) ; 
the action thus freed from nemesis is therefore regarded as 
justified or understandable. 
24 In a similar manner, when a 
1i 
character urges /%&I YEME(a (etc. ) he is effectively 
apologizing beforehand for annoying behaviour which he 
nevertheless feels is demanded on the particular occasion. 
25 
The neuter adjective nemesseton occurs seven times in the 
poems in the sense "occasioning popular disapproval. " In Il. 
9.523 (Q. 22.59) the expression is Ov YEýIýtC tf -roV , which A 
corresponds to the usage of Ou VE/&C-tltS Just mentioned; in 
the other passages there is an obvious reference to "how 
13 
things look, " to appropriateness; in Il. 3.410 and 14.336, 
for example, the term is applied to the performance of the 
sexual act at a time or place which is felt to be inapprop- 
riate. 
26 
At U. 19.182 and 24.463 the question of the 
correct conduct for individuals of a certain status is fore- 
most: in the former passage Agamemnon is informed that 
it will not be nemesseton for him to make amends with 
Achilles since it was he who began the quarrel; apparently 
the nemesis which is here denied is to be imagined as direc- 
ted at a king who would show himself weak by giving in to 
his inferiors even when they are in the wrong; 
27 in the 
latter, Hermes refuses to`"`""ýd'ly Priam into Achilles' 
presence, on the grounds that to do so would be nemesseton, 
i. e. not fitting for a god like himself. Finally, at Od. 22. 
489 Eurykleia tells Odysseus that it would be nemesseton for 
him to remain in his beggar's rags: again the idea of 
physical appearance and the status of theperson concerned is 
stressed. This idea of appropriateness and of appearances in 
the adjective, together with its connexion with popular 
disapproval reveals it as clearly comparable with those 
terms which express more explicitly the notion of "how 
things look", namely aischron and aeikes. 
28 
The use of nemesetos in the masculine at 11.11.648 is 
unparalleled: coupled with aidoios and predicated of 
Achilles it appears to mean "liable to feel nemesis, ' but 
this is not certain; given that the verbs aideomai and 
nemesizomai/nemessaomai can approach each other in meanin39 
it could be a synonym of aidoios here; the tautology would 
not necessarily rule this out. Whatever the, meaning, the 
passage is evidence of a certain fluidity and polyvalence 
in the use of these terms. 
The connexion between Popular disapproval and appearances is 
also evident in the usage of the terms aischos, aischros 
etc.. The root meaning of the noun is "ugliness", and this 
connotation is present throughout the range of its uses. At 
Qß. 11.433 aischos is the legacy left by Klytaimestra to 
the rest of her sex, and the context is clearly one of 
14 
disgrace or infamy. Aischos also has an obvious reference to 
popular disapproval at Od. 18.225, where Penelope tells 
Telemachos that he will suffer aischos and lobe among men 
for allowing a guest under his protection to be 
ä6($LlOJUfvX'., 
Again, appearances are stressed in the use of all three of 
these terms. Lobe is roughly a synonym of aischos and, its 
root meaning apparently "disfigurement" (see LSJ s. v. ), it 
clearly bears a similar relationship to physical appearances. 
The two terms also occur together at 11.13.622, where Mene- 
laos, exulting over his defeated opponent, Peisandros, 
claims that the Trojans have no lack of aischos and lobe. 
the context is one of condemnation of Paris' breach of 
guest-friendship, yet the two terms quoted do not refer to 
the Trojans in this instance, for Menelaos goes on to say 
that the lobe which the Trojans do not lack is the lobe they 
inflicted on him (vý-1 
It Xwflu(01l8t) 
. Although Menelaos is 
condemning Paris' conduct, then, and promising divine punish- 
ment, he decides in this instance to stress the discreditable 
nature of that conduct for himself, the patient, rather than 
for the agent. 
30 
In the examples just quoted aischos was both the state which 
might arouse popular disapproval and the state resulting from 
it. In the plural, aischea can refer both to the state 
considered disgraceful and to the reaction of others to that 
state. The two usages, however, should not be sharply dist- 
inguished, since "ugliness" is the dominant connotation of 
both and because it is perfectly natural that a condition 
deemed ugly by popular opinion should be designated by the 
same term as the words, ugly in themselves, used to comment 
on it. At Od. 1.229 it is to acts liable to arouse dis- 
approval that aischea refers: the disguised Athene says to 
Telemachos, with reference to the excessive behaviour of the 
C le suitors (note 227 ýACýf 6VE5 V"Tfe 
f 1. ahW S) 
veMEr! ºý ä0C CTb KE 0(ý/1ý 
Al fA&K -rr »' öeo JJ ö 
/s 
-Tcs -rr c vrTOS YE (-IT 0c. , 
A sensible man, then, would feel nemesis at pcsl? EK 'T AV_ 
Adkins31 believes that these aischea are disgraceful for 
Telemachos alone, but this can hardly be the case when 
15 
Athene has been referring to the hybris of the suitors, when 
she is masquerading as a guest in Telemachos' house (and, as 
we shall see, 
32 
strict conventions demand courtesy between 
guest and host - it is surely incredible that a guest should 
draw attention to a host's disgrace) and when Telemachos 
obviously takes her words not as criticism but as sym- 
Pathy. 
33The 
possibility of nemesis at the aischea of the 
suitors here suggests that their "uglinesses" and their 
hybris may also entail breaches of aidos, and we should 
remember that they are characterized as without aidos 
throughout the poem. 
At Od. 19.373 the reference of 
is to the insults which cause 
reaction of other people, rat] 
reaction. The same is true of 
oneidos also occurs, 
34 6.351, 
aischea (together with lobe) 
disgrace, that is to the 
her than to the object of that 
11.3.242, where the term 
where it is coupled with 
nemesis, and 6.524. 
At 11.18.24,27,180 and 24.418 the verb aischuno occurs in 
the sense, "make ugly", "disfigure", while at 22.75 it 
governs (subject Wvv'C S) KKCI , YEVELOV and Oct 
SW); the literal 
sense of the first two terms suggests that aidos is also 
physical here, in the sense/aidoia. 
35 The meaning is the same 
at 23.571, but the usage, because of the abstract object, more 
figurative (Menelaos complains to Anti lochos, 
1i(; CVJocS ... 
Cýmv 
ä((-Tg4) At 6.209 Glaukos reports the injunction of his father, 
/A41 
6 YEvOS -rrPLTE(wJ aiu, Nvv where we might legitimately 
translate "disgrace", "shame", provided the root meaning 
is kept in mind. Similar is 0.2.85-6, where Antinoos reacts 
to Telemachos' criticism: jrO7o4 jrEaCs OCl tý(vvwd) 
10 `Rats 
gC 
ICE ýtwý of 
öýJaýcýaý. The suitors deny (87) that they are 
responsible for the dissipation of Telemachos' patrimony, yet 
Antinoos clearly believes that his criticism could "disfigure" 
them. This relates to our remarks on aischea at x. 1.229; 
there Jischea referred to the suitors' behaviour, and it seems 
here that criticism of that behaviour may implicate them in 
aischos, since, it seems difficult to deny, that is the 
16 
result when one allows another to aischunein one. Even if 
one takes atCy 
VVwV 
simply as "abusing" here the fact remains 
that Antinoos envisages harm to his reputation as the result 
of Telemachos' criticism of the suitors' excess, and that it 
seems possible to use the verb aischuno in a context of 
censure of co-operative failure. 
36 
The adjective aischros remains to be considered. At Il. 
2.216 the superlative is used to describe Thersites, "the 
ugliest man at Troy". This is the only instance of the 
adjective in a personal application in Homer. In several 
passages (Il. 3.38,6.325,13.768)37 the combination 411)Vo&s 
C JrC-- E C1LV occurs, and in each case the ugliness of the words 
reflects particularly on their recipient, and not on the 
speaker: to address someone with ugly words, then, is 
equivalent to "disfiguring" (aischunein) them. Similarly, 
the adverb O(t(Aews, on its only two appearances in the 
poems refers to the act of abusing or reproaching someone 
( 1.23.473, Od. 18.321). In both cases the speaker wishes 
to censure or humiliate the person addressed, and any dis- 
grace accruing would doubtless fall on the addressee, but 
equally it is the words themselves which are felt to be 
"ugly", and there is a case for saying that the adjective 
primarily describes the "appearance" of the words and only 
incidentally 
"- their effect on the addressee. In the latter 
passage in particular, the words are directed by Melantho, 
the unfaithful maidservant, at Odysseus, and while they 
are primarily disgraceful for the latter, since he should be 
able to prevent others' abuse, the possibility remains 
that the audience are expected to disapprove of the former's 
conduct, since ill-treatment of guests and abuse of one's 
master (even if he is incognito) is not the kind of 
behaviour commended in the Qdyssey. Perhaps circumstances 
and the justice of the rebuke dictate whether to address 
another Oct( ws is discreditable for the agent or not. 
The neuter singular, aischron, occurs only three times 
in the poems, all three instances in the Iliad. All three 
also refer to exactly the same situation, that of return 
17 
from a military enterprise with nothing to show for it. U. 
2.298 is the most succinct of the three: 
ai (xCöJ Trug 
öv 
-re. ývt Ev'ECý KEVF V TE \/EFd'fýac 
Similarly, lines 119-22 of the same book stress the effects 
on the warriors' reputations and the disgrace of giving up 
before victory is achieved: 
O) fýeä / T'C. ( TGýEý V/ C rTC kE (f o"Woc. A. TVOE(Vat s 
ýInOýtý 00I-W TGluvltSE -re (oVSt -rE xov 
'AxacwV 
ä'ýTrf 
I ecro J T'ä 
> Eý, o J ltTh 
kEtcfEJ ýE Ný oýý(ý6 e oý c 
v ö"p (L -rra vr o? oL (c The third passage i5 I1.21.436-8, where Poseidon says to 
Apollo: 
oLge, Tl. 1 (q VWI, 
SL 
EfToC/ýt, ýý/ 0ü 
[ OIKEV 
a(Javwý GTEcw -r ' ýV aý ýJ(co ý a( K ýº-"aX1T 
LOp.. e 0t XIj/t'ii'o/SE 
Z40 
S 'roTI XPAKOý%r&5 
SW 
Again, appearances constitute the main incentive (O u 
4E 
10, 
EUCKEJ), and the context is again one of returning home with- 
out a fight. 
38 
It will readily be seen that aischron is a word of very 
infrequent occurrence in Homer. It thus seems a little 
unwise to build as much on it as does Adkins at R pp. 30 
iaischron 
... is the most powerful word used to denigrate a 
man's actions") and 33. Admittedly, Adkins is correct in 
saying that aischron is confined to the competitive sphere 
in Homer, but, as we have just seen, -the same 
is not true 
of aischos and aischuno; nor is there any reason to assume 
that the co-operative uses of the latter two terms are any 
less powerful than their competitive cousins. The adjective 
aischros refers to appearances, whether those of a man, an 
action, a situation or whatever; it does not occur in Hesiod, 
but in Theognis, for example, we see it used of a situation 
in which drunken men and sober men find themselves in each 
other's company (Thgn. 627-8), or (in the negative) of a 
requg. k that a favour be returned (1329-30), and neither of 
these uses is competitive. Non-competitive uses, then, occur 
early in post-Homeric poetry, and the usage of other terms 
from the same root in Homer himself tends to suggest that 
it is simply a matter of chance that aischron is exclusively 
competitive in the few passages in which it occurs. There 
18 
are, moreover, other terms which Adkins ignores or depre- 
ciates which have a similar application to that of aischros: 
we have already looked at nemesseton, now we shall consider 
aeikes, by far the most frequent term expressing both 
unseemliness and unfittingness in Homer. 
39 
In the overwhelming majority of passages in which it occurs 
it is the primary, physical sense of the adjective which 
dominates. When qualifying-rorjtos or>ocyos , for example, 
it refers primarily to the unpleasant nature of death by 
violence. 
40 Similarly the blinding of the Cyclops is 
aeikelios at Od. 9.503, and Odysseus would have suffered an 
Ö(CtKeXto' o Xf O5 had he been devoured by Eumaios' dogs (Od. 
14.32). In several passages the groan of warriors slain in 
battle is also described as aei , and here the reference 
of the adjective is clearly to the unpleasantness of the 
sound. At 11.24.19 the noun aeikeie refers to the physical 
disfigurement against which Apollo protects Hektor's body. 
At Qd. 20.308 the term is used more figuratively, of the 
behaviour of the suitors in Telemachos' house, but again it 
comments on the visual aspect of the situation, and it 
scarcely seems possible to tell whether the situation is 
dishonourable for the suitors, for Telemachos, or for both. 
In a number of passages ae' es and aeikelios seem to convey 
the ideas of meanness and low status. Often, for example, 
the disguised Odysseus' clothes and accessories are so 
, 
designated, and the reference here seems to be to the humble 
status of the items and their unsuitability for a man of 
Odysseus' position. 
41 Something of the flavour of "mean" or 
"contemptible" seems present in the use of ae' with YooS 
at Qd. 20.366 and aeikelios of the kind of army Odysseus 
feels Agamemnon is better suited to lead at 11.14.84. The 
idea of low status is also present at Od. 6.242 and 13.402, 
where aeikelios is used firstly of the previous impression 
the Phaeacians had of Odysseus and secondly of the appear- 
ance lent him by Athene as part of his beggar's disguise. In 
both passages the idea that people of low status are also 
of unpleasant appearance may influence the choice of 
19 
vocabulary. The notion of lowliness or meanness is also 
present in Odysseus' description of the bed on which he 
spent many sleepless nights as aeikelios at Od. 19.341. 
The concrete meaning "disfigure" is also the primary one of 
the verbs aeikizo and aeikizomai, which are often used of 
the physical maltreatment of dead bodies in the Iliad. 
42 
There is only one instance of the verb in which the sense 
could be considered figurative. This comes at Od. 18.222, 
where Penelope chides Telemachos for allowing the beggar to 
be aGtk'tIBI1t4&at, . Odysseus has suffered no physical dis- 
figurement, but he has been struck by Antinoos and was 
involved in a scuffle with Iros. 
The adjective aeikes is most relevant to our discussion 
when it occurs in the neuter, whether alone as a substantive 
or qualifying ergon or ergs. Here again, however, we should 
cconsider the adjective first of all as descriptive of the 
ergs themselves, before assuming that an ergon aeikes 
reflects on either its agent-or its patient. In three 
passages in the Iliad43 the combination 0Q K occo<iS describes 
a situation that is both natural and fitting. The idea of 
honour is most prominent in the second of these (15.496), 
where Hektor claims that death in battle is not dishonour- 
-.: able ( e' s) when one is fighting qn behalf of one's 
native land. In these passages the main point is that other 
people, in viewing the particular situation, will not feel 
that it merits their disapproval. The neuter aeikes, then, 
has a similar application to that of both nemesseton and 
aischron in that it comments on the outward aspect of a 
situation 
categorizes 
it as one of which people are liable 
to disapprove. 
Adkins claims that, "In all cases where eraon aeikes refers 
to a defeat, miltary or social, it is the person who 'per- 
formed' the ergon aeikes who is discredited, "44 and goes on 
to suggest that this is true of all passages in which these 
words occur. There is no need, however, to be so 
categorical. At 04.17.216, for e xample, aeikes describes 
20 
the insulting and excessive manner in which the goatherd, 
Melantheus, addresses Odysseus and Eumaios. The agent's 
behaviour is undoubtedly condemned, yet Odysseus is provoked 
to anger, and it can hardly be that it would not be consid- 
ered unfitting for him to be insulted by a goatherd. But 
aeikes does not mean "discreditable": its primary reference 
is to the goatherd's words themselves, and it will depend on 
the circumstances whether an unseemly act damages the reput- 
ation of the agent, the patient or both. 
In some passages, however, particularly those in which there 
is no patient, and where only the status of the agent is 
involved, actions which are aeikea do reflect primarily on 
the latter. 
45 In others, where there is a patient, it 
often seems clear that, in designating an act aeikes, the 
speaker intends to condemn the agent. 
46 This need not mean, 
however, that the honour of the patient does not also suffer, 
for in a society which cares as deeply about honour as that 
partrayed in the Homeric poems, - it is surely dishonourable 
(to some degree at least) to allow oneself to suffer the ai ea 
ergs of others. Adkins47 says as much in connexion with aischea 
and aeikelios, and there is no-good reason to assume that an 
insult designated aischea is any more insulting or dishonour- 
able for the patient than one described as ae es. Since, as 
we saw (14-15 above), aischea can discredit both agents and 
patients, it seems entirely arbitrary to deny aeikes the same 
possibility. 
Particularly relevant here are those passages which refer to 
the murder of Agamemnon. 
48 In these, the deeds of both 
Klytaimestra and Aigisthos are described as aeikea, and the 
condemnation which the description entails is obviously 
directed at them; the same is true of aischos at -0-d. 
11.433.49 
Yet Agamemnon describes his death as most pitiable at Q. 11. 
412,50 and it is hard to imagine that a great warrior king 
such as he would not regard such a death as beneath his dig- 
nity. Disinterested members of society would presumably 
condemn Klytaimestra's crime before Agamemnon's failure, but 
the fact remains that Agamemnon suffered an ignoble death, 
21 
and it is quite possible that someone not well-disposed to 
Agamemnon could comment adversely on, for example, the 
ignoble manner of his death, or his failure to retain the 
loyalty of his wife, and this would certainly have a detri- 
mental effect on his posthumous fame. This being the case, it 
seems possible both that a person might be deterred from 
the commission of erga aeikea by aidos at society's dis- 
approval and that aidos at what some people might say could 
be present in one who had suffered, or feared the prospect 
of suffering, such treatment at others' hands. 
The inconsistency of Adkins' insistence that aischea and 
aeikelios reflect only upon the patient while aeikes 
reflects only upon the agent is clearly demonstrated by two 
passages from the Odyssey, the second largely a repetition 
of the first. At 16.106-9 (cf. 20.316-9, where Telemachos is 
the speaker) Odysseus says, 
ýavýa 
výý KI E% 
01 
NýcCc KdTaCK'racM. EVOS /vtEýX(OL(L 
ý 
E/CV Oýäa ý9ac, TEBVOCAt v 11 Tal Cc- Y a-t E, / of ELk isc 
CCVavs -rf- rTv f C-> (. SO 
. 
VOV$ CS t4 J#r. S TE- E1rvVo-t 
Ka. s 
euc-räýo as äE ºcFhcwýs KaTöc o. Ta KPAä ... . 
Now, according to Adkins' schema aeikea ergs in 107 
refers to the suitors, and it is they alone who are thereby 
condemned, while aeikeliös in 109 reflects badly on Odysseus 
aiýo Telemachos, 
51 in the sense that it is disgraceful that 
the head of the house should be unable to protect his 
dependants. There is, however, no basis for this distinction 
in the text, which speaks only of unseemly acts of which the 
unseemly treatment of the serving maids is one. The sense of 
both ae' and aeikeliös is that the acts to which these 
terms apply are of a kind of which other people might dis- 
approve; it is the appearance of these acts which is thus 
described52 and there is no necessity to conclude that the 
terms employed must always apply to either the agent or the 
patient in any mutually exclusive way. In the particular 
example quoted Odysseus obviously regards the. conduct of the 
suitors as insupportable, and it is a reasonable inference 
to imagine that he sees their actions as undermining his 
status and reputation, but equally, if the suitors are 
22 
performing actions which may legitimately be described as 
unseemly, and if society at large condemns excess and 
unseemliness, then the suitors will also be discredited. 
This is an important point for the study of aidos, because 
it establishes the link between the suitors' conduct and 
their often mentioned lack of aidos, and suggests that 
aidos may be a motivating factor for Odysseus and Telemachos 
too. 53 
Of the terms so far discussed, then, nemesseton, aischos, 
aischea, aischron and aeikes/aeikelios refer to the external 
aspect of actions or situations which are liable to excite 
adverse comment, while nemesis, aischea and oneidos can be 
used of the reaction of others to those actions or situ- 
ations: there is a strong presumption that aidos is the 
reaction to the idea of popular disapproval represented by 
these terms. There remains just one more group of terms 
to be discussed before we move on to examine the operation 
of aidos itself, that centred on the nouns elenchos and 
elencheie. 
The plural of the noun elenchos, which appears to mean some- 
thing like "showing up"54 can be used concretely of people 
who are exposed to the disapproval of others; in two 
passages (fl. 5.787 and 8.228) those so described are urged 
to show aidos, and part of the object of that aidos is the 
implication of unworthiness or cowardice contained in the 
reproachful description, elenchea. To describe someone in 
these terms, then, is to excite their aidos at the slur on 
their reputation. 
55 The plural of. the adjective, elenchem, 
works in the same way (f. 4.242,24.239). The singular 
elenchos occurs at 11.11.314-5, where Odysseus tells 
Diomedes that elenchos would be the result were Hektor to 
reach the Greek ships. Similar is the use of elenchea at Off. 
21.329, where Eu rymachos foresees the taunts of -1(S 
KAKw3eos if the beggar Odysseus should succeed where the 
suitors have failed in drawing the bow. The connexion 
between elenchos and "what people say" is thus explicitly 
made, and inasmuch as aidos is the typical reaction to 
23 
popular disapproval, it would seem that the speaker is 
subject to that emotion here. 
56 Penelope reinforces the 
idea of popular opinion at 331-3, in claiming that the 
suitors have forfeited their claim to eukleia by reason of 
their actions in the house of Odysseus. Adkins (MR c. 39) 
calls Penelope's implicit identification of elenchea with 
the suitors' co-operative failures a "persuasive definition", 
and it is indeed clear that she has a different view of 
theapplication of the term from that of the suitors, but it 
is not at all clear that she is using it in a way that 
society in general would find novel or impossible. 
57 We have 
already seen that the suitors' actions could be designated 
aischea and that it was possible for one who criticized 
these actions to be seen as aischunon the suitors, and 
obviously elenchos is a word used in similar contexts to 
these. Penelope may, in fact, be right in terming the 
suitors' misdeeds elenchea, since characters in the poem do 
condemn them and since the poem was obviously composed for 
an audience which would share their condemnation. The fact 
that the suitors are insensitive to criticism in most58 
places does not mea+hat the criticism is not in keeping 
with the values of society. 
One has to concede, however, that in the majority of its 
usages the root elench- does refer to competitive failure. 
The noun elencheie occurs four times in the context of 
the result of failure in battle or in some other competitive 
exploit. 
59 At O d. 14.38, however, Eumaios says that it would 
have been a source of elencheie for him had he failed to 
prevent his dogs attacking the beggar Odysseus, a visitor to 
his home. Thus the word does refer to failure here, but the 
failure is in according another the protection he deserves, 
and this is a co-operative not a competitive failure. 
60 The 
same is true of the usages of the superlative adjective 
elenchistos: in three out of the four passages in which it 
occurs it does refer to the disgrace resulting from failure 
on the field of battle, 
61 but in the fourth it has no such 
30 i 
reference. At O d. 10.72 Aiolos calls Odysseus EhC-) XLr -& 
fI40VfWV, and the reason for his being elenchistos, open to 
24 
popular reproach, in this case is the fact that he appears 
to Aiolos to be hated by the gods, and while the latter's 
evidence for the gods' hatred comes from his failure to 
reach Ithaka in spite of the gift of the bag of winds, this 
it not obviously a failure in competition. To be elenchistos, 
then, to be open to elenchos or elencheie is to be in a 
position in which one is liable to be criticized or mocked, 
and there is nothing inherent in the words themselves which 
would exclude their use in non-competitive contexts. 
62 
All the terms discussed in this section are connected with 
"how things look" and with "what people say": these are the 
words which indicate the grounds for aidos and the conseq- 
uences of ignoring it. The range of their collective usage 
is wide, and there is no real reason to believe that some 
refer exclusively to any one circumstance or that some are 
more powerful than others. Nor is there any reason to 
conclude that words which span both the co-operative and the 
competitive spheres necessarily lose their power in the 
former. Adkins makes much of the idea of the "effectiveness" 
of popular disapproval in the competitive and co-operative 
spheres, 
63 
and it is perhaps true that the characters of 
the Homeric poems, or some of them at least, are more 
concerned at criticism of their competitive failures than at 
criticism of their co-operative failures. This, however, is 
a matter not of theory, but of practice, not of the power of 
the terms employed but of the realities of the particular 
situation. A strong individual in any society is able to 
ignore others' censure of his breaches of the "quiet" 
moral virtues; he will, however, have to take notice of any 
accusation of weakness or inferiority, because even if the 
person making the accusation is an inferior, the charge 
may encourage an enemy or a competitor to attempt a trial of 
strength. It is not the power of words decrying competitive 
failure which is more compelling than that of words decrying 
moral deficiencies, but the likely results of ignoring 
criticism in either sphere. No word, no matter how "power- 
ful" constitutes effective restraint; 
64 
the only effective 
restraint is physical force, 
65 
and that is the ultimate 
25 
sanction feared by the hero who is sensitive about his 
reputation as a warrior and head of his community. Criticism 
of competitive failure is taken seriously because a 
challenge from a rival is the likely outcome if it is not so 
taken. As students of Greek society we ought to take note of 
this, as it constitutes part of the reality of Homeric 
society, but equally, if we wish to gain an accurate insight 
into Greek values, into the "moral ideology" of the Greeks, 
we must consider theory as well as practice, and the theory 
in Homer is that competitive and co-operative failures are 
condemned in similar, sometimes identical terms. 
AIDOS IN BATTLE 
We have already seen that nemesis, aischos, aischron, aeikds 
and elenchos, together with their relatives, can decry 
cowardice or shirking in battle. Two passages already 
referred to show how aidos operates in the thick of battle 
to promote courageous behaviour; at 11.5.787 (= 8.228; cf. 
p. 22 above) we find the exhortation, 
ai öws , 
'A 





The warriors are elenchea, as we should say, "a disgrace". 
The implication is that they are acting in such a way as to 
bring the disapproval of others upon themselves, and they 
are urged to feel aidos at this prospect. Other passages are 
even more to the point, in that they-employ the exhortation 
aidost on its own as a means of rousing the army to greater 
activity. 
66 
The major function, then, of aidos in battle is to ensure 
that the soldiers in the field do not give in to the impulse 
to save themselves regardless of the outcome of the conflict. 
In the very thick of things it often acts to prevent flight, 
5Z 67 
as in 11.16.422, or at 5. , where Agamemnon, alarmed at 
the lack of vigour in his men, 
^ 







Elfe 1. C4Cc OAký ov lr4( cX40eI 
ä ýývýkouS -r' ai ýý-cýAE týatä KýaTC-täsý v ö(-v1.5 
oci cioýVt, 
Evw ov wV -rrX&oveS Coot. vý E 'äE ocvTa 
4) 
U'O v1 &/ cY cju T oc ek )) f-o söV UToc (, au TF Tc s oCý KVG . 
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Important here are the practical justification of aidos 
(those who show it retain their Leos and can win more, 
and aidos is more likely to ensure the safety of the 
majoritylý4he emphasis on the interdependence of the members 
i 
of one contingent (o(X) \av9. 
The situation is similar at 15.655-8: Hektor has driven the 
Greeks back to the very prows of their ships, and is 
wreaking havoc amongst the army. The poet goes on: 
Äey&LOL c YHZW /AM-1 
£Xw(J k ävärKI 
ýfWJ 1 'rcW , a. 
urov Peek KhvýfcýtrtJ Ec-Lor 
&6P00L ofýE KEc5 cO / 
ÖCý/oe 6Te aTc' csx 
/ýäP 
aiýws 
Kocýc -SOS " AS J XFS Y-ae o Khc-4v ä» hoc 6-c . 
By necessity the Greeks have given some ground, yet they do 
not break ranks and scatter - c+rj(F -(^e Xi&J Kxc 
(o$. dos 
thus maintains discipline among the troops, and this is the 
case, we are told, because, "they kept reproaching each 
other. " One's fellow soldiers, then, are the guarantors of 
one's bravery in battle, in that they have an interest in 




1t X -ovEs rO61 ýc -ri&f V174 
It is the certain knowledge that one's comrades will witness 
one's actions and one's reluctance to acquire a reputation 
for cowardice in their eyes that arouses ao at the 
prospect of acting in the way of which they disapprove: this 
does not mean that, if an individual felt he could get away 
with it, he would necessarily take the opportunity to act 
like a coward, simply that in the normal situation in the 
field he has no opportunity to act like a coward, because 
the presence and the exhortations of his fellows make such 
conduct unthinkable. 
There is, however, a very considerable calculative element 
in such passages, and this is well illustrated here by the 
presence of deos. The fear which prevents the host 
scattering can hardly be fear of Hektor, for that would be 
more likely to produce the opposite response; we must take 
dens closely with aidos here; it denotes the fear of the 
27 
consequences of not heeding aidos, 
68 the fear of being 
considered a coward and being singled out for reproach, and, 
perhaps, the fear of one such as Nestor, who alludes to the 
disgrace which will result if they do not stand their ground 
in lines 661-6: 
% ww 8E vL 0w Lk OL) vvcv-S C 6-rt Kxt 0g 
ä hkwJ äv J )\/ C'ýý cSE rºV1 CA C- 
CýKa6tos 
'' 01 Tt ALcawV ýß ' 
öa k ox Vd Ka t c-ri A OS v' 
RE T0 ICk WV, 
výV äT-w wov6t. Ka. c w KcC'faCTE-ývvl KOc r( 
r-hiv 0 "T ed vex6 C -&J Yati ýoa-f L o6 -ira Eovrw 




The phrase of o[>kktV XVeCW1 QVhas caused some difficulty; 
for von Erffa these words are "leer" and "nichtssagend", and 
thus must be interpolated; 
69 
Verdenius rightly rejects this 
approach, 
70 
and sees aidos here as the reaction to the 
criticism of others. The only parallel for the use of the 
noun with a dependent genitive (Od. 14.505) is certainly 
different (since the person designated by the genitive in 
that place is not the third party who will vent his dis- 
approval, but the recipient of the feeling of aidos), but 
this does not rule out Verdenius' interpretation, since the 
verb aideisthai can take an accusative of the person whose 
criticism is feared o/c, f the person towards whom one feels 
aidos (this is the usage which is often rendered bybrespectf 
in English), and since the use of a noun with an objective 
genitive is analogous to that of a verb governing the accus- 
ative. Nevertheless, Verdenius may not be right. Whether he 
is or not depends on whether one regards the sentence 
beginning girt OE in 662 as a continuation of the previous 
one or the addition of a further point. If the latter, &AXWV 
0(VBew7r. J/ will refer in a general manner to anyone who may 
criticize or ridicule the Greeks for retreating; if, how- 
ever, the former is the case, 
AXW V XYQC& kNmust in some 
way refer to those who are mentioned in 663. 
It seems to me far more likely that the twosentences bear 
some relationship each to the other than none at all; at the 
very least, the second must be prompted by the first. If 
there is some connexion in thought, vCi ij 
ä"Xhw4 OlvOoAJ7fW\/ 
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will be open to one of two interpretations; either the 
"other people" will be those named in 663 or they will be 
those who will disapprove if those named in 663 are let 
down (in this case aidos would still be a reaction to the 
criticism of a generalised group of "other people", but not 
quite the same people as envisaged by Verdenius). In view of 
the parallel from the Odyssey and of the emphasis placed on 
the emotional appeal in 662-6, the former seems the more 
likely; öCXXwv oV6e will then refer to the direct recip- 
ients of the combatants' aidos, their children, wives and 
parents, and the sense of Nestor's words will be that they 
should feel aidos for their dependants, both because they 
will be without protection if the warriors are killed and 
because any disgrace affecting the warrior affects his 
dependants as well. The very fact that those whose parents 
are dead are also urged to feel aidos shows that Nestor is 
not simply thinking of the material consequences of defeat. 
71 
The idea of a community of honour, then, seems to underlie 
this passage, together with the notion that one has a 
responsibility to protect one's dependants. 
72 
Other passages 
reinforce the idea that others have an interest in the 
honour or disgrace of the individual; family honour, for 
example, is in the keeping of the warrior, hence the 




The converse, that the father rejoices in the fame of his 
son, is also found. 
74 At 11.6.350-1 Helen expresses the 
wish that she might be the wife of a better man, one who 
knew (i. e. took notice of) the nemesis and aischea of men. 
The context is one of Paris' slacking in battle, and Helen 
clearly feels that her husband's disgrace reflects upon her. 
Hektor, too, is perturbed by others' criticism of his 
brother. 75 Other characters, however , are less concerned 
with the honour of their relatives than with their safety, 
and the attitude of Helen towards Paris in book six is 
in sharp contrast to that of Andromache to Hektor in the 
same book; 
76 
similarly, at 22.82-9 Hekabe would rather her 
son avoided Achilles entirely than bow to the demands of 
honour and face him. 
77 At 22.482-507, it is the other 
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element in Nestor's appeal, the complete dependence of the 
the hero's wife and family on their protector, and his duty 
to protect, to which Andromache refers in painting a 
pitiable picture of the lot of herself and her son after 
Hektor's death. Even then, the responsibility of the 
protector to protect is not divorced from the claims of 
honour, in that the pitiful situation of the dead hero's 
dependants presumably diminishes the status of his family. 
Nestor's appeal to aidos on behalf of the hero's dependants, 
then, is an appropriate one, since one's personal honour is 
closely bound up with that of other members of one's house- 
hold and family. 
We saw in the section on sanctions that defeat in battle and 
cowardice were consistently described in terms which condemn 
them as unseemly and subject to popular disapproval; in 
each of the two passages in which the word occurs aischron 
refers to the disgrace of failure in the martial context. 
78 
The implication in those passages seems to be that the 
empty-handed return of the warriors will be proof of their 
failure, and it would seem that such failure is disgrace- 
ful regardless of any circumstances which may be adduced in 
mitigation. This attitude also seems to prevail at 11.17. 
336-7, where Aineias points out, 
C6 QS vü ý'ýN Y' ä ýi ýýhwý wir' 'Axat v ''I ht a C- t 6-0Cvx v'S . c. ä vxý t< EC 'L 
S'a4 wrx. s . 
Von Erffa (p. 6) sees aidos as a virtual synonym of aischron 
here, and takes the words as meaning, "This is a disgrace... ", 
but Verdenius rightly observes that such 'a use would be 
without parallel, and suggests that this passage, like the 
others we have discussed, is an exhortation to aidos; the 
sense will then be, "This is occasion for aidos, " or "let 
ads be present. "79 Part of Aineias' strategy in attempting 
to arouse his comrades' aid os is his suggestion that to 
return to the city at this point will be taken as a sign of 
i 
cowardice (aýýk kC 
Ci(s) 
. No doubt many Trojans fought well 
enough, but this is not envisaged as an adequate excuse. 
At 11.8.139-44 Nestor advises Diomedes that, since Zeus is 
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manifestly favouring Hektor, a prudent withdrawal would be 
the best policy. Diomedes recognizes the validity of the old 
man's advice (146), yet cannot bring himself to act upon 
it (147-50): 
akka -r-O's, a% VoJ of os KeoýScýV Kat (-0 vpo/ C K&vC-L. cýEKTW( 
y-&Q lro-r v) ýFl CVl ( 
wE6f' oirox 
&VWv 
_rV ce1 d vis U? i' 
L/"HIj lev/'ttv0s C fc ro VII O. S. 
Ws _Tr_o-r K_V6 X1CC. i " -no-re /4 L x\XVOC EVe&Lj< ? ýUWV. 
Nestor's answer to this is to claim that no one would 
believe Hektor were he to impugn Diomedes' honour in the way 
he fears (152-6). As Adkins points out, 
so Diomedes does not 
simply rely on his own opinion of himself, nor does Nestor 
advise him to do so. On the other hand, Nestor, the older 
and wiser of the two, clearly does believe that Diomedes' 
aidos here (for that is surely what his anxiety is) is mis- 
placed; Diomedes may, then, be rather more concerned for the 
opinion of other people than is thought normal. Nevertheless, 
his concern for what other people, even his enemies say, is 
obviously acute, and this suggests that the power of popular 
disapproval is very considerable. I doubt, however, whether 
this passage shows us that the Homeric hero's self "only has 
the value which other people put on it; "81 Diomedes' concern 
for what others might say presupposes a high personal image 
of the self; he has an idea of his own worth which he 
fervently hopes other people will share, and the prospect of 
this not being the case causes him great anxiety. The fact 
that popular opinion is of the utmost importance in Homeric 
society and that one's self-image often requires the valid- 
ation of others does not mean that the hero has. nQ. idea of 
his own worth. 
Diomedes' reaction is interesting in other ways, too; it is 
significant, for example, that a hero can be concerned 
about the opinions of his enemies as well as his peers; 
82 
and his wish that the ground would open up (and swallow him) 
is an example of the classic shame-reaction, the desire to 
hide oneself from view. 
83 Both of these aspects of his 
response are paralleled. At 11.4.171 Agamemnon addresses 
Menelaos, telling him that he, Agamemnon, would be 
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elenchistos on his return to Argos, were he to return with- 
out his brother. At 175 we find the familiar distaste for 
leaving an enterprise unfinished (&TEXývTýjfw irri 
while at 176-81 Agamemnon imagines the taunts of "one of the 
Trojans" as he jumps on Menelaos' grave. 
At this prospect, he reacts as did Diomedes: TUTE ,VLX av/oL 
CüeGL )(0 ' w& 4Agamemnon, then, is concerned for his brother, 
but this is not a matter of mere affection; the honour of 
the two is closely bound, and the death of Menelaos would 
be a disgrace for Agamemnon, not simply because others would 
charge him with failing to protect his brother, or because 
his death would give their enemies a chance to dishonour 
them both, but also because it would negate the whole 
purpose of his mission, which was to recover Menelaos' wife 
and to restore his honour. 
Again, it appears that the negative judgement feared, 
whether that of one's own side or that of one's enemies, is 
based on results rather than intentions71 dkins is therefore 
right to stress the importance of results in Homeric society. 
There may be a number of reasons for this; first of all, 
one's enemies are hardly likely to consider anything other 
than results, since any action upon which they can place a 
discreditable interpretation is good for their moray and 
bad for one's own; the position, however, with regard to 
the judgements of one's colleagues and friends is not quite 
as clear cut, and requires rather more consideration. 
There does, in fact, exist a number of passages in which 
characters do attempt to persuade others to consider intent- 
ions rather than results; only those which refer to success 
or failure in battle, however, need concern us here. Perhaps 
the most striking of these is 11.14.80-1, where Agamemnon 
offers the opinion, 
Dü -(ä( res vE e; rLj uv-ECC4 KaKd/1 oUcS, avoc YjKTd. 
/SC-iITFeeJ OS KocKo' v1E cc Wq 
This is a clear reversal of the view found in those passages 
we have discussed so far, which is that retreat is discredit- 
able no matter what the circumstances, and it should be 
32 
noted that Agamemnon is urging a consideration of circum- 
stances (greater advantage) rather than of results. But 
his attempt to convince his audience has no chance of 
success, as indeed one might expect from the far greater 
number of passages in which retreat is said to be disgrace- 
ful tout court. 
85 Immediately Agamemnon has spoken the lines 
quoted, Odysseus reacts with great vehemence (83ff. ), and 
expresses the opinion that he is unworthy of his kingship86 
better suited instead to command of "some aeikelios army. "(84) 
Other passages are similar; a character claims that there 
is no cause for criticism in the particular situation, but 
is proved wrong by events. At 11.13.222 Idomeneus asserts 
that none of the Achaeans is responsible for the current 
reversals, which must be the will of Zeus (226), but, as 
Poseidon points out (232-4), and as Idomeneus himself is, in 
any case, very well aware (228-30), this does not excuse 
wilful withdrawal from battle. 
87 
The tone of 17.91-105 is 
somewhat different. There, as we have already seen, 
88 Menelaos 
debates whether he should obey aidos by attempting to defend 
Patroklos' body or risk the nemesis of his fellows by saving 
himself. At 98-101, however, Menelaos seems to change his 
mind, and he expresses the view that it would be unjustified 
of his comrades to feel nemesis against him, since Hektor is 
obviously fighting with the aid of the gods. Nonetheless, he 
does not follow the implications of this view, and withdraw 
entirely; another thought occurs to him, and he decides to 
pursue another method of rescuing the body, with the help of 
Ajax (102-5). In spite of his expressed belief, then, that 
no one could find fault with one who fled in the face of 
divine intervention, he decides not to do so, and follows, 
with a slight modification, the course dictated by aidos. 
On the other hand, the passages just quoted, in which the 
reference to circumstances and intentions is proved mis- 
suided or not acted upon, do at least indicate that there 
could be a degree of doubt or of difference of opinion as to 
whether or not intentions were relevant, and this 
suggests that some individuals did not feel themselves 
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absolutely constrained by maxims such as " it is disgraceful 
to retreat, "89 but it general it does seem that for most the 
power of popular opinion, which could never be counted on to 
share one's own interpretation of one's actions, or even to 
be aware of it, was too strong. The major exception to this, 
the main area in which popular opinion does seem to have 
been willing to consider circumstances and intentions, is 
that of death in battle, which may be aeikes to the eye, and 
which is indisputably a failure, but which may, nevertheless, 
be glorious, depending on how the victim fought. 
90 
In this context, that of the power of popular opinion and 
the relative weakness of the individual's ability to content 
himself with his own interpretation of his actions, one 
figure, Paris, seems rather out of step with the others, and 
this is particularly true in book six of the Ilia , where 
his character emerges in sharp contrast to that of his 
brother, Hektor. On three occasions Hektor addresses Paris 
Oc iö)(eöc3 E-ý["F(-6CL , abusing him for his slackness in battle. 
91 
The second of these episodes begins at 6.325, where Hektor, 
having hastened to Paris' house, commences his rebuke; 
he assumes that Paris has kept himself away from the field 
out of )0X0$(326), and points out that such wrath is 
inappropriate, when people are dying on his behalf; Paris 
himself would fight with another whom he saw slacking (329-30); 
a fortiori he, the cause of the conflict, should not hang 
back. 92 This, like other passages we have discussed, is 
clearly intended to arouse aidos by the implication of 
cowardice. 
In his reply, however, Paris shows no ads whatever, and, 
while he does say that he has been thinking of returning to 
battle (337-9), he says merely that to do so "seemed better", 
and adds, philosophically, that victory attends now one man, 
now the other. He acknowledges the validity of what Hektor 
has said (333), but gives no indication that he is moved 
either by Hector's reference to those to whom he bears a 
responsibility, or by the threat of popular disapproval 
implicit in (Ü ýý o(%/ /AO4)<& Taco Kai 
ö[hkw. 
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Paris, then, does not seem concerned that his reputation 
might be diminished by his absence from the field of battle, 
nor does he seem particularly upset at his brother's 
reproach. This might suggest that his susceptibility to 
aidos is low. This impression is confirmed by the words of 
Helen, who continues the attack against Paris when Hektor 
disdains to address him; at 350-1 she wishes that she had 
been the wife of a better man, who took heed of other's 
nemesis and aischea. 
93 Paris then, is insensitive to others' 
disapproval, and therefore not susceptible to aidos, even in 
a situation where his reputation as a warrior is at stake. 
94 
Later in the same book Paris and Hektor meet up again, and 
here the latter is more reflective on the subject of his 
brother's shirking: 
iýA mac., ou is x/ -r-(. s Toi aVtosc va ýr) C-(1) Cý of ýtT c j' & I. ocx $ E'fýF C ýC it kt/Crr ý' 
CC itjK C_ K' ' /vt, E000-l, s -f-t- Kots OuK E0EXý' To 
(4I k7C 
a)vvT«A. ýfAU lt, 4j I cO u- 
ce6EV XI r)Ce 0KOVw 
TZoS 1ewwV ac 6XcU6 . 
noXUJ T1,0,1oJ E(Vt- ocC6c0(521-5), 
Here Hektor concedes Paris his bravery, and claims that any- 
one who was EVatQV\os would share his appreciation of it; 
this suggeS4S both that one's reputation for valour is not 
entirely vulnerable to the attacks and reproaches of others, 
and that there are some people who are prepared to judge 
one's bravery in battle by taking more than simply one's 
immediate conduct into account. The E VAcf`MoS in this passage 
is in sharp contrast to the frequently mentioned TLS 
KaK i PC (1.. 22.106, Od. 6.275,21.324), who judges on 
/ 
,r OS 
results alone and who takes delight in criticizing the 
efforts of his betters, even if their V, talities are well 
known. In this case, however, the implication seems to be 
that those who are uttering aischea against Paris are 
justified in doing so, since Paris is the cause of their 
troubles and is thus expected to pull his weight. It is 
significant that the aischea'of others worry Hektar; he does 
seem concerned that they might affect the standing of his 
brother and perhaps of himself, but equally he expects that 
EValö4NO5 People, like himself, will retain a positive 
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appreciation of his brother's fighting ability in spite of 
his previous shirking and inactivity. This passage shows us 
how and why intentions areiess important than results in 
the poems; neutrals and those well-disposed to the subject 
may be prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt; for 
them, one who appears to be acting like a coward may still 
be an essentially brave man; but war is a serious, competit- 
ive business, and those involved in it will often not be 
prepared to accept excuses when a loss has been incurred or 
to spare one whose conduct has led to defeat and disgrace, 
however brave he has been in the past. In the same way, the 
individual hero will know quite well that those who might be 
expected to support him should he seek to excuse a retreat 
or some other failure will be few, and accordingly his own 
estimation of his own bravery and value will not be suffic- 
ient to allay his fears regarding the disapproval of the 
majority. The feeling of shame, moreover, seems in general 
to have less to do with intentions than results, and not only 
in "shame-cultures". We are all very well aware that other 
people make judgements about us based solely on appearances, 
and it is not uncommon for us to be concerned at their judge- 
ments, even if we know them to be false: one who, as a 
result, say, of some problem of balance, is forced to walk 
with a pronounced stagger, may be acutely concerned lest 
other people, as they will, think him inebriated, even 
though he is perfectly aware that his gait is the result of 
circumstances entirely outwith his control95 
Book six of the Iliad is almost entirely taken up by the 
contrast of Paris and Hektor, and clearly Paris emerges as 
the less admirable figure; the contrast is particularly 
evident in the susceptibility of the two to aidos, and if 
Hektor, j the more admirable character, there is a strong 
presumption that we are intended to see his attitude to 
aidos as more proper than that of his brother. In her speech 
at 6.407-39 Andromache begs Hektor to pity herself and her 
son, and to carry out the future defence of Troy from within 
the fortifications. Hektor replies as follows (441-6): 
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It is a dos, then, which drives Hektor to fight in open 
battle, in spite of the pity he feels for his wife and child. 
It is clearly unbearable for him that others should consider 
him to be acting like a coward. But this is not his only 
reason for rejecting Andromache's appeal: he knows that 
there is something else which impels him to risk his life, 
something within himself not dependent on his fear of what 
the Trojans might say, and it is to this factor that he 
refers when he says that his thymos produces the same result 
as his a' dos. In referring to his thymos Hektor is effect- 
ively telling us that it is his own subjective wish to face 
the Greek heroes in battle. He has no word for "will", but 
this is the concept to which he appeals. His t mos bids him 
fight because he has learned to be brave and always fight 
among the first of the Trojans; we should do well not to 
divorce his "education" from the aidos which he has just 
expressed; in the society envisaged by the Iliad any 
education will be in the values and expectations of 
the group, and the sensitivity to custom thus produced must 
approximate to aidos, a quality which will later figure 
prominently in Greek educational theory. 
96 Hektor's education, 
then, will have taught him how society expects him to behave, 
and thus contributes to the formation of his social role; 
inasmuch as it is his thymos, as well as his aidos, which 
leads him to pursue this r6le, however, Hektor has obviously 
internalized the expectations of society, so that they have 
become his own idea of his status and his duty. 
Hektor is faced with a similar situation in book 22, when it 
is his parents who attempt to dissuade him from going into 
battle. Again he is not persuaded (91), and again he sees 
his choice to remain in the field in terms of aidos. This 
time, however, his aidos is not directed at the implication 
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of behaving like a coward, but at the charge that he has 
failed in his duty to protect Troy and its people. He cannot 
return to the city, he claims, because Polydamas will be the 
first to set up elencheie for him (100); Polydamas had urged 
him to lead the host back to the city when Achilles had made 
his initial return to the fray, and Hektor had disregarded 
his advice. 
97 The result was disaster, and now Hektor is 
afraid to return to the city: 
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(22.104-7) 
Two points are important here: the first is that Hektor 
regards it as normal that he should be condemned for failing 
in his duty to others; as the punishment for such failure is 
personal disgrace, it seems legitimate to conclude that the 
requirement to protect is regarded as a demand of personal 
honour. The second point is that Hektor is clearly aware 
that he has done something which is reprehensible. This does 
not mean that his aidos is retrospective, as von Erffa 
points out; 
98 it is still the reproach of other people which 
he fears, and his apprehension is still prospective. Never- 
theless, in giving the reason for his aidos in 104 he 
expresses more clearly than does any other Homeric character 
his awareness of his own culpability, - and awareness of one's 
misdeed is a prerequisite of conscience, a word which, in 
its Latin and Greek forms, syneidesis and conscientia, refers 
explicitly to the idea of "awareness". Hektor knows he is 
culpable, and he knows this because he is familiar with the 
standards by which others will judge him; although he 
articulates his "conscience" of his past mistake in terms of 
prospective apprehension, the reproach of the Trojans is 
still hypothetical; Hektor's awareness of his mistake is 
thus subjective, and it troubles him no; he does not have 
to await the actual disapproval of the Trojans. The explicit 
reference to "other people" is perhaps not what we would 
associate with conscience, but it would be wrong to say that 
the germ of conscience is not present in this passage, or 
that Hektor, within the limitations of his language and his 
38 
culture, is not experiencing something very like that which 
we experience in situations which we explain in terms of 
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conscience or remorse. 
We saw in the last passage how it seemed to be expected of 
Hektor that he should not endanger his men; failure to meet 
this requirement could bring elencheie, which suggests that 
the standard might be enforced and upheld by the aidos of 
the individual. In both of the passages quoted from book 
six in which Paris was criticized by Hektor reference was 
made to the former's responsibility to those who were 
fighting on his behalf (6.327-30,525). We also noticed how 
hortatory appeals to aidos in the midst of battle were 
intended to have the effect of ensuring discipline in the 
host and promoting the security of all; to the passages on 
pp. 25-7 above add 11.15.502-3: 
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In such appeals, then, co-operation among the troops is 
achieved through the appeal to the individual's concern for 
his own reputation, while in the other passages it seems 
that the charge of failing one's comrades-at-arms was seen 
as one which might bring disgrace on the subject and arouse 
his aidos. Thus the proper modes of conduct towards one's 
fellows are allied to the requirements of personal honour; 
the individual's sensitivity regarding his own honour causes 
him to remain at his place in battle and to strive to see 
that his fellows do the same, while failure to protect one's 
comrades constitutes grounds for reproach. 
The idea of personal honour, then, has its part to play in 
co-operation as well as in competition; since, however, our 
subject is not the responsibility of the heroes to each 
other, but aidos and its relatives, we shall be restricted 
to discussion of those passages which have a direct bearing 
on our subject. 
100 Here we shall be concerned mostly with 
the responsibility of the heroes to their fallen comrades, 
for it is in this context that nemesis in particular has a 
considerable röle to play. 
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Glaukos' words after the death of Sarpedon are both typical 
and instructive: the first point in his speech (11.16.538-40) 
refers directly to Hektor's responsibility to his allies: 
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In the next line Glaukos informs Hektor and the Trojans of 
Sarpedon's fate; clearly he feels that Hektor should have 
taken steps to prevent it. Now that Sarpedon has fallen, 
however, Glaukos turns to the more pressing question of the 
rescue of his body, addressing the general company of Trojans 
and their allies (544-6): 
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The Trojan side, Glaukos' iloi, is asked to feel nemesis 
lest Sarpedon be stripped of his arms and his body suffer 
dis figurement. The Lycian leader would be a considerable 
prize for Patroklos and the Myrmidons, and his armour would 
be concrete proof of their success. It is therefore a matter 
of honour, both collective and personal, that his comrades 
should take steps to retrieve his body and avoid disgrace. 
The passive form of the verb is important here: if nemesis 
is always anger in which one feels oneself justified, then 
there must be an object of the Trojans' nemesis here; but 
obviously the correlation between one's own nemesis and 
another's breach of aidos is not relevant, for in a society 
in which warfare was a way of life it is scarcely credible 
that one should be expected to refrain from killing one's 
opponent out of aidos, or that it was considered occasion 
for resentment when an enemy killed a friend; Glaukos surely 
cannot be asking the Trojans to feel nemesis towards Patroklos 
for killing Sarpedon. 
The passive, VE/IE3(h61te is the clue, for although not a true 
passive, it does differ slightly in meaning from the middle; 
the nemesis of Sarpedon's fellow-soldiers is directed not 
at Patroklos but at themselves; the breach of a' os is their 
own, or would be. There are two sides to the reaction of 
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shame at the prospect of disgrace; one is the inhibitory 
side, when the agent suppresses the action which might lead 
to ignominy; the other is the angry, resentful side, which 
comes into play when the reprehensible action is abandoned *AA 
positive steps are taken to wipe out any suggestion of an 
insult; this emotion can be covered by aidos (in hortatory 
appeals especially), but here it is expressed by nemesis. 
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In Iliad 17 the question of duty to one's fallen comrades 
arises for both sides, the Greeks striving to rescue the 
body of Patroklos and the Trojan side still involved in 
recriminations regarding the body of Sarpedon. We have 
already seen (pp. 11 and 32 above) how Menelaos, at 11.17. 
91-105, debates whether he should attempt to rescue 
Patroklos' body, giving in to aidos, or consult his own 
safety, thus risking the nemesis of his fellows. The question 
of Menelaos' obligation to Patroklos arises in line 92, 
where he mentions that Patroklos has been killed fighting 
for his (Menelaos') time. The idea must be that Patroklos 
has done something for Menelaos, and now Menelaos finds it 
difficult to escape doing something for Patroklos. Later in 
the same episode, after calling on the leaders of the Argives 
as his iloi in 248, he appeals to their nemesis much as 
Glaukos did in the previous book: 
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At line 95 Menelaos saw his responsibility to Patroklos as 
Prompted by aidos, now it is nemesis which he imagines will 
motivate the others to intervene; the force of nemesis here 
seems to rely on a vivid imagining of the discreditable 
event; the hero is urged to regard the disgrace of losing a 
comrade's body as a real and present possibility; the 
reaction of nemesis will then occur as a response to the 
failure, the breach of aidos thus envisaged. It will be seen 
that the heroes' concern for their own, personal honour is 
invoked to encourage an attitude of responsibility towards 
the other members of their contingent; the honour of each, 
in fact, is closely bound up with that of the others, and 
thus brings about co-operation rather than competition. 
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The appeal to personal honour which is implicated in the 
collective honour of the group is not , however, the only 
means of encouraging the heroes to act in the interests of 
their fellows, for each hero bears certain obligations 
towards the others which are not directly connected with the 
fact that the loss of a comrade's body reflects badly on the 
whole company. We have just seen that appeals to nemesis in 
this particular context are frequently addressed to the 
general body of the army addressed collectively as i i; 
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we remember, too, that Menelaos mentioned the service 
Patroklos had rendered him in the context of his explanation 
of his reluctance towards leaving his body behind (17.92); 
so too Paris is reminded by Hektor that the Trojans and their 
allies are fighting on his behalf (6.327-30,525; 33-4 above), 
and Hektor feels himself responsible for the deaths of many 
of those whom he was supposed to protect (22.104-7, p. 37 
above). 
The implications of these passages are brought out more 
clearly in another passage of Iliad 17, and again the point 
at issue is Hektor's responsibility to the dead Sarpedon. 
At 142-7 Glaukos threatens Hektor with the withdrawal of the 
entire Lycian contingent, on the grounds (147-8) that they 
receive no charis for their efforts in the field. Hektor's 
lack of charis, Glaukos claims, is manifested in his 
failure to rescue the body of Sarpedon, his xeinos and 
hetairos (150). The fact that Hektor has failed to save 
Sarpedon, it is suggested, will discourage others from 
fighting on his behalf, since they can scarcely expect him 
to act in their interests when he has failed to act in those 
of one to whom he was bound by such strong ties of guest- 
friendship, comradeship and gratitude. The value of 
Sarpedon's services, then, as well as the specific ties 
between him and Hektor, Put Hektor under an obligation to 
help him where possible, and to rescue him from ill-treatment 
and dishonour when dead. 
103 Sarpedon enjoys special status 
as a result of his pre-eminence as a warrior and because he 
is Hektor's xeinos, but it is clear from Glaukos' words that 
the other Lycians also expect charis from Hektor, and the 
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evidence suggests both that it was seen as a duty of hetairoi 
to come to each other's aid in battle104 and that each 
member of either of the two sides, Greek or Trojan, could be 
considered the hetairos of the others. 
105 Thus any member of 
one's own side might be covered by the obligations which 
existed between hetairoi. 
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We shall discuss the matter of supplication below, but here 
it will be sufficient to comment that there does not seem to 
have been much room for aidos towards one's opponents in the 
Iliad; Rektor at 22.123-4 claims that he can expect no mercy 
or aidos from Achilles even if he does lay down his arms as 
his mother requests. Yet Achilles has become particularly 
savage by that point, and perhaps it was thought woithwhile 
to plead for pity or aidos from less ferocious opponents; 
otherwise, if no quarter was ever given (and, as we shall 
see, this is not the case), why should the question even 
arise? 
AIDOS AS A SOCIAL VIRTUE 
Frequently in the poems we find people described as aidoios; 
those who deserve this designation, people before whom one 
feels aidos, fall into three broad categories; those before 
whom one feels inferior, who fill one with a sense of awe; 
those with whom one has a tie of philotes; and those who are 
helpless or who throw themselves on one's mercy. In the 
feminine, however, the adjective is used formulaically of 
any respectable woman, and its usage tells us relatively 
little. 
Where aidoios is the only adjective employed it most often 
refers to those in the third of these categories; in other 
contexts, however, it is frequently combined with other 
adjectives which help define the precise grounds on which 
the person so described is aidoios. One of these is deinos. 
At Oc. 14.234, as part of his yarn designed to deceive 
Eumaios, Odysseus tells how, after his of KoS ö¢ 
EX\Cro 
, he 
became de os and aidoios among the Cretans. At 11.18.394 
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S 
Hephaistos describes Thetis as a ö«v' 
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and goes on to describe a debt of gratitude which he owes 
her. The two examples appear quite dissimilar, but the 
common factor seems to lie in the special status of the 
person described; Thetis is deine for Hephaistos because he 
owes her a favour, and this constitutes a tie between them, 
while Odymus' Cretan is deinos because of his wealth and 
power; in combination deinos and aidoios seem to describe a 
sense of awe or inhibition which one feels towards one's 
superiors or those one respects for some other reason. 
The relationship between aidoios and deinos thus works in 
much the same way as that between aidos and fear, and one 
feature of both combinations is their use in portraying the 
attitude of inferior towards superior. The two heralds at 
11.1.331, for example, feel both dread and aidos for 
Achilles, both because he is their superior and because he 
is particularly fearful in his present mood. Similarly, 
Eumaios experiences both aidos and fear with respect to his 
masters, Odysseus and Telemachos. At Od. 14.145-6 he tells 
his disguised master of his feelings towards Odysseus: 
-r i ývt, FJ ýwýWE ýv6 Koc.. ov -ýT'a CFOV 1' ovo, ka ýCJ 
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His a' os here clearly approximates to a very considerable 
respect for his master; his reluctance to name him107 
strikes us as an indication of fear, yet he gives as his 
reason for this reluctance not Odysseus' severity but his 
kindness; like Hephaistos for Thetis, then, he feels some 
kind. of awe for one who has treated him well. At 17.18$-Q 
the swineherd tells the disguised Odysseus that he will 
carry out Telemachos' instructions, even though he would 
rather not, explaining: 
Ctkköc -röJ x. SE c KýI äEýýcoc , ýaºy IA44L 
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vcc. KC-LI . Xoc \ fl ( öe ävo ("KI-w1/ E Kha! t 108 
This passage shows that the object of one's aidos in 
situations like these is the immediate recipient of one's 
actions; in experiencing fear and aidos towards Telemachos 
it is Telemachos' own disapproval that Eumaios fears, not 
that of other people in general. 
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The analogy of the combination, aidoios and deinos, seems 
to help explain the use of the adjective nemesetos in an 
unparalleled personal sense at I1.11.649.109 Here Achilles 
is described as aidoios and nemesetos in the context of 
Patroklos' unwillingness to incur his anger, and it is 
significant that deinos in 654 covers the same notion as the 
two previous epithets; on balance the active meaning of 
nemesetos, liable to feel nemesis, seems more likely, but a 
passive meaning, expressing the idea that Patroklos would 
feel nemesis towards himself were he to go against Achilles' 
instructions, seems just possible. 
In addition to finding aidoios and deinos as a pair, we 
also meet them in combination with a third adjective, Rhil0s, 
as at 11.3.172, where Helen addresses Priam, who has just 
.1 11 shown kindness towards her: pCS'öLö s TE evwi 
E(tcEE 
K"uc , 
EWVOS1"E. There may be any number of reasons why Priam 
should be deinos to Helen; he is'a great king, and a reverend 
old man, and in both of these senses may be considered her 
superior. 
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He is also manifestly her Philos, as the father 
of her new husband. 
ill 
At Od. 8.21-2 Athene covers Odysseus with charis and makes 
him mightier in aspect, with a view to making him Philos, 
de os and aidoios in the eyes of the Phaeacians. Being 
taller and stouter in appearance Odysseus could obviously 
expect to appear e' os to the Phaeacians, and the other two 
epithets take their force from this fact; looking like a man 
of wealth and power, Odysseus would be more likely to find 
people who will entertain him, since, philotes being the 
reciprocal relation that it is, one who looks as if he can 
repay one's hospitality is a better prospect than one who 
does not. And if he is both deinos and Philos it is only 
natural that he should also be aidoios, since men feel aidos 
towards those whose presence they find imposing and towards 
those who are their philoi. The implication that it is only 
on these grounds that Odysseus can expect aid os from his 
prospective hosts should, however, be rejected; as we shall 
see, even those who are neither demos nor the philoi of 
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those they encounter are still entitled to be met with aidos; 
it would appear, however, that one could be more confident 
about receiving hospitality if one could create the 
impression that any kindness done would be rewarded; hence 
Odysseus' statement at Od. 11.360 that he would be AiSoc"T&Co1 
Kai 4 c)v rfcos 44 
I( 
rtv were he to return to Ithaka 
-rrh&co-rýeh ')(E<ccc . 
There appears to be a certain degree of interchangeability 
in the way in which deinos and Philos accompany aidoios; we 
might compare, for example, the last passage quoted with 
14.234 (p. 42 above); in the former Odysseus expects to become 
O(% Öot ürFýos Kai ¢iý TEý 0$ as a result of increased 
wealth, while in the latter he becomes $ -LV0 S '1'' occ 
SöI-öS -rt 
by the same process. One wishes, it would seem, to become 
the Philos of the deinoi. In 11.18 the question of the 
relationship between Philos and deinos arises in connexion 
with the gratitude one owes one who has done one a kindness. 
At 386 and 425 Thetis is described as a, i S o'Ll ire 
4 th tI re 
while at 394, at the beginning of a passage which gives 
powerful grounds for Hephaistos' philotes with her, she 
becomes (E lvv) i& FCdi di &(' J. Thetis has done Hephaistos a 
great service, and this appears to be the reason for her 
designation as deine and aidoie. At 14.210, however, Hera 
explains to Zeus that she believes that she will be called 
phile and aidoie by Okeanos and Tethys if she succeeds in 
bringing about a reconciliation between them. Apparently, 
one to whom one owes a debt of gratitude may be both Philos 
and ei os; dein os is obviously far removed from the idea of 
fear here; it seems that both deinos and Philos refer to one 
who has a special status in another's eyes, and it is this 
special status which makes one aidoios. 
Philotes is a frequent ground for aidos in Homer; in addition 
to the passages already quoted and others in which philos 
and aidoios are combined, 
112 there also exists a number 
of passages in which the operation of ad in philotes 
relationships may be observed. At Od. 20.343-4 Telemachos 
says that he feels aidos at the thought of expelling his 
mother from the house against her will; at 2.134-7 he gives 
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elaborate reasons for his compunction; his father would 
punish him were he to do as the suitors request, his mother 
herself would set "hateful Erinyes" against him, and people 
in general would feel nemesis towards him. Clearly, then, 
the requirement that one should show aidos towards one's 
mother is backed up by the strongest of sanctions; but 
Telemachos is not simply constrained by fear of punishment 
or opprobrium, for at line 131 he stresses the debt of 
gratitude which he owes his mother in referring to the fact 
that it was she who gave him life and nurture. This debt was 
also felt to be a factor in producing aidos towards one's 
mother; at I1.22.82-4 Hekabe bares her breast to her son and 
bids him show aidos on account of the nurture she gave him: 
av -rºý J, C-C 'Ti' o T' 
f Tal, kaýc EC ý ýý oc ý" äý 





Strife is to be avoided among members of the same family, 
even if the family is divine; at Od. 6.329-30 Athene is 
deterred by aidos from provoking a confrontation with her 
uncle Poseidon, while at 11.21.468 avuncular philotes again 
gives rise to the aidos which prevents a quarrel between 
Apollo and the sea-god. In both cases the divine sphere 
reflects the norm in human family relationships. 
The tie of philotes, however, was not simply one between 
members of the same family, but existed in relationships in 
which no blood tie was involved. 
114 As might be expected, 
aidos is also a feature of this type of philotes. At , 
1.24. 
110-11 Zeus informs Thetis that his wish in assigning 
Achilles kudos is to preserve the aidos and philotes which 
bind Thetis to him; a philotes relationship already exists 
between the two, but this further favour strengthens it and 
secures Thetis' aidos for the future. 
We saw above (38-42) that the heroes of the Iliad were each 
other's ilo' and that they had certain obligations to each 
other which it was a matter of honour to uphold; while it 
is true to say that the cohesion of the warriors in battle 
is produced to a great extent by their individual concern 
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for their own reputations, we also sensed that there was 
more to their mutual obligations than that; it now seems 
opportune to suggest that, as a group of philoi, they felt 
themselves obliged to accord each other aidos. The sanction 
against neglect of this aidos will still be popular dis- 
approval, since the belief that aidos is appropriate among 
iloi will be shared by society in general, and because 
aidos is itself a sensitivity to the opinions of others, but 
there will also be a direct tie between the h' o' and each 
will be concerned not only with the reactions of a wider 
public, but also with the reactions of the other party to 
the relationship. 
The issue of the hero's obligations to his philoi arises 
most conspicuously in Iliad 9, where the ambassadors attempt 
to persuade Achilles to return to the fighting. 
115 Not much 
is made of aidos or philotes in this context, but what is 
said is significant, and indeed the whole purpose of the 
mission is to persuade Achilles to consider the interests of 
the rest of the army rather than his own injured ime. 
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The appeal to eleos (302) is also important, in that ee 
appears to be expected among philoi and can lead the warrior 
to subordinate his interests to those of his friends. 
'17 
Aidos makes its first appearance in this episode at 508, but 
here the context is not one of Achilles' responsibility to 
his comrades, but of the god-given benefits of giving in to 
entreaty. Ajax, however, who speaks after Achilles has 
rejected the appeals of the others and whose words have the 
greatest effect, 
118 does refer explicitly to that respons- 
ibility, and to dos and philotes. At 630-2 Ajax charges 
Achilles with neglect of the philotes he enjoys with the 
rest of the army, and rEminds him of its reciprocal nature; 
the other Achaeans honour (ER' V) Achilles with their 
philotes, and it is implied that he should return their 
friendship. 119 In concluding his speech, Ajax asks Achilles, 
x i", rc rraL G/ %GAKO&V, and points out that he and his 
colleagues are guests under his roof; this appears to be a 
reference to the institution of xenia, but need not be 
narrowly interpreted; Ajax is appealing to the ties of 
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friendship which exist between them, and although the envoys 
are currently enjoying Achilles' hospitality, we should not 
see Ajax' words as an appeal to xenia separate from that to 
philotes; similar conduct is required in both relationships, 
and, in practice, once the initial bond between host and 
guest is forged, xeinoi are treated as philoi. We should 
also notice that Ajax concludes his speech, and his appeal 
to aidos, by claiming that he and his fellows are Achilles' 
closest friends (Kº'cfi ltoc -r' ý Fvitl K #ü 
J ATxro L, 642) . Ajax 
and his colleagues, then, consider it worthwhile to attempt 
to persuade Achilles by referring to their friendship as 
members of the same army; they do not, it is true, suggest 
openly that his refusal to be persuaded is unseemly or 
discreditable, or name any sanctions which may be brought to 
bear as a result of his neglect of his philoi, but then 
their purpose is not threatening, but cajoling. And there are 
indications enough that they regard his obstinacy as unusual 
and excessive; line 523, for example, 1T LV 
ý' a') VEJue«1Ta/ 
KEX okW 6ýout should be read with emphasis on the 7CCL V, while 
the remarks of Phoinix that even the gods are open to 
persuasion (497) suggest that Achilles' concern for his time, 
exceeding even that of the gods, is abnormal. So, too, Ajax, 
in pointing out that even one whose brother or son had been 
murdered would accept compensation (632-3), implies that 
Achilles is going too far in his anger. Clearly, then, it 
was regarded as desirable that one should listen to one's 
philoi, consult their interests, and accord them aidos, but, 
as in any society, it was difficult to coerce those who put 
their own interests first. 
The avoidance of strife in the peer group appears to have 
been an ideal, but so too was the pursuit of honour, and 
although the opposing forces at Troy may be considered as 
two groups of philoi, each individual within the group also 
cherished his own claim to honour; and where honour exists 
as an acknowledged factor in the motivation of men, there 
also exists a hierarchy of honour, for if everyone has equal 
honour, then no one has any; by the same token, honour is 
regarded as a commodity, of which there is a finite amount 
49 
within the community; one man's acct sition of honour is 
another man's loss. 
120 Thus a situation could arise in which 
acute concern for one's own honour might be combined with a 
wariness of one's rivals and a determination that they should 
not increase their honour at the expense of one's own. In 
this type of situation the individual might be subject to 
competing claims, and aidos might enter into these claims in 
more than one sense, in that concern for one's own honour 
and reputation, which may take in aidos at the prospect of 
any loss of status in the eyes of others, 
121 
may conflict 
with the honour of the group, which aidos helps defend, or 
with the requirement that one's superiors and one's iloi 
be accorded aidos. 
Although the forces at Troy may be seen as groups of h' oi, 
some enjoyed greater status than others; we have already 
seen that aidos is a proper response with regard to one's 
superiors, and in straightforward situations there is no 
problem about this; the heralds at . 
11.1.331 are quite 
obviously Achilles' inferiors, and the aidos they show him 
recognizes that fact unambiguously. In other situations, 
however, the position may be more complicated, particularly 
when two or more of the most prominent heroes are involved, 
for in such situations the matter of superiority is not 
always clear, and one party may decide to push his own claim, 
either to superiority or to parity; time is important in 
this, for while one hero may have more than another, in 
dealing with his fellow heroes he is never dealing with one 
who has a negligible claim to time of his own. 
An episode in Iliad 4 shows how problems might arise; at 
370-400 Agamemnon, who is pursuing the task of urging the 
army on to greater effort with no little enthusiasm, abuses 
(W(kE(YEV 368) Diomedes, accusing him of slacking and, 
comparing him unfavourably with his father. Diomedes himself 
does not immediately respond, but his companion, Sthenelos, 
the son of Kapaneus and so, like Diomedes, one of the 
epigonoi, the sons of the Seven against Thebes, reacts 
angrily to the suggestion that his generation is inferior to 
50 
that of his father. Significantly, he sees the matter in 
terms of time, arguing that his generation was successful 
where their fathers failed, and that they should therefore 
enjoy greater time (410). Sthenelos, then, takes Agamemnon's 
words as an affront to his honour, and we can see how a 
dispute might arise on that basis. Diomedes' response, on 
the other hand is totally different; at 401-2 he refrains 
from making any reply at all, oCi O Eý9 e. S 
ýa rýkýos 
E vvir / 
aipOLOCO. As supreme commander and basileus Agamemnon is of 
paramount status, and Diomedes acknowledges this with aidos. 
After Sthenelos has spoken, he explains why he has taken no 
offence; he realizes (412-18) that Agamemnon is attempting 
to encourage the troops to greater effort, and accepts his 
right to do so, for, as he points out,. both the glory of 
success and the sorrow of failure rest with him. Diomedes, 
then, does not resent (Oü Y fr 6W413) remarks which another 
has taken as an affront because he can understand why the 
remarks were made; he makes allowance both for Agamemnon's 
status and for the pressures and responsibilities that that 
stasis entails. 
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Sthenelos and Diomedes, then, exemplify opposite responses, 
both of which are envisaged by the values of society; 
Sthenelos' is the individual response, conscious of personal 
time, while that of Diomedes takes lpyalty to the peer group 
and respect for one's superiors into account. We see the 
latter attitude again at IL. 10.237-9, where Agamemnon excuses 
Diomedes from the need to take aidos for one of superior 
into account 
birth and rank/in choosing an accomplice for the mission 
behind enemy lines: 1)i 
öE ÖÜ Y 0. ( döýEý/o$ ýý öl Lý ý1'l TUB ýEý/ olPEI. tJ 
KýkkVrt'E-ýJ öJ 
öE 6troI' a-4c -xt oai 
oo. c. i`Kw1, 
ES YEVeºýJ öeÖwJ , ýºnýÖý-c afLhEvttCöS 
Ltr. v. 
Agamemnon is being disingenuous (trying to ensure that 
Diomedes does not select Menelaos, 240), but even so his 
argument must be plausible; aidos for one's superiors, then, 
must have been a powerful force, in some individuals at least. 
On the other hand, a response like that of Sthenelos may 
also be envisaged as normal, as at 10.129-30, where Nestor's 
51 
denial that anyone will feel nemesis at Menelaos' commands 
in the present instance implies that such a response might 
be likely in other instances (cf. 114-5, where Nestor 
foresees nemesis on the part of Agamemnon should he charge 
Menelaos with dereliction of duty). 
123 Where aidos inter- 
venes, then, it helps subdue the nemesis which is occasioned 
by an affront to one's time; 
124 the fact that nemesis is the 
term employed suggests that the affront, the failure to 
recognize another's-time, may be regarded as a breach of 
aidos. 
It is suggested by Scott125 that the fact that Diomedes' 
aidos in 4.402 is not shared by Sthenelos and others in the 
same situation reveals the weakness of the restraint which 
the concept provides. If the fact that some feel aidos in a 
given situation while others do not means that aidos is weak, 
then we shall have to accept this argument. To me, however, 
this does not imply that aidos is weak, but simply that it 
is an emotion to which some are more sensitive than others, 
or which certain individuals, as a result of their upbringing 
and disposition, are more likely to experience in some 
situations than in others. 
126 We should not consider fear to 
be weak simply because some are more prone to it than others, 
nor pity, nor love; rather we judge the power of these 
emotions by their power in individual human beings; and we 
have already seen that in some individuals aidos can be 
powerful to the point of being undesirably so. It should be 
no surprise that it is not powerful in every individual. 
At Il. 23.473ff. a quarrel breaks out between Ajax, son of 
Oileus, and Idomeneus; after a quick burst of invective from 
both sides (in which the former addresses the latter ai cý(Cw5, 
cf. P. 16 above), Achilles quickly interposes (492-4): 
/441 
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It may be true that Ajax' address is only aischron for its 
recipient, but Achilles reprimands the conduct of both as 
"unseemly" and occasion for nemesis, terms which appeal to the 
same 
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ideas of appropriateness and disapproval as does aischron. 
This is clearly a minor quarrel, and perhaps that is why it 
is considered inappropriate, but where time is at stake, the 
importance of the cause of the dispute may be irrelevant, and 
so it is important that a dispute can arouse nemesis, which 
suggests that aidos has been ignored, and that the standard by 
which it does arouse nemesis can be seen as universal 
äiXvJ Vý1(: CXr6). 
We have seen that aidos can override resentment at an affront, 
and that nemesis is the reaction of one who feels himelf 
affronted; aidos, then, in an ideal situation, should work 
both ways, preventing both the insult and an excessive 
reaction to it, relying in both cases on an appreciation of 
the other's time. But ideal situations are few in any 
society, and disputes do arise. At this point we can hardly 
help but be reminded of the quarrel which stands at the 
centre of the plot of the Iliad. When Achilles is insulted 
by Agamemnon, his reaction is to complain of his opponent's 
anaideie, 
127 
and his grounds for this accusation clearly 
lie in the slight he has suffered upon his time. Adkins, in 
connexion with this and other passages, points out that 
there is a natural tendency to set a higher value on co- 
operative values in others when one has oneself been wronged, 
128 
and there is plainly a great deal of-truth in this, but 
aidos and time are associated, 
129 
and Achilles' charge of 
anaideie does seem to coincide with the judgement of others; 
certainly all those who express an opinion feel that Achilles 
was the wronged party; at 19.86 Agamemnon is abused for 
provoking Achilles, while at 9.523 (above, p. 48) Phoinix 
says that, up to that point, Achilles' anger has not been 
nemesseton. Even Agamemnon himself admits as early as book 
two (377) that it was he who started the quarrel. Most 
importantly, however, Nestor, the first to attempt to calm 
the two, sees the matter in terms of their time, pointing out 
that Agamemnon should not deprive Achilles of a prize 
allotted him by the other Achaeans (visible proof of the 
time he has won in battle), and that Achilles, although 
of divine birth and the greater warrior, should bow before the 
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greater time of a king who rules from Zeus (1.275-84). 
129 
Agamemnon, then, is certainly anaides in disregarding 
13 Achilles' time, 0 while Achilles himself is reproached for 
being without the kind of aidos shown by Diomedes at 4.402. 
The implications of this aspect of the quarrel for the wider 
q stion of the nature of Homeric values are manifold; we 
see, for example, that although Achilles does not act as did 
Diomedes, or as Nestor urges him to, nevertheless he is not 
regarded as in the wrong; while the reflective response, the 
response with which aidos is associated, may be the ideal, 
it appears that retaliation for a wrong suffered is felt to 
be legitimate. Two kinds of response are thus envisaged, 
one of self-control and one of self-assertion, one of regard 
for the time of others, one of regard for one's own. Aidos, 
moreover, may be part of both responses, aidos for one's 
iloi and superiors on the one hand, and aidos at the 
prospect of humiliation resulting from failure to avenge the 
affront on the other; it seems to me that Achilles is clearly 
subject to the latter at 1.293-4, where he claims that he 
would be called deilos and outidanos were he to yield to 
Agamemnon in every matter. Obviously the two responses 
conflict, and where they do, the conflict will be between 
loyalty to the group and loyalty to oneself. 
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The conflict is also one between co-operative and competitive 
standards, between the avoidance of strife and the pursuit 
of one's own interests. Adkins is therefore right to point 
out that Agamemnon, in ignoring Achilles' time is undoubtedly 
anaides, and that his aidos is weak. 
132 Indeed, his aidos in 
this instance is non-existent; Adkins might also have pointed 
out that Achilles, too, follows competitive aidos rather 
than co-operative, even if he is justified in doing so. This, 
as we have said before, is a question of what is at stake, 
rather than of the structure of Homeric values; 
133 both 
Achilles and Agamemnon are concerned at the prospect of being 
thought weak; this worries them more than the prospect of 
being considered anaides, because the charge, "You are weak, " 
challenges their rights, privileges and status in a way that 
54 
the charge, "You are anaides, " does not. This is not, 
however, a question of the relative power of the two charges, 
but of the material consequences of ignoring them; popular 
disapproval is not effective in itself, whether in the co- 
operative or the competitive sphere. The fact, then, that 
Agamemnon feels able to ignore criticism of his conduct in 
depriving Achilles of Briseis, feels able, in fact, to be 
anaides, and that his peers are unable to prevent his doing 
so by means of their disapproval, is a question not of 
values but of practicality; it is not part of the structure 
of Homeric values that breaches of co-operative virtue on 
the part of the powerful are condoned by society; as we have 
seen, Agamemnon's behaviour is not condoned. Therefore it is 
not true to say that Agamemnon has a claim to deprive 
Achilles of his prize, 
134 but it is certainly true to point 
out that he feels able to do so without undermining his 
position in any way. 
135 
Adkins also claims that, while Agamemnon may be anaides in 
refusing to acknowledge Achilles' time, it is not aischron 
for him to do so, 
136 The context, however, gives us no clue 
on this question, and the paucity of evidence for the usage 
of aischron in Homer scarcely equips us to decide one way or 
the other. Yet we do know that aischron refers to the 
appearance of actions or situations, -and 
that it implies that 
the situation thus described will be such as to occasion 
popular disapproval, and we have seen both that Agamemnon 
ignores popular disapproval and that quarrels can be condemned 
on the grounds of their unseemliness; I should hesitate, 
therefore, to say that it is impossible that Agamemnon's 
behaviour be described as aischron. We remember that the 
suitors do perpetrate aischea which reflect badly upon 
themselves, 137 and throughout the Odyssey they are 
characterized as anaideis. It is interesting, therefore, 
to find that on two separate occasions they are condemned 
because 3i %i)/ 00 Tc vd roc l f'c E dýK4' /E -itc x6 ovcw/l oavO6 wr, w, oü Kock q o3 S'e lm. W EQ dhö, /, FTcs d-4EKS 
(9d. 22.414-5,23.65-6) 
The suitors, then, are anaideis, commit aischea and do 
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not accord others the time they deserve; they are agathoi 
but are condemned throughout the poem, and their arete is 
largely irrelevant to those who condemn them; nor does the 
poem as a whole give the impression that it was composed for 
a society which would countenance breaches of the co- 
operative virtues provided arete was maintained. The fact 
that aret e is unaffected by such behaviour does not mean 
that it is condoned; arete encompasses so many aspects, such 
as birth and wealth, which could never be affected by anyone's 
disapproval, that it is difficult to imagine it being 
affected by anything but the severest material disaster. 
138 
The significance of the extracts examined for our purposes, 
then, lies in their demonstration that it was considered 
discreditable. to deprive others of the tim they deserve, 
and that aidos was felt to be the factor which led one to 
acknowledge the status of others. 
Turning more firmly now to the Odyssey, we find that much is 
made of aidos in the context of the youthful Telemachos' 
dealings with those he meets on his travels to gather news 
about his father. At 3.24139 he experiences aidos at the 
thought of addressing the aged Nestor, even though Athene, 
disguised as Mentor, has assured him that he has not the 
slightest need to feel that way (14). Telemachos' instinct- 
ive aid os, then, which is regarded as normal in one of his 
age, is active even when he has been assured that it is not 
necessary; this amounts to an assurance that no one will 
the fact 
think th worse of him for abandoning his aidos and so / that he does not abandon it 
shows that the emotional reaction represented by aidos 
does not amount to a simple calculation of the responses of 
others. Rather Telemachos' aidos is deeply rooted in his 
temperament, which is portrayed as characteristic of one 
making the transition from boyhood to manhood. 
Telemachos is showing similar reticence at 4.158-60, where, 
describing his behaviour towards Menelaos, Peisistratos 
explains: 
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As we have already noted, 
141VEP (1ä'rAL comes very close to 
the sense of aLSti ou. here; both verbs refer to possible 
breaches of the decorum expected by society. It is therefore 
interesting to note the association of aidos/nemesis and 
saophrosyne, a concept which will later express some of 
the notions of self-control and self-inhibition present in 
aidos. 
142 Sophrosyne, however, has no overt reference to the 
censure of other people, except inasmuch as popular dis- 
approval is an unpleasant consequence which one who practises 
sophrosvne will wish to avoid, but this restraint is of an 
intellectual nature and differs from the instinctive, 
emotional force of aidos. In Homer, saophron works much as 
do other words which connote "good sense", 
143 
and the inter- 
action of these with aidos will be discussed below. 
144 
Telemachos' aidos, as we have just seen, could go too far, 
and interfere with the purpose of his journey; but just as 
he feels aidos towards his hosts, so he expects that they 
will feel it towards him, and he realizes that this, too, 
may conflict with his purpose, which is to find out the 
truth about his father. Hence at 3.96 and 4.326 he entreats 
Nestor and Menelaos (respectively), 




/, VA 16 
'C kEa Cwt. 
Telemachos imagines that aidos, concern for his feelings, 
may lead his hosts to withhold unpleasant details regarding 
his father's fate. Aidos here clearly denotes concern for 
the recipient of one's actions, and while one could claim 
that such aidos contains the notion of fear of that person's 
disapproval, it seems pedantic to deny that its primary 
reference is to an altruistic concern for another's feelings. 
145 
Aidos, then, is a powerful influence over the conduct of 
Homeric man vis-ä-vis his fellows; it is a desirable quality 
and helps enforce the norms of society. So far, however, we 
have only seen it in action with regard to those who have 
some claim to it arising from their special relationship to 
the subject, be they his superiors, his family or his 
colleagues. Other categories of people, however, who cannot 
demand aidos on the grounds of their power or their philotes, 
57 
are nevertheless felt to be entitled to it; this group of 
aidoioi consists of those who enter a community from outside, 
and who are largely at the mercy of those they encounter, 
namely strangers, suppliants and beggars, all of whom may, 
to some extent, be subsumed under the heading of xeinoi. 
146 
Unlike those groups discussed so far, however, one's philoi 
or one's superiors, these people do not rely on their 
own tim to attract the aidos of others, but on that lent 
them by Zeus, their protector and epitimetor (9d. 9.270). 
147 
Obviously, though, society will only impart this special 
status to those who enter a community from outside because 
it regards it as desirable that they should be protected; 
the impulse to protect strangers thus arises from within 
society, and should only be regarded as divinely imposed by 
those who believe in the Olympian religion. 
148 
To disguise Odysseus as a beggar on his return to Ithaka was 
a masterstroke on the part of the poet of the Odyssey, 
149 
for it is only when the suitors are confronted by the beggar 
that the full extent of their anaideie (as well as their 
hybris and atasthalie), for which they are criticized 
throughout the poem, becomes apparent. In Od. 17 the beggar 
Odysseus goes to town, and is encouraged by Telemachos to 
make the rounds of the suitors begging for alms; he is also 
told that, as a beggar, he is exempt from the need to feel 
aidos (347; c(352): 




Antinoos, however, when the beggar comes to ask him for alms, 
shows himself to 
ws its Epp 
This discrepancy 
clearly reflects 
be unaware of this exemption, exclaiming, 
ýoc? ýEos WAt kvx(. SiS c((L -rr(o K-ri s. (449} 
in attitude between Antinoos and Telemachos 
badly on the former; 
151 Antinoos, however, 
goes further in contempt for proper conduct, hurling a stool 
at Odysseus' back, arousing the censure of several in the 
company, most immediately from the victim himself. The crux 
of Odysseus' speech is that his assailant will be punished: 
äkk' C- i/ -rou -r--rwxw/ y- F 0&ot K4 Eýtvüý5 Fi6(V 
ýývrLvoo, / -n-6e YO/C , o&. -mhos 
OPCVäroco 1'CLXf 1. (475-6) 
The beggar's divine protectors will intervene to exact the 
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vengeance most beggars are unable to take themselves; in the 
mouth of Odysseus, however, these words hint darkly at his 
own intentions. Antinoos is contemptuous of the beggar's 
complaint (he is impious as well as anaides), but his 
comtempt merely excites the disapproval of the others: 
0L S1 J, 
/ 01 11 ded -r vT&S TC-(e u 
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The standard that even beggars should be treated with aidos, 
then, is so widely acknowledged that even Antinoos' fellow 
suitors disapprove of its breach. 
What follows is interesting, for, through TLS VC-WV 
6*1CC-CJvoeC-ovr V, we are given nothing less than an empirical 
and materialistic justification of the advisability of 
treating beggars with aidos. Beginning with the assertion 
that it was of e(.. 
( for Antinoos to strike the beggar, 
152 
the spokesman goes on to affirm that he is, indeed, doomed, 
if there is a god in heaven (484), and continues (485-7), 
Ka. i i- (ý f-oýý j tvoi. cýý/ Eo ißä TES . 
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In harming a stranger, then, one may be harming a god, and 
so caution is required when dealing with strangers; if this 
belief, based on the common folk-motif of theoxeny, was at 
all widely held it is evidence for the uncertainty with 
which strangers were regarded; 
153 
we may be confident, 
however, that the doctrine that one shOdld receive outsiders 
kindly is older than the justification. That such a 
justification is offered, however, does illustrate a 
characteristic feature of Greek moral thought, the attempt 
to identify behaviour in accordance with traditional 
morality with individual self-interest. 
Now, beggars are only a species of the genus ceinoi; their 
profession demands that they wander from town to town; 'other 
xeinoi may have any number of reasons for leaving the 
security of their own communities, but, like the beggar, 
they are xeinoi by virtue of their being outsiders and 
unprotected, except by the gods. At Od. 14.386-9 Eumaios gives 
his reasons for affording the beggar Odysseus protection: 
59 
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We should notice that fear of Zeus xenios and pity for the 
beggar himself are presented as Eumaios's reasons for 
showing aidos; showing aidos is not the same as showing fear 
or pity, although both help define aidos here. There are 
clearly two strands to the aidos reaction in the context of 
guest-friendship, and these, the prudential and the 
alhuistic, are expressed by Eumaios' fear of divine punish- 
ment and his pity for one less fortunate than himself; both 
these aspects can be expressed by the verb aideisthai, which 
may have either the god or gods who underwrite the standard 
or the stranger himself as its object. 
154 It is difficult 
precisely to establish the sense of eel. 
WtCo. L here; the 
association with the verb philein, which 
refers 
here to the 
cox[rete acts Eumaios will perform in the entertainment of 
his guest, 
155 
suggests that ittco, may refer more to Eumaios' 
conduct than to his disposition. Perhaps, though, the two 
should not be separated, in that the swineherd's attitude of 
respect towards his guest, based on the special status 
invested in all guests by Zeus and on pity, will be manifested 
in those acts which are proper to the relationship of 
xenia. It is, however, important to realize that, from 
this passage, it appears that the verb aideisthai is as 
descriptive and characteristic of the action of receiving a 
guest as is philein. 
Eumaios, then, explains his aidos for his guest in terms of 
his obedience to divine law (and fear of divine punishment) 
and his own capacity for pity. There is, however, another 
sanction against the ill-treatment of guests, one both more 
immediate than the wrath of Zeus and more compelling than 
the individual's instinct for pity. It is to this that 
Eumaios refers when the beggar Odysseus first stumbles 
towards his hut, forcing the swineherd to save him from the 
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Failure to protect a guest, if it became known, might 
lead to elencheie, "showing up", and thus another kind of 
aidos, different from that one accords the recipient of one's 
hospitality, but still related, enters into the sph ere of 
guest-friendship. We have seen that proper treatment of 
strangers is an imperative which is widely adhered to; this 
being the case, popular disapproval will inevitably be the 
consequence of any breach of the standard; and so aidos, by 
now familiar as the fear of popular disapproval, can work in 
two ways in the attitude of the host, firstly as a concern 
for the stranger himself, a fear of his reaction and a 
withdrawal from the prospect of doing him harm, and secondly 
as concern for the opinion of others, who are presumed to 
take a dim view of any breach of a standard to which they 
themselves subscribe. It cannot be too strongly emphasized 
that these motives, the altruistic, the fear of punishment 
and the fear of opprobrium, co-exist, even within the same 
individual, and therefore should not be considered in 
isolation; it would be wrong to say that Eumaios' concern 
for Odysseus is entirely altruistic, but neither is it 
entirely self-regarding. 
157 
That the honour of the host is diminished by his failure to 
protect a guest emerges from a number of passages, some of 
which we have looked at already. 
158 
Telemachos, for example, 
is concerned that he is unable to welcome a guest properly 
because of the suitors' behaviour, and feels nemesis at 
himself on that account (0.1.119-20); if his own nemesis is 
aroused then so, one would imagine, would be that of others. 
The nemesis of Penelope at her son's failure to protect his 
guest is certainly aroused at 18.220-5: 
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Penelope, then, sees Telemachos' failure as an intellectual 
one, and implies that the impulse to protect one's guests 
arises from one's intellect; Telemachos agrees (227-30) that 
one's intellect, if it is sound, does lead one to act as 
custom demands, but points out that he is prevented from 
acting as his intellect urges him by the suitors, whose 
"bad sense" (232) is opposed to his own good sense. Clearly, 
then, there is a link between what one knows and acting in 
accordance with propriety, and that link will be explored 
below. 159 For our immediate purpose it will suffice to 
record that aischos and lobe were felt to accrue from any 
inability to protect a guest, and that the impulse to avoid 
the disapproval represented by these terms was seen as 
an intellectual one. Thus proper conduct could be both an 
object of knowledge and a goal of education. 
Words of seemliness and appearances abound in the last 
passage quoted, and we noted in our discussion of those terms 
how the unseemliness of the situation could reflect on either 
the doer or the sufferer of the action described as unseemly; 
we have just seen how Telemachos is affected by the actions 
of the suitors, but in other passages, as we saw, 
160 their 
conduct seems to reflect as badly on themselves as on 
Telemachos, if not more so. Accordingly, it seems that abuse 
of another's hospitality can be regarded as disgraceful, 
even if those who act in this way are not always concerned 
at disapproval on that account. Certainly both abuse of 
hospitality and failure to protect a guest are described as 
inappropriate and unseemly. 
161 
The courtesy demanded of both parties in the relationship of 
xenia is also governed by aidos. In the fifteenth book of 
the Odyssey Telemachos is anxious to take his leave of 
Menelaos, but has no wish to cause his host offence. 
Menelaos, however, brushes his anxiety (which is perhaps 
itself akin to aidos, and is certainly further evidence that 
concern for others' feelings formed part of Homeric etiquette) 
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This form of expression, in which the speaker rejects a course 
of action by referring to the nemesis he would feel at such 
conduct in another, suggests, as we have seen before, 
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both the universality of the standard and the speaker's 
agreement with it. Excess is to be the object of Menelaos' 
nemesis here, and the fact that excess can attract nemesis 
suggests that aidos might cause one to reject excessive 
behaviour. A desire not to overstep the bounds of good manners 
in the host-guest relationship seems also to underlie 
Odysseus' aidos at Od. 8.85-6, where, moved by the bard's 
song, he hides his face in order that his hosts should not 
see him weep. Elsewhere in the poems even the greatest heroes 
do not experience aidos at shedding tears, 
163 
and at O d. 4. 
195-6 Peisistratos, who had joined the others in a lament 
over the fate of those who did not return from Troy, explains 
that he feels no nemesis at those who weep for the dead; it 
is unlikely, then, that Odysseus feels aidos at weeping Per 
se; more probably he regards it as a discourtesy to his hosts 
to show anything less than complete satisfaction with their 
hospitality. 164 The idea that one should not burden one's 
hosts with one's troubles certainly occurs atQd. 19.118-21, 
where Odysseus expresses reluctance to bewail his own mis- 
fortunes in another's house, lest one of the household or his 
hostess herself feel nemesis. A similar idea seems to occur 
at fl. 24.90-1, where Thetis' unwillingness to join the other 
gods seems to be based on reluctance to inflict her troubles 
on them (although it is also possible that she simply feels 
inferior to the Olympian deities). 
Besides the negative justification of the custom that one 
should behave kindly towards strangers (the theoxeny idea, 
p. 58 above) and the negative sanction of ill-repute for those 
who fail to do so, we also find a positive , but nonetheless 
materialistic, justification at Od19.333-4, where Penelope 
says that the fame of good men (men who are a ut0ýE$) is 
spread by xeinoi. Thus a good reputation is thee reward 
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of proper conduct, just as ill-repute is the lot of those 
who treat guests badly. 
165 Yet Penelope does not simply say 
that xeinoi report on the behaviour of their hosts qua 
i 
hosts, but that they carry the fame of anyone who is ic, vtVµ WV 
and who "knows K/. tv/A&V4" to all men; conversely, she 
remarks 
(329-31) that "all mortals" curse those who are 
äI-rIVECs 
i 
and who "know 
pt1 r (e. c "; although she begins her speech from 
the context of xenia, she seems to believe that society in 
general shares her abhorrence of moral wickedness and 
appreciation of moral goodness, and, accordingly, she sees 
popular disapproval as the consequence of the one and popular 
commendation as that of the other. And indeed, given the 
Plot of the Odyssey, withits emphasis on poetic justice and 
its undoubted didactic purpose, particularly where proper 
behaviour towards guests is concerned, 
166 
there must be a 
strong presumption that the poem was composed for a society 
whose ideals, if not necessarily the everyday conduct of its 
members, matched those of Penelope in this passage. Certainly 
much is made of the theme of xenia in the poem, and in 
particular the society of those who'practise it is sharply 
contrasted with that of the Cyclopes, who are distinguished 
from civilized peoples by their lack of cohesion and 
ignorance of themis (9.188-9); 
167 
when Odysseus first sets 
out to ascertain the disposition of those who inhabit the 
Cyclops' island he refers to two alternative types (9.175-6): 
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Thus the values which promote the observance of the laws of 
hospitality are precisely those which characterize a 
community as civilized, and we can see how Penelope's remarks 
on the conduct of men in general can spring from 
contemplation of their attitude towards guests in particular; 
the attitude of men to those who enter their communities from 
outside is indicative of their sensitivity to justice and 
propriety in general, and one who maltreats a guest is 
likely to be unjust in other ways. This being the case, 
aidos, which is so central to the institution of guest- 
friendship, obviously has a role of considerable importance 
in the society of the Odyssey. 
64 
Protection of strangers was, then, a Homeric ideal; we 
should not, however, be blind to the possibility that practice 
may have fallen short of that ideal; we have seen that 
materialistic justifications were often felt necessary. 
Materialism also affects the institution in the form of the 
exchange of gifts which was the norm among xeinoi; Odysseus 
is constantly concerned to amass booty for his return to 
Ithaka (his fictitious description of himself doing just 
that at 19.272-4 is quite in character), and even asks the 
Cyclops for a gift outright (9.268). In addition, we have 
seen that at 11 . 360 he believes that he will be k 
irpýMEeos 
and ýýhT6ýos to all men if he can return to his home with a 
substantial amount of wealth. He is aidoios no matter how 
much he posseses, but his own experiences as a beggar tend 
to confirm that while aidos towards all strangers is the 
theory, ill-treatment of those of them without means could 
all too often be the practice. 
The institution of guest-friendship is very closely linked, 
especially in the Odyssey, to another code of behaviour, 
that of supplication, and, indeed, the boundary between 
suppliant and stranger is difficult to define. 
168 A suppliant 
is a "comer", 
169 
and often we find strangers, who come 
unpr"tected to an alien community, and who might also be 
regarded as xeinoi, either describing themselves as suppliants 
or resorting to supplication. Odysseus' supplication170 of 
the local river sod on his arrival in the land of the 
Phaeacians is a good example, in that he himself refers to 
the etymology of hiketes in identifying himself as a 
suppliant (Od5.447-50): 
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The general "immortal gods" of this passage is particularized 
in the Zeus xeinios of Od. 9.269-71, another indication of 
the closeness of xenia and hiketeia171 
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Zeus, then, in his guise as xeinos was felt to be the 
protector of both strangers and suppliants; at Od. 13.213 we 
find him described by another cult title, hiketesios, which 
is obviously derived from his function as protector of 
suppliants, but which is used in that passage in a context 
of his punishment of human crimes in general. 
Since one who is a xeinos might also decide to style himself 
a suppliant (although suppliants do not behave exactly as do 
other xeinoi172) much of what was said about xenia also holds 
good for hiketeia. In a number of contexts, however, the 
connexion between supplication and xenia is not prominent, 
in that those involved are not stranger and prospective host; 
in these situations supplication is employed to further a 
specific request. Like the xeinos, the hiketes appeals to 
a'dos, his claim to which seems to rest on his special 
status as a protege of the gods and on the ritual self- 
abasement173 to which he subjects himself; he thus claims 
aidos both as one enjoying time (invested in him by the gods) 
and as one without time. 
Since an appeal to aidos is an appeal to an emotion which 
may or may not be present in the individual supplicated, such 
appeals are often unsuccessful. In "full" or literal 
supplication, however, the suppliant's physical contact 
with the supplicated, or with an altar, means that outright 
rejection of the appeal will entail the breaking of contact 
by force, 174 and the use of force in such a context, where 
popular opinion believed the gods took an interest, which in 
turn reveals that society in general believed that protection 
of suppliants was desirable, would be discreditable. Whereas, 
then, at first sight it may seem that the distinction 
between full and figurative supplication should have no 
effect on the individual's aidos, it may be that the prospect 
of using force against a suppliant could lead to ads at 
the thought of the disapproval, divine and human, which 
would result, in a way that the simple rejection of the 
appeal, or the avoidance of full supplication, would not. 
These considerations, however, are relevant only to a later 
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period, for although aidos is mentioned in the appeals of 
suppliants, and while one could, if one had the time and 
space, make a case for the presence of aidos in those who 
accept the supplication of others, there is no passage in 
the Homeric poems in which a character states explicitly 
that he has been moved by aidos to accept another's 
supplication, whether literal or figurative. 
In the first book of the Iliad the supplication of the 
priest, Chryses, who comes bearing the suppliant's 6TýK afK 
(1.14) shows both that aidos is the proper reaction and that 
failure to react with aidos is reprehensible; all the other 
Greeks, we are told (22-3) wanted to aideisthai the priest, 
but Agamemnon, to whom (with Menelaos) the supplication was 
Principally addressed (16), sent him away, as the poet says, 
Ka Kw} There is-also the question of ransom in this case, 
however, and it seems that the rejection of appropriate 
compensation was frowned upon as much as was the disregarding 
of the suppliant's pleas, for Ajax complains bitterly of 
Achilles' refusal to accept the gifts offered him by 
Agamemnon at 11.9.636-7,175 and from then on, until he 
accepts the supplication of Priam in book 24, Achilles is 
clearly in the wrong. 
176 Achilles also rejects the supplic- 
ation of his comrades in the same booklý77in spite of Phoinix' 
personification of their entreaties as the "daughters of 
Zeus" (508). 178 
In times of war and conflict attitudes to suppliants seem to 
have varied according to the circumstances of each case, 
while in peacetime contexts the dominant impression given is 
that it is right that their. pleas be heeded; certainly in the 
Odyssey it would have? 
regarded 
as occasion for the strongest 
disapproval if Odysseus as a suppliant at the court of 
Alkinoos had been harmed; similarly. Polyphemos' rejection 
not only of Odysseus' pleas (quoted on p. 64 above) but even 
of the power of Zeus himself (Q . 9.273-8) is intended to be 
shocking, and, as we saw, Agamemnon's dismissal of Chryses 
was roundly condemned. But a commonsense attitude seems to 
have prevailed in those cases where the suppliant is an enemy 
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begging for his life. We saw (p. 42 above) that Hektor 
expected no aidos from Achilles, and in those scenes of 
supplication which are acted out before us in the Iliad no 
suppliant is spared. 
179 
In the passion for revenge which 
often motivates those who kill suppliants there seems to be 
little room even for the distinction between real and 
figurative supplication. At Od. 22.310 the priest, Leodes, 
takes hold of Odysseus' knees, and in 312 utters the 
suppliant's appeal: 
Y, ouvoüýat., ý'v(EV ý0 aicSeo Kati ýº'Ekýýýýý. 
The appeal to aidos, however, and the ritual clasping of the 
knees make little impact on Odysseus, who instead treats 
Leodes' case on its merits: the priest claims that he never 
said or did anything atasthalon, but rather attempted to 
restrain the suitors from their deeds of atasthalie; Odysseus, 
however, considers him implicated in the suitors' crimes and 
kills him, and although he kills a suppliant in the very act 
of supplication, no condemnation is forthcoming, nor does he 
express any misgivings. Later in the same book, both the bard 
Phemios, who utters a plea for aidos at 344, having already 
clasped Odysseus' knees, and the herald, Medon, who 
supplicates Telemachos (365-70), are spared, not because 
Odysseus is noticeably moved by their appeals, or because he 
cannot bring himself to break ritual contact, or because he 
fears the wrath of Zeus, but simply because he has been 
persuaded, largely through the intercession of Telemachos, 
that they are innocent of the crimes of the rest of their 
company. 
The case of Lykaon in Iliad 21 is interesting; Lykaon was 
spared by Achilles on a previous occasion, and it may be 
that a successful Btjppiic 'ation had something to do with 
this. 
180 At 71 he clasps Achilles' knees, and at 74 he 
appeals for aidos and pity, adding (75), 
O(VTI TUl C- ( KE'reCO ) 
, 
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Now, Lykaon has effected the full ritual contact of the 
suppliant, and yet he claims only to be "in the place of a 
suppliant, " "a sort of suppliant"; this may be significant, 
in the sense that, while supplication of a foe in battle 
68 
might have been an expedient which was worth the attempt, it 
could be that rejection of such supplication on the part of 
one who only moments before had been attempting to kill the 
recipient of his appeal was regarded as understandable, if 
not normal. 
181 Achilles, of course, has become an extremely 
savage human being by this time, but still there is no 
indication that his rejection of Lykaon's appeal, or even of 
his claim to philotes, which, though technically justified, 
is nevertheless unquestionably tenuous, is an act which 
society would find abhorrent; Lykaon himself has little hope 
that his plea will be successful (92-3), and it may be 
that his description of himself as "a sort of suppliant" 
expresses a similar lack of confidence. Lykaon, as Gould 
points out, 
182 does abandon his supplication by relaxing his 
grip on Achilles' spear and stretching out his hands, and 
this does show that he has accepted that Achilles' desire 
for revenge will mean his death, but there can scarcely be 
any doubt but that Achilles would have killed him in any 
case, and neither the ritual contact nor the appeal to 
aidos and pity has any effect on him. The tone of both the 
passages, indeed, in which Odysseus and Achilles kill their 
suppliants suggests that the desire for revenge will 
inevitably override any sense of aidos or compunction. There 
is no indication in the text that their reaction is justi- 
fiable, but the implication must surely be that it is. 
The position of those who undertake supplication in situations 
of conflict, then, appears weak; if there is little at stake 
in the encounter, or if a ransom is offered which pleases 
the supplicated, as seems to have been the case on Lykaon's 
first meeting with Achilles, the supplication may be accepted, 
but in practice it seems that supplication in such contexts 
was felt to be resistable and to have little chance of 
success. In other contexts, however, where the suppliant is 
genuinely a "comer" in that he is unknown to the recipient 
of his appeal, and where supplication and guest-friendship 
almost coincide, his position seems rather stronger, and the 
killing of a suppliant would surely meet with the same kind 
of condemnation as is incurred by Herakles, who is described 
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as schetlios for killing his host and failing to show aidos 
for the anger of the gods or for the relationship that 
existed between them (Od. 21.28). 
183 
This example relates to 
the relationship of xenia, but the reaction to such conduct 
in the context of peace-time supplication would surely be 
similar, because the essential difference between the acts 
of supplication which succeed in the Odyssey and those which 
fail in the Iliad is not to be ascribed to the greater 
moralism or the greater concern with divine justice of the 
former (for Odysseus kills Leodes with impunity), but to the 
fact that one supplicated by a stranger, as in the Odyssey, 
has no legitimate grounds for treating his suppliant with 
violence (Polyphemos' rejection of Odysseus' supplication is 
an indication of his monstrosity), whereas in the context of 
war or similar conflict it is one's goal to kill one's 
opponents and revenge is an important and legitimate motive. 
Although the ritual of supplication does not differ in these 
contexts, the situation does, and Homeric values, as would 
ours, make allowances for that difference. 
Priam's supplication of Achilles in Iliad 24 provides a good 
indication of the precariousness of the suppliant's position 
in cases where there is a great deal at stake. Achilles has 
been told that it is the will of Zeus that he should heed 
the old man's plea (24.128-37), and it-is almost unthinkable 
that he should ignore such a direct command, yet the 
supplication must still take place, and, when it does, it 
creates a formidable amount of tension. 
184 At 503 Priam bids 
Achilles oCI 
'c 
o OEoWJS , and since Priam is aware of the will 
of the gods in this matter, this may be a general usage, 
"respect the gods (on account of their power)"; such a usage 
would have no parallel, however, since in Homer the gods are 
accorded aidos only as protectors of guests and suppliants, 
and so it is probably better to take the words in that sense 
here. The main point of Priam's appeal, however, is not that, 
as a suppliant, he is under divine protection, but that 
he deserves pity, as an old man in a situation analogous 
to that of Achilles' own father. This is the point which 
frames his appeal (486-501,503-6), and it occurs already at 
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22.418-22, where Priam announces it as his intention to 
employ precisely this form of appeal. And it is the appeal 
to pity and the reference to Peleus which has the greatest 
effect on Achilles, and the analogy with Hektor and Priam 
places himself and his father in the same tragic situation; 
Achilles knows that Hektor's fate will be his, and that he 
will never see his father again. Achilles, then, does feel 
Pity, and he is also aware of the need to obey Zeus' 
instructions and to avoid harming a suppliant, although when 
he does refer to these points, it isi the context of the 
danger'of his ignoring them (560-70). He does not, however, 
say that he feels aidos, although his acceptance of the 
supplication itself may be construed as "showing aidos"; an 
indication of how aidos might arise in such a situation, 
however, is afforded by the description of Achilles' reaction 
on first seeing Priam at 480-4; he feels e 
/n/3o5 
at his 
appearance and at his immediate performance of the ritual 
gestures of supplication, and this reaction is compared to 
that of those who receive a homicide into their presence. 
185 
Both the homicide in the simile and Priam himself are 
suppliants, and dread or awe is the reaction they arouse; 
this is not uniquely a reaction to the shedding of blood, 
for although the suppliant in the simile has shed blood, 
Priam has not, and it seems that it is the supplication 
itself, or perhaps the appearance of one who intends to 
supplicate in a particularly tense situation, which arouses 
such an emotion. It does not seem too far-fetched to suggest 
that this feeling of awe, of uncertainty, towards a suppliant 
of somewhat ambivalent status might be related at least to 
1 
one aspect of the aidos which is appropriate to the situation. 
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LIDOS AND WOMEN: SEXUAL AIDOS 
A number of passages exist in which aidos occurs in a broadly 
sexual context, whether in relationships between the sexes, 
where it affects women particularly, or with reference to an 
individual's own sexuality or to sexuality in general; in the 
former category, ads is concerned with the social role of 
men and women, while in the latter it relates to a coyness 
regarding sex, sexual organs and bodily functions. 
187 To 
71 
take the first category first, we might begin by suggesting 
how the aidos of women might differ from that of men. We have 
noticed some instances of women being described as aidoie 
in connexion with some specific relationship; usually 
aidoie is accompanied by deine or phile in these contexts, 
and the adjective commends exactly the same qualities as it 
would when used of a man. 
188 Frequently, however, aidoie is 
the only adjective employed, 
189 
and it may describe a queen 
of the highest birth 
190 
or a relatively humble household 
servant. 
191 
Rarely are the reasons for the use of the 
adjective apparent in any specific activity of the woman so 
qualified. The explanation of the apparently indiscriminate 
application of the adjective, however, lies in the r6le of 
women in society and the nature of women's honour. Society 
sets different standards for womenfrom those it sets for 
men, 
192 
and the main virtue required of women is faithfulness; 
men's honour is vulnerable through women, and men have an 
interest in ensuring that the women under their control 
remain faithful and sexually pure. 
193 
Although women, by 
virtue of their upbringing in society, may subscribe to the 
standards imposed on them without question, and be critical 
of the deficiencies of other women, ultimately the standards 
to which they adhere are laid down by men. 
194 It is in 
adhering to these standards and in being above any slight on 
. her honour that a woman merits the title aidoi 
It is, as we might expect, a woman's aidos which helps her 
remain within the guidelines laid down by society, and such 
aidos frequently manifests itself as a coyness about dealings 
with the opposite sex. Nausikaa, for example, has been 
promised a husband by prophecy and is anxious to meet him, 
but she obtains leave from her father to go out by offering 
to take the linen down to the river for washing. the poet 
gives her reason for the artifice (Od. 6.66-7): 
aý'ýýre ýocý 0a. )ccý: v Yýý,. ýoý ovojvac 
-Trec 
Once Nausikaa has met Odysseus, she wishes him to return with 
her to her father's palace, but there are standards to be 
observed; she cannot be seen in the company of a man without 
72, 
having gained her father's permission, and she knows that 
there are people, 
vlirc-e 4L 
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who will comment adversely on her conduct. This she explains 
to Odysseus, and concludes (6.285-8): 
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Nausikaa was led by aidos to conceal her desire to meet her 
prophesied husband, and now she explains that oneidea and 
nemesis are to be expected at a girl who consorts with men 
before her marriage. Her words in 286 on her own feelings, 
should she see another woman acting in the'way she shuns, 
endorse the standard she is herself in the course of 
breaking; 195 ir(spite of her assertion that only the üýýe Kothot i1 
and TtS Koc1i ireeo5 would reproach her, Nausikaa admits that she 
would act as they do towards another woman. This is clearly 
one of the passages in which the calculative aspect of aidos 
dominates; Nausikaa is aware that her present conduct is 
unacceptable, but she overcomes any aidos she might have 
felt at the thought of mixing with Odysseus at all by means 
of her own preference and the knowledge that she is, so far, 
unobserved; it is not the transgression which troubles her, 
but the danger that it will be found out. The calculative 
aspect of the girl's behaviour might_be mitigated, however, 
if we imagined that she is afraid that others will place an 
interpretation on her actions which is unjustified and 
pejorative, and that she regards her current behaviour not 
as reprehensible, but as entirely innocent. 
The modesty with regard to the opposite sex shown by Nausikaa 
is not confined to unmarried women. On two occasions we find 
married women expressing reluctance with regard to sex even 
husbands 
with their , and doing so on the grounds that others 
will disapprove. At 11.3.410 Helen refuses to go to her 
Ö 
husband's bed - VFrt ((1 rJ 
S, t kC-V G-(&J - and she goes on to 
explain that it is the censure of the Trojan women that she 
fears(411-12). It is simply not the right time; she is 
clearly troubled by Paris' showing in the duel with Menelaos, 
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and no doubt the sight of them both together has caused her 
to reflect on her conduct in leaving Sparta. We remember 
that Helen saw Paris' unseemly conduct in battle as a 
reflection on herself, 
196 
and her reference to the blame of 
the women might be related to a fear that they will criticize 
her for leaving a good husband for an inferior one, and 
regard it as inappropriate of her to behave as a wife to the 
latter immediately after his inferiority has been revealed. 
Inappropriateness of place is Hera's alleged reason for 
refusing sex with Zeus at 11.14.330-40, where, attempting to 
deceive her husband, she claims that it would be nemesseton 
for her to return to Olympos having slept with Zeus in the 
open on Mt. Ida; she is, then, feigning aidos at beinyseen 
in the act of love and at facing those who might have seen 
her. 
Just as a sensitivity about sex is common to married and 
unmarried women, so shyness of the other sex persists after 
marriage. At Od. 18.164 Penelope decides to call two female 
attendants before facing the suitors, explaining, 
oLI ö ovK ýýý(- c. /wEr a''c " a. cýE0/*"- 
Shyness of sex itself and of the company of men combine at 
Od. 8.324, for while the male gods meet to see Ares and 
Aphrodite in bed, , 
eIXVTýCtt CrE _aý ývt, EVý a. ýoL 0, oL c Ko-rrI . 
A certain amount of coyness regarding sexual matters does 
seem to have been common to both sexes; the usage aidoia = 
genitals occurs only once (11.13.568), but is implied by 
Odysseus' statement that Thersites' clothes "cover his 
aidos" (1.2.262) 
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Obviously there is a certain flexibility 
in both these usages; the aidoi are not aidoios in the same 
way as a suppliant is, but still they are cause for aidos, 
and Thersites' ads is not a reaction on his part, but part 
of his anatomy; aidos is here used of that which arouses 
a' os, much as aischos (disgrace) can arouse aischos 
(reproach). 
Propriety in a sexual context might also be the issue at Od. 
6.221-2, where Odysseus declares that he will not allow 
74 
himself to be washed by Nausikaa's attendants: 
Oc cýEo, s a. L Y -X. ( I 
yvpvoü60aCc KoüCj rýý CÜ-rr)Ok P/c (L ý. trl>6wJ. 
Some commentators point out that men are more than once 
bathed by women, both slave and free, in the Odyssey 
198 
and 
suggest that Odysseus' aidos here is really motivated by the 
fact, mentioned in 220, that it has been a long time since 
his last wash; von Erffa, 
199 however, refers to lines 135-6, 
where the natural implication of the text is that, in normal 
circumstances, one should not appear naked before young 
women; in the other passages in which men are washed by 
women the context is one of xenia and the guest is washed in 
the house of his host; this is not the case here, and it may 
be that it was not considered proper for a man to be seen 
naked by women except in certain well-defined situations. 
Aidos with regard to nakedness and sex, then, is not confined 
to women, but sexual aidos is nonetheless stronger in women 
in that scrupulous. avoidance of any implication of sexual 
impurity or unfaithfulness constitutes a major part of a 
woman's virtue. In general, a woman's duty is to her husband 
or father and to the family group of which he is the head. 
Penelope's loyalty to Odysseus, for example, also entails 
loyalty to his father, and on three occasions she expresses 
the conviction that other women will_feel nemesis against 
her should she allow Laertes to go to his grave without a 
shroud (O d. 2.101,19.146,24.136). Her primary loyalty, however, 
is to her husband, and twice we find this duty described as 




Penelope, then, feels aidos for her husband's bed as the 
symbol of the marital relationship, 
200 
and for popular 
opinion as the agency which helps enforce her duty to her 
husband and which will condemn any neglect of that duty; it 
might be significant that the participle has these two objects; 
Penelope's aidos for her husband and their marriage bed 
suggests a more personal and internal obligation than does 
aidos at what other people might say; obviously it is popular 
opinion which establishes that it is a woman's obligation 
to remain loyal to her husband, but the fact that Penelope 
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venerates the relationship itself suggests that, for her, 
the standard laid down by society has become a personal moral 
imperative. 
Along with Helen and, to a lesser extent, Aphrodite, 
Klytaimestra is a prime example of a wife who felt no aidos 
for her husband's bed, and it is she who is contrasted with 
the faithful Penelope in Od. 11; 201 at 432-4 of that book the 
former's aggrieved husband describes how her act has damaged 
her reputation: 
vý E1 0AK >v'/ (t 
%0t -rt- K"-f XI Idos E )cev I Kati C. rroEJLl rt/ 0'7[-(d (. J 
6vjXI1- iöC rvv'b fc, ka'- vý Ký C-VEGOS 
Gº16t1' 
, L 
A vigorous exaggeration from a biased party, no doubt, but we 
should at least accept Agamemnon's assertion that his wife's 
deed brought aischos on herself; it is aischos of this kind 
that Penelope's aidos forestalls. Klytaimestra's act implies 
a lack of aidos and it is to this idea of shamelessness that 
Agamemnon gives expression when he calls her wvvwirt5 at 424.202 
Agamemnon also draws the contrast between his wife and 
Odysseus'; of the latter he says (445-6), 
dE hhoc 0G LIYice -T kV crr1 -t-f- K 04 6v¢CerL 
4/4". 11 K! JVý' I Kaýl!! LC ,U &CL 
ý(tJV 
II 1V&X SELS< 
. 
The passage fairly bristles with terms relating to Penelope's 
intellect, 203 and we should notice that her intellect is seen 
as producing the same response as her aidos, namely loyalty 
to her husband; the relationship between aidos and the 
intellect, particularly in the Odyssey will be explored 
immediately below. 
The requirement to be loyal to the head of the household, 
however, extends beyond the kinship group to the other 
members of the oikos; at Od. 22.424 it is said that 12 of 
i 
Odysseus' maidservants oC Vxd, 
Cis ETCt'ºý rc ' by consorting 
with the suitors, and these are marked out for punishment. 
Their chief offence is obviously their disloyalty to their 
master, but it is also significant that Eurykleia follows up 
her statement about their anaideie with the amplification, 
76 
1,1 I11, .r1 /-. 01 OUT E)1n. t '("1OU6oc( OST vcvrJ IlgV401r'E«(425). The women's 
disloyalty, then, also encompasses a failure to accord others 
the time they deserve, and this is an offence which they 
share. with the suitors themselves. 
204 By their conduct they 
are also said to dishonour Odysseus himself (418) and to 
have "poured oneidea on" Telemachos and Penelope (463-4); 
their disloyalty is an insult in itself, entailing as it does 
disregard for the instructions of one's superiors, and, 
although as anaideie the maids' conduct is discreditable 
for themselves, it also discredits the ruling members of 
the oikos, in that failure to secure the loyalty of one's 
inferiors may be taken by others as an indication of weakness; 
the notion of a community of honour is thus also relevant 
within the household, in that, while its members enjoy the 
prestige of its head, the honour of the latter is also 
vulnerable through its less important members. 
AIDOS. INTELLIGENCE AND EXCESS 
We have already noted some ways in which the moral thought 
of the Odyssey differs from that of the Iliad; most readily 
recognizable of these is the greater expressed concern for 
the co-operative virtues, but here the difference is one of 
degree; the Iliad is not blind to the desirability of such 
qualities, but there is obviously less scope for them in a 
society at war than in one at peace, _and, 
indeed, the 
distinction between wartime and peacetime may go a long way 
towards explaining many of the apparent differences of 
outlook. 
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A more profound difference, perhaps, lies in the 
greater degree to which the gods of the Odyssey have an 
interest in the justice men show in their dealings with each 
other, and this will be considered towards the end of this 
section. First of all, however, let us deal with the matter 
of intelligence; we noticed how Agamemnon's commendation of 
the loyalty of Penelope (od. 11.445-6) stressed her intellect, 
and saw that her intellectual qualities led her to pursue the 
same course of action as her aidos. There should, then, be 
some link between aidos and "good sense", and the Odysy 
provides us with ample opportunity to explore that link. The 
association, however, of terms denoting intelligence and 
77 
aidos or the conduct suggested by aidos is not unique to 
that poem. At I1.15.128-9, for example, Ares, on the point 
of entering battle to avenge the death of his son and so 
disobeying the orders of Zeus, is restrained by Athene as 
follows: 
Oo(06s i VU foc aUTwS 
14 ).. (' örýT'u 0üicr' ä KaUtý (; J ECTL I VuOs 
XwXe Kai at 
S, 
In the Odyssey, however, the association is much more 
apparent, and this is particularly so in the cases of 
Penelope, as we have seen, and Telemachos, who in the early 
books of the poem is a virtual type of aidos, personifying 
the modesty and inhibitions of youth; accordingly he is 
frequently described as pinutos, pepnumenos etc.. Od. 4.158-60 
is a good example, where Pei. sistratos explains his companion's 
reticence to their host, Menelaos: 
äß)cf%( öc öýÖ CWýý E lTC vE fr, ocT. ( d' EVL tIv 
WO E ýl B WJ TG TO ET[-6 r to kl4 XV4C At v -t 
aura rF6 FV 10u vwC 0Eov ws Týýo OL L 
Telemachos' saophrosyne and nemesis (here directed at 
himself) 206 are clearly seen as virtues, and as Helen North 
points out, 
207 
not only is the former associated with aidos 
here (through nemesis) but it is also close to it in sense, 
in that the designation saophron signifies the control of 
the impulse to outspokenness. But saophron takes on this 
connotation largely through its association with nemesis, 
and in other Homeric passages does not imply much more than 
do other terms which commend "good sense". 
Lack of intelligence may also be seen as lack of aidos, as 
we saw, in fact, in the example from 11.15 above. Similar is 
Od. 17.454; Antinoos has shown a flagrant lack of aidos in 
his words to the beggar, and Odysseus charges him with lack 
of re e: 
s/ý !//111 ý/ 
i 
öa vit cEc 1ýE t Ka1 C/E vts W '7ro'frO LauKaK 
By convention, those of Antinoos' status are assumed to be of 
fine appearance, and Odysseus' claim that Antinoos' wits do 
not match his appearance recalls the reproach uttered at f.. 
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1W9 S05 dýºýTýý 
The thought is the same; those censured have acted without 
aidos and are criticized for the possession of an appearance 
which belies their true nature; it is assumed that the 
man of admirable appearance will possess aidos and act 
accordingly. 
Just as Antinoos is condemned for his lack of sense in his 
treatment of the beggar, so the herdsman, Philoitios, whose 
reaction is a true manifestation of aidos, is commende(for 
his intelligence (Od. 20.227-8): 
0V Kok ", E Int. Cour Kot it: wouTXC evi 
frcrt E OIL KA. S, 
ýtYv(.. ýr v- w ýF Ka. I a-urO o Toi -7r"L I/ 41 
ýeFVa IK Fc ... 
A man who does not treat stangers well is thus not only 
a ron but also kakos. We might well compare 18.383, where 
Odysseus charges Eurymachos, who has just acted without 
aidos, indeed (381) with hybris, with consorting with Ii"Avo0-rL 
k' DVW . (- OoL6pI, 
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namely the other suitors. We are thus 
confronted with usages of agathos and kakos which, based as 
they are on the possession of co-operative moral virtues, 
differ sharply from those stressed by Adkins, undoubtedly 
the majority, which commend ability in warfare, wealth, noble 
birth and decry their opposites. 
209 We could conceivably 
regard the "quiet" usages as "persuasive definitions", but 
the problem with that expedient would be that we should have 
no way of knowing whether the society for which the poem was 
composed would agree with such descriptions or not; if 
anything, the general tone of the Odyssey, which assumes that 
its audience will condemn the suitors, conventional arete and 
all, suggests that it might. It seems we must simply reckon 
with two usages, one, the competitive, both descriptive and 
evaluative, and the other purely evaluative. A good parallel 
from English usage would be the adjective "noble"; one might 
never be noble in the sense of coming from a distinguished 
family, but it is not beyond the powers of ordinary speech 
to describe one as noble by virtue of some action, heroic or 
altruistic, say, which people find commendable; and just as 
the suitors remain agathoi in spite of others' disapproval, 
in spite, even, of being called "not agathoi", so a nobleman 
79 
in our culture may continue to be so described regardless of 
whether his conduct is noble in any morally evaluative sense. 
We have already looked at Penelope's statement (Od. 18.215-25, 
pp. 60-61 above) that Telemachos' failure to protect his 
guest revealed his lack of sense and would implicate him in 
aischos and lobe; Telemachos accepts his mother's criticism, 
but wishes to defend himself against her attack on his 
phrenes and his noema; hence (228-32): 
aJ'roc ( Er J Ovp V06W Kxi aiSa EKad-ra, 
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aewro. 
Telemachos, then, also sees the impulse to protect a guest 
in terms of good sense, and since to protect a guest and to 
be aware of the consequences for one's reputation of not 
protecting a guest are both reactions with which aidos is 
-concerned, there is clearly a link between acting in 
accordance with aidos and good sense; similarly, the suitors, 
whose insensitivity to aidos is their chief characteristic, 
and whose presence prevents Telemachos' acting in accordance 
with his principles, are described as wvcWx eýeoýfsvmM232). 
Now, Adkins210 points out that neuter usages of agathos and 
kakos do not affect his thesis on arete as the most admired 
quality because, "to say of an action 'it is agathon 
( akon) to do x' is simply to say that it is beneficial to 
do x, without passing any moral judgement on the rightness 
or wrongness of x. " This may be true of the formulation which 
Adkins quotes, but here the wording is both different and 
more general: Telemachos " knows $ and to chereia and 
the suitors "think kaka". The implication of the latter may 
be, as, for example, in 11.6.161-2 and -0d. 
1.42,211 that the 
suitors' current "thoughts" will prove harmful for themselves, 
that their present conduct is imprudent, but even this idea 
is not clearly brought out. Clearly there is an element of 
prudential morality in both cases, that of Telemachos as well 
as that of the suitors, for it is certainly imprudent of 
Telemachos to leave himself open to aischos and lobe, but 
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it would be to misrepresent the tone of the passage to 
suggest that Penelope is simply urging Telemachos to consult 
his own interest and that he replies by pointing out that he 
knows what is good for him. Telemachos knows what he should 
do in order to act in the manner expected of him, and it is 
in that sense that one course of action is esthlon and 
another kakon; he is not simply considering his own interest, 
because the direct beneficiary in the event of his being 
able to act as his phrenes bid him would not be himself but 
his guest. In criticizing her son's intellectual capacity 
Penelope is urging him to react both to the fact that he 
to the stbijýty has failed in his duty to his guest andýRa o er people 
will see this as grounds for reproach, while in pointing out 
that he knows esthla and to chereia Telemachos wishes to 
impress upon his mother his awareness that it is not esthlon 
that a guest should be treated as the beggar has been, 
neither in general, because it violates a norm which is 
portrayed as universal, nor in particular, because it is not 
fitting that one of his status should be unable to protect a 
guest; Telemachos is saying that he knows what the standards 
of society are and how they affect him. 
There is a link, then, between awareness of the values of 
society and individual self-interest, and this link is some- 
thing we have seen before in all those passages in which 
proper conduct is justified in terms of expediency; it is, 
indeed, an underlying message of the Odyssey that self- 
interest and behaviour in accordance with propriety will 
coincide. It is possible to view this phenomenon in two ways; 
either one can stress the materialism of the Greeks, pointing 
out that they are rarely content with a simple injunction 
such as "do it because it is right", or one can point out 
that the identification of morality with self-interest 
places the code of morality on a very stable basis and 
suggests that a society which subscribed to the belief that 
it is in one's own interest to observe the norms of that 
society would have a strong belief in the validity and 
universality of its own values. The tendency to link morality 
and self-interest is a characteristic of Greek society in 
81 
all the stages of its development with which we shall deal, 
and as well as being responsible for a strong streak of 
materialism it also gives rise to the elevated moral thought 
of Protagoras, Demokritos and Sokrates. 
212 
"Good" conduct, then, is that which promotes one's own good 
by means of the observance of the standards of society, and 
it is one's intelligence (loosely defined) which enables one 
to recognize and act upon the requirements of society. That 
having been said, it will be apparent that aidos and the 
intellect lead to the same ends. This does not, however, 
mean that aidos is an intellectual quality, nor does it imply 
that Homeric man adopted an intellectualist approach to 
ethics; for the words which belong loosely to the category 
we should describe as intellectual cover a much wider range 
of usage in Greek. One's noos and that which one "knows" 
describe not one's knowledge but one's character, 
213 in the 
sense that if one "knows lawless things" , like Polyphemos 
(Od. 9.189,428), one will act consistently in a lawless way, 
will be, in fact, a lawless person. Furthermore, if there is 
no real distinction between knowledge and character, neither 
is there any between knowledge and ability; "knowing how" is 
not distinguished from "knowing that". 
214 It is in this sense 
that one's "intellect" enables one to act in accordance with 
propriety, for knowing what society expects is combined with 
knowing how to act upon that knowledge, and both are regarded 
as ingrained features of one's character; and this is where 
aidos is relevant, for, since one's awareness of the standards 
of society is, in the ideal situation, profound and acute, 
any failure to act as required will entail the knowledge 
that one is not living up to expectation and that popular 
disapproval will be the likely result; and the reaction to 
that prospect will be aidos. 
We saw in our section on sanctions that the terms which 
place conduct in the category of that which is liable to 
arouse popular disapproval refer fundamentally to appearances. 
Society thus condemns conduct on the basis of "how it looks", 
and one consequence of this is that excessive behaviour is 
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regarded as unacceptable and moderation is approved. Thus 
aidos has a great deal to do with avoidance of excess and, it 
is in this way that it is operative over a whole range of 
situations which do not belong to any of the categories to 
which it is particularly relevant. 
215 At Od. 1.227-9, a passage 
which is by now very familiar, we see how excess, 
appropriateness and intelligence interact with the complex 
of values centred on aidos; we have already dealt with the 
suitors' "uglinesses" (aischea 229,14-5 above), now we 
should notice how their conduct is condemned as excessive 
( %)rC' o rE-5 
ü-r(f cAwS, 227) and contrasted with that which 
an intelligent man (pinutos, 229) would expect; the possibility 
of nemesis(228), moreover, suggests that in other individuals 
such excess might be inhibited by aidos. 
The suitors, it need hardly be said, are cast as anaideis 
throughout the poem, and many people express their nemesis 
at their actions. Apart from their anaideie they are 
condemned for two other major vices in the poem, their hybris 
and their atasthalie, both of which refer to excess. 
216 At 
20.169-71 the behaviour of the suitors is described in terms 
of all three: 
A trot Q öý ,E uxc E6 &0 c. -rc Eac 
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A lack of aidos, then, may lead to or be accompanied by acts 
of hybris and atasthalie, and indeed there is a strong case 
for saying that these two vices operate as rough antonyms of 
aidos. 
217 Thus the benefits of possessing and showing aidos 
are 
.i central to the theme of the poem; certainly the dangers 
of the opposite course are stressed in very prominent 
passages which occur at its beginning and at its end (1.32-5, 
cf. Dodds, GI, p. 32, and 24.454-60). 
Abhorrence of excess, however, is not a quality peculiar to 
the Odyssey, although it is pehaps more prominent there than 
in the Iliad (war gives more scope for excess than does 
peace); we do, in fact, find similar notions in the Iliad 
and, indeed, a case could be made tor the proposition that 
83 
moderation and avoidance of excess are as central to that 
poem as they are to the Odyssey. 
218 In particular, much is 
made of the excessive conduct of Achilles himself from the 
point at which he rejects the appeals of his comrades until 
he accepts the supplication of Priam. Ajax appeals to his 
aidos (9.640), an appeal which he rejects, Phoinix hints at 
the possibility of nemesis (9.523) and Priam and others refer 
to the violence of his nature (see especially 22.418, where 
Priam describes him as ýcTicc04.1 
Jj (v"e(r q) . By the time 
his excess has taken the form of dragging Hektor's body daily 
round the walls of Troy even the gods are beginning to worry 
about his conduct. Apollo is the first to voice their concern, 
and in terms which are familiar by now (24.39-45,52-4)': 
0XGw ý(xlhIL 060L 
ýOVAC-re 11ra Elvt 
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There are several important points here, of which the main 
ones for our purposes are the criticism of Achilles'lack of 
sense and the stress laid upon his excessive violence, 
violence which is so excessive, in fact, that he is compared 
to a wild beast; hence von Erffa's statement, with reference 
to this passage, "aidos unterscheidet die Menschen auch von 
den Tieren. "219 It is indeed a lack of aidos which has led 
Achilles to his present condition, and Apollo's threat of 
nemesis makes this doubly clear. 
220 Most important of all, 
however, we see from this passage that similar standards 
obtain in both the Iliad and the Odyssey. 
It is also significant that Apollo envisages the nemesis of 
the gods as a direct result of Achilles' conduct; elsewhere 
in the Iliad (e. g. 4.507,8.198) any nemesis the gods feel 
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towards mortals is based on slights they feel themselves to 
have suffered; here, however, it seems that their reaction 
is directed simply at the excessiveness and inappropriateness 
of Achilles' behaviour; this reaction, then, does not differ 
from the nemesis a mortal might feel at similar conduct, but 
it is significant in itself that the gods are seen to be 
taking a similar interest in human propriety to that which 
might be shown by a man. 
221 
With this we might compare Od. 14. 
284, where Zeus xeinios is said to feel nemesis at kaka erga; 
in his capacity as protector of guests Zeus already has an 
interest in human conduct, but only in so far as maltreatment 
of guests is felt to infringe his prerogative; here, however, 
the natural implication is that he dislikes kaka erga in 
general. Nemesis in these passages therefore stands mid- 
way in its development from purely human disapproval to an 
exclusively divine reaction, a. development which seems to 
take place because the gods were first felt to share human 
standards, then to impose them. 
The feeling that the gods share mortals' disapproval at 
excess is widespread in the Odyssey; at 14.83-4 Eumaios 
expresses his belief that the gods "dislike"222 schetlia ergs 
and prefer dike and moderation (aisima era ). From this 
there follows a general assumption that the gods will have a 
hand in the punishment of the suitor*; in two such passages 
reference is made to their failure to accord others their 
proper share of time (see 22.413-5,23.63-7, and cf. pp. 54 
and 76 above), something which, we decided, was indicative 
of a lack of aidos, while the second of these states that 
the suitors have been punished for their atasthalie, which 
might also imply lack of aidos. 
223 Breaches of aidos, then, 
may be reasons for divine punishment. 
This point emerges more clearly from Telemachos' appeal to 
the Ithakesians at 2.64-7: 
xxxovs T' oLl' St rav, TE 
o 'R"ECcVocCFTC( ov4t. 
ývº rt ývý, -roc ar-re ýw r 
ve(fj8vlr'i- Kost aü Tön, 
'fCEC c. kcrC o\(a. S äv Oe wirou S 
ü-rrO G-4 6 "ßr ý,,, j v. v 
ýv' ocýecýöKiwývoý R xt e%Yic . 
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Telemachos asks the people to feel nemesis at the destruction 
of his inheritance, most probably directed at themselves for 
allowing it to happen, but possibly also at the suitors who 
are responsible for it. 
224 They are also urged to show aidos 
with regard to other communities, which suggests that the 
members of the community had an interest in the collective 
honour of their group and in the status of their leaders, 
and that communities as a whole might vie with each other 
for prestige. Telemachos' third point, however, is a new one; 
he does not suggest that the people of Ithaka will themselves 
be punished by the gods for their failure to expel the 
suitors, but that the punishment of the real wrongdoers may 
implicate the entire community. The thought seems similar to 
Hesiod, 1DD. 240-1, and may be based on an idea that the gods 
punish by means of natural disasters which overtake all. In 
carrying out such punishment, the gods' chief target would 
be the suitors and their anaideie, but Telemachos' point is 
that failure to show aidos and nemesis on the part of the 
ordinary people may involve-them in the fate of the guilty. 
It also emerges from this passage, as from 14.284 (previous 
page), that the gods dislike kaka erga in general; in the 
latter case it was Zeus xeinios who took an interest in such 
deeds, and it could be that the deeds in question could be 
seen as infringements of his prerogative in his capacity as 
protector of guests; at 2.64-7, however, the connexion with 
guest-friendship is more tenuous, and it seems unlikely that 
the gods regard the suitors' conduct as an offence against 
themselves. The same is true of 22.38-40, where Odysseus 
charges the suitors: 
OCV TOU -rf ý wo/TO S UT('E NýV 
Ö. 
k( t )UVlCL K-K ý j/ tý "17l s/ 
0U rc- B Eavs cEC+foc sý OL ou ocvoJ C-U(VV E)ýa'v(Ud, 
oU rc -rc i' äv @e & -zrMW vE rclJ Kac. Tncý rA Eý ý"r e lac . 
Wooing another man's woman while he is still alive is not 
one of the particular offences against aidos we discussed 
above, nor are the gods specifically protectors of the 
marital relationship in the same way as they are of guests 
and suppliants, yet Odysseus states it as a fact that both 
the wrath of the gods and the nemesis of men would result 
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from the suitors"illicit wooing of Penelope. If the suitors 
had no regard for the nemesis of men then they were anaideis, 
and the act of wooing another man's wife is presumably felt 
to be occasion for nemesis because it transgresses the normal 
order of things and is "inappropriate"; anything of which 
others disapprove, then, may arouse aidos in those who are 
sensitive to that emotion, and thus aidos can cover a range 
of situations much wider than consideration of those with 
which it is chiefly concerned would suggest. It is also 
assumed in this passage that the gods share men's disapproval, 
and so, in theory at least, any beach of aidos may excite 
divine anger and lead to divine punishment. The gods might 
therefore enter into any situation in which aidos is relevant, 
yet it is not true to say that aidos is a religious scruple, 
for only in a few well defined situations (those of guest- 
friendship and supplication) does one aics4 (9.1 & &ovs . In 
other cases, although divine and human disapproval may result 
from the same breach of aidos, it is with the disapproval of 
other human beings that aidos is concerned, while the dis- 
approval of the gods is seen more as occasion for fear than 
for aidos (aidos might perhaps accompany this fear, since to 
be hated by the gods might leave one open to the disapproval 
of one's fellows, as in the case of Odysseus at Od. 10.72, 
pp. 23-4 above, but it is still true to say that, outwith the 
special circumstances we have considered, aidos is not 
primarily concerned with the gods). 
To sum up, then, aidos in Homer is an unwillingness to act 
contrary to one's own perception of the standards of society 
as a whole or of a particular peer group; it is associated 
with the individual's concern for his own reputation, but 
also, because one's relationships with others affect both 
parties to the relationship, with the status and reputation 
of others, and the proper reaction to the same. It is an 
important concept in both poems, and is regarded as desirable 
in most circumstances, although it is recognized that in 
some situations the restraint provided by aidos will be 
undesirable; Adkins, in explaining the weakness of ads and 
other quiet virtues, writes, "Naturally, to say that this 
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distaste, this aidos, is weaker when the quiet virtues are 
in question is not to say that it does not exist; and it 
must be such aidos which holds Homeric society together, in 
so far as it is held together, for a society of agathoi with 
no quiet virtues at all would simply destroy itself. "225 I 
have no quibble with the substance of this statement; we 
have already seen that there are sound practical reasons why 
the characters of the poems are more concerned about 
criticism of their competitive failures than about their 
co-operative ones; but Adkins' emphasis seems strange; we 
know that Homeric society is held together, that it did not, 
at least as far as the poems tell us, destroy itself; if, 
then, aidos is responsible for this, if aidos does hold 
society together, this would appear to be a reason for 
stressing, not minimizing, its importance, even if it is not 
present in some individuals or ineffective in some critical 
situations, whether by virtue of its own nature as an 
emotion or as a result of practical considerations. 
Aidos is also important thematically in both poems; Agamemnon's 
initial offence against Achilles is seen as anaideie, but 
Achilles himself lacks aidos in his persistence in his anger, 
and becomes virtually a savage without it, until Priam's 
appeal to aidos restores him to normal human society. In the 
Odyssey the suitors' chief characteristic is their anaideie, 
and the appearance of Odysseus as an aidoios par excellence 
both throws their lack of aidos into higher relief and 
demonstrates the desirability and utility of the concept in 
the society of the poem. If the didactic purpose of both 
poems is accepted, as it was by generations of ancient Greeks, 
then surely the benefits of aidos form one of the major 
lessons to be learned. 
From what has been said about aidos as a fear of popular 
disapproval and from its association with a group of terms 
connoting intellect, one might suppose that it simply 
amounted to a calculation of the effects of courting society's 
disapproval, and we have certainly seen passages where an 
element of this is present. 226 But even where a' os is 
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combined with a calculation of the consequences of one's 
actions it is not synonymous with the calculation, but rather 
the prospect of a given set of consequences produces the 
emotional inhibition which aidos represents. A calculative 
aspect, indeed, will be inherent in the application of any 
prospective check, since, if one's aidos or one's moral 
conscience is to inhibit a course of action, the consequences 
of that action must be clear in one's mind. Nor is aidos 
always calculative; Telemachos is told (Od. 3.14) that no one 
will think ill of him for seeking to ascertain his father's 
fate, yet (24) his aidos is still as strong; aidos is an 
internal emotion and is governed by instinct rather than 
reason. Nor would it be true to say that aidos is always 
self-regarding; even though it is a characteristic of the 
Greeks to expect a return for their favours and material 
justifications of the desirability of according others aidos 
are found, it is not necessary to suppose that the hope of 
reciprocity or the justifications of co-operative relation- 
ships constitute the sole reasons for showing aidos to 
another human being; the aidos which Telemachos imagines his 
hosts may show him out of c&ern for his feelings (Od. 3.96 
= 4.326) can hardly be self-regarding, 
and it would be churlish 
to suggest that Eumaios, who saves a portion of his income 
in order to help aidoioi (Od. 15.373), does so for reasons of 
self-interest. 
In what way, then, if any, does aidos approximate to an 
internal form of conscience? Redfield 
227 
writes that aidos 
is "nothing like conscience, " yet goes on, "Aidos is a 
vulnerability to the expressed ideal norm of the society; 
the ideal norm is directly experienced within the self, as a 
man internalizes the anticipated judgements of others on 
himself. " Aidos is therefore an internal form of consciousness 
according to this definition, but not a form of conscience. 
228 
This view is at least an advance on those scholars, mainly 
those writing in the German tradition of Geistesgeschichte, 
who claim that Homeric man possesses no internal standard, 
is incapable of decisions and simply adjusts his conduct to 
suit the external standards of society; 229 it is in this 
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sense that aidos is sometimes called an external form of 
conscience. 
230 An external conscience, however, is little 
more than an absurdity; even to recognize that a given action 
or occurrence will damage one's status in the eyes of others 
will demand both a subjective idea of one's own worth and an 
awareness of the standards of society, and it is difficult 
to see how either of these could be external. 
231 Those who 
propound the sort of theory which suggests that Homeric man 
adjusts his conduct to his environment and has no capacity 
for rational decision also tend to point out that the 
reactions and choices of the type of individual they 
describe, given the power of convention and the pressure to 
conform, are automatic, instinctive and unquestioning; this 
suggests, however, not that the standards being observed are 
external, but that they are deeply internalized, since 
surely observance of external standards would entail 
reflection and deliberation rather than automatic response. 
232 
The observation that for Homeric man morality is not distin- 
guished from conformity233 does not mean that he has no 
internal moral conscience; it may mean that he has no concept 
of personal morality as distinguished from adherence to the 
standards of society, but this should not surprise us, since 
the development of personal codes of morality is a relatively 
sophisticated one, and one which only occurs at an age which 
is both much later than that of the Homeric poems and much 
less certain of its inherited system of values. Neither is 
conformity uniquely a feature of "shame-cultures"; values 
based explicitly on guilt may also produce conformity, 
234 
and when dealing with popular morality in any sort of culture, 
one will have to consider those values to which the culture 
as a whole conforms or would like to conform, rather than 
principles which are unique to a number of different, 
usually educated, individuals. 
Aidos is, then, an internal state of conscience which is 
based on an internalized awareness of the values of society; 
this awareness will have become internalized precisely 
because of the uniformity of those values and of the power 
of popular opinion to enforce them, and it will have become 
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internalized through education at an early age. It is, 
however, based firmly on the values of society rather than 
personal principles, and although characters express some 
disagreement with the values of society by ignoring popular 
disapproval or, as does Agamemnon at Il. 14.80-1, pp-31-2 
above, by denying its applicability in situations in which 
it generally is applicable, there is no case where a character 
experiences aidos at the prospect of the breach of a standard 
which is not one generally accepted by his peers; where 
aidos is deprecated it is so because it is seen as natural 
in the circumstances, but unhelpful. 
Aidos is also exclusively 
prospecting 
in usage in Homer, 
and as such cannot express the ideas, "I am ashamed of 
myself" or "I am ashamed of what I have done, " that is to 
say, if it does encompass conscience in the sense of 
awareness of the standards of society, it does not approximate 
to pr notion of the retrospective "bad" or guilty conscience. 
There is a case for saying, however, that prospective aidos 
can be based on a retrospective awareness that one has done 
something discreditable, and the feeling of anxiety occasioned 
by this awareness, which the Greek articulates in terms of 
aidos (because for him the disapproval of his fellows is a 
more pressing sanction than his own disapproval of himself), 
may be similar to the anxiety which we call "a bad con- 
science. "235 Explicitly, however, aidos is always connected 
with the future disapproval of others in Homer, and for most 
of the period covered by this study we shall find that the 
Greeks have the greatest of difficulty in trying explicitly 
to express the idea of guilt or remorse. This is not to say 
that the characters of the/oems do not experience that which 
we should call guilt or remorse, 
236 
simply that they have no 
words with which to articulate the emotion in a form which 
would designate it unambiguously as the feeling which we 
describe in those terms. 
237 While aidos is internal, then, 
it is nevertheless to be distinguished from our concept of 
conscience in that it does not fully coincide with all the 
applications of that concept in terms of its usage. 
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OTHER TERMS 
On pages 23-7 of his work von Erffa considers other concepts 
which approximate to aidos in some of their usages; these, 
in the main, are terms which express an idea of inhibition 
together with a notion of respect for another's status; in 
most cases they are, as aidos is not, operative in the sphere 
of man's response to the divine. Most examples of the verb 
hazomai, for example, are concerned with the proper reaction 
to the gods238 or their representatives. 
239 In this sense it 
does resemble aideomai in that it is an inhibitory reaction 
to the special status of its object, and it inhibits 
disregard for, and maltreatment of, that object. Its inhibi- 
tory force and its connexion with the numinous is shown at 
11.6.266-7, where Hektor explains: 
xEerý ýý äVtlriOLIfW A(A > t[ e(/ Gtl 001x& OLVOV 
o'fopxc- 
Here the verb clearly operates in a similar way to aideomai, 
but the exclusive reference to religious scruple, rather 
than to "other people", sets it apart. It can, however, be 
used in a context where aideomai might also occur, provided 
that context is one of those in which aidos is specifically 
linked to the divine sphere: hence Odysseus' warning to the 
Cyclops (Od. 9.478-9): 
6xCTiýL1) E'WE% ( J& vuvs OUK 
oCfEo 13 
Gvl, OtKw 
E (O býCVý Tw rý 
Z c'u TtraTo Ka. ( O6OL aA OL. 
The opis of the gods, originally their all-seeing eye, comes 
to denote their anger. 
240 If a connotation of "seeing" or 
"being seen" is retained in the term, then it is highly 
appropriate that one can aideisthai the opis of the gods 
(Od. 21.28, in the context of guest-friendship). As with 
hazomai, however, it is with fear of divine anger, not of 
popular disapproval, that Opis is concerned, and the verb, 
opizomai, works much as does hazomai. 
241 Thus it may approx- 
imate to aideomai in those religious contexts in which ads 
normally occurs: fearing the wrath of Zeus xeinios at Q d. 14. 
283-4 might amount to feeling dos towards the god and his 
proteges. Opizomai is used with a human object at x.. 22.332, 
but seems to connote"fear" rather than "respect". 
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Closest to aidos of all those terms considered by von Erffa 
is sebas, and this is a concept which we shall have to 
consider at all stages of our study. Like aidos, sebas is a 
reaction which can acknowledge the status of other people 
and which can inhibit action; in Homer the noun seems always 
to be used of the subjective reaction to some special aspect 
of another person, of material objects or of a situation, 
although in later works it may also denote the quality in 
the other person etc. which arouses the reaction in others. 
i 
In the formulaic expression 6e$as , tA 
cj c Ct fo(owvToc (Od. 3. 
123,4.75,142 {with feminine participle}, 6.161,8.384) sebas 
seems to/a feeling of wonder or astonishment which acknow- 
ledges something special or unusual in its object, and to 
have little to do with aidos, but at 11.18.178-80 it appears 
iri 
virtually as a synonym; 
s- is urging Achilles to react 
to the possible mutilation of Patroklos' body: 
6'6((a 
Se 
6-f ev, vüJý KE6(ýw 
-TFPa ro Khoo 1 e 1CwýrL KvriJ /. ihOýx ycve 60a. c 
6 XWPJ J At KEV -L VEKUS I(lvl+ýIý, wos Choi. 
The prospect for Achilles should his friend's body be dis- 
figured is lobe, and sebas is to be his reaction to that 
prospect; if se as, then, can be a feeling aroused by the 
prospect of disgrace, it must be very close to aidos; as well 
as being a feeling of wonder it must also be a form of anxiety 
with reference to the individual's own status. The usage of 
the verbs, sebazomai and sebomai, confirmsthe closeness of the 
concept to that of a' o; twice in 1 1.6 (167,416-7) the 
former expresses, as might aideomai, inhibition at doing harm 
to another of a particular status; in the former passage 
Proitos refrains from killing Bellerophontes, and in the 
latter Achilles' se bas causes him to refrain from stripping 
his victim, Eetion, of his arms. At x. 4.242, however, it is 
sebomai which comes closest to the meaning of aideomai when 
it is used in an exhortation to greater effort in battle: 
-hoc. i öýWe0L 
E kc 1? 
Ees 
, Uü VV 
ýC-iSEýEýc- 
The implication of cowardice contained in elenchees clearly 
marks this exhortation to sebas as very similar to those we 
looked at in which aidos was urged, and the conclusion that 
the feeling of sebas can express the idea of concern for 
93 
one's own reputation is inescapable. Sebas in general seems 
to be a kind of shudder, which produces a momentary withdrawal, 
and as such can cover a whole range of reactions from awe 
and astonishment to respect and fear; there is very little 
to go on, but it does seem that sebas, although it does 
undoubtedly relate to concern for one's reputation and for 
the status of others, is less explicitly tied to the idea of 
the disapproval of others than is aidos. 
I have left consideration of the three usages of aischunomai 
till last, in order to tackle the question of the degree to 
which that verb may be seen as synonymous with aideomai. In 
two of the three passages of the Odyssey in which it occurs 
it seems to me that there is no practical difference between 
it and aideomai. Both verbs, in fact, refer fundamentally to 
the same idea; aideomai is cognate with aischos and aischros 
and works as a reaction to the commission of deeds which may 
be described as aischron, aischea or which may involve one 
in aischos (disgrace) or invite the aischea (insults) of 
others; aischunomai, on the other hand, is clearly a deriv- 
ative of aischos or aischros and is probably a later format- 
ion than aideomai; nevertheless it refers to the same reaction 
to the prospect of disgrace or humiliation which would be 
expressed in terms of aischos or aischron. At Od. 7.305-6 
Odysseus explains why he did not accompany Nausikaa to town; 
gallantly he represents the decision as his rather than the 
girl's: 
ov K Eýýýhoý &Cöaýs xi ('(vroµh/os TE' 
% 
, AAq -TrW3 
14Xl äoc. v"3 M 6Kv'Iacrr0 c, 
rav`CL 
Here the familiar connexion with fear and the reference to 
Alkinoos' disapproval (1ifcoKViföac'i0 ) mark aischunomenos out 
as synonymous with aidoumenos, and the fear of popular 
criticism to which Odysseus refers (307) is exactly that 
which Nausikaa articulated earlier (6.273-88) in terms which 
were clear indication of her aidos. 
242 
At 21.323-9 aischunomai is even more obviously a synonym of 
aideomai; the participle governs y rt\/ oeVSSZv 4 yvvx (k-WV 
as its object, and the familiar fear of what 15Ka Kw---reC' S 
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may say is expressed, and summarised by elenchea in 329. 
At 18.12, however, the situation seems less clear; Iros tells 
the beggar Odysseus that he is being urged to drag him away, 
and goes on 0 ait'XV'(0 C Eýt"rrvýs . Now, if aischunomai were 
to be equivalent to aideomai here, we should expect the 
meaning to be that Iros is reluctant to treat a beggar with 
violence, and, indeed, there is nothing in the text to 
indicate that this is not the meaning, but if Iros really is 
i 
taunting Odysseus (Y/6CKECw\/, 9) then such compunction seems 
out of place, although it might be suggested that his scruple 
is feigned. Von Erffa, on the other hand, believes that Iros 
means that he considers it aischron for himself to become 
involved with so menial a task, and thus insults Odysseus by 
claiming that it is beneath his dignity to expel him; 
243 
this seems to fit very well, but it is a matter of subjectivity 
which interpretation is preferred. Even if aischunomai does 
diverge from aideomai here, this does not mean that there is 
a fundamental difference in the usage of the two verbs; we 
shall meet such slight differences again, but generally 
we shall find that the two verbs are interchangeable in most 
contexts, and that even usages which at first seem unique to 
one or other of them tend to become attracted to the other 
by a process of cross-fertilization. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE 
1.11.21.468-9, Od. 146-7 are similar. 
2. Obviously, then, it operates negatively, it inhibits; see 
Verdenius, Mnem. 1944-5,47-8,49n. 2,51. Von Erffa's insistence 
(5,40) that aidos is positive arises from a confusion of its 
effects, usually beneficial, and its operation. 
3. Aidos of this kind is clearly altruistic; see Scott, 
1980, p. 25, and cf. pp. 56 and 88 below. 
4. On this topic and these passages, see Pearson, Popular 
Ethics 42-3; for a parallel from a modern Greek community, 
see J. K. Campbell in Peristiany (ed. ) Honour and Shame, p. 150. 
5. Cf. 
, 
x. 13.121-2, and see Scott, 1980, p. 14; nemesis is 
more frequently situated in the thymos - I1.2.223,16.544, 
17.254, Od. 1.119,2.138,4.158); Scott, p. 26. 
6. See Murray, Rise of the Greek Epic, 83 and 89. 
7. See von Erffa, 28-31, and the remarks of Redfield, Nature 
and Culture, p. 118; aidos is coupled with pity at 11.21.74, 
22.123-4,419,24.44,207-8,503,0d. 14.388-8,19.253-4,22.312,344. 
On pity in Homer in general, see Scott, 1979,1-14. 
For aidos and words connoting fear, see 11.1.331,3.172, 
15.652-3,18.394,24.435, Od. 8.22,17.188, and cf. below, 
pp. 42-4, on aidoios in combination with deinos. 
8. Pity - e. g.. I1.21.74, fear - e. g. (1.1.331, Od. 17.188 
9.458-61 were athetized by Aristarchos, but Plutarch (see 
OCT app. crit. ) may be right to assume that this was on account 
of their shocking content; the lines certainly seem to belong 
here. On their substance, see von Erffa, p. 5. 
10. See below, pp. 74-5. 
11. See below, pp. 93-4. Other instances of the phrase (O d. 15. 
468,14.239) are less important. 
12. On nemesis see von Erffa, 30-5, Redfield, Nature and 
Culture, 115-8, and Scott, 1980,26-30. 
13. Nemesis etc. occur at . 
LI. 2.222-3,296,3.156,410,4.413,507, 
5.57,872,6.335,351,8.198,407,421,9.523,10.115,129,145,11.543 





14. These would be a valuable trophy for the Trojans, and 
proof of their success. On the importance of trophies and 
other means of concrete proof, see Finley, WO, 132-7. 
15. P. 30. 
16. On these, see Scott, 1980, p. 26. 
17. See below, pp. 38-40. 
18. The terminology is that of Adkins, E, c. 3 passim. 
19. Od. 2.101-2,19.146-7,24.136-7. 
20. It is frequently directed at the suitors, for example; 
see Od. 1.228-9,2.64,17.481,21.146-7 etc.; the gods in the 
Iliad feel nemesis when one of their number becomes involved 
in human strife - Il. 5.757-9,872; correspondingly, a god who 
acts in the manner condemned by nemesis is said to be without 
aidos - I1.15.115,129; see von Erffa, p. 33. 
21. e. g. Od. 4.158,22.489. 
22. Nature and Culture, p. 117; cf. Scott, 1980, p. 26. 
23. P. 35. 
24. 
. 
1.2.296,3.156,4.413, Od. 1.119,350,18.227,19.264,20.330; 
cf. Redfield, 117-8, Scott, 1980, p. 27. 
25. 
. 
1.10.145,15.115,16.22, Od. 23.213; cf. Hohendahl- 
Zoetelief, Manners, 22-4. 
26. See below, 72-3. 
27. For an alternative explanation (which seems to me less 
probable), see Scott, 1980, p. 29. 
28. Cf. von Erffa, p. 35. 
29. See below, pp. 38-40. 
30. See Adkins, ME, p. 42; this does not mean, however, that 
Paris' conduct is only discreditable for its recipient, 
Menelaos; see Long, JHS 1970, p. 133 on 11.3.46-51. Lobe also 
occurs at fl. 3.42,9.387,11.14 (where it is qualified by 
aeik6s), 19.208, Oc. 18.347,19.373 (note aischea), 20.169,285, 
24.326,433. Verbal forms ("disgrace", "insult") occur at 
11.1.232,2.242,13.623, Odd. 23.15,26. One whose situation is 
disgraceful may be described as a lobeter, as at 11.2.275, 
11.385,24.531 (note elenchees) or lobetos, as at I L24.531. 
31. ME, p. 42. 
32. See below, pp. 61-2. 
33. Cf. Long, JHS 1970,130-1. 
34. Oneidea also occurs at 11.1.291,2.222,251,3.438,9.460 
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(p. 10 above), 20.246, Od. 6.285,17.461,22.463; oneidos at 
11.16.498,17.556; at 0d. 6.285 oneidea behaves like aischea 
in referring to the situation which leads to reproach, rather 
than the reproaches themselves. 
35. dos therefore denotes that which attracts aidos in this 
usage; cf. 11.2.262. In later literature aidos also appears 
as that in one's character which attracts the aidos of others; 
see below, p. 126on h. Hom. Cer. 214; in Homer aidos comes 
nearest to being a character trait at O d. 8.172, where it is 
a quality of the man whose morphe a god has crowned with 
eloquence. Characters are said to have no aidos at 11.15.129, 
24.44, Od. 21.171), and this is obviously a reference to a 
quality which they do not possess, but in each case the 
speaker has a specific act of misconduct in mind; see von 
Erffa, 38-9. 
36. This is the interpretation of Long, JHS 1970, p. 131. 
37. The formula äv1t4kCoi. E'7rEE«t / is comparable, and 
slightly more common; see . 1.519,2.277,16.628,21.480, - 
Od. 18.326 and cf. 11.22.497, where either öv-tcF(' Lf(/ "is a 
. 11 
neuter substantive or c-rTF E rtd e4 is to be "understood". The 
combination övac. (E-Cov ýnvOof (internal accusative) also 
occurs; 11.21.393,471. 
38. It is significant that Apollo strongly resists the 
invitation to fight; his aidos for his uncle (468-9) outweighs 
the aidos at failure which Poseidon's aischion in 437 seeks 
to arouse. It is also interesting that Apollo implies that 
his conduct in refusing to fight is "sensible" (saophron, 462); 
cf. Long, JHS 1970, p. 132n. 37. 
39. On Adkins' treatment of aischron and its deficiencies, 
see also Long, 129-32. 
40. See 1.. 1.341,398,456,4.396,9.495,16.32, 
. 
04.2.250,4.339, 
340,17.130,131,19.550,22.317,416. The notion of'dishonourable 
in this use of the adjective is, it seems to me, only 
secondary, although obviously in many circumstances to die 
violently will be seen as proof of inferiority. Death in 
battle is not always dishonourable, however (contrary to the 
implication of Adkins, I1$, p. 42): see, for example, 11.15.495-6, 
22.110,24.214, and cf. 13.275-91, where Idomeneus implies 
that one's ae is not diminished by wounding or death, 
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provided one's wounds are honourably received (on this 
passage, see D. B. Claus, TAPA 1974, p. 16). See further Long, 
p. 136, Griffin, Life and Death, p. 96. 
41. Od. 14.199,24.250 (his clothes), 13.437,17.197,357,18.108 
(his lr4(l ), and 20.259,24.228 (other items). 
42. Il. 16.545,559,19.26,22.204,24.22,54. At 22.256 the sense 
of the fut. aftKcw is clearly physical (pace LSJ s. v. ); 
Hektor says that, if he defeats Achilles, he will strip him 
of his arms, but will not maltreat his body, returning it to 
the Achaeans instead. 
43. (.. 9.70,15.496,19.124. 
44. ME, P. 43. 
45. e. g. 11.14.13,19.133,24.733. 
46. Od. 15.236,23.222,4.694,20.394,22.432. 
47. M$, 41-2. 
48. Od. 3.265,4.533,11.429. 
49. Cf. Long, p. 130 and n. 30. 
i 
50. Ot KT 
(tw OKv crw , M. Scott examines the usage of oiktros 
etc. in Homer in Acta Classica 1979,6-8, and shows that 
oiktros is only once used of the death of a warrior in Homer. 
On p. 7 she concludes, "It is as if the feeling involved in 
oiktros is aroused only by people placed in a position of 
peculiar humiliation, of especially shameful failure under 
Homeric arete standards. " If this is accepted, it would imply 
that Agamemnon's death was also aeikes for himself. 
51. Adkins (ME, p. 41) says Telemachos alone, but this is 
because he assumes that Telemachos is the speaker here, as 
he is in the repetition. 
52. Cf. Long, p. 136. 
53. The position of the aeikea ergs which Achilles committed 
against Hektor is similar (. 7.. 22.395,23.24). Achilles is 
condemned for committing them, even by the gods, and yet his 
intention is clearly to dishonour his vanquished opponent, 
and indeed Hektor's body would have suffered mutilation had 
not Apollo prevented this by supernatural means. The acts 
themselves, described as unseemly or excessive, may reflect 
on both agent and patient, but the agent is more immediately 
condemned, while the danger for the honour of the patient 
lies in what an enemy or rival may make of his sufferings. 
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On Achilles' ergs see also Griffin, Life and Death, p. 85n. 9. 
54. The idea of "showing up", "making obvious" is the common 
link between the two separate meanings given by LSJ s. v.. As 
a result of this idea of "exposure" elenchos will be important 
long after the Homeric notion of "disgrace" has been forgotten. 
At all periods, exposure to the public gaze may arouse aidos. 
55. Cf. Il. 2.235,24.239. On the latter, see Hohendahl- 
Zoetelief, Manners, p. 62; on elenchos in general, 62-6. 
56. Note, At rnuvöµtvO(. { ocrcJ öcvrew 
i 
YV, (4, 
wrin 323, and 
cf. P. 10 above and 93-4 below. 
57. Cf. Long, P. 134. Adkins' reply (JHS 1971,6-7) does not 
seem to me to answer this point. 
58. But not all: see 0d. 2.85-6 (15-6 above). 
59.11.22.100, where Hektor foresees Polydamas' criticism of 
his leadership, 23.342,408, where elencheie is envisaged 
should Antilochos lose the chariot race, and Od. 21.255, where 
it is the result of Eurymachos' failure to draw the bow. 
60. On this passage, see Adkins, ME, p. 33, Long, p. 125, 
Adkins, JHS 1971, p. 8. Adkins' reply to Long's objections to 
his remarks in MR is to point out that Eumaios' failure is 
described in the same terms as failure in battle. This, 
however, proves nothing; if a word is used iný given context 
this does not mean that it is tied to that context. 
61.11.2.285, where Agamemnon would be elenchistos if he left 
Troy without defeating his opponents,. i. e. if he were to act 
in the manner described as aischron at 298 (cf. Adkins, 1R, 
p. 33), 4.171, where Agamemnon is concerned at the prospect 
of criticism of his failure to protect Menelaos (and to win 
the war) - see below, 30-1 - and 17.26, where Menelaos is 
called 6ýEýx«i0$ urjs. 
62. In addition to the forms discussed, the verb elencho 
occurs twice in the sense, "expose (to ridicule)". At 11.9.522 
Phoinix urges Achilles not to elenchein the mission of the 
ambassadors; presumably they would be embarrassed to return 
without success. At Oc. 21.424 Odysseus, having drawn the bow, 
tells Telemachos that his beggar guest does not thC-yxEl him; 
the bond between host and guest creates a tie of collective 
honour, a tie which is most often evident in passages in 
which the host's honour is said to be committed by failure 
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to protect his guest (see below, 59-61), but apparently the 
failure of the guest could also implicate the host. 
63. See MR, 39,46 etc.; similarly Scott, 1980,16,20,23,31. 
64. See Havelock, Justice, p. 22. 
65. Cf. Pitt-Rivers in Peristiany (ed. ) Honour and Shame, p. 29. 
66. See 11.13.95,15.502,16.422. 
67. The exhortation is repeated at 15.561-4, ajc'w 8-(V Ev. 
ýU, Kw replacing 
aXk 
&sf v-ro( EMiGe 
68. Cf. von Erffa, p. 30. 
69. P. 6. 
70. ne m. 1944-5, p. 53. 
71. This is the interpretation favoured by Redfield, Nature 
and Culture, 120-1. 
72. On the community of honour in modern Mediterranean 
societies, see Peristiany (ed. ) Honour and Shame, 35,52,89, 
119,179,245,249-50. Dover, GPM, 237-8 shows that the notion 
is widespread and natural, applicable to our society and not 
confined to "shame-cultures". 
73. Cf. Od. 24.508. 
74.11.6.446,479,8.285; cf. Redfield, Nature and Culture, p. 33. 
75. x.. 6.523-5. 
76. See especially 6.431-2; cf. S. Farron, Acta Classics 1979, 
p. 22. 
77. Farron, p. 26 
78. Above, 16-7; the comparative aischion also occurs 
(21.437-8). 
79. Verdenius, p. 55. 
80. MR, 48-9 (Many, 31-2). Dover (JHS 1983, p. 40) criticizes 
Adkins here, but his criticism is of his expression ("Nestor 
cannot say, 'Don't worry, it isn't true"') not his meaning, 
which is that the Homeric warrior does not feel himself able 
to ignore popular opinion. 
81. Adkins, MR, p. 49 (cf. Many, p. 44). 
82. Verdenius, p. 53. 
83. See above, p. 2. 
84. Cf. also Il. 17.415-9. 
85. See von Erffa, P. 33, Scott, 1980, p. 26. 
86. Cf. Thornton, Homer's Iliad, p. 127. 
87. See Adkins, MR, p. 14, JHS 1971, p. 8. 
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88. P. 11 above. 
89. See Claus, TAPA 1974,16 and 20. 
90. See n. 40. 
91. fl. 3.88ff., 6.325ff., 13.768ff.. Hektor's words are only 
really insulting, however, in the first of these passages. 
92. The phrase äi1 d 
ßäV 149)c(-40 (6 k' ar}Chw seems to be a 
d variant of (e. g. ) Kati es, KXkw VEpe Tov, rts Tbc. au1 re (EJÖ( 
(23.494). Such expressions suggest that the standard being 
breached is universal and that the speaker is justified in 
his complaint; see Hohendahl-Zoetelief, Manners, 11-13, and 
cf. Od. 6.286 and 15.69, where the first person of the verb 
is used, implying the subject's own agreement with the 
standards of society. 
93. Cf. P. 28 above. 
94. Cf. Redfield, Nature and Culture, p. 114. 
95. Cf. also Dover, GPM, p. 238. 
96. See below, pp. 3 3-5,551-4,562-3. 
97. It is interesting that elencheie may be the result of 
refusing to retreat, since other passages stress the idea 
that retreat itself is disgraceful. Hektor seems to have been 
caught in an impossible situation; his aidos would prevent 
him retreating, but retreat would have prevented the elencheie 
he now faces. 
98. P. 8. 
99. See also the discussion of this passage by Verdenius, 
p. 59, and cf. 88-90 below. 
100. The notion of the individual's responsibility to his 
fellows is an important one in the Iliad, but it is only 
rarely expressed in the terms of our enquiry; for a discussion, 
see Roisman, Loyalty, passim, esp. 6,9-11,17-32, and Kakridis, 
Amitie, cc. 1-3. 
101. The verbs nemesaomai and aideomai thus refer to the same 
type of reaction here, namely the rejection and avoidance of 
discreditable conduct; see von Erffa, p. 33. Verdenius agrees 
with the general interpretation of this usage, but points out 
that aidos differs from nemesis in the manner of its 
operation (49-50, esp. 49n. 2). At 24.4.158-9, however, the 
present VEýtýýTac comes extremely close to aiýýTK( in sense 
(von Erffa, p. 54, contrast Verdenius, p. 49n. 2); there is, 
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however, an important difference; the participle 6XO hJshows 
that the reference of vep (. cTaL is to the present, and the 
sense is that Telemachos has already embarked upon a course 
of action which he regards as a breach of aidos in himself; 
pct 
SELrx Eýi'ýa'ßQýºý-ics äVO. 4x(V(4 would mean that he had yet to 
act, and that his aidos was preventing his doing so. At 
Od. 2.64 JTt is probably best taken as reflexive, and 
so a reproach from Telemachos to the Ithakesians (Verdenius, 
p. 50, Redfield Nature and Culture, p. 116) although an injunction 
to them to feel nemesis towards the suitors (passive for 
middle or active) would be equally possible; it seems less 
likely that the words are addressed to the suitors as an 
appeal to their nemesis with regard to their own conduct 
(the last two interpretations are also considered by Long, 
p. 131n. 36) . At Od. 1.263 yVt&A, FTO 
OC-QL'S 
clearly means " he 
feared the anger of the gods", and thus, as a prospective 
fear of disapproval, the verb comes close to aideisthai in 
that context; oLi'S'& tGXL 06-v VJ , however, is only found in 
contexts of supplication and guest-friendship in Homer. 
102. Cf. Kakridis, Amitie, p. 8 (further examples). 
103. See Kakridis, Amiti, p. 96, Long, p. 124, Roisman, 
Loyalty, P. 17. 
104. Kakridis, 65-70 (on hetairos in general, see 47-77, 
Roisman, Loyalty, p. 6). 
105. Kakridis, 56-8; hetairoi might also be members of one's 
own clan (52-5)Yor simply the heads of clans among themselves. 
One's hetairoi may also be one's Philoi; 61,64 etc.. 
106. Thus Adkins' statement (CQ 1963, p. 3L, cf. J-IS 1971 p. 4) 
that "Diomedes is far more closely bound to a Lycian who is 
his philos than to a Greek who is not, even during the Trojan 
War, " deserves the qualification that, if all the Greeks at 
Troy are Diomedes' hetairoi, they are presumably his Philoi 
too. Admittedly, disputes can arise, but when they do they 
are regarded as disputes between philoi, and are condemned 
as such; see below, 51-2. 
107. Von Erffa (p. 19) is perplexed at the use of I( ou 
-#ce&ovT#e here; Scott (1980, p. 47n. 33) suggests two explanations; 
Eumaios is avoiding the pain of naming his long-lost master, 
or he is influenced by the superstition that if one divulges 
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a name, the enemies of its owner gain some kind of magic 
control over him. Aidos, however, is never used of the 
avoidance of pain Per se in Homer, only of avoiding the pain 
of humiliation caused by others' disapproval, while the 
second explanation can hardly be correct, since Eumaios 
pronounces the name at 144! To me, the lines appear as nothing 
more than an exaggerated expression of Eumaios' respect for 
his master; he is saying, somewhat rhetorically, that he still 
feels aidos for him despite his absence. 
108. Cf. I1.24.435-6, where Hermes is posing as Achilles' 
therapon. 
109. See above, p. 13. 
110. A king is obviously one's superior; cf. I1.4.402, where 
ýo(ftX EVS is qualified by aidoios and Od. 18.314, where aidoie 
is used of a queen. That one feels aidos for the old on the 
grounds of their superiority is the assertion of von Erffa, 
p. 11, on 11.22.419-20, where, he believes, old age attracts 
aidos because of its authority and pity because of its 
disabilities. This distinction may well be valid. The most 
explicit statement of the claim of the old to aidos comes at 
Od. 3.24, AIQ15 
P 
Ali V toll vtýCrc y(-(D 
rc-C 6JECE6(0sc(. 
111. This is not to suggest that phi os is merely a kinship 
term here; clearly the adjective also has an affective 
meaning, as is allowed by Kakridis (who discusses philos on 
pp. 1-46 of her work) and Adkins (ýQ 1963); see especially 
Kakridis, 5-8,15-17, Adkins, p. 33. 
112. Od. 5.88,10.114,19.254; cf. von Erffa, p. 11. 
113. In urging Hektor-r&dr O(iöFO, Hekabe is using the emotive 
aspect of the mother-child relationship (her breast) 
metonymically for the real object of the aidos she wishes to 
arouse, namely herself. Similarly, in other passages some 
feature of the particular relationship in which aidos is 
felt appropriate is used as the object of the verb in place 
of a personal object; cf. (.. 9.640, x. 16.75,19.527,21.27-8 
(see Scott, 1980, p. 22). 
114. The extension of the terra Philos to those outside the 
kinship-group is not a primitive feature; cf. Finley, WO,. 
p. 116. (Yet Finley still feels able to say (28-9) that the 





115. For a full discussion of this episode, see Roisman, 
Loyalty, 5-22. 
116. ibid. 5-6. 
117. Scott, 1979,1-14, distinguishes eleos (a positive 
feeling of sympathy, often associated with aidos (p. 11) and 
appropriate among iloi (11-2)) and oiktos (pity combined 
with revulsion, felt towards the humiliated, etc. (cf. n. 50 
above)); Roisman, 12-3, shows that, while iloi were not 
explicitly obliged to accord each other eleos, they do so on 
a recurrent basis, and concludes that eleos constituted part 
of the duty one owes one's philoi. 
118. Roisman, p. 14. 
119. Philotes thus refers not to a condition in 630, but to 
an action, the act of philein. 
120. See Adkins, BICS 1960, p. 31 on this point (and the rest 
of his article on honour/time in general) and cf. Pitt-Rivers 
in Peristiany (ed. ) Honour and Shame, p. 24, Dover, GPM, p. 231. 
121. On the connexion between time and reputation, see Adkins, 
BICS 1960, p. 30, and cf. Pearson, Popular Ethics, 48-50, on 
reputation, time and arete. Aidos and time are associated as 
the recognition accorded a bard at o d. 8.479-80; von Erffa, 
p. 12, Adkins, BICS, p. 24. 
122. Thus, where honour is at stake, circumstances and 
intentions can be very important; this is mainly true of one- 
to-one situations, however, in which the status and intentions 
of the person delivering the affront will help determine 
whether or not the recipient of the affront decides to commit 
his honour; the individual will have to consider, for example, 
whether the other person meant to diminish his honour, as 
well aswhether it would be a proper decision to regard the 
affront as a matter of honour (whether, that is, other people 
will consider him dishonoured should he fail to take action). 
On this, see Pitt-Rivers in Peristiany (ed. ), Honour and 
Shame, 25-8,33-4. Outside the one-to-one situation, where a 
generalized "other people" is making judgements on the 
conduct of individuals, intentions, as we have seen, often 
do not matter; cf. Pitt-Rivers, p. 64. 
123. Nemesis is the normal reaction'of heroes to rebukes 
which they regard as unjustified or insulting; see Hohendahl- 
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Zoetelief, Manners, cc. 1-2; hence the precaution, /41 'r. <. 
124. Cf. Redfield, Nature and Culture, p. 116. 
125. Scott, 1980, p. 17. Adkins also frequently claims that 
aidos is weak because it is not effective in every individual 
on every occasion; see RR, 45-6, BICS p. 31, JHS 1971, p. 9 etc.. 
126. This is the view of Murray, Rise of the Greek Epic, 88-9, 
and he seems to me to get it exactly right. 
127.11.1.149,158; cf. 9.372-3, where Achilles again refers 
to Agamemnon's anaideie and claims that, kU/ O5 (= anaides) 
as he is, he will not dare look him (Achilles) in the face. 
Achilles thus seems to be saying that even one as shameless 
as Agamemnon would experience aidos when faced with one he 
has wronged; the ability to look others straight in the face 
is a sign of anaideie, at least when one has some reason for 
aidos, and the dog seems to be particularly associated with 
shamelessness: 11.1.225 (note 
S, 4Ikacrr 
-ads and anaideie 
are commonly manifested in the eyes - cf. 1.159 Kvv&'K and 
see below, p. 75 and n. 202), 3.180,6.344,8.423,21.481, Od. 4.145, 
8.319,11.424,19.91; other passages in which a human being is 
called "dog" may be relevant, but the context does not always 
make it clear whether the insult is levelled on the grounds 
of shamelessness. In connexion with Agamemnon's anaideie we 
should notice that Achilles also charges him with hybris 
(1.203,214,9.368; cf. von Erffa, p. 19); hybris and anaideie 
are also combined in the suitors (below, p. 82). 
128. MB, p. 61. 
129. Cf. Lloyd-Jones, , 7IZ, 12-3. 
130. See Adkins, BICS 1960, p. 31 (= JHS 1971, p. 9) and Scott, 




132. M$, 43,45-6, BICS 1960, p. 31, ä 1971, p. 9. 
133.24-5 above. 
134. Adkins, MR, p. 37. 
135. Long, p. 127. 
136. BICS 1960, p. 31. 
137.14-5 above. 
138. In the Odyssey both Eumaios (17.322-3) and Penelope 
(19.124-6) lose some arete, Eumaios because he loses the 
status of a free man and Penelope because her husband, in 
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whose arete she shares and on whom her aee depends, has 
gone; see Pearson, Popular Ethics, P. 49. Penelope, moreover, 
exaggerates, since her very resistance to the suitors is a 
manifestation of her arete. 
139. Cf. n. 110 above. 
140. Telemachos eventually overcomes his aidos in this 
episode, and he does so by means of tharsos (76, cf. 0a(C10: 5 
ibid. ). The opposition of boldness and aidos is one we shall 
meet again, most notably at Hesiod, WD 319 (below, pp. 117-119). 
In addition, part of the pseudo-platonic definition of aidos 
(P. 412c) runs -roký1(rws u1roXwe1r(5 C Kour« c(te .c ws ... 
(cf. 
von Erffa, p. 41). 
141. Above, n. 101. 
142. On aidos as a forerunner of classical sophrosyne, see 
North, Sophrosyne, 6-7, and cf. Greene, Moir p. 20. 
143. North, 3-5. 
144.76-81. 
145. Cf. above, p. 9 and n. 3. 
146. Xeinoi are aidoioi at Od. 8.544,9.271,19.191,316. On the 
institution of guest-friendship in general see Kakridis, 
86-107, and cf. Finley, WO1 109-14. 
147. See Adkins, BICS 1960, p. 25, who interprets epitimetor 
as "he who imparts time". 
148. Cf. Scott, 1980,19-20. Verdenius (p. 52) believes that 
strangers are accordedaidos not because of their weakness as 
outsiders, but because they are unusual amd mysterious; there 
may be something in this, and the aidos which one feels for 
them might arise from an uncertainty about their origins, 
status, intentions or character which could lead to inhibition 
of any impulse to harm them. Cf. Finley, WW, 111-2,134-5,137 
on the ambivalence of the stranger. 
149. Cf. Havelock, Justice, 161ff; on the importance of the 
theme of guest-friendship in the P*Om as a whole, see Thornton, 
People and Themes, 38-46 etc.. 
150. Cf. 578, where Penelope asks Eumaios whether it is aidos 
which causes the beggar's reluctance to enter the house, and 
opines Kacº! ös s ,. cic o. oS oiit41 . The active usage of aidoios 
here is unique in Homer, and is evidence of a certain flexi- 
bility of usage. On the analogy of this passage von Erffa 
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(p. 13) believes that the adverb in Od. 19.243 (the disguised 
Odysseus claims that he sent his guest, the fictitious 
Odysseus of his tale, on his way aiVoi w_ S) is also active in 
sense (meaning that the host showed aidos towards his guest); 
but the sense could just as well be passive or proleptic, on 
the analogy of the far greater number of passive instances 
of the adjective. The sense would then be, "I sent him away 
in such a condition that he would be aidoios to other people. " 
Cf. Scott, 1980, p. 33n. 4. 
151. Again, "daring" (O. Ce(V-k 
(ö$, here coupled with anaides) 
is seen as an antonym of aidos; cf. n. 140 above. 
152.17.483: one might expect O' KXX 4 to be equivalent to 
aischron, but Adkins (I, 43-5) denies that this is ever the 
case in Homer, claiming that kalon does not commend success 
as aischron condemns failure; this begs a very large question, 
since aischron is rare and, in any case, has no intrinsic 
reference to failure. For other passages in which 0o Kock-FV 
(etc. ) may be equivalent to aischron (including Od. 21.312-3, 
also in the context of Antinoos' maltreatment of the beggar) 
see Long, p. 128. 
153. Cf. n. 148. 
154.1) object Zeus or the gods - Od. 9.269 (in the context 
of both xenia and hiketeia) and 11.24.503 (context of suppl- 
ication). 2) personal object - the present passage (14.388), 
and (context of supplication) 0.22.. 112,344, . 
11.21.74. 
At Qd. 21.28-9 the opis of the gods (see below, p. 91) and the 
table of his host are the objects Herakles failed to aideisthai 
1 01 
in killing his host; cf. 11.9.640, opt cýi 
ýcr(MM 
c)0 ý"1 E 
kot eeýý 
and n. 113 above, on the verb governing some central, emotive 
feature of the dos relationship; for the table as the 
central feature of the relationship of xenia cf. Qd. 14.158-9, 
17.155-6,19.303-4,20.231-2 (and Gould, TES 1973, p. 97). 
155. See Kakridis, 41-3, Adkins, 
_CQ 
1963, p. 34. 
156. Cf. P. 23 above. 
157. Cf. in general Pearson, Popular Ethics, 62-3, and on 
14.386-9 and Eumaios' altruism, Havelock, Justice, p. 164. In 
that passage Eumaios' active desire to help is important, as 
it is at 15.373, where he describes how he reckons part of 
his income as available to help aidoioi; cf. 14.56-8, where 
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he states his obligation to help xeinoi and beggars as a 
simple moral imperative (themis); cf. Havelock, P. 163, 
Hohendahl-Zoetelief, Manners, p. 117. 
158. On Od. 16.106-7,20.316-9, cf. pp. 21-2 above and, generally, 
Kakridis, p. 95. 
159. pp. 76-81. 
160. See 14-16,21-3 above. 
161. We saw that it was ou Koc%toc for Antinoos to strike the 
beggar (Od. 17.483, p. 58 above) similarly at 20.294-5 
(= 21.312-3) it is o) KocNo/ to abuse another's guests. Cf. 
n. 152 above. 
162. Cf. n. 92 above. 
163. See 11.1.357 and cf. Scott, 1980, p. 23. i 




cSc& u. ( he'/ .. N as the only instance of aideomai with a ptc. 
in Homer, but, in fact, OL, SEro governs the accusative 
IaiJKAS 
as in many other passages, while %Clý wV is used causally; 
see Verdenius, p. 48n. 1. 
165. Cf. Od. 17.415-8, where the beggar Odysseus promises to 
spread Antinoos' fame. 
166. Cf. Havelock, Justice, 161-76. 
167. Cf. von Erffa, p. 36, Long, P. 139, Havelock, Justice, 
159-60; Pearson, Popular Ethics, 43-4, shows both that themis 
and dike represent custom, "how things are done" in the 
Odyssey (cf. Havelock, 179-84), and that Cyclopean society 
emphasizes the importance of these by contrast. The poet or 
poets of the Odyssey clearly believed that their society was 
a civilized one by virtue of its possession of themis and 
dike, with which aidos is intimately connected as the force 
which dictates their observance. 
168. On supplication in general, see Gould, JHS 1973,74-103; 
also Kopperschmidt, Die Hikesie, 11-53, Stagakis, Hermes, 
Einzelschr. 26,1975,94-112, and Thornton, Homer's Iliad, 
passim (esp. 119 on the role of aidos); on the closeness of 
xeinos and hiketes, see Gould, 79,92n. 94a, 93-4 and cf. 
Stagakis, 109-10. For parallels from other cultures see 
A. A. M. Zeid in Peristiany (ed. ) Honour and Shame, 254-5, 
Gould, 98-9,101, Thornton, Homer's Iliad, 170-1. 
169. Adkins, CQ 1963, p. 35. 
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170. Odysseus' supplication is "figurative" here, in that he 
does not make the ritual contact with the supplicated which 
is felt necessary to the act in its fullest form; on "full" 
and "figurative" supplication, see Gould, 76-7 etc.; cf. 
Kopperschmidt, 20-1. 
171. Cf. Od. 7.165. 
172. See Gould, 93-4; not all strangers, it should be added, 
employ the language and gestures of supplication. 
173. Gould, 94-6. 
174. Gould, 78-85. 
175. Cf. Lloyd-Jones,, p. 17. 
176. Cf. Finley, WO, p. 130. 
177. Cf. above, pp. 47-8, on their appeals to philotes. 
178. On the importance of this passage, see Thornton, Homer's 
Iliad, 114-121 (cf. Lloyd-Jones, JjZ, p. 16); Thornton makes a 
convincing case against the rejection of these lines (as 
favoured by Dodds, 1, p. 6, Page, History and the Homeric 
Iliad, 302-3; see Thornton, p. 116n. 17 and cf. Lloyd-Jones, 
IZ, p. 6) and shows that they are, in fact, central to the 
poem in the form in which we have it. On the importance of 
the theme of supplication in the is and its four stages 
see Thornton, 121-4. 
179. See Griffin, Life and Death, p. 91; on the other hand, 
we do hear of suppliants being spared; see below (p. 67) on 
Lykaon in 11.21, and cf. Gould, p. 80n. 38. 
180.11.21.35-44,77-80; Gould, ibid.. 
181. Why does Lykaon say he is "like a suppliant"? Leaf, ad 
loc., believes that he is referring to his claim to philotes 
with Achilles; he is only "like a suppliant" because Achilles 
does not recognize him as a philos. But being a quasi-philos 
does not make one a quasi-hiketes; one does not have to be 
the philos of the person addressed in order to supplicate 
him, although reference to any tie of philotes or charis 
which may exist will always be a useful argument in making 
an appeal. Leaf obviously takes Lykaon's in 76 as 
i 
explanation of his use of avTL , but it seems more natural to 
regard it as introducing the grounds on which he hopes 
Achilles will accept his appeal, namely the fact that they 
have broken bread on a previous occasion (see Gould, p. 79 
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and n. 36, p. 81, Scott, 1979, p. 11,1980,18-9); Achilles 
acknowledges this claim contemptuously at 106; it does not 
necessarily follow from this, however, that Lykaon would not 
be entitled to see himself as a suppliant in the full sense 
of the word. Either his use of AVT(- is insignificant or it 
implies some doubt as to whether one in his position may 
legitimately be regarded as a suppliant; it seems more likely 
that this doubt should arise from the fact that he has been 
Achilles' adversary until the commencement of his appeal 
than from the ambivalence of his claim to philotes (see Scott, 
1980, p. 18). (I now see that Parker, Miasma, p. 182 and n. 207, 
182. P. 81. Lholds that Lykaon has no real claim to full 
183. Cf. n. 154 above. Lsuppl., and that his use of ö(vri acnow- 
184. Gould, 79-80,96. Lledges this. ) 
185. The simile thus inverts the röles of the parties in the 
real situation; Gould, p. 96. 
186. This would certainly square with Verdenius' assertion 
(n. 148 above) that strangers of whatever kind arouse aidos as 
a result of " das Ungewöhnliche in ihrer Erscheinung. " Gould, 
p. 96n. 111, suggests that the thambos of the spectators in the 
simile might imply a horror of pollution; Parker, Miasma, 
134-5, believes that the supplication of a prospective 
protector by a homicide might be an appeal for a minimal sort 
of purification, but (p. 135n. 124) is sceptical about the 
argument that thambos is a reaction to pollution. Supplication 
as described in the simile may also be relevant to Ajax' 
assertion (11.9.632-3) that the relatives of the victim 
accept ransom from his killer; for a parallel from N. Africa 
see Zeid in Peristany (ed. ), 254-5. 
187. On the Greeks' attitude to sex in more general terms see 
Dover, GPM, 205-13, Parker, Miasma, 74-103; cf., more briefly, 
Henderson, Maculate Muse, 3-5. 
188. See above, 42-5. 
189.11.2.514,21.479,22.451, Oc. 3.381,451,8.420,10.11,17.152, 
18.314,19.165,202,336,583. 
190.31.22.451, Od. 18.314. 
191 " aci O(4 Tsc ýftt q- Od. 1.139,7.175,15.138,17.94,259. 
192. This is true of many more cultures than the ancient 
Greek; see Pitt-Rivers in Peristiany (ed. ), p. 42. On this 
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phenomemon in Homer, see Adkins, IHR, 36-7. 
193. See Adkins, ibid., and cf. Pitt-Rivers and Campbell in 
Peristiany (ed. ), 45 and 146 resp.. 
194. See Pitt-Rivers, op. cit., p. 67. 
195. See above, n. 92 and p. 62, and cf. Redfield, Nature and 
Culture, p. 116. 
196. I1.6.349-51, above, p. 34. 
197. Cf. 11.22.75 for this physical sense of aidos (p. 15 above). 
198. See 4.49,252,10.362-4, and cf. Thornton, People and 
Themes, 40-1, Scott, 1980, p. 25 and n. 52. 
199. P. 18. 
200. Cf. nn. 113 and 154 above. 
201. Cf. Roisman, Loyalty, 55-6. 
202. Cf. Od. 4.145,8.319, and n. 127 above. 
203. Cf. (generally) C. P. Bill, CJ 1932-3,202-7; also 
Roisman, Loyalty, 47-55. 
204. Cf. P. 54 above. 
205. Cf. Pearson, Popular Ethics, 48,219n. 2. 
205a. Cf. 11.6.350-2. 
206. See n. 101 and pp. 55-6 above. 
207. Sophrosyne, P. S. 
208. Cf. Long, 126n. 16 and 154. 
209. Adkins, R, 31-3. 
210. IHR, P. 31. 
211. See Long, p. 123. 
212. The foreshadowing of Sokrates' identification of 
morality and self-interest in Homer has often been noted; 
see Dodds, 91, p. 17, Gould, Development Plato's Ethics, P. 7. 
For an explicit Homeric statement that wrong conduct is 
imprudent conduct, see 0d. 22.372-4. 
213. See Dodds, ibid., Pearson, Popular Ethics, p60 (also 
52-60 in general). 
214. Pearson, p. 224n. 21. 
215. On appropriateness, moderation and excess in Homer, see 
Pearson, 39-41, Long, 135-9, and cf. Greene, Moira, p. 20. 
216. See Greene, Moira, 18-23. 
217. Cf. Long, p. 136. 
218. See Thornton, Homer's Iliad, p. 142. 
219. P. 36, cf. Redfield, Nature and Culture, p. 211; the lack 
1 13 
of the peculiarly human quality of aidos by reason of their 
inanimacy is the only explanation I can think of for the 
designation of boulders and rocks as anaides (I1.4.521,13.139, 
Od. 11.598). 
220. Apollo also comments (45) on the ambivalence of aidos; 
this line is certainly much more appropriate in the other 
context in which it occurs (Hes. WD 318), but the question 
of "interpolation" in Homer is a vexed one, and we can hardly 
be sure that the Hesiod passage has influenced that under 
discussion or that line 45 did not stand in its present place 
when the Iliad was given the form in which we have it. 
221. Cf. Redfield, Nature and Culture, p. 213. 
222. Ou Jc N'ou rte/, a unique usage of the verb in Homer; see 
Kakridis, Amitiä, p. 40. 
223. Cf. 24.351-2, where Laertes is of the opinion that the 
suitors have suffered the reward of their KtKý3ahaj 
224. Cf. n. 101 above. 
225. IHR, p. 46. 
226. See esp. 71-2 above, on Od. 6.285-8. 
227. Nature and Culture, p. 116. 
228. Pearson, Popular Ethics, p. 223n. 18, also states that 
Homeric man possessed a personal, internal standard of 
conduct, -but does not explicitly relate this to aidos. 
229. Specifically on aidos, see Verdenius, P. 56, Scott, 1980, 
13-5; generally, see Snell, Aischylos und das Handeln im 
Dram , 24-5, Philoloaus 85,1930,141-58, C. Voigt, 
Überlegung 
und Entscheidung, passim, H. Fränkel, Early Greek Poetry and 
Philosophy. 75-85 (= Dichtung und Philosophie, 
283-94), 
Snell, Entdeckung4, cc. 1 and 2; for criticisms of views of 
this kind, see E. Wolff, Gnomon 5,1929,386-400, Dodds, GI, 
p. 20n. 31, Pearson, 208-10 (n. 3), Lloyd-Jones, Z, 9-10 (with 
further reff. at p. 188n. 41). 
230. Jaeger, Paideia I, P. 8 (Eng. trans. ), cf. Verdenius, 
p. 50, Scott, 1980, p. 14. 
231. To be sensitive about one's honour entails a claim to 
honour, which is subjective; see Pitt-Rivers in Peristiany 
(ed. ), 21-2,72, and cf. P. 30 above. 
232. Singer, Shame and Guilt, p. 64, points out that once 
standards or sanctions are internalized, they operate auto- 
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matically. For the view criticized here, see Scott, 1980, p. 13 
(cf. Fränkel, Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy, p. 84). 
233. Redfield, Nature and Culture, p. 116; cf. Havelock, 
Justice, p. 123. 
234. See Piers in Piers and Singer, Shame and Guilt, p. 53. 
235. The best example is that of Hektor at x. 22.104-7, 
pp. 37-8 above. 
236. Some, for example, believe that Achilles shows remorse 
at the death of Patroklos (Il. 18.98-126 etc.; so Lloyd-Jones, 
ýJZ, p. 22, contrast Redfield, Nature and Culture, p. 22) or 
that Helen's self-reproach at 11.6.334-8 shows something of 
that emotion (so Farron, Acta Classica 1979, p. 17 (cf. 21-2 
on 24.764), contrast Hohendahl-Zoetelief, Manners, 30ff. ). 
237. Seel, Zur VorgesAichte ..., 302-9 gives examples of the 
ways in which Homeric characters express ideas close to that 
which we should call conscience and reasons as to why Homeric 
language cannot fully express a concept of conscience. He 
shows, convincingly, I believe, that our concept of conscience 
is not totally absent from the poems; it is, however, only a 
concept for us, and not for the Homeric characters; there is 
a difference between "the concept of conscience is not 
absent from the poems" and "the characters of the poems do 
have a concept of conscience. " The relationship between words 
and concepts is such an intimate one that it would be wrong 
to imagine that a society could have a concept of something 
which it could not express in words. 
238.11.1.21,5.434,830. 
239. Od. 9.200. 
240. See von Erffa, 25-6. 
1 , 1ý 1. i161,41 * 242. See p. 72 above. 
243. Von Erffa, p. 23. 
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2. FROM HESIOD TO THE FIFTH CENTURY. 
HESIOD. 
In comparison with Homer, Hesiod provides us with little 
opportunity to observe the workings of aidos, and many of 
the passages in which our terms do occur are either insig- 
nificant or uninformative. 
1 The adjective aidoios, for example, 
frequently occurs as a simple honorific epithet; at Ih. 44 
the children of Ouranos and Gaia are a ytvo$ we ro 
i 
ev/ , and i 
Aphrodite is an ai(ýa 
iJ 
KAhq 6 -oS at line 194 of the same 
poem. 
2 Kings are aidoioi at Th. 80, fr. 43a. 89 and fr. 361; as 
in Homer aidoie is a favourite epithet of women. 
3 The 
concrete usage of aidoia occurs at WD. 733-4, in the form of 
the injunction: 
-rresýr-ahaýrtkýos aL Kou 
C(Tt F1vni-PIKoo\/ "ifa( . 4aw/At' f 
ä)Ck /rýEacoO'« . 
This sexual tabu is found in that part of the poem which 
deals in general with proper conduct towards one's neighbours 
and the avoidance of conduct which may be unseemly or unprop- 
itious (707-64-); the major sanction against breaches of 
these standards is outlined at 760-4, lines which reveal 
Hesiod's appreciation of the importance of popular opinion 
in his society and which suggest a corresponding importance 
for aidos: 
wý &, iv " 
ýcý)cýJ ý4 ýSeoiwý ü-1raA&L'eÖ 
7µh, /. 
Tc- Ka Kv) 
ýýý-hFToc 
Ftov fk /c-'1 «L(( 
C/`ý 0, hý, a aka 
ýc- C- ýcý Xxýýrr aýuýEf9ýcý . Ö 0-j rt S lr, c, h-irroc da hid u%t I Y`r(-V k -vo 
, eA% 
k3 0 vrl. BFOS vv res E (TL h<acI avTq. hxoL J1 
Defeat or failure is disgraceful in Hesiod as in Homer (WD. 
210-11) and presumably aidos would be the reaction to such a 
prospect: ` PCwq 
0 ýS K4 9F)ii ? T' CS KE OVýcs Ocvnii- ((CL1ý' 
VL RI S -rc- (-r c-e F-ra L `' TrrC 5Tal iý N rý Jä hy(-x -rºA ry KFc, 
Moving to more important instances of the relevant terms, we 
might begin with Ih. 80-93, a passage which affords interesting 
parallels with Od. 8.169-73.4 Both passages involve an 
individual who is favoured by the gods, and both deal with 
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aidos, but the Hesiodic is longer and more specific. The 
eloquent man of the Odyssean passage has the following 
characteristics (171-3): 
o tl ariAXEwj aroc"K 
ai GL ýtýtE-ýkcxýý &-& cSý TeFtr'ý-t öcýeo, u, 
ývoýtcJý 
.ýiý""ý ýi 6ýxa, vet/ 
r 
a vo( aö ru A ¬-O q WS E 160 C0W Sfl, V, 
The Hesiodic version has all these elements butt. employs them 
in a different form and in a different context, and the 
subject is not one who is good at speaking, but a king. The 
king, like Homer's aXk os 4 eeV, delivers his speech ärýdhCýýS 
(86), but with poc%ýýKOtrt 6Tree(lt4(90) rather than Oliýoý 
i 
/t4. &LXtx(1. Aidos in the Hesiodic version is not the property 
of the speaker but of his audience (91-2): 
X , EVeJ cs) 
äV ;, 




^C- c. k t1C 1A, FTýc opvo <<c . 
In both passages the subject enjoys the favour of the gods 
and the respect of other mortals, but only in the Hesiodic 
is that respect explicit. ly described as aidos; the aidos 
the king receives recognizes his status and authority, and 
corresponds to the designation of the king as aidoios in its 
normal sense of "deserving aidos" at line 80. In the passage 
from the Odyssey the possibility that the reaction of the 
spectators, which is so similar to that of their Hesiodic 
counterparts, might also be classifiable as aidos should not 
be ruled out, but aidos is only mentioned in that place as a 
quality of the speech itself; the words of the Homeric 
character reflect the aidos he accords other people, 
5 
and if 
the reaction of others to that quality of his speech is also 
aidos then it seems that aidos as a quality can attract aidos 
as a response. The usage of aidos in the lines from the 
Theoaonv is certainly the more orthodox of the two, but the 
speaker's aidos in the Odyssean example is also readily 
explicable as an oblique reference to the absence of the 
same quality in the words Euryalos has just directed towards 
Odysseus, and it seems illegitimate to conclude that the 
former must be the model for the latter simply because aidos 




The best known instance of aidos in Hesiod is that at WD. 317-9, 
a passage whose interpretation has been much discussed. 
7 
oc ; ýww 6' 0K äýa 8vß KFx, oh, cýEvod o'V S( 1ra, ". iýýtVý 
>ý ii , .i, 1. /", a s, o vL, r/ 
Acs csws Tul -rr 5 avo)y6C' foS dT. 'fr`oö. s ö a/w , L 
The text reproduced here is that of West, and I fully agree 
with him that k 
4jEtV is to be preferred to k 5^ L f" in 317. 
The point of the passage is the inefficacy of aidos in 
certain circumstances (see pp. 8-9 above) and this requires 
i the infinitive, in order that oc-sOl may have its dominant 
sense of "good at"; 
8 
with the reading the line loses 
its traditional and proverbial basis, a basis it shares with 
those passages of Od. 17 on the inappropriateness-of aidos 
for a man in need (347,352,578); Occ moreover, 
is an awkward expression, and some violence must be done to 
it in order to obtain an acceptable meaning. 
QcKay9 argues 
that Ko tfbt must have been the reading known to Euripides, 
who, as Cook shows, 
10 had these lines in mind at Hipp. 383-7 
and Erect . fr. 365N2, but the tragic poet's ouic and KK KGs 
, *j-Y, 
c may be verbal reminiscences of Hesiod's ot( K' Oº' , and 
need not imply that OJ K ä'e4 is attributive in our passage. 
All these passages deal with the ambivalence of aidos, and 
its harmful effects in certain circumstances, and both these 
aspects are clear enough in our passage without the reading 
Ko/. q {. 11 
Having dispensed with the notion of "bad (or false) shame"12 




aidos means the same in 317 as in 319, and construe: "Aidos 
is not good at looking after a needy man; it can do both harm 
* 15 
and good; the poor have their aidos, the rich their tharsos. 
The three lines are somewhat disjointed, and it seems highly 
probable that all three are proverbial maxims that Hesiod has 
adapted to his own purpose. 
16 The original sense of 317 was 
most likely similar to that of the Odyssean examples cited 
above, referring to the necessity of initiative and boldness 
in the poor in spite of the aidos which might affect one who 
imagined that he was showing an excess of self-confidence 
for one of low status and who therefore feared the reproach 
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of others; 318 will have been an expression of the traditional 
ambivalence of aidos such as we noted in Homer, and 319, as 
+ Kay plausibly suesests, 
17 
may have been a proverb by which 
the poor consoled themselves with their own . 
(positive) aidos 
in contrast to their betters' (reprehensible) tharsos. 
Hesiod, however, has adapted his material to the situation 
on which his immediate concern is focused, and the aidos of 
317 is not that of one who is forced to ignore his inhibition 
in asking others for help or charity, but a reference to 
Perses' preference for wealth without effort; it must be 
Perses to whom the observation that work is not an oneidos 
(311) is addressed, and he is presumably to be thought of as 
regarding work as an oneidos because he considers work to be 
beneath his dignity (hence his aidos). 
18 Similarly aidos ;n 311 
retains its negative aspect), and it is seen as regrettable 
that the poor cling to their aidos; this reflection must be 
general and not specifically related to the situation of 
Perses, since Perses does not show either the positive a'dos 
of the putative model of this maxim, or any kind of aidos 
which might be seen as appropriate to the poor, but, in 
Hesiod's view, regrettably so. No doubt the gnomic nature of 
the previous verses has led the poet to more general reflections. 
Equally the reference to tharsos is only indirectly relevant 
to Perses; he is being asked to show_a positive kind of 
tharsos in buckling down to hard toil, but the line also has 
the general application that the poor as a class would do 
better to imitate the quality which they resent in their 
social superiors. The general and the particular thus mingle 
in this passage, as indeed one might expect in a poem which 
is intended both for its named addressee and for a wider 
audience, and this may contribute to its undoubted difficulty. 
Hesiod is thus being deliberately controversial in arguing 
for a beneficial form of tharsos and against a negative form 
of dos; the positive connotation of tharsos is supported 
by Qd. 3.76 (p. 55 above, with note 140) where it is also 
opposed to inappropriate aidos, but the word is also 
frequently negative in character, 
19 
as indeed it is in the 
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proverb which Hesiod adapts, and the poet shows his awareness 
of this negative aspect by adding an injunction against 
carrying tharsos too far at 320 -) (výaTO( 
S'ovx A rc, crii 20 
This excessive tharsos the poet equates with violence (321; 
note xc-(st and cf. 191-2) and with a desire for kerdos which 
leads one's Woos astray, and all of these are subsumed in 
the generic anaideie of 324 which drives away aidos. The 
connexion between negative tharsos and anaideie and its 
opposition to aidos are thus apparent, and it would appear 
that it is aidos which leads one to refrain from theft and 
the pursuit of wealth by dishonest means. Anaideie here will 
be either lack of regard for the status and disapproval of 
the victim of dishonesty or failure to take into account 
society's disapproval of theft and dishonesty in general 
Pa 
Further examples of anaideie are given at 327-32, and these 
are a mixture of the familiar and unfamiliar; the harming of 
guests and suppliants (327) is certainly familiar to us as a 
form of anaideie from the Odyssey, and the seducing of a 
brother's wi 
el 
would be a grave breach of philotes and as 
such also a breach of aidos in terms of the values of the 
Homeric poems. Equally the last example of the series (331-2), 
maltreatment of an aged parent, would also involve neglect 
of the aidos proper among i of and, more specifically, that 
owed by children to their parents; the harming of orphans in 
330, however, does not appear as a specific breach of aidos 
in Homer, and indeed at . 
1.22.484-506 it is assumed that a 
fatherless child will be harmed; perhaps Hesiod is thinking 
of the obligation to protect the orphaned children of a 
member of one's own family, 
21 
or perhaps it was simply seen 
as excessive and discreditable to maltreat the helpless. 
Since we are in a context of anaideie we should also notice 
the use of the twin criteria of good sense (A jCx 
Lys, 330) 
and appropriateness (1 /K K%(, c, (, 329) so familiar from such 
u (3ý3-4" 
contexts in Homer; Hesiod also goes on to say tha Zeus 
himself punishes the offences outlined in 327-32, and this 
reflects the interest taken by the gods in human propriety 
in general in the Odyssey. 
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These offences which Zeus punishes are, however, not only 
instances of anaideie, for in 334 they are described as C'c YK 
vc IKA. This suggests that there is a link between aidos and 
dike, the concept which has dominated the first part of the 
poem, and this is confirmed by an examination of the poet's 
description of the collapse of moral standards in the current, 
iron age of human civilization. The iron age men, he tells 
us, will be ungrateful to their parents, oudE OC-1-4 o it-IJ 
Ctt J rc-S (185-8), and goes on (189-93) : 
L 00`Kc&1 f OS 
Sý 
CT4 ) ýAt /E . rica'Tra K. xF .(' 
i 
0U 'rL5 cu 




vý(a Kýct ýý(V OÜ -' aYac Ooh pvý. 
ChhaJ ý6 KirKWd Fý 
cFýK uTývrov 
/(c" (uIl g' C xFCCL iýSws oj 
e r(Eu x 
To observe the aidos proper between parents and children is 
also to observe the opis of the gods; the idea of concern' 
for divine anger thus coincides with aidos once more, and 
this is because the gods are felt to share the standards of 
men. Lack of aidos and failure to consider divine anger will 
lead to the breakdown of civilized procedures for the 
settlement of disputes (XEted(5' zl, 189) and in the ensuing 
reversal of civilized values the hybristic will be honoured 
in place of the just and dike and aidos will be overcome by 
violence. More unnatural disruptions follow, leading to the 
climax (197-201): . 
Ka i TOTE cc 
1 --C 
ös "c i\ v µ- J OC-T io xo 4v 
öS 
F" UQ Eýys 
Fv Kocäld a (4(1 KO(X AFVra LO* 1CJS0V 
1 
6c O I# TwJ öt `ýý hýýi-4i -Ti' o t; rrövt' ör vd trýS 
i öw KK F (as " Tä ýE 
ýF 
i 1-Týc äßt EK v 'c N 
ev1-r6L ävU( crirot art) Ka KO' d' OJIC E r«'fit( a>K1 . 
Aidos (with its correlate Nemesis) is thus explicit ly linked 
with dike and its departure from the world is seen as the 
final stage of a moral collapse in which the abandonment of 
dike is also prominent. Now, in an authoritative study of 
dike in WD Gagarin points out that the word refers primarily 
to a process in the poem, the process employed in the peace- 
ful settlement of disputes, 
22 
and thus explains the close 
link between dike and the questions of property and the 
proper acquisition of wealth which prevail in the contexts 
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in which the term is employed; we have already seen that 
aidos, too, is involved in this economic sphere in 320-4. 
Perhaps, then, aidos is the impulse which leads one to be 
susceptible to and to observe the process of dike; 
23 if, 
however, dike is to be restricted to the narrow, "Iliadic" 
sense of "arbitration", "settlement", and to have nothing 
, to do with the wider, "Odyssean" sense, "proper behaviour" 
24 
then we must also suppose that where aidos does interact 
with it, it is in the context of readiness to observe the 
adjudications arising from a dike or of determination to 
avoid the sort of conduct which would involve one in a dike. 
I do not believe, however, that dike can be so narrowly 
interpreted in the WD; in 327-34, as we have seen, various 
offences against propriety are placed under the heading of 
Of I ýK ,i i1(4, and if it is 
äýriKOJ to maltreat guests etc. it ` 
must be StKxCOJ to behave properly towards them; this passage 
renders Gagarin's assertion (p. 91) that, "... no violator of 
the rights of a suppliant or a guest, no doer of any wrong 
except that connected with litigation is ever spoken of as 
.. 25 violating c)u(I1 .... totally invalid; dike is still a 
process in Hesiod, 
26 but it is the process of acting properly 
towards others as well as that of litigation; it is thus not 
separable from popular morality, as Gagarin would have us 
believe. The close relationship between aidos and dike is now 
that much easier to understand; since dike does have a 
reference to proper behaviour, aidos can play its normal röle 
as the force which renders one sensitive to the values of 
society and which inhibits departure from those values. 
A clear indication that dike refers to more than the settle- 
ment of disputes is given at 276-80, where the poet claims 
that dike separates man from beast; as Claus points out, 
27 
the beasts are not differentiated from man simply because 
they do not possess a system for the settlement of disputes, 
but because they do not have the civilized qualities of the 
dikaios man, qualities which, in the Odyssey, served to 
characterize civilized communities as different from 
barbarous races like the Cyclopes. 
28 
Admittedly, Hesiod 
does argue from the general sense of dike possessed by humans 
122 
to its concrete application in legal disputes (280-5), but 
this does not restrict its reference to litigation in 276-80. 
Von Erffa29 notes the function of dike as the major 
civaizing quality in these lines and contrasts this with I1. 
24.40-5,30 where it is aidos which separates man from beast; 
this does not mean, however, as von Erffa seems to imply, 
that aidos has a different or less important röle in Hesiod, 
or that society has "developed" into one in which justice is 
more important; Hesiod has particular reasons for stressing 
the part played by dike and, in any case, dike describes the 
behaviour of men in a civilized society; it is not primarily 
the awareness of the standards of society which produces 
civilized behaviour. That function is performed by aidos, in 
Hesiod as in Homer, and the absence of dike in the fifth age 
of men entails also the absence of the aidos which encourages 
its observance; we should not, moreover, overlook the climax 
in lines 197-201; the departure of Aidos and Nemesis from 
the world is seen as the ultimate in moral collapse; without 
aidos there is no defence against evil (201). And if we need 
any confirmation that aidos in Hesiod "still" separates man 
from beast, we need only look at Th. 312 and 833, where 
anaides is the adjective applied to Kerberos, the "raw-eater" 
(311), and to the thvmos of a lion. 
A word on nemesis in Hesiod; at T h. 223 the idea is personified 
as the daughter of night and a manifestation of divine anger, 
but the other personification at Wp. 200 is not the same; 
there the notion personified is that of popular disapproval, 
the correlate of aidos, and nemesis is not a divine element; 
its absence, we are told, will lead to woes and unmitigated 
KKKoJ for mortals, and if it were divine anger it would be its 
presence which would have such effects. 
31 Elsewhere in Hesiod 
nemesis generally has the same significance as it does in 
Homer; at WD. 756 the verb does refer to divine anger, but it 
is anger at an offence against the gods themselves (the 
profanation of the mysteries) rather than divine anger at 
human wrongdoing in general. At 303-4 of the same poem the 
nemesis of men at one who does not work is shared by the gods, 
but this does not place the term firmly in the divine sphere; 
1 23 
it still refers fundamentally to popular disapproval, as the 
recapitulation, ocjCy j 
ce t) övccöos (311) shows. At fr. 197.8 
the sons of Amphiaraos incur the nemesis of men, while at fr. 
70.27 we find the similar w OavlTw4 TF O Ewq V /Efl\/ 0 v1 i w\/ 1" 
Is - aV6Cwir'w/. Fr. 204.814 , -deals with the oaths imposed on the 
suitors of Helen by Tyndareus, and shows? äidos and nemesis 
work within a group on a basis of mutual security: 
ö`S oe ; CJ ävdCWV 
OcQTUs EhuLTO p '1) vE(-rL\l T (TO()F(ro Kds alcýw., 
T JV X'1 T04 -rra 'S ä/VWyE1/ 
cp XXEocS 0e/ I eI vx 
Tot, qI 1 -. 6 EVOus. 
By imposing this oath Tyndareus makes each of the suitors the 
guardian of the others; all have committed their honour by 
swearing it, and to break it or allow it to be broken would 
be to fail in an obligation to the others; aidos should 
prevent perjury, because perjury in a case like this would 
entail the manifest contradiction of a statement on which one 
had staked one's honour; nemesis here might refer to the 
reaction of a defaulter to his own transgression, or to the 
nemesis he would feel if another were to act in the way he 
himself is contemplating, but the simplest way to take 
"rejecting nemesis and aidos" is to regard nemesis as refer- 
ring to the prospect of others' nemesis at any breach of the 
terms of the oath; the perjurer rejects the thought of nemesis. 
THE HOMERIC HYMNS 
Most of the instances of the terms with which we are 
concerned which are found in the so-called Homeric Hymns are 
unremarkable usages of the adjective aidoios which need no 
comment; such, in fact, are all the passages in the minor 
hymns with which we might otherwise be concerned; detailed 
comment is only required in the case of a few passages from 
the hymns to Demeter and Hermes, both of which, we may be 
fairly confident, were composed within the period covered by 
this chapter. 
32 To begin with the hymn to Hermes, then, we 
find that deity addressed as by his 
mother at line 156, the same phrase as is 
used 
of Agamemnon 
by Achilles at 11.1.149.33 Hermes has stolen Apollo's cattle, 
and his anaideie is presumably to be related to that fact; 
theft was described in the same terms at WD. 324 (p. 119 above); 
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but although Hermes' anaideie is undoubtedly to be referred 
to his crime and to his rascality in general34 it must also 
relate to his disregard of the consequences of being found 
out, which would be a source of discredit, and to his failure 
to show aidos for the status of his victim. It is this proper 
regard for a deity of superior status that he feigns at 381-2, 
denying the charge of theft (a further example of his 
anaideie, the denial of responsibility which, if exposed as 
false, will reveal his disregard for the opinions of others): 
01 C-iCl UN JF 'vtoCX OCIOCOlrC i. c l C(ICYv... vKS Uº/S1 
Kd1 (F tAw woc(Totro'I O'Tr%ýZc. 
He claims that aidos for the Sun and the other gods would 
have prevented his committing the theft, and implies the same 
of his philotes of Zeus and his fear of Apollo's anger; 
öýijo 3used of Apollo shows that the proper relationship 
between that god and Hermes should be based on the latter's 
respect for the former's greater power. It is, however, 
Hermes' intention to test that power and to assert his own 
time, with the ultimate view that it be acknowledged by the 
other gods. 
36 In pursuing this aim he is anaides in many 
respects, considering neither the rights of the direct 
recipient of his actions nor the possible disapproval of 
others. 
At h. Cer. 64-5 Demeter asks Helios fQr help in finding her 
daughter: 
'H -' )º La tIA, rra i ýE 6 c. 
cv 
ýO 
EäS ;6 £- t -r-o-re ((-U IC irFI I FPYW KeaOUV/ Koe% 0VWCI VOC . CL 
For Helios to accede to the goddess' request would be to 
accord her aidos, and Demeter asks for aidos on the basis of 
the return of past kindnesses; in such examples, it seems, 
aidos is to be felt for the special status of the individual 
(and we remember that one who has done one a favour may be 
deinos, philos and aidoios - cf. P. 45 above) and at the 
prospect of ignoring that person's request; society in 
general believes that it is proper to return favours and 
discreditable not to, while it is also easy to imagine that 
the prospect of disappointing one who does have a special 
status in one's eyes might produce aidos. Von Erffa37 points 
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out that the sun god's reaction to Demeter's appeal to aidos 
is expressed as uýºtoc. L and F hEK CW at line 76, but this does 
not suggest that either of these verbs is synonymous with 
aideomai; Helios can hazesthai Demeter because she is a 
goddess, but she herself only asks for aidos on the basis of 
her past services; equally Helios may pity her, but she does 
not ask for pity, but for the return of a favour. 
At line 190 of the same hymn the effect of Demeter's appear- 
ance on Metaneira is described: 
-rl, / 
9' 'ti 
(s TE o'Eaj TE C 
ýC > h>\ 
l, 
f 8 ýS Gi >EV. 
Metaneira can see that Demeter is a being of unusual status, 
but she does not yet know that she is a goddess; accordingly 
the words used of her reaction describe the response of an 
inferior to a superior; we met the combination of aidos and 
deos frequently in such contexts in Homer, 
38 
and saw also 
how sebas could describe a similar reaction. 
39 As in all the 
passages in which the word occurs in Homer, sebas is 
subjective here; it describes a response to some quality in 
another which inspires awe; probably the first instance of 
the word in its objective sense (that which arouses awe) 
comes in the eighth of the epigrams preserved in the pseudo- 
Herodotean life of Homer (Ep. 8.3-4), where the sebas of Zeus 
xeinios attracts aidos and his opis is the sanction brought 
to bear upon those who disregard it. 
40 At h. Cer. 10-11 sebas 
describes the response of gods and men to the narcissus 
which is to entrap Persephone, but there the term has a 
slightly extended sense, "occasion for, cause of sebas, " as 
in the case of aidos at 8.17.336-7 and 01.3.24; in each of 
these examples sebas and aidos designate the situation as 
one in which these reactions are appropriate; the terms enjoy 
considerable flexibility of usage, and it is this which 
allows se bas (and occasionally aidos) to be used both 
subjectively and objectively; we might compare the twin 
usages of aischos and aischea, and the active and passive 
senses of aidoios. That which arouses sebas may be described 
as semnos, as at h. Cer. 1 and 478 (note sebas in 479 and cf. 
h. Merc. 552) and Demeter and her daughter are described as 
both aemnai and aidoiai at h. Cer. 485-6; clearly, since both 
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sebas and aidos can denote similar reactions to another's 
power, aidoios and semnos are very close in meaning, but at 
this stage it seems that semnos is more readily used of 
divine majesty than is aidoios. 
Metaneira's first impressions of the goddess lead her, at 
213-5, to address her as follows: 
i"lV, 
,X 
PC LvVV #C I) ETC-EC 0 %) fF 1<0C KW i 0e'T C. 0X Trx TO K VI W 
Eýt, ýC-Vxä)' öYa AwJ ' E-ML nL ýeýýEC 
ö, a rýJl cYi dý,, is 
Ki XAC's ) 
ws Eý -Tie TE &e/ Lfra7['ükwV x((A1W). 
Aidos is manifest in the eyes because the feeling of shame 
or inhibition naturally causes one to avert one's gaze, and 
it is therefore not remarkable that the situation of aidos 
in the eyes should become proverbial. 
41 The association 
between aidos and charis is important, recalling 04.8.18-23, 
where, as a result of Athene's pouring charis on his head and 
shoulders, Odysseus becomes phi os, deins and aidoios, 
42 
and 169-77 of the same book, 
43 
where possession of aidos is 
contrasted with lack of charis; here Demeter must show by 
her demeanour, perhaps by her downcast eyes, that shelcapable 
of showing aidos, but her ai o is not related to any specific 
action and appears to be much more a quality, like charis, a 
quality which likens her to b Iii. =V'VXo( i)hjts; kings are 
described as aidoioi in three passages ofrHesiod, 
44 
and, as 
we have just seen, aidos was part of. Metaneira's reaction to 
the appearance of the goddess at 190; the aidos which is 
apparent in one of a certain status, then, arouses a corres- 
ponding feeling of aidos in those they encounter. 
45 It is 
significant, too, that Metaneira equates aidos so readily 
with noble birth; this identification is one we shall meet 
again in Theognis and the tragedians. 
Before leaving hexameter poetry we might first consider a 
few passages in the Homeric epigrams46 which deal with aidos 
in the context of guest-friendship. We have already looked at 
Ep. 8, which mentioned the role of Zeus as protector of guests, 
and Ep. 1 is an unremarkable plea for aidos for a needy 
stranger; in 2.2 and 6.6 the poet hopes to meet men who are 
aidoioi with respect to strangers, and since the context in 
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both places is one of the proper way of receiving strangers, 
it would seem that aidoios is to be construed in the active 
sense, "showing aidos", for which the only Homeric parallel 
is Od. 17.578; 47 again, evidence of considerable flexibility 
in the usage of these terms. Two further passages in the 
epigrams are worthy of brief comment; at 4.2 a mother is 
described as aidoie, suggesting the obligation to accord one's 
parents aidos, and at 14. (= (Hes. ) fr. 302) 7 anaideie refers 
to failure to keep a promise, in this case the promise to 
pay the bard for his services. 
LYRIC, ELEGIAC AND IAMBIC POETS. 
Here it seems most appropriate to deal first with the early 
elegists, Tyrtaios and Kallinos, both of whom transport us 
back to the martial atmosphere of the Iliad, giving us 
further opportunity to observe the role of aidos on the field 
of battle. Kallinos fr. 1 (West) 
48 begins thus (1-4): 
4A-rX Ls TEO kqcTa 1cEtCOE - Ko ae>, 1< ýB ETE 
ýv, 
ýýofý / "" /, 
VE OL aL) S' oci Sct66' orr 6c-rrcec KTLOVßCS 
4(e > 'iy µE OL&vr&5 ;G ie vývvý cue 
ýa 
KEC T 
1iß (ea. ,D T0(( L5 ra. 
La. 
ý/ or7[-ocCOer/ --" 
This kind of hortatory appeal to 
aidos 
is familiar from 
the Iliad; the poet, imagining himself on the field, accuses 
his colleagues of slacking, and seeks to arouse their aidos, 
urging/to consider "what other people will say". There is no 
essential difference in the way aidos works in this passage 
from its operation in various passages in Homer, yet von 
Erffa49 contrasts Kallinos' expression with that of . 
11.5.529-30, 
and finds significance in the fact that, whereas the Homeric 
warriors are urged to aideisthai each other, Kallinos' fellow 
citizens are asked to show aidos for the opinions of members 
of other communities, i. e. other city states; in the one 
case the warriors are urged to show concern for their own 
reputations and in the other for that of their community. 
This, indeed, is true, and the argument does differ in the 
two passages, but this is not necessarily because Homer's 
warriors live in scattered oikoi while those of Kallinos 
dwell in a city state; the situation of the participants is 
undoubtedly different; the heroes of the Iliad do not live 
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in the same kind of society as does Kallinos (although the 
poet who gave the epic its written form might have), but 
even in the Iliad the idea of a community of honour in which 
all the members of one contingent were involved is of 
considerable importance, and we do find an appeal to aidos 
with regard to the reputation of one's own community vis-ä-vis 
other communities at Od. 2.65-6,50 and such appeals must 
always have been possible. It would also be erroneous to 
imagine that Kallinos' warriors are not concerned about their 
individual reputations in the same way as the Homeric; in 
fact, personal honour and collective honour go hand in hand. 
Tyrtaios 10.15-8 offers a similar kind of battle-speech:, 
w vFa c ,ýäkk 
.c am. o')c eth -rt"ae' ý IX tc vt vrýs, 
ýºý, vý6 10115 a ff ix( js äc'"-' /1' 4i o oo 
i & hha -EYDCV -Tr 0L &IT iC cc «j Ev JCesi vV VJ 
`ý` `1 
öý X0 Un t-r' örvý6ä rt 
, 
ý(vi -vo(. . 
Flight is "ugly" and brings disgrace; Tyrtaios, even in 
fragmentary form, is much freer with the use of the adjective 
aischros than is Homer, but, broadly speaking, it is used in 
similar contexts to those in which it is found in the Iliad 
and Odyssey. Its primary reference is still to physical 
appearances; at 10.21ff. it is aischron that an older man 
should be killed fighting in the front ranks before the 
younger warriors, and while this situation obviously reflects 
badly on the young, it is its external appearance which is 
primarily described as "ugly". The relationship between 
ugliness and disgrace is apparent at line 26; the wounds of 
the older man (to his aidoia) are 
" ýcýGCV, I r" V( TA , 4axhAýL3 Kau vcC-N(T oV 
51 a 1_, C Y 
Here the stress on physical appearances is reinforced by 
re. Y0¢ OKk5/K, ols. The scene is ugly to the eye, and, because an 
older man should not have to fight in the front ranks while 
there are young men who could take up that position, occasion 
for disapproval (nemeseton); nemesetonrefers explicitly to 
disapproval, aischra etc. only secondarily, in that people 
disapprove of that which is ugly; perhaps aischron is so 
much rarer than nemeseton in Homer precisely because it is 
more firmly in the sphere of appearances than in that of 
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popular disapproval. 
The extant poetry of Tyrtaios makes much of the idea that it 
is a duty of the äy& ofys(GoS to be brave in battle and to 
avoid flight; 
52 flight, we have seen, is aischros, 
53 
and, as 
such, will be liable to arouse the aidos of any who consider 
it. On this topic, von Erffa54 writes, 
"Bei Tyrtaios sehen wir zuerst einen Zusammenhang der 
aidos mit der arete. Die alte homerische aidos = das 
Standhalten im Kampf ist für Tyrtaios eine Forderung 
der arete. " 
I find this hard to understand; the Homeric warrior is also 
fighting to preserve his arete and it is the mark of a kakos 
to show cowardice in battle; disgrace is to be avoided, in 
Homer as in Tyrtaios, and disgrace can affect reputation, 
which is crucial to aret e. It is, however, true that Tyrtaios 
does equate bravery in battle with arete much more explicitly 
than do the Homeric poems, but Tyrtaios' poetry is also much 
more explicitly didactic, and the same lessons are furnished 
in Homer by indirection. 55 
If aidos has a negative röle to play in the preservation of 
arete by means of the avoidance of disgrace, it also has a 
positive röle in its recognition. In fr. 12, having expressed 
the view that martial arete is the most important, Tyrtaios 
goes on to describe the rewards attendant on those who 
manifest this arete. The warrior who has died for his city 
brings fame to it, its people and his own family (23-4), and 
the entire city mourns and honours him, and his family after 
him (27-30); his fame survives (31) and, though dead, he 
becomes immortal (32). The warrior who is fortunate enough 
to fight bravely a escape death is also honoured by the 
entire community, and for the rest of his life (37-42): 
IrXVTE-$ 4tV TLµf/rtV ,Ö ývºwS 
VE UL ºiý pE -rC- XX! 6L 
-dkk/k re - e-rrv -rra/ & 
wV 6FaL Ns 'A V 
oder KwJ cS4 OC ýTGcý. ft E'rý'7C' ETEC OýdE Tls a(cýTýY Y`7ý 
koc-rtý'ýcý our A; oürE- ck 
-TravrE-S EvOW Kot 4t. V a'r- ý,. ý 5 V&O . oc T7- Kar'a UTO\ 
Gt KavrEKX 'C'1 S of- E -ti 'aha C6 rtc 0 L, 
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Again we see a relationship between time and aidos; both are 
here used of the community's recognition of the are e of a 
brave soldier, as, too, is dike; as a result of the respect 
in which he is held, it seems, the hero does not suffer the 
same fate as Hesiod, being cheated of a fair settlement in a 
dispute. 56 Lines 41-2 appear to describe one way in which 
the aidos of the people for the warrior and the time they 
accord him are manifested; giving up one's seat to another 
is an obvious mark of respect and one which is equated with 
aidos at Ar. Clouds 993.57 
The fate of one who does not display sufficient arete in 
battle, however, is very different, as we can see from 
11.14-6: 58 
ý 1. 
o cSEý$ äý v -rra Tý -roe üroc kE 6-W v oa vvr ý-c Ev 
Oö(', výv aiýxC). ß; c91, 'raC öevCIei ktKo'. 
Here aischra refers to cowardice in battle, and the result 
of "learning aischra" is loss of aret e. 10.1-12 enlarges on 
the lot of one who has lost his arete: 
T'C- dv ýC ý/, ý l ýäc Koc k 0,1 CVZ, 'Ti'(oý L6(. 'Ero VTK 
äv öe' ä ýa 8 ov -rc-( VI -TR-r tba ýroavTu0 
TP ohL-n-aV TK cv Koh o1-S 
ä6-(äU 
-rrrwxýv cL% -r'ä v. rtJ ((r' äv vi oro. TW 
1Tý IEO VTC '7r"iý ä vod öUvTL^ cA C if lu t< , 
. 11 
-Tr it 
PL L6L .rFrUv(. KOt, Ký0 VL 
dt "T !XAkW. 
XBeOS M, 6 
ý 
oý EToýC^OUS kkkV (LK. ra 
Ct2? 
' c- "WW 
KOCI 
O"TV1& ' '7CE-VC 
fxuvC-c -r-E ýý-voS ýxTýc De< oý 6-4 SOS 6 he()c ) ýr'a rýC da -rC c. K4 t tact k-o rSE 7R-Tx 
f Et d' ou rc., S äv Cös -rOL kXW voU a .4t 4Et ýý`ý 
LV Frak 0JT aC ýws cuT OI 
(LJ rFvFas 
It appears that the woes of the beggar here have something 
to do with failure to act as described in 1-2; either he has 
shown himself a coward and been forced to leave his own 
community or he and his family are survivors of a community 
which has been utterly defeated, something which might also 
be taken as an indication of his failure to fight to the 
best of his ability. 
59 It is also clear that the beggar is 
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to be seen as one who has fallen from previous respectability. 
The whole of this fragment is intended to promote bravery in 
battle at all costs, and it seems to be the purpose of this 
section to depict the disgrace of cowardice or defeat in 
vivid terms, to depict, in fact, the kaka that befall one who 
has lost his arete. Knowledge of the disgraceful consequences 
of defeat, it need hardly be said, is likely to arouse the 
aidos of those who are faced with defeat as a real possibility, 
and aidos would certainly be the reaction of Tyrtaios' 
audience to the prospect of suffering in the way he describes. 
It is significant, then, that the coward/failure of the poem 
is placed in the position of having acted in a way which 
aidos should prevent, and of being unable to act as his 
aidos might urge him. He has, for example, shamed his 
family (9), in breach of one of the warrior's fundamental 
commands; 
60 
he has exchanged prosperity for poverty and is 
now unable to fulfil his obligations to his parents, his 
wife and his children; even his appearance suffers. In 
addition, having failed'to act as aidos demands and to be an 
s1ý 
Owle s y«B4S" he has no claim to the kind of rights possessed 
by his more fortunate counterpart in 12.35-42; he receives 
no time and no aidos. 
It need not surprise us that a beggar is described as being 
without the aidos of others; just as the Odyssean idea that 
beggars deserve aidos was idealistic and, even in that poem, 
often ignored in practice, so Tyrtaios stresses the ignominy 
of the beggar's life in order to reinforce his warning. 
TYrtaios' beggar, however, does seem to belong more to the 
real world than to that of Homeric fantasy, and perhaps it 
is a feature of the world he portrays that utter defeat and 
total loss of a ete seems a more present possibility than it 
does to the heroes of epic; no doubt utter defeat is also 
possible in Homer, and no doubt a severe loss of reputation 
could, in theory, lead to total loss of aret , but these are 
not eventualities which the heroes themselves stress, and 
although the Homeric characters are acutely concerned for 
their reputations, none of them ever looks like losing all 
his arete in the way described by Tyrtaios; 
61 
this is not to 
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say that the values of Tyrtaean and Homeric society are 
essentially different, simply that the fragments of Tyrtaios 
seem to reflect a real world in a way that the Homeric poems 
do not. 
It is not only in Sparta and Ephesos, however, that values 
of this kind prevail, and we find Athens' earliest known poet 
expressing similar ideas when he says (Solon fr. 3) 
l0 /ýC-d j oC 
il . tý 
7V 
dM PCX r0 rt-4-vol ir&-e V1 ro. / 
lýEe'rýS x xh-- o%T at(x/aS oe-lr746'd6VOL 
To be inferior in war involves one in aischos, ford Solon as 
for Homer. Although much of the surviving poetry of Solon 
deals with more or less moral topics, there are few instances 
of aidos etc., and not much that is relevant to our 
discussion. One fragment, however, (fr. 32) is of particular 
interest: 
'TfaTC c cýas 
ý'rvveYV 
c Jgo cSý %< cis ö< 'IXtx o%) 
OJ Koc d ba ºý M, c. oc ýeýS K oýxt ýý OVýS ºýýEos 
oJS 
.va d'E o ýc " -rt'X&oJ aW 
ýC vt K CEtv ýOKýw 
Toa i- oc Sä vCw-rc-uVS , 
The use of aideomai in this fragment is best explained by 
taking the phrase ltM. oýV4.5 Kit Kdýý«)(ý/ýj k) o as referring 
to the kind of judgement made by Solon's contemporaries with 
regard to his decision not to become-an absolute ruler, 
rather than explaining it as his own view of the conseqences 
of setting up a tyranny; 
62 I should paraphrase, then, 
"If I defiled and disgraced my reputation by not seizing 
absolute power, " as opposed to "If I did not defile and 
disgrace my reputation by seizing absolute power. " Under the 
first of these interpretations Solon is admitting, rhetoric- 
ally, that he has diminished his kleos, but denying that this 
causes him aidos, while, if the second were adopted, he would 
be saying that he has done nothing shameful, therefore he is 
not ashamed; the latter, however, would be a strange sort of 
sentiment to express in a conditional sentence. 
63 
Von Erffa64 regards this passage as the first retrospective 
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usage of aideomai, but, although Solon's aidos (or rather the 
lack of it) is undeniably related to an event in the past, 
the position is not essentially different from that in Il. 
22.104-7,65 where Hektor's aidos at future abuse is based on 
his awareness that he has done something which others will 
consider reprehensible. Similarly here Solon is momentarily 
accepting the charges of his opponents (whose taunts are 
quoted in fr. 33, which may be part of the same poem and may, 
indeed, have stood before the present passage) that he has 
damaged his fame, and it is primarily at these criticisms 
that he feels no aidos; this is not, however, to disagree 
with von Erffa that O* c$E,, O tst , r(also expresses the poet's 
lack of regret over his past conduct, but simply to point 
out that aidos is still explicitly related to the judgement 
of others while nevertheless encompassing an internal 
awareness of the character of one's conduct. 
The real importance of this fragment, however, lies in 
another direction; Solon is faced with a relatively widely- 
held belief that he has acted in a way that brings him no 
credit; people are saying unpleasant things about him, yet 
he feels no aidos about this, and relies instead on his own 
evaluation of the situation (note line 4 ioKtu), and this is 
something which Adkins66 claims no one does before Sokrates. 
The crucial point here is that Solon does not even consider 
the effects the taunts of others may have upon his reputation 
and his status; it is not in itself new that aidos can be 
inactive in the face of certain reproaches; numerous 
characters in Homer feel no aidos when reproached, the most 
notable example being that of the suitors; but the suitors 
in most cases67 simply ignore reproaches which they know can 
not seriously damage their position or even their reputation, 
because they are powerful and admired in other respects; they 
do not disagree with those who say that their conduct is 
dishonourable, they ignore them; in cases where the reproaches 
of others are likely to gain wide currency and to have a 
serious effect on an aspect of their object's reputation 
about which he is sensitive, and, by affecting his reputation, 
also to affect his material position, Homeric man does not 
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feel himself able to ignore popular opinion (the classic 
example is that of Diomedes in I1.8). 
68 Solon, however, does 
not care who believes the taunts of others, or how they 
might affect his reputation, and instead is content with his 
own conception of the truth; he believes not only that his 
action was not dishonourable, but that it was positively 
honourable, and will be proved so in the long term. 
68a 
Archilochos is another archaic poet who is not subject to +he 
power of Hesiod's E-Aki 4v 4 (P. 115 above); fr. 14 reads thus: At, 





ah oc -rt_ui\k (/% (-(o E vT. ( -1rA Dcc. 
We reme")er, too, that Archilochos admits throwing away his 
shield in order to save his life (fr. 5), contrasting only the 
value of his shield, which, though a good one, is not 
irreplaceable, with that of his life, and saying absolutely 
nothing about the fact that such an action is universally 
considered disgraceful. His contempt for popular opinion, 
however, differs from that of Solon, for he simply ignores 
the disapproval of others, whereas Solon ventures to dispute 
its relevance; Archilochos, then, is simply anaides; he 
does not say that it is not disgraceful to throw away one's 
shield, he just ignores those who say that it is. It is, 
however, significant that one who lives by the spear (fr. 2) 
can afford to admit that he has acted in a way commonly 
viewed as cowardly; obviously he feels that the disapproval 
of others, even of a failure in terms of competitive values, 
will not significantly affect his material Position or his 
ability to get on with his job, and this attitude provides 
an important contrast with that of the Homeric warrior, who 
puts his reputation for valour above all; perhaps this is 
another respect in which the values of the Homeric poems are 
idealized. 
Archilochos' iconoclasm and disregard for convention are also 
in evidence in fr. 133, where he ventures to dispute the 
conventional opinion, as found in Tyrta*os 12.23-34, that 
those who die bravely in battle are honoured after death: 
69 
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In fr. 124b. 4fhe ventures to accuse a friend who has burst 
into a symposium uninvited (thus showing no regard for the 
disapproval of those already and legitimately present) of 
anaideie, but it is his own anaideie which is remembered by 
posterity (Kritias B44DK), 
70 
and the chief example of this 
for Kritias is the loss of his shield; contemptuous of both 
time as the reward for success and popular disapproval as 
the punishment for failure, Archilochos is an important 
exception to the mainstream. 
71 
In the collection of poems which has come down to us under 
the name of Theognis we have an opportunity to witness aidos 
and the other relevant terms in action in a wide range of 
contexts, and aidos itself enjoys an importance in the corpus 
which is comparable with that accorded it in the-Homeric 
poems. 
72 
One of the most important areas in which the term 
occurs in the corpus is that of friendship; we saw in Homer73 
that a' os was a proper reaction towards one's i i, and, 
although aidos does not occur in that connexion in Hesiod, 
the concept of philotes and the proper modes of conduct 
towards one's ilo' remain the same in all essential aspects 
in that author; in Hesiod as in Homer philotes is a reciprocal 
relationship (WD. 353-6), but it is not necessarily a 
calculating or materialistic one; there may be an intrinsic 
pleasure in giving (357-8), and forgiveness and constancy 
are also stressed (707-16). 
74 Nevertheless, reciprocation of 
friendship is regarded as fundamental, 
75 
although reciprocity 
is obviously not everything there is to the relationship, 
76 
and it is frequently with the obligation to return a favour 
that aidos is concerned, particularly in Theognis. 
77 
The complaint that friendship has not been returned is a 
frequent one in Theognis, and this is seen as a breach of 
aidos; typical is 253-4, where the poet complains that, 
despite his having presented Kyrnos with the gift of immor- 
tality through song, he receives little aidos in return: 
136 
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1263-6 is similar: 
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C- V e, e o<; s'oVs 0V ý ILý5 BTU, OV Two passages illustrating the consequences of failing to 
return a favour show clearly that to do so is to ignore aidos; 
at 1272 a greedy boy is said to have become an aischune 
78 
to the friends of both parties to the relationship, while at 
1297-8 a boy for whom (presumably unrequited) philotes 
threatens to lead the author to Hades is urged O C- WVd 
i-ir rrrc jio A%vLä jCV tocv8(wtwJ. Failure to behave properly 
towards one's ilol, then, can implicate one in aischune 
and lead to the disapproval of both gods and men. 
79 
The aidos which is owed to one's i of is explicitly 
associated with arete at 399, where K; SwßocL 
4týovs is said 
to be a basic duty of the agathos; we find no such explicit 
statement in Homer, but the impression created by the stress 
on aidos in the context of philotes in epic is that the same 
also holds good in the Iliad and Odyssey. The idea of 
reciprocity and gratitude is also combined with aidos at 
1329-34, a passage which seems to sum up all that we have 
said on the subject so far: 
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To return a favour, then, is kalon and it is not aischron to 
recall a favour one is owed; to give charis, moreover, is 
equated with showing aidos. This obligation is common to all 
kinds of philia, not only to erotic relationships between 
boys and older men (we have seen the truth of this from 
Homer, especially at 11.. 18.394, where Thetis is described as 
ado e, deserving aidos, on account of a favour she once did 
Hephaistos, and from passages like h. Cer. 6480), and von 
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Erffa is therefore wrong to say (p. 71) that the aidos 
demanded at 253,1266 and 1331 is derived from the respect one 
owes one's elders; the stress in these passages is wholly on 
the failure of the addressee to return a favour. 
We also saw in Homer how aidos was frequently combined with 
terms denoting intelligence, 
81 that one of these was the 
adjective saophron82and that, in general, aidos was opposed 
to similar ideas of excess and self-assertion as is classical 
sophrosyne. 
83 In Theognis aidos and sophrosyne meet to an 
extent not hitherto encountered. An explicit connexion is to 
be found at 479-83: 
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The notion of excess is important in this passage (479), and 
to go beyond the metron is to discard aidos and sophrosyne; 
one also loses control of oneself (480), and thus sophrosyne 
begins to take on positive connotations of "self-control", 
84 
but, as the antithesis with v qTt'tus shows, the dominant sense 
of the adjective is still "sensible" or "prudent", 
85 
and, as 
in Homer, good sense or prudence is the ally of aidos. Again 
we see the relationship between aidos and that which is 
aischron; the drunkard's conduct appears ugly to others, and 
arouses their disapproval, but the prospect of their disap- 
proval does not worry its object, because, in his drunken 
state, he ^söurýtt dý ýCrwý oücSäV "86 A similar idea is to be 
found at 627-8, where we are told that it is aischron that a 
drunken man should be in the company of sober people and that 
a sober man should remain in the company of inebriates; 
clearly the experience in both cases would be unpleasant for 
the odd one out, and it is the unpleasantness of the 
situation itself which is denoted by the word aischron; such 
a scene simply does not look right 
86a 
The alliance between sophrosyne and aidos is most apparent 
in passages in which moral decline and social conflict are 
138 
the main topics. At 41,379 and 1082a sophrosyne emerges as 
the antithesis of hybris, 
87 
and hybris, along with bie (835), 
atasthalie (749) and hyperbasiel 
refers 
to the notion of 
excess which is opposed by both aidos and sophrosyne, both 
of which, it is claimed, are absent from a world in which 
these vices flourish. At 83-6 we learn that there is not one 
shipload of men alive who have aidos on their tongues and 
eyes, 
88 
while at 289-92 the topsy-turvy state of contemporary 
society is blamed on a lack of aidos and a preponderance of 
anaideie and hybris: 
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Similarly at 635-6 we learn that of the "good men" who are 
attended by gnome (= sophrosyne) and ads there are now few 
examples, while at 647-8 the sentiment of 291-2 is reiterated: 
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The departure of aidos, then, means a lack of agathoi, no 
dike and a surfeit of hybris and anaideie, almost exactly 
the situation envisaged by Hesiod as the culmination of the 
iron age (above, p. 120); but when the poet of 1135-50 chooses 
to depict moral decline in thoroughly HesLodic terms, it is 
sophrosyne, not aidos, that he decides to personify (1135-8): 
'EXiCLS fsv äVo W'><-ßt, 6L / v"i 
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It is also significant that, in the sequel to this statement, 
the state of affairs which has just be attributed to the 
departure of sophrosyne is seen as a result of man's failure 
to respect the gods, and a number of those terms which refer 
specifically to the human response to the divine make their 
appearance (äP,, rAL 1140, fEPGwV1141, [-üsfý äS1142, C-VrFLSFWV 
Moss 1144); hazomai, we noted, refers almost exclusively 
to the divine sphere, 
89 but sebo/sebizo etc. could work in 
the area of human relationships in Homer; 
90 here, however, 
eusebes seems primarily religious. From this passage it seems 
139 
that sophrosyne, a term not primarily associated with fear 
of the gods, can nevertheless refer to similar conduct to 
that implied by those terms which do; the same was true of 
aidos in the Odyssey. 
At 399 (p. 136 above) we saw that it was a duty of-the aciathos 
to /ci l66nt ¢t )t ovs 
91 
whi le1289-92 (p. 138) the decline of the 
agathoi and the ascendancy of the kakoi coincide with the 
destruction of aidos and the hegemony of hybris and anaidei 
similarly at 635-6 (ibid. ) aidos is said to be a property of 
the agathoi. We find similar thoughts at 409-10, a passage 
which refers to the importance of instilling aidos in the 
young and which once more associates it with arete: 
oü gc , D( ývý tavräý -tT-acýiV ýcocTa erH ä cvc. ý 




The crucial question here, however, centres on the reasons 
for the designation of those who possess aidos in these 
passages as agathoi; are they morally good, or are they 
simply agathoi by virtue of their birth and rank? In some 
places it seems that social change, in which one class gains 
the ascendancy over another, can in itself render the agathos 
kakos and vice versa (55-8,1109-13), and there aaathos etc. 
must be socially descriptive rather than morally evaluative. 
In other places, however, it seems that it is moral qualities 
render one agathos or kakos (most notably 145-8). otherwhich 
passages simply do not allow us to decide, while some seem 
to combine the descriptive with the evaluative; a case in 
point is 53ff.; in 57-8 agathos, esthlos and d eilos refer to 
social class, but in 59-68 the former deiloi, now agathoi 
are chiefly characterized by their moral failings, cheating, 
faithlessness and unreliability as friends, all of which 
could be seen as breaches of aidos. Another problem regarding 
arete in Theognis is that it sometimes appears that agathos 
is a title conferred by success (165-6,797-8), while elsewhere 
success or wealth are irrelevant (315-8). 
92 Where arete is 
not tied to success it nay be moral, but in view of the 
confusion of social and moral arete in 53-68 it is hardly 
safe to assume this; it seems, in fact, most likely that 
either the poets who composed the relevant portions of the 
Icorpus 
140 
genuinely believed that the nobility were, as a class, also 
morally good and their inferiors morally bad, or they sought 
deliberately to imply that this is the case. Certainly the 
identification of ads as an aristocratic virtue is one we 
have met before, 
93 
and the idea that a given social class 
should have a monopoly on moral goodness is not one that is 
unfamiliar to us. 
94 
The Theognid corpus does not offer many instances of nemesis; 
at 279-80 the kakos is said to be unable properly to discern -ro( 
, 
f6cKwk, 
and not to fear (hazesthai) the nemesis to come; we 
are not told whether this nemesis is of man or god, but the 
use of ý soývtevo4 might suggest the latter, without ruling out 
the former as a possibility. Nemesis is divine at 660, but 
only in the sense of the gods' anger at an abuse of their own 
;. ,i, 
prerogative (the gods, Ot6ty t1FsTI. TeXOS feel resentment 
if one swears plrrm -rC1ewC T* 
Errat). At 1179-82 the 
appearance of aidos and nemesis in close proximity might 
suggest that the lines 
form a 
complete excerpt (hence Young 
(Teubner) Prints them as such); in the first couplet Kyrnos 
is urged e 4ou5 a" you K)i 
ciot&Dy 
and informed that such aidos 
prevents asebeia in word or deed; we have met aidos for the 
gods before, but only in the contexts of supplication or 
guest-friendship, although we saw in connexion with the 
Odyssey how the interest taken by the gods in those aspects 
of human affairs could become more general. 
95 As a result, 
it seems, of that process, it is now possible to use &i 6rO mt 
OFouS in a more general way, and to regard the conduct which 
ads prevents not simply as that which is discreditable for 
oneself but as that which exhibits disregard for the gods as 
upholders of morality (asebes). The adjective asebes seems 
in this passage to have a special reference to the divine 
sphere, but in Homer sebas itself has no such exclusive 
reference, 
96 
although in later literature the religious usage 
is the dominant one; here the two groups of terms meet because 
aidos itself has now moved into the religious sphere, and it 
seems that aideomai refers to the same idea of awe at the 
superior power of the gods as would sebo etc. in a similar 
context. Again we see the combination of ads and fear in 
141 
1179, and again the combination itself tells us that the two 
ideas are not synonymous, while nonetheless placing this 
usage of aidos in the category of "respect for those of 
greater power". 
The first couplet, then, expresses the idea that aidos for, 
and fear of, the gods prevents asebeia; the second (1181-2) 
maintains that the nemesis of the gods is not aroused by the 
overthrow of a 4, AJ), iv TuC. cw&v, no matter how this is 
achieved; the clear implication is that violence is justified 
against a political enemy who can also be seen as an enemy 
of the people as a whole. The nemesis of the gods might 
therefore seem to link up with the idea of aidos in 1179, 
and, if taken together, the lines would have to mean; "Aidos 
for the gods prevents asebeia (and avoids divine nemesis), 
but it is not asebes to dispose of one who is consuming the 
wealth of the city. " The injunction to aidos will then be the 
rule to which the following is the exception, and the main 
point of the stanza will be the legitimacy of any method 
which will get rid of the tyrant, but the connexion does seem 
abrupt, and 1179-80 do have the air of a genuine moralist's 
precept, and so it might be better to see the lines as two 
separate distichs, as does West. No matter how the lines are 
divided, however, the main point of both couplets for our 
purposes is the attraction of both ads and nemesis into the 
divine sphere; aidos will only operate in that area on 
relatively few occasions, while nemesis very quickly becomes 
an exclusively religious concept. 
In a body of poetry in which ads is constantly seen as 
necessary and desirable one passage stands out in sharp 
contrast; lines 1063-8 exalt the pleasures of love and the 
symposium, with the conclusion (1067-8): , 
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Wealth is probably seen as unnecessary here because one's 
enjoyment of revelry and love-making stands in no relation 
to one's riches; these are simple pleasures to which wealth 
is irrelevant. Aidos, on the other hand, must be that which 
142 
would conflict with enjoyment of these pleasures, the aidos, 
perhaps, of one who did not wish to behave in a way which 
might arouse the disapproval of others, or who thought such 
revelry "unseemly" or "inappropriate". 
97 
Once again we see 
aidos as an inhibition feeling which is felt to be more a 
hindrance than a help in certain circumstances. 
We have already discussed some of the more important usages 
of the adjective aischros in Theognis, mostly in passages in 
which aidos etc. also occur; even where the two do not occur 
together, however, there will still be a connexion, because 
any act or experience which could be described as aischron 
will also be of such a kind as to occasion aid os in a pros- 
pective agent or patient. In the Theognid corpus, as in 
the Iliad, it is aischron to return from a battle with 
nothing to show for it, or, worse still, without even having 
taken part (889-90): 
Nv a '1ce -rr'aý E-oýr c Ka w Kvr-o (ww cryloivi, c 
4'oKtýýbevi' E, - c ,. 
Most of the instances of aischron etc. in the corpus, however, 
have nothing to do with the martial context; at 1177-8 the 
avoidance of c' c( «i i>o, 
(, 
either as agent or patient, is 
related, in a general way, to aee, and this bears comparison 
with those passages in which aidos, the force which leads one 
to avoid aischra, is also seen as part of ae 
98 
Elsewhere aischron etc. are often used in two particular 
contexts, that of poverty and that of dishonesty. At 373ff. 
the poet takes Zeus to task for allowing the just and the 
unjust to live 1v TKUr` 
/ , 
I4oL(q; many who are just, he goes on 
(383-7), are forced to live in poverty, and some are led into 
wrongdoing under its compulsion; the poor man, we are told, 
endures against his will aiixfK ir6>)cc(388). and learns many 
kaka, lies and deceit and strife (389-90). Aischea here seems 
to refer first of all to the indignities which one for whom 
ao is unseemly (391) is forced to suffer, and secondly to 
the discreditable action which many who are constrained by 
poverty are forced to take; although the crimes of deceit and 
dishonesty are described as kaka rather than aischra, the 
143 
context seems to imply that the kaka which the poor man is 
forced to commit form part of the aischea which he is forced 
to endure; to be in a position in which one is tempted to act 
dishonestly is in itself aischron. The poet, however, does 
not believe that poverty necessarily leads to dishonesty, 
since he goes on to claim that it is in poverty that the 
moral character of the individual is revealed (393-4); even 
in time of need the good man will not turn to injustice. 
99 
Another passage on the same theme reveals similar ideas at 
work (649-52): 
ä ýc tk, rev1ýýýt, ý, öýSäL/ 
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The deprivations of poverty disfigure a man's appearance100 
and his intelligence; the inclusion of nods, which normally 
refers to the moral intelligence required to act prudently 
and in accordance with convention, suggests that aischra and 
esthla refer to improper and proper conduct respectively, 
although it is also possible that C(GX C ... Kaci KA' f'-1rtýfäýEVaJ 
signifies knowledge of a more prosperous and dignified way 
of life; perhaps, as in the previous example, both ideas are 
present. For the idea that it is aischron in itself to be 
poor we. might compare TYrtaios 10.1-12 (pp. 130-1 above), 
where the beggar suffers total atimie and kakotes and 
receives no ad from others. It appears from Hes. WD. 717-8 
that poverty could in itself be considered grounds for 
reproach, although Hesiod himself holds that one should 
refrain from such reproach; 
101 his injunction, however, seems 
to have gone unheeded by many. 
There appeared to be a suggestion in both these passages that 
the discreditable condition of poverty could lead one to 
discreditable conduct; in other passages aischron etc. are 
frequently used of the offences of theft, deceit and dis- 
honesty, and the distaste for the pursuit of wealth by improper 
means is redolent of the attitude of Hesiod in the Works and 
Days. Lines 27-30 are a good example of this, in which Theognis 
144 
implicitly equates the avoidance of injustice and aid-) e; c 
tcy rc with arete (27-8) and explicitly relates it to good 
sense (29): 
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465-6 and 1147-50 are similar: 
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From the first of these it appears that it is a requirement 
of arete to pursue justice and avoid aischron kerdos102, 
while in the second the conduct which is aischron consists 
of a proclivity towards theft or at least the acquisition of 
another's goods by deception; in both cases that which is 
dikaion or not adikon is related to that which is aischron. 
Pursuit of the wrong sort of kerdos is, as we saw, 
103 
a major 
vice in Hesiod, and at D. 323-4 it is equated with anaideie 
and opposed to aidos; similarly at Theognis, 83-6, the 
possession of aidos 
AM that which would prevent one being 
led by kerdos into conduct which is aischron; at 1148, however, 
it is failure to heed the anger of the gods which leads one 
to commit aischra and adika, and thus we see once again how, 
from the Odyssey onwards, the observance of human propriety 
may be equated with fear of divine punishment. The idea of 
aischron kerdos also occurs in 607-10, where profit made from 
lying is said to be aischron, kakon and not kalon; there is 
liitle indication in the Odyssey that lying is discreditable 
in itself (as it appears to be in 607), and Odysseus in 
particular often tells lies to further his own aims, but a 
certain distaste for deceit does emerge from 11.9.312-3, 
where Achilles says that he hates a man who thinks one thing 
and says another. The notion that it is aischron to tell lies, 
however, does become common in fifth century literature. 
104 
145 
At 197-208 it is Zeus' way of punishing those who acquire 
wealth unjustly (those whose conduct is described in 199-202) 
which is described; the gods do not punish wrongdoers 
immediately; some are punished, while some, it seems, die 
before their punishment; the punishment envisaged, then, must 
be something like ruin or loss of prosperity while one is 
still alive. The important point to note for our purposes, 
however, is the designation of death as anaides in 207; 
clearly the adjective in this case refers to ruthlessness 
rather than to insensitivity to popular opinion; death is 
anaides because there is no possibility of its being averted 
by entreaty or being persuaded to feel aidos; in this 
application the adjective, as we have seen, is also used of 
inanimate objects 
105 
and wild beasts. 
106 
Many of the lyric, elegiac and iambic poets refer to aidos 
only in passing, and uninformative instances of aidoios etc. 
are common. Of those passages not so far discussed in which 
the relevant terms occur the following are the most interesting. 
A sepulchral epigram, attributed by some to Simonides 
(fr. 136D) but probably later, reveals the persistence of 
aidos as that which prevents cowardice in battle: 
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Sappho 137LP shows how aidos inhibits utterances which are 
not kalon: 
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The surviving poems of Bacchylides offer remarkably little 
of relevance; the only passage worthy of comment is 5.104-7 
(Snell-Maehler), where the Kalydonian boar is described as 
ýY#ctöo 
K*'Xjj, presumably because, like death at Thgn. 207 
(above), it cannot be persuaded to show quarter. 
146 
PINDAR 
The concept of aidos is not crucial to the ethical views to 
be found in the extant poetry of Pindar, but the term does 
occur and over a wide range of usage. There are three 
immediately identifiable areas in which the concept is often 
found; firstly, since the epinikian odes are written for 
specific athletic champions, the aidos of others towards the 
victor is important; secondly, the aidos proper among philoi 
also occurs; and, thirdly, we also find the term in the 
familiar context of sex and sexuality. 
In two passages the adjective aidoios is used in connexion 
with the attitude of others to the victor; at Q.. 7.89-90 Zeus 
is requested to grant Diagoras 
kt -trot' 
ä 
r-twl KäI -TToT 
S« 
VwV. 
Cas is the quality possessed by one towards whom others 
feel aidos, 
107 
and the adjective is thus used in its normal, 
passive significance. A similar idea occurs at 1.2.37, where 
Xeinokrates is described as 0 cc0' os """c roZ5 
Öýwcý4cv ; 
primarily, these words may be taken as referring to others' 
recognition of the victor's success, but an active notion 
seems to coexist with the passive in the adjective, for the 
poet immediately goes on to praise Xeinokrates for his 
hospitality. 
Two passages from. E. 4 illustrate the operation of aidos among 
philoi; at 145-6 the text, as printed by Snell-Maehler, reads: 
M 
Ote"Gl d"a¢i r1 LYT 
" 
Tts C°' T'Fi1E 
ö 
M4Y 0V 0LS ai 
e(w 
1lccicü4+"tl . 
In the Loeb edition, however, a comma is printed after 014-4 r"VOts 
and commentators are divided as to whether oc eS j IeKku Kt is 
final after Mo . ct cý'p"r It (loci or consecutive after G AA&t 'TT'4 F-'. 
Greene108 points out that the Moirai are associated with the 
family through Eleithuia and their attendance at childbirth 
(Q. 6.42,2.7.1), and this might explain their aidos, but on 
either interpretation the Moirai withdraw, and so their 
association with the family does not prove that it is they 
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who experience the aidos of 146.109 Yet because the Fates are 
associated with the family, von Erffa's reason for rejecting 
the interpretation favoured by Greene, 
110 
namely that there 
is nothing to connect the goddesses with family strife, is 
rendered invalid, 
111 
and the translation, "The Fates withdraw 
... to hide their aidos, 
' thus makes good sense. So too, 
however, does the rival interpretation, "The Fates withdraw, 
... if strife among kin conceals aidos, 
" and, in the end, it 
is only the word-order which makes the latter the more likely. 
For our purposes, however, it is the link between aidos and 
philia which is important, and this is present under either 
interpretation. 
At line 218 of the same poem a much more straightforward 
form of aidos is mentioned, the aidos of Medea for her 
parents which the charms taught Jason by Aphrodite were 
intended to overcome. On the debt of aidos which one owes 
one's parents we might compare 11.22.82,0 . 20.343-4112 and 




9 aidos makes an appearance in the context of sexual 
relationships; at line 12 we learn how Aphrodite cast aidos 
on the yývKEeKi EüvKi of Apollo and the mortal girl, Kyrana 
(Cyrene). The union of the pair is idealized, and the presence 
of a' s, a form of restraint and respect for decorum in 
sexual contexts, illustrates this. Such delicacy is, however, 
general, according to the centaur, Cheiron, who informs 
Apollo (40-1): 
Kost c -q -rt- vEOt$ TUvTo I<or%oeLAfflOLS oft: j$ 
ai cýE0vTC</. 
¢re äV oC ýEc 
oc T v) GzqTö 1r ji-ov C- 
U 
Voc s. 
This may refer to a general distaste for open lovemaking 
(cf. fl. 14.330-40, p. 73 above), but if the inclusion of -ri 
7rewrol is to have any significance, there must be a reference 
to shyness at taking the crucial first step towards a sexual 
relationship. 
Other instances of aidos in Pindar seem to be linked by an 
association with foresight and good sense; a difficult 
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passage of Q., 7 relates aidos and foresight explicitly (43-7): 
F' g' äe Ercv 
E e%1 
RkEý Kýcý xiýxT' ävOec"nr/pari 1r(o O 
os 
ai (I"S 
c7rL paJ acvEc 7L F<A( XFC0 . ATEKýa(rK VE¢O f %c (XKEý ? ['PaýMýTW OPo iÖ cSöý 
eý w1C EYWý/. 
1. / 1, 
The meaning of these lines, if we take aidos as the subject 
41 114 and not7CKý, as Wilamowitz suggests, is reasonably 
clear; ads, something to do with forethought (or forethink- 
ing), brings men ae and 2c^( but forgetfulness can 
lead them astray (thus on the particular occasion they forgot 
to light fires to Athene). '7r Op. &0S Al Jws, however, is 
difficult; Jebb115 would print 
lrCo/. 
ýý9EýS, but such a genealogy 
is unparalled and, moreover, difficult without the article or 
something like ecr; von Erffa1 
suggests 
that 11CCoj. a 96-oJ 
is the genitive of the masculine adjective and translates, 
"the aidos of a forethinking man ... 
", but this is surely far 
too specific for the context; equally, it seems impossible 
for 
to take Cv%scO&&j as the genitive of the neuter, here, too, 
the article seems necessary in order to give the sense 
"foresight" or "forethought", and, in any case, "aidos towards 
foresight" seems to make little sense. 
117 It seems, then, 
that the best option of those considered is the interpretation 
of Jebb, since it is the only one which gets us close enough 
to the required sense, "aidos, which is related to foresight", 
in spite of the absence of the article orOvy4rI (an absence 
which Gildersleeve's alleged parallel, 8.5.27Täß'E'rrpv NOS- 
04v 
öJ OvýPc7E(ic lI otsfrcj, only makes more obvious) 
The importance of this passage, however, lies in the 
association of aidos with piety (aidos is seen as that which 
prevents neglect of one's obligations to the gods, just as 
it does in the case of one's obligations to one's fellows) 
and with foresight, and these associations are present no 
matter how the text is interpreted. The link between ads 
and foresight presumably relates to the prospective force of 
the term; if aidos is to inhibit action in the future, fore- 
sight will be required in order to envisage the possible 
consequences of different courses of action; if-one such 
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course seems likely to bring discredit on the agent, or to 
be unacceptable to the set of values to which he subscribes, 
then aidos will intervene. At N. 11.45-6 lack of aidos is also 
1-1 associated with lack of rcoý^ C-LK , and it seems that the 
intelligence which enables one to foresee the consequences 
of one's actions is indispensable to aidos in its prospective, 
inhibitory sense. 
118 
Aidos is again linked with good sense at N. 5.14-18, but here 
the tone of the passage differs considerably from that of 
those just discussed: 
aiýc rcýý"c c-irrciý 
4V 
cfL KK TE KF KLV(U1 VoJj 
-rt'ws di ?ýi rt-af G-ü eac e' vac ý'oý/, 
*I f 1J<OLIL TCS OCVSr. s «Xn/sN us 
got 





ö1 PC (op C"o ii -ru'.. ä-rra ý. c Kies 
wý 
ýº 
ai vag 1rK -Irc 
or 
w- rod äkx6 eiL örre E 1<6, S . 
Kai ro (L 5/-1O)SxOI<Sý fTL 0- 
4- 
Tacrt, J ACVOpWirw Vo'jIraL , 1. ý 
The deed which Pindar wishes to conceal is the murder of 
Phokos, the son of Aiakos, by his two half-brothers, Telamon 
and Peleus, and thus the poet represents himself as feeling 
aidos at the prospect of relating the discreditable actions 
of others, and his aidos might perhaps be seen as distaste 
for the unpleasantness of the story; yet he explains his aidos 
by Kä\ Tö rLyK / 'TToXX C(S Fm. iF. f 
Trr. V; is, then, the poet's 
scruple based on a fear of unpleasant consequences should he 
tell the story? This can hardly be the case, since the 
allusion to the event is quite clear, and, in fact, the poet 
reveals that which he claims to conceal. 
119 In reality, the 
passage is nothing more than elegant and witty praise of the 
victor; Pindar pretends to expel any disreputable elements 
from his victory-ode, and Tb (c/, which conceals ignoble 
deeds, is contrasted with the poet's craft, which makes noble 
deeds immortal; but he need not have mentioned the episode 
at all, and so he must have some reason for making the 
allusion, and it is most probable that his reason was a 
literary one, involving the clever and courteous "suppression" 
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of unsavoury detail and a sly literary joke, to the effect 
that the poet must show prudence in his selection of material, 
lest his patrons refuse to pay him. The aidos of this passage, 
then, is manifestly not genuine. 
We have already had occasion to mention the contrast between 
anaideia and foresight in 1,. 11.45-6; the whole passage, from 
43-8, reads as follows: 
Cit, re "ra U" IK A. LOS . (VeCt rr6(s 6ocE5 Oux ER T C. 
TE K/, txe , o(XX E rr. V /FEY Kit Ac 
Vo acs flvo/. r/, a 
G" K T4 'irc .iK(, Vst, 
/VwVTeS 
C &T'4(- W%00'#tc 
G 1C'TC t. o t, y w, o( 
Toe 







vo-W ee rzuV 
81vrEexL /AtaVLccC 
. 
This is one of the many passages in Pindar in which moderation, 
particularly in the enjoyment of prosperity, is stressed, 
and one of the few in which aidos has a röle to play, as it 
did in Hesiod and Theognis, in the restraint.. which is urged 
with regard to the acquisition of wealth. The striving for 
wealth, it appears, can be harmful when it becomes excessive, 
and when, having no regard for the metron or the possible 
consequences, it leads one to anaideia; the danger of kerdos 
is familiar from Hesiod and Theognis, as is the association 
of the unrestrained pursuit of erdos with anaideia, while 
the desirability of moderation and the dangers of excess were 
apparent in Homer. Pindar differs from Homer, however, in 
stressing the idea of divine resentment of human prosperity, 
an idea of which only the germ is present in epic. 
120 The 
tendency of humans to get above themselves, thereby presuming 
upon the prerogative of the gods (see . 
E. 3.59-62,. 1.. 5.14-5) 
121 w tgh i is most often encapsulated in hybris, to e A&Ey^hav0C LOCL 
and nvztGU t» n-tS of IL. 11 . 44-6 approximate. 
Apart from its appearance in the passage just considered, 
ads only enters into the poet's insistence on moderation 
and the dangers of kerdos in two other places; in 
conclusion to Q, 13 (line 115) we find the following prayer: 
ZEv -r c', ai 
ýW 
Ca 
ÖOL Kdt -rüpo/ -r& ý-rrvwý YaVK4ca, l, 
Aidos could refer here to the aidos the victor is to receive 
151 
from his contemporaries, but it is more likely, given that 
the rest of the line refers to his attitude to his prosperity, 
that it is the victor's own aidos with regard to others and 
particularly with regard to the disposal and pursuit of wealth 
that is meant; it accords well with beliefs such as those we 
have already looked at to imagine that enjoyment of prosperity 
is to be seen as possible only if aidos is present. 
122 
A similar notion is also to be found in IL 9.33-4, again in 
the context of a prayer to Zeus; the god is reminded that 
the people of Aitna are uncorrupted by possessions (32-3), 
but the poet concedes (33) that this may be hard to believe, 
explaining, 
aIcJ3Y 1K e L) oK1 v{ "t K ýý 
h- 
. 
Kit E"fýi"ýoc C, t-%i -173 
cc 
4 EPEc 60 JsCJ . 
Again, a 
is 
brings about resistance to kerdos, and, as 
concern for one's reputation, it keeps one's doxa intact and 
allows it to grow. From the renown of the Aetnaeans, however, 
the poet moves on to that of his patron, Chromios, and lines 
34-7 describe how aidos, personified as a goddess in 36, 
enabled him to stand his ground in battle; aidos, then, is 
still the force which promotes courage in the martial context, 
as, indeed, might also be concluded from an earlier passage 
of the same ode (24-7), where it is said that Amphiaraos, 
having taken to flight in the battle. for Thebes, was saved 
from the disgrace (aisXv-113ºjp4/, 27) of being wounded in the 
back 123 by the intervention of Zeus. 
123aThe 
relationship 
between ads and courage is also apparent at P. 4.174, where 
the sons of Poseidon join the crew of the Argo 
äXKK*V; it would hardly be in keeping with the tone of the 
passage for this to mean, "ashamed lest their cowardice should 
be exposed", and so it seems that the warriors'pc> Ky is 
treated as a semi-personification, and they accord it aidos 
as they would a person of greater status and power. 
124 
Two instances of the adjective anaides seem worthy of brief 
comment; at fr. 140a. 59 
ECY ä1. cLc refers to deeds which 
manifest the anaideia of their agent, in this case with regard 
to an. abuse of hospitality, while at a. 10.105 death is 
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described as anaides, as at Thgn. 207 (p. 145 above). Nemesis 
occurs only twice in Pindar, and in both places it is far 
removed from its epic sense of popular disapproval; at 0. $. 86, 
Cuj Dem 
äp{ 
t K#(XW VL It Vý 
it is clearly seen as a divine reaction to human/over- 
prosperity, while at P. 10.42-4 the Hyperboreans are said to 
be free from toil and battle and thus to escape t Ir(, ý 4ý't Ko 
i t'i(ytrL$, 
where nemesis seems to be divine punishment for 
human injustice. 125 The verb nemesao occurs in the sense "be 
angry" at I. 1.3. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO. 
1. It is not automatically assumed that Homer is earlier 
than Hesiod, although much or even most of the traditional 
material incorporated in our Iliad and Odyssey will predate 
the composition of the Hesiodic poems; nevertheless, there 
remains the possibility that the latter were in existence 
before the former were given the form in which we have them; 
with this in mind West (Theogony, 46-7) argues for the 
priority of Hesiod, Havelock (Justice, 214-5) for that of 
Homer; probably the Odyssey, Hesiod, the earliest elegists 
and Archilochos are all roughly contemporary, belonging to 
the century or so following the reintroduction of literacy; 
cf. Seel, "Zur Vorgeschichte ... ", p. 310, Thornton, Homer's 
Iliad, p. 23. 
2. Cf. WD. 257 (Dike), 300-1 (Demeter). 
3. Ih. 572, DD. 71 (Pandora), fr. 195.14 and 46 (= Scutum, 14 
and 46). 
4. See above, p. 97n. 35. 
5. Odysseus is thus contrasting the aidos shown by his 
exemplar towards others with Euryalos' lack of aidos towards 
a guest (Q . 8.159-64); cf. von Erffa, p. 
47. 
6. Such is the view of the first group of scholars cited by 
West, ad loc., and opposed by von Erffa, P. 47, and Havelock, 
p. 215. West himself argues against direct dependence, pointing 
out that both passages may be derived from a traditional 
stock of ideas, but also that the application of the language 
is more traditional in the Hesiodic passage. 
7. See in Particular A. B. Cook, C$ 1901,341, T. A. Sinclair,, 
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CR 1925,147-8, A. Hoekstra, Mnem. 1950,99-106, Verdenius, 
Entr. Fond. Hardt 7,1962,141-2, K. J. MacKay, AJP 1963, 
17-27, E. Valgiglio, Maia 1969,169-74, D. B. Claus, TAPA 1977, 
78-83; cf. von Erffa, 48-9. 
8. Cf. Adkins, M_RR, P. 157. 
9. op. cit., p. 17. 
10. loc. cit.. 
11. It might be claimed that the twocCt4-S at WD. 11ff., 
expressing the idea of the ambivalence of Eels, lend support 
to "bad ad s" in 317 (sf. Verdenius, comm. on 317 ärx04 
318. u'6 j); but the idea of two kinds of aidos does not emerge 
from 317 even with the reading t-oý"If(, t and an attributive 
sense of ojK ýy. G4 ; certainly 318 does not say that there 
are two kinds of aidos, but that aidos is now harmful, now 
helpful; if pressed to keep t< V-%f" in 317, rather than, 
"bad aidos looks after a needy man, " I should translate, 
"the aidos which looks after a needy man is not good, " i. e. 
in the particular circumstance (certainly not, "the aidos 
that is bad for a poor man (also) fosters him, " Claus, TAPA 
1977, P. 83 - an obvious attempt to mitigate the oxymoron, ou K 
AfKel/ #< LkS .); the meaning of the passage would still be 
that aidos is inefficacious in some circumstances, but this 
is a meaning which is much clearer with the reading 1<rt. C-tv. 
12. Von Erffa, p. 48, Verdenius on 317(-scG1 . 
13. p. 18. _ 
14.102,106. 
15. On tharsos as an opposite of aidos cf. pp. 107n. 140 and 
108n. 151 above. 
16. See N cKay, p. 21, Claus, 1977. p. 81, West on 318 and 319. 
17. loc. cit.. 
18. This interpretation might be supported by E. fr. 285N. 
2 14, 
where ao leads a poor nobleman to reject physical work. 
In general, however, manual labour was not felt to be 
degrading in itself; see G. Nussbaum, CQ 1960,213-20, esp. 
217, where the 1-iesiodic attitude is contrasted with the later, 
classical outlook which may lie behind the Euripidean passage. 
Perses, however, clearly does reject work, and prefers to 
live the life of his social superiors; his attitude may not 
have been typical, but this does not mean that such a view 
1 54 
could not have been held. 
19. See Od. 17.449,18.331 (p. 108n. 151 above) 11.21.395 (cf. 
West, ad loc. ); contrast McKay, 19-20. 
20. So Verdenius on 320 
SF; / 
cf. Claus, 1977, p. 83. 
20a. On aidos and anaideie in the context of taking by force, 
see also WD. 359, fr. 204.82 (p. 123 below). 
21. So Verdenius on 330 
ee f It 
22. CP 1973,81-94. 
23. So Fränkel, Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy, p. 121. 
24. On the "Odyssean" and "Iliadic" sensesof dike see Gagarin, 
82-6; cf. Havelock, Justice, cc. 7-10. 
25. Gagarin concentrates too closely on interpretation of the 
substantive, dike, itself at the expense of the adjectives 
dikaios and adikos which have a wider reference and which 
thus give dike a wider reference (see Claus, 1977, p. 77). 
Gagarin does discuss Claus' example (270-3, dikaios) and mine 
(327-34, adika) on p. 93 of his article, but claims that these 
usages, which he admits relate to proper behaviour, have 
nothing to do with dike; but how can conduct which can be 
described as dikaios or adikos have nothing to do with dike? 
Gagarin contends that these passages demonstrate the separa- 
tion of proper behaviour and lawful behaviour; on the contrary, 
theyshow their close interaction. 
26. See Havelock, Justice, 216-7, where he also recognizes 
the moral aspect of dike, and notes that Hesiod's personi- 
fications of the concept foreshadow, in a limited way, the 
development of justice as a principle of human conduct; cf. 
Claus, 1977, p. 78. 
27.77-8. 
28. See Pearson, Popular Ethics, p. 82 and cf. P. 63 above 
(with notes and ref. to O d. 9.175-6). 
29.52-3. 
30. P. 83 above. 
31. So Wilamowitz, Glaub 1, p. 350n. 1, Verdenius ad loc.. 
32. See Richardson's ed. of h. Cer., p. 3. 
33. Cf. p. 52 above (with n. 127). 
34. On the h. Merc. as a celebration of clever wickedness and 
crafty anaideie, see Whitman, Aristophanes and the Comic Hero, 
31-4. 
155 
35. On opizomai cf. p. 91 above; it is beyond the scope of 
this enquiry to treat such terms, which only bear an 
occasional relationship to aidos, systematically; henceforward 
they will only be taken into account when, as here, an 
obvious connexion with the terms of our enquiry does exist. 
36. Cf. 172-3: äc Jt ^ .1 
Kai w -r iSo «1S E'Trl r0Mncc iS- Ee -47-0 WV. 
36a. OEacd OC-oj (Peerlkamp; see Richardson's app. crit. ) as 
against Ludwich's iSAV r ! rQ (OCT); Allen refers us to 116 
as a parallel for Ludwich's emendation, but the inclusion of 
ws in that line makes all the difference. 
37. P. 23. 
38. Cf. pp. 9,42-4 above. 
39.92-3 above. 
40. Sckmid-Stählin, I. i. 224, regard the epigrams as genuine 
archaic poetry. 
41. Cf. Arist., et. 1384a34, and cf. p. 106n. 127 above, 
below, pp. 138,165,167,213,227,252,328,406n. 142,508-12. 
42. Cf. P. 44 above. 
43. Cf. p. 97n. 35, p. 116 above. 
44. See P. 115 above, and cf. p. 103n. 110. See also h. Cer. 343 
and 374 (Demeter and Persephone aidoiai). 
45. Cf. Richardson, ad loc., and p. 116 above. 
46. Cf. P. 125 and n. 40 above. 
47. Cf.. n. 150 (pp. 107-8) above. 
48. Allfambic and elegiac poets cited from West, unless 
indicated otherwise. 
49.61-2. 
50. Cf. above, 84-5. 
51. For the physical sense of aischros cf. 11.19. 
52. See 10.1-2,11.14,12.1-20,43-4. 
53. Cf. 12.17. 
54. P. 61. 
55. In stating his preference for martial arete over all 
other kinds (cf. Xenophanes' preference for a different kind 
of arete, 2.1-12) Tyrtaios is not redefining aret , nor does 
his notion of martial ae differ essentially from that of 
the Iliad (although even there arete does not solely consist 
of bravery in battle); different kinds of ae are, as in 
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this passage, also envisaged in several places in the Odyssey 
(4.725-6,8.244-9,13.45-6); on arete in Tyrtaios; cf. Pearson, 
Popular Ethics, 48,75,231n. 8, Adkins, MR, 70-3. On the role 
of aidos in maintaining arete in battle, cf. Timotheos, PMG 
789 (last quarter C5th. ): I 
öEýcr@' a. csw cvvTrov 
äe FTas Cýoe tp. 
X)(oJ 
56.12.37-40 also occur at Thgn. 935-8; on dike in this 
passage, see Gagarin, CP 1974,190 and 197. 
57. See below, p. 508" 
58. The lines immediately before these resemble 11.5.531 in 
that they commend endurance and cohesion in battle (explicitly 
the results of aidos in the Homeric passage) with reference 
to the fact that more are saved than die when the host as a 
whole exhibits these qualities; cf. von Erffa, p. 60 and 
pp. 25-6 above. 
59. Tyrtaios is, of course, a Spartan, and the Spartans were 
renowned for their severity towards those whom they regarded 
as cowards; on descriptions of the fate of cowards at Sparta 
in Hdt., see below, pp. 420-3. 
60. Cf. P. 28 above (with n. 73). 
61. Eumaios does lose half his arete on losing his freedom 
(Od. 17.322-3, n. 138, pp. 106-7 above), and loss of liberty is 
exactly the kind of material disaster which can destroy arete; 
in Homer disapproval alone is not sufficient to do this. In 
the world of Tyrtaios, however, it might be possible to 
regard one who is subject to universal opprobrium as without 
arete, provided it was accepted (as it presumably was not by 
many sectors of society) that bravery in battle is the only 
important arete; obviously one's reputation for bravery can 
be affected by the taunts of other people in a way that, for 
example, one's wealth or nobility of birth cannot. 
62. The latter is the view of von Erffa, 62-3. 
63. We should note in passing that .. %a 
. 
ut . c. has not been 
encountered before. 
64. ibid.. 
65. Cf. above, pp. 37-8. 
66. MR, p. 155 and n. (d). 
67. See pp. 15-6 above and p. 99n. 58; the suitors are not 
totally insensitive to criticism of their conduct. 
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68. Cf. pp. 29-30 above. 
68a. Solon fr. 13.5-6 deserves a mention for the way in which 
he exploits the epic collocation of the adjectivesaidoios and 
deinos, which are complementary in Homer, for a different 
purpose; Solon wants to be aidoios to his friends and deinos 
to his enemies. 
69. Cf. Frankel, Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy, p. 139. 
70. Cf. below, P. 573n. 49. 
71. Cf. Whitman, Aristophanes and the Comic Hero, 37-9. We 
know, too, that Alkaios (fr. 428LP) lost his shield, but the 
citation gives us no clue as to his feelings on losing it. 
72. If the Theognidean corpus does preserve a selection of 
early elegiac poetry (West, Studies, p. 59), and if most of 
the excerpts are at least no later than fifth century in date 
(West, Studies, p. 77, Gagarin, Cp 1974, p. 193), then questions 
of authorship and relative dating do not greatly concern us, 
since most (all? ) of the passages considered will be legit- 
imate evidence for the period under discussion. 
73. Cf. pp. 38-49 above. 
74. On these aspects of philotes in Hesiod, cf. Fraisse,, 
Phili , 47-9 (in general, 46-50). 
75. Cf. Pearson, Popular Ethics, 86 and 88. 
76. Pearson, p. 245n. 2, Fraisse, loc. cit.. 
77. On philotes in Thgn., see Fraisse, Philip, 50-6, and cf. 
Pearson, 85-8. 
78. This is the first instance of the noun aischune we have 
encountered (cf. von Erffa, p. 73); here it appears in its 
regular sense, "disgrace" ("ugliness", cf. aischos), although 
later it will be used, like aidos, of the reaction to disgrace. 
On the figurative description of a person as an aischune, 
cf. the Homeric usage of elenchea (above, p. 22) and Thuc. 8. 
73.3 (on Hyperbolos, P. 489 below); also Ar. $c . 855 
(oneidos, 
cf. p. 512 below). 
79. Eiro7rt job oc,. is used here of a reaction to human disap- 
proval, and so comes close in sense to aideomai; but the 
verb properly refers to divine anger, which is the factor 
which dictates its use here, and only governs 
flpc f c. v To vO(knrNP 
by a kind of zeugma. 
80.11.18.394 - p. 45 above, h. Cer. 64 - pp. 124-5 above. 
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81. Above, pp. 76-82. 
82. Above, pp. 56 and 77. 
83. Above, p. 56. 
84. See North, Sophrosyne, p. 18. 
85. ibid.; cf. 431,453-6,497-8,665-6. 
86. This is the first example we have met of aideomai followed 
by a ptc. where the verb does not also govern a direct object 
(as in Od. 8.86 (p. 109n. 164 above) and Kallinos 1.2-3 (p. 127 
above)). We have now encountered aideomai + acc., + inf. and 
+ ptc., as well as rci crt 
ö, r. xc c-t (Sol. fr. 32, P. 132 above) ; from 
these usages it will beclear that one can feel aidos (a) 
concerning future conduct (often); (b) concerning present 
conduct (those passages cited in which a pres. ptc. gives the 
grounds for aidos); and (c) concerning past conduct (11.22. 
104-7, Sol. fr. 32). 
86a. Cf. 502; excessive drinking can V, LTict(XuVott one 
previously (0 
4; his conduct becomes aischron and both he 
and it "look ugly". 
87. Cf. North, 16-8. 
88. On aidos in the eyes, cf. P. 126 and n. 41 above; on ads 
and one's YhWýýoc, or one's voice in general, cf. below, pp. 
516 + 518 on Ar. Knights, 276-7,637-8. 
89. Cf. above, p. 91. 
90. Cf. above, pp. 92-3. 
91. Cf. 105-12, where the ingratitude-of de o and kakoi is 
contrasted with the cas of agathoi. 
91a. In 1161-2, where the language is similar, aidos is still 
associated with education, but is not a quality of agathoi, 
rather a reaction to those who are aaathoi; if, however, one 
does possess the ads appropriate to acJathoi one will 
Presumably follow convention and accord other aaathoi their 
due. 
92. Cf. Pearson, 76-7. 
93. h. Hom. Cer., 213-5, p. 126 above; on Philotes as an aristo- 
cratic virtue in Thgn., cf. Fraisse, Philip, 50-1. 
94. See Lloyd-Jones, .. 
TZ, p. 47, and cf. J. Ferguson's parallel 
from Chinese wisdom literature (Moral Values in the Ancient 
World, P. 39). 
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95. Above, 83-6. 
96. Cf. pp. 92-3 above. 
97. Cf. P. 137 above, where the passfies quoted seem to suggest 
that aidos might be a proper response to the excesses of the 
drinking party. 
98. Cf. P. 139 above. 
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are so 
described because of their moral qualities, and wealth and 
success do not affect the application of the adjectives; 
cf. P. 139 above. 
100. Cf. Tyrtaios, fr. 10.9 (pp. 130-1 above). 
101. Hesiod bases his advice on the fact that wealth or 
poverty is in the gift of the gods, and so one shoo ld not 
criticize another for something that is beyond his control; 
he is thus urging his audience to consider circumstances and 
intentions rather than simply results; cf. pp. 29-35 above. 
102. From this and other passages Gagarin (CP 1974, p. 193) 
concludes that dike in Theognis is, as he claims it is in 
Hesiod, mainly concerned with the proper pursuit of wealth; 
in the similar passage at 27-30, however, pursuit of prestige 
and status by dishonest means is also seen as aischron and 
unjust. Generally, though, Gagarin is right to maintain that 
dike refers mostly to economic behaviour in the corpus; other 
forms of dishonesty, such as that between philoi, for example, 
are not described in terms of dike, as they are in later 
literature (cf. Pearson, Popular Ethics, 86-7). 
103. pp. 119-21 above. 
104. See below, pp. 185,248-62,352,443. 
105. pp. 112-3n. 219 above. 
106. P. 122 above. 
107. See p. 126 above; in 04.8.169-77, however, the man who 
(implicitly) possesses charis does not (explicitly) attract 
aidos, but rather shows it towards others; cf. p. 97n. 35, 
p. 116 above; charis is also qualified as aidoia at Q. 6.76-7, 
again as a quality of the victor which attracts the admiration 
(envy) of others. 
108. Moira, p. 71. 
109. So Burton, Pvthian Odes, p. 159, who also refers to the 
Fates' association with the family, but takes seKkü j xt as 
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consecutive. 
110. And by Gildersleeve, ad loc. (with further reff. ). 
111. Von Erffa, p. 75. 
112. pp. 45-6 above. 
113. P. 119 above; cf. WD. 185-8 (p. 120). 
114. Pindaros, p. 336n. 3, rejected by von Erffa, 77-8. 
115. JHS 1882, p. 155; Jebb's interpretation is followed by 
Gildersleeve, ad loc.. 
116. P. 78. 
117. This is the interpretation of Boeckh, Pindari opera 
(Leipzig 1821), 171,178, quoted by von Erffa, ibid.. 
118. Pearson, Popular Ethics, p. 85 (on Thgn. 1135-46) believes 
that sophrosvne is, above all, the ability to recognize the 
consequences of one's actions; if this is accepted, it goes 
some way to explaining the frequent association of aidos and 
sophrosyne (as well as that of aidos and other terms signify- 
ing intellectual qualities); for a further association of 
aidos with good sense, cf. fr. 52b. 50-1 (aidos and euboulia). 
119. Cf. 0.1.52-3. 
120. Greene, Moira, p. 20 suggests the following as indications 
of the concept of divine resentment in a minimal form; . 
11.5. 
440-2, Od. 4.78-81,22.287-9; another example might be . 
111.7. 
446ff. (cf. Adkins, Many, p. 36). 
121. See, for example, Q. 13.9-10, . E. 2.28-9. 
122. So Gildersleeve, ad loc.. 
123. For the disgrace accruing from a wound of this type, cf. 
1.1.15.495-6 (p. 97n. 40), Tyrtaios, fr. 11.19-20 (p. 155n. 51). 
123a. aischuno also occurs in its primary, physical sense at 
P. 4.264. The comparative aiiXto. also occurs at 1.7.22, where 
the victor's arete is said to be "not uglier" than his 
appearance. 
124. Cf. von Erffa, p. 80. 
v 125. On ýt- Ee-dtkoS, see von Erffa, p. 82. 
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3. AESCHYLUS. 
Moving from archaic poetry to drama necessitates a considerable 
difference of approach; while the nature of tragic speech 
and song, especially in Aeschylus, often requires detailec 
elucidation of individual passages, as in Pindar, in the 
most important instances of aidos etc. in tragedy the focus 
of our attention will be the motivation of the characters 
involved and the röle of their aidos in the meaning of the 
piece as a whole; in each of the three major tragedians aidos 
is often crucial in these respects, but their approaches to 
the concept differ greatly; in Aeschylus the concept is 
frequently important in the creation of tension and in the 
motivation of those characters who find themselves in a 
tense and difficult situation. 
Before considering the major instances of aidos etc., however, 
we must carry out a brief survey of some uses which, while 
less crucial to the interpretation of the plays in which they 
occur, are nevertheless valuable evidence for the usage of the 
relevant terms in the period under discussion. At Pers. 800- 
42 the ghost of Dareios speaks of the hybris of the Persian 
force in Greece (808,821) and of the punishment that awaits 
them at Plataia; the description of their crimes includes 
the following (809-10): 
el , 0C "1 lq /k 
VTES EhkK S OU tý ýWý ýý FTC 
výýouvTo rv)cac, J ou de -fr ýeKvzc VEws . 
dos should have prevented this sacrilege, it appears; in 
that such conduct will presumably arouse the condemnation of 
men as well as the anger of the gods aidos might still be 
related to sensitivity to damage to one's self-image and 
reputation through discreditable behaviour, but the stress 
in the text is on the lack of scruple which led to the 
commission of sacrilege rather than on the sanctions, human 
and divine, which await it. Aidos should have preventedthese 
crimes simply because the perpetrators should have known that 
such conduct is "wrong", that it is offensive to men and to 
the gods who, by now, lay down the standards by which men 
1 
should live; aidos is the reaction to this "wrong" conduct, 
whether the force which dictates that it is so is popular 
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opinion, the gods or one's own personal moral conscience. 
Also apparent in Dareios' speech are the ideas of hybris, 
excess (825,827-8,831) and boldness or daring (831); failure 
to show aidos, then, as we have seen many times before, may 
lead to, or be equated with, conduct which may be described 
in those terms. 
2 Fragment 530M presents a general antithesis 
between aidos and excess; the goddess Dike speaks of a son 
of Zeus and Hera, a "IT' 
(o 
to . 4(31 a 
pVL6 -T-C-i<VO41 
c(vroce º4"I/ I a' 
(ws S"Ovk G V+1V 4 oß'1 &Ti. 
-it'o kk ýýSýýäv ýcra -rwJ ö cSa ý-r oe`wV ßk1 
C 
Ets ävaLýwj Kr)ý (32-5)3 
Also in Persae we find the adverb aischrös in the context of 
the honour of the warrior in battle and its diminution in 
death; the Messenger prefaces his account of the massacre of 
Psyttaleia with the following (441-4): 
1 EerwJ Orolirf-( 1ff(V öcK/GNociot. 
vrLVý 
V Xh -r äý «rOL WrVrCV& %1 
G Kate vrt ais 
oc ýi rW T Of VAC ºcrL -ire r rLV 
&V 'fip 
wioýs ä (rL 
el, 1. .11 
-re A vac tv a. ýXý ;S 
-vi 
L 
The contrast is made between the previous valour, strength 
and loyaityýandPthieirnsubsequent slaughter in circumstances 
which gave them no opportunity to show their qualities or to 
die nobly; the very unpleasantness of their deaths reflects 
badly on themselves, precisely because it was not mitigated 
by any noble deeds on their part. 
4 
In the Redepaare scene of the Septem Melanippos, the adversary 
of Tydeus, is said to honour the throne of Aischune and to 
hate proud words (409-10), and this, in turn, is explained 
by his freedom from aischra and his reluctance to be kakos 
(411); Winnington-Ingram 4aseems to assume that all these 
terms refer to his concern for his personal honour as a 
warrior, and he relates this to Eteokles' desire to avoid 
aischune at 683-5; 
5 
the primary reference here, however, is 
surely to the moral superiority of the defenders to their 
Argive opponents (with the exception of Amphiaraos); the 
lines (especially 411) may well explain the bravery of 
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Melanippos, but his worship of Aischune clearly differentiates 
him from Tydeus, and we have no reason to believe that Tydeus 
does not also wish to avoid the disgrace of cowardice; the 
difference, then, must lie in Melanippos's rejection of his 
opponent's overweening pride, impiety and excess. 
6 It should 
be noted that 409-10, 'rah 
A 
?%" Is 
Oeöý"ý implies the 
use of aischune not as "disgrace" but as a synonym of aidos, 
a usage we have not met before but which must already have 
been known, and which quickly becomes common. 
7 
The motive of honour, both personal and collective (familial), 
is frequently adduced in connexion with the need for vengeance 
in the Oresteia; at Eum. 95-8 Klytaimestra complains to the 
sleeping Erinyes: 
Etw ý0 rý ü; NJ wä 
öV C E vFºlCJJ KTavaJ 
0VCrt4 66 V 
ýýITULýIý Oý{1 C- A&L1rEToc. 
a. rxews 1' öckwýº. aýý. 
Vengeance, then, should restore the time of the victim, 
but without vengeance the victim is dishonoured; here 
Klytaimestra's ghost speaks of the reproach and disgrace she 
has to suffer among the dead, and, had she a living, human 
avenger, such dishonour, given the strong bonds of collective 
honour within the family, might conceivably be a source of 
aidos for him. Certainly in Cho. Orestes and Elektra dwell 
on the dishonourable manner of their father's death; he was 
killed aischrös, by deceit (494), he did not receive the 
burial due a king (430-6), and his death was unfitting for 
one of his status (479). Agamemnon is also dishonoured by the 
the latter 
adultery of his wife and Aigisthos; at Cho. 990 is described 
as an Wischunter, whom it is lawful to kill, 
8 
and a similar 
term, kataischunteres, is used of both Aigisthos and Klytai- 
mestra at $8.1363; similarly, the chorus reproach Aigisthos 
for shaming (aischunon) another man's bed at Ag. 1626. As the 
last of these passages shows, and as is implied in the others, 
it was felt to be discreditable to dishonour a man by seducing 
his wife, even though the primary reference of the terms 
employed (aischuno etc. ) is to the disgrace suffered by the 
cuckold. 
9 Revenge for an affront done to Menelaos' honour was 
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presumably the motive for the expedition against Troy, for 
at Ag. 399-401 the chorus state that Paris was punished by 
Zeus xenios (362-6) for shaming (yýXvvE) the table of his 
host. 
Of all the plays the Supplices is the richest in instances 
of aidos, and this is so because of the importance placed on 
the supplication of the Danaids at Argos; we shall consider 
how aidos affects Pelasgos below, 
10 but here we may usefully 
examine the role of aidos in the chorus' supplication both 
before and after the crucial decision. The Danaids adopt the 
part of suppliants immediately on entering the orchestra, 
even though they do not take up position at the altar until 
207ff. 11 and despite the absence of any representative of 
the Argives; in the opening lines of the play, then, their 
supplication is directed towards the gods, to Zeus in 
particular, and at 27-9 they pray: 
(c 
r ai8' C sc r1J 
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This is clearly an appeal to aidos, and, this being the case, 
aidoios must be active in sense in 28; the -g Vev XJ does 
not attract aidos, it manifests it. 
12 The active usage of 
the adjective has hitherto been rare, 
13 but in this play, as 
we shall see, it frequently coexists beside the passive. The 
chorus are reminded of the importance of aidos in their 
supplication by their father, who, in his exortation to them 
to climb upon the altar, urges (191-6): 
Kkký ws TäXEofTK ýaOCT& Kxc 
XC-vKocr& J&tS 
LIýTICC, 15 xyx r C0tcoCOU aI6S i, ON ýE vws 6 )cOV (. LO) t(wJ C-ü VUfr. WV 
PW. -vý. o. Ký. i 
677,1 
&vauS a ýcýSc-6A ws ¬ r1k as -rt-ýEwwEL 
70( ws , uvarac- TAr OV401 MocK-MVS (ufgS . 
Both instances of aidoios in these lines are invested with 
the fullest significance; it is always possible that ai(dCöJ 
dto$ means "reverend Zeus", but there is no reason to reject 
an additional active significance for the adjective, and, 
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indeed, the parallel with line 1, aphiktor, shows that it is 
quite likely that a term normally applicable to the suppliant 
could be applied to his protecting deity. 
14 Like aidoios, 
semnos, derived from sebomai, is normally passive, and so the 
adverb in 193 is most naturally taken in the sense, "in such 
a way as to arouse the sebas of others; " Friis Johansen and 
Whittle (ad loc. ), however, in translating "in a reverent 
manner, " clearly feel that an active connotation is also 
present beside the passive (of which they are also aware), 
and this does not seem impossible. Holding the suppliant 
branches semnös, the Danaids are to utter oc i fog ýc ... 
e rrl 
and again the use of the adjective is ambivalent; as supp- 
liants, the maidens will speak in such a way as to arouse 
the aidos of others, but in the following lines Danaos speaks 
not of others' reaction to his daughters, but of their 
behaviour towards those they will encounter; they are to 
speak as befits newcomers (195), avoid boldness (197), appear 
composed in countenance (198-9), be neither forward nor 
reluctant in speech (200-1) and, above all, they are to yield 
to their prospective hosts (202); all this suggests that 
they are to manifest aidos as well as attract it, and, in 
particular, mention of TG 
, 4, 
AA h OexrV and o/%/. wroS -1t, 
V1vxdJ, 
given that aidos is frecntly opposed to boldness and mani- 
fested in the eyes, makes it very likely that the Danaids' 
words are to be both actively and passively aidoia. 
According to Danaos' precepts, then, both suppliant and 
supplicated are expected to show aidos in a reciprocal manner 
and thus, in connexion with supplication at an altar, it may 
be correct to say that, "aidos is common to both parties in 
the encounter, or ... is characteristic of the encounter 
itself. "15 On the other hand, in Homer it was only the Idos 
which is owed to the suppliant by the supplicated which was 
mentioned explicitly, and in other places, too, aidos is 
much more regularly the reaction of the supplicated.. 
16 In 
personal supplication, moreover, while the suppliant might 
perhaps feel dos for his protector after his plea has been 
accepted, in making his plea he must, in fact, disclaim or 
overcome any aidos he may feel, in order that the self- 
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abasement which is essential to personal supplication17 can 
take place; one kind of aidos, at any rate, namely concern 
for one's own reputation and status, would actually exclude 
the possibility of this kind of supplication, as, indeed, it 
threatens to at E. Hel. 947-9.18 While, then, it is unnecessary 
to deny that aidos is also required in those who carry out 
supplication at an altar dedicated to the gods of a city, 
especially when the suppliants are women (the supplicated 
will be better disposed to accede to the pleas of those who 
behave properly), it does seem to be an exaggeration to 
suggest that aidos might always exist as a reciprocal element 
common to both parties in the supplication relationship in 
any schematic way; it seems far more likely that the ambi- 
valence of aidoios in the passages discussed is a feature of 
Aeschylus' pregnant style, and that his reasons for raising 
the question, "how will the Danaids behave? " are thematic, 
connected with the future action of the trilogy. 
After they have been granted the protection of the king and 
his subjects the Danaids sing in praise of Argos, and acknow- 
ledge the citizens' aidos at 641; a reference to the aidos 
they have been shown by Pelasgos must also exist at 490-1, 
but the text in that place does not allow us to be sure of 
the precise sense; Porson's e6c&04-/-"K (adopted by Page) is 
convincingly rejected by Friis Johansen and Whittle ad loc.; 
if the general sense can be assumed to be a reference to 
Pelasgos as the Danaids' ai öo_Lo5 -ire vos then aidoios is 
presumably best taken as active, referring to the aidos the 
king showed in his speech immediately preceding these lines, 
although an honorific application ("deserving ad s") might 
also be possible, and the two senses may even coexist. 
19 
In Eumenides aidos occurs three times as the proper response 
towards an oath (483-4,680,710); an oath is sworn publicly 
and commits the honour of the swearer to its observance; it 
is also sworn by the gods, and thus partakes of their power; 
and society in general must have believed that it was dis- 
creditable to commit perjury; for all these reasons, then, 




oJ seems highly appropriate. 
20 
167 
dos is also operative in the familiar sphere of sexual 
relationships and encounters between male and female in 
Aeschylus. It is particularly characteristic of feminine 
modesty; at PV 133-421 the chorus explain their presence thus: 
i k-rV-Trov br ae x- 
)C wxäh výos 
SL I -1/ 
`TewV 
ývXuý/ 
ýK ÖýCý'}ýºý¬E v 
Ta ý/ O yt* 
cfrt 
aý cIuJ .J 
The most natural way to take these lines is as an explanation 
of the abandonment by the chorus of their natural feminine 
reticence in their desire to discover the origin of the 
commotion. 
22 (ý E tE, -ýý S is a rare word (elsewhere only at Emp. 
B122.2DK) but Hesychios glosses Otýxe#S by 
/Efr1ýos, rýwüs, 
avri-01 ; the Oceanids' composure, then, a product of their 
aidos and manifested in their eyes or facial expression, has 
been shattered by the noise of Hephaistos' hammer and their 
subsequent eagerness to discover the source of the commotion; 
again the connexion between aidos and the eyes is apparent, 
and we might compare Supp. 198-9 (p. 165 above) where the 
aidos of the Danaids was also to be manifested in the 
composure of their countenances. The appropriateness of aidos 
for young women is asserted at fr. 355M. 23-4, and again we 
should notice ö'ýýº. oLri. v and o/7%w,, ro5 in the two previous lines. 
At Ag. 1203-4 (transposed by Hermann and subsequent editors) 
the chorus enquire about Kassandra'a sexual relationship with 
Apollo and she, admitting that the nature of their relation- 
ship was sexual, explains that aidos had previously prevented 
her speaking of it; her aidos is thus occasioned by an event 
in the past, but directed at future reproach for conduct 
which is universally seen as discreditable; the chorus 
immediately interpret her ads as "delicacy" (kftVV4'rlC. C), 
appropriate to the prosperous but not to one in the prophetess' 
22a 
pitiful condition. 
At Supp. 991-1009 Danaos effectively urges aidos on his 
daughters, although the term is not employed; warning them 
about the tendency of people to speak ill of outsiders (994-5), 
168 
he urges them not to shame him (V#TKýrýWv V 996) by succum- 
bing to sexual temptation; at 1008-9 he recapitulates: 
/41 'ý T(x°s º" ý, ºcoij v' d ýxoCý ýs ýý ors 
Danaos, then, is concerned about popular opinion and about 
his own reputation, and is afraid of the mockery of others; 
23 
this suggests that he himself is sensitive to aidos and 
reveals once again that the honour of men is vulnerable 
through the women under their control; we might compare those 
passages in As. in which Klytaimestra's adultery with 
Aigisthos is said to shame Agamemnon. 
24 It seems remarkable, 
however, that Danaos feels it necessary to make his speech 
at all; 
25 his daughters, certainly, have given no indication 
that they are liable to behave in the manner which he 
deprecates; it is commonly assumed that his advice shows 
that he, at least, did not believe that his daughters had 
conceived an aversion to all men, 
26 but other passages in 
the play suggest that they 
have 
although this might not be 
the ultimate explanation of their character; 
27 it may, 
however, be possible that Danaos is wrong about his daughters 
in this passage; even if they do not hate all men, neither 
do they need such detailed advice on this subject, and it 
may be that the passage characterizes Danaos rather than his 
daughters (although we cannot be sure for what purpose). 
Aidos also occurs as a feature of encounters between men and 
women at Ch o. 663-7, where Orestes, knocking on the door of 
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, cS E u-rr E-rýE s-rýs 
ai dw VC CV (--(AaL6iV ov6 GTia`Y ous 
XOpV) TlÖkltV_ Ei j'E 
00cC'1' j PC V1ý 
S öcvÖCK K; cr11V4IVI- V OcýEs TE19. aC, 28 
We have already seen that aidos tends to be present when the 
sexes meet, 
29 
and that it can be a hindrance when plain 
i 
speaking is required. 
30 Once more boldness (Ooterf(ij) is seen 
as opposed to a' s, 
31 
and a particularly close parallel 
would be Od. 3.14,24 and 76,32 where Telemachos is first 
advised not to pay any attention to aidos in order that he 
1 69 
may speak freely, then expresses his ads which prevents 
self-assertion, and finally overcomes his inhibition by means 
of tharsos; as in that passage, tharsos is desirable here. 
At Supp. 579 the chorus sing of Io's release from her torment; 
transformed by the touch of Zeus, she "sheds her sorrowful 
aidos of tears" 'weüwý/ 
'cfw ); the PCTCu 6týc Fl -tT Ev8 `Aýwv it i 
most natural interpretation of these words is to assume not 
that Io loses her aidos by weeping, 
33 but that her tears are 
an expression of her aidos. 
34 Her aidos, then, is not shyness 
with regard to her more or less sexual union with Zeus, as 
Friis Johansen and Whittle suggest (for, as they acknowledge, 
it would by inappropriate for a woman to lose (their trans- 
lation of air'oarxf FL) such aidos at the moment of conception), 
but it may encompass embarrassment at her present condition 
(the other possibility suggested by FJW); there is, however, 
no need to reject an application to her past experiences; 
35 
having regained human form, Io is at last able to weep, and 
her self-consciousness and embarrassment, both at her past 
indignities and at her present condition, which is itself a 
product of her past experiences and virtually inseparable 
from them (she is embarrassed for the present and future 
because of her previous sufferings), burst out in a flood of 
tears; this is not only plausible, it is an acute and remark- 
able piece of psychological observation. 
A different kind of aidos, though still with sexual overtones, 
is found in fr. 228M, where Achilles reproaches the dead 
Patroklos as follows: 
ýtýocs ýr ýýýiJ 
O( 
VOJ O') ei 
N cývrX 
e0. (rt 'rPVV -rvº-VW'J ¢1h Two. 
Male homosexual love is a branch of philia, and charis is 
important in that context; Achilles' grief leads him to 
regard his friend's death as a failure to show the aidos and 
accord the charis whichare appropriate among philoi, and his 
complaint is similar to those addressed to the 
tew/µ. 
evo$ at 
Thgn. 253-4 and 1263-6.36 It is interesting that sebas can 
be the object of aidos, and we shall have to discuss the 
relationship between these two terms in some detail later in 
this chapter. 37 
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In a number of crucial passages in the plays, passages in 
which the chavcter involved often has to make a difficult 
choice or is more generally in a stressful situation, aidos 
is absolutely central to the motivation of the character and 
to the interpretation of the play; we see aidos at work deep 
in the conscience of the individual, and often the emotion 
works in more than one direction, producing psychological 
turmoil and crises of indecision. 
38 
One might imagine that 
Septem would be unlikely to provide much evidence for aidos 
of this type, particularly in view of von Erffa's comment: 
39 
"Für Eteokles spielt bei der Erwägung, ob er seinem 
Brüder kämpfen soll, aidos keine Rolle. Er ist vielmehr 
fest überzeugt, daß Polyneikes mit seinem Angriff auf 
die Vaterstadt dik e verletzt hat und daß sie auf seiner 
eigenen Seite steht. " 
Both the assumption that Eteokles deliberates and the asser- 
tion that aidos has no role in his resolve to fight his 
brother are questionable; Eteokles does not deliberate; he 
both wants to fight his brother and sees it as inevitable 
that he should do so; 
40 but he is also motivated by aidos to 
the same act, as is shown by 683-5: 
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Eteokles, then, is motivated by concern for his honour as a 
warrior; 
41 he wishes to avoid aischune and aischra, the 
disgrace of cowardice, and to preserve his reputation; we 
have met this concern often enough to recognize it as aidos. 
42 
This motive is a personal one, as is his desire to shed his 
brother's blood, and these must be seen as somehow combined 
with the curse; either they exist independently, in which 
case Eteokles is still responsible for his own desires, no 
matter how the curse may affect him, 
43 
or the curse may be 
the cause of his desire and concern for his honour, 
44 
and, 
if this notion that the gods work through personal human 
motives is accepted, it presumably holds good in every case 
(although, lacking poetic omniscience, ordinary men do not 
normally recognize it), with the result that the individual 
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is still liable for the consequences of his own actions in 
terms of everyday values; for nowhere in Aeschylus is it 
suggested that liability on the human level is cancelled out 
by the belief that all motives come from the gods. 
45 
Eteokles' concern for his honour, then, his aidos, is an 
important element in his motivation; in claiming that he 
gave no indication of aidos in declaring his resolve to face 
his brother, however, von Erffa may have been thinking of 
the aidos which is proper among members of the same family, 
and it is certainly true that this aidos is totally dis- 
regarded by him; when the chorus refer to the horror of the 
shedding of kindred blood (677-82,718) Eteokles replies 
firstly in terms of personal honour, secondly in terms of 
the curse. We do not know the rights and wrongs of the 
quarrel between the brothers, but Eteokles' disregard of 
familial aidos must surely be seen as discreditable, as, 
indeed, the reaction of the chorus suggests; the mere 
existence of the quarrel would probably be regarded as 
discreditable, and at 831 both brothers are condemned for 
their murderous intentions (wkovr'ärtýSci c(Lavaior ). 
We have already seen46 something of the importance of aidos 
in Supp., and in the play's central decision scene this 
importance is even greater; the Danaids, as suppliants, 
appeal constantly to the king's sense of aidos, but his aidos 
does not lead him immediately to give in to their requests. 
From Pelasgos' entry until 332 the origin of the Danaids, 
both immmediate and ancestral, is the central issue; in 
333-4, however, the theme of supplication is reintroduced, 
and is to dominate until 491; in this passage of stichomythia 
(-347) the question of the rights and wrongs of the quarrel 
with the Aigyptioi is only raised allusively, and the Danaids' 
evasiveness in 337 is chaateristic of. their responses in 
this connexion. 
47 At 340 Pelasgos' question indicates his 
desire to behave properly towards the suppliants, but he 
soon recognizes that to do so to their satisfaction will 
involve conflict with their opponents; the theme of war, 
which will concern the city of Argos as a whole, is already 
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introduced, and it is a prospect which the king does not 
relish. Against his reluctance to go to war on their behalf 






Pelasgos acnowledges the force of this appeal by his 
reference to the shudder he experienced on seeing the altar 
(346), and either the chorus-leader or he himself48 explains 
this shudder in terms of the power of the wrath of Zeus, the 
protector of suppliants (347). Pelasgos' shudder is important; 
it suggests an instinctive reaction to the act of supp- 
lication and may thus be akin to the inhibitory reaction of 
aidos; no less important is the clear statement of the 
consequences of the king's decision; he can choose to accept 
the supplication, and thereby involve the city in a war, or 
he can risk the anger of Zeus by allowing suppliants to be 
maltreated; crucial in this respect is the obvious parallel- 
ism between the two alternatives; both are oe v(342,347)_ 
These ideas are developed in the ensuing epirrhematic section 
(348-437); the chorus stress their suppliant status (348-53), 
and Pelasgos accepts this, but returns to the prospect of 
war; -rwV rote ov (ciract 1rc j (358). The Danaids then reiterate 
their appeal to aidos (359-64, esp. 362pct. vs5), but once 
more Pelasgos refers to his resonsibility to the city (365-9), 
but now his mind is not so much on the consequences of 
accepting the supplication (war) as on those of its rejection 
(miasma 366); the Danaids' supplication takes place before 
the altar of the city's gods, and since the city will be 
affected by any pollution resulting from the supplication, 
the citizens must have their say. 
49 From the general "wrath 
of Zeus", then, the consequence of ignoring the girls' plea 
has crystallized into the more definite idea of pollution; 
pollution or war are now the alternatives, and the people 
will be involved in both. The chorus reject the king's claim 
that he must consult the people (370-5), but they pick up 
his mention of pollution, and warn him of the dangers of 
inviting it (375 KYos VýPCMO. 
In answer Pelasgos restates the difficulty of his choice 
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(376-80), and declares himself unable to decide; 
50 
once again 
his choice appears as a balanced antithesis between two evils. 
The Danaids then remind him of the anger of Zeus (381-6), 
but Pelasgos is not yet willing to decide in their favour; 
instead he attempts to evade the decision entirely, hoping 
that the chorus may be persuaded to pursue their claims in 
accordance with the nomoi of Egypt (387-91); he would clearly 
rather not decide, and probably he is hoping that they will 
be persuaded to leave the altar, thus freeing him from the 
anger of Zeus and the danger of pollution. 
51 The Danaids, 
however, are not impressed (392-6). 
To the difficulty of the choice the king adds the idea of 
the importance of the views of the people (397-401), and it 
is here that we see how complete is the balance in his mind 
for and against acceptance of the supplication, and how exact 
the parallelism between his impulses to accept or reject and 
between the consequences of either: 
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Here Pelasgos explains exactly why he must consult the demos; 
it is not that he is obliged to consult them, simply that he 
does not wish to take sole responsibility for a decision 
which will affect the whole city upon himself; he fears the 
censure of the people in the event of disaster, and imagines 
their reproaches; his position, then, is analogous to that 
of Hektor at j1.22.104-7; 
53 
Hektor recognizes his respons- 
ibility for the ruin of his city, Pelasgos does not wish to 
be uniquely responsible for the ruin of his, and both fear 
what their fellow-citizens may say; Hektor expresses his 
concern in terms of dos, and Pelasgos' concern is identical. 
His choice, then, is not between giving in to aidos or 
rejecting it, but between the demands of two sorts of aidos; 
aidos for the suppliants and for the wrath of Zeus inhibits 
rejection of the appeal, and aidos at the prospect of the 
disapproval 
greatest popular inhibits its acceptance; we have 
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already seen how aidos may be undesirable when initiative is 
called for, and that it can lead to indecision or diffidence; 
here it inhibits both of a pair of alternatives, and leads 
to complete amechania. 
From 402-54 the position remains unchanged; the Danaids 
remind Pelasgos of the other side of the coin, of Zeus (402-6) 
and of the consequences of ignoring their supplication (418- 
37), and he stresses the importance of deliberation and the 
gravity of the conseqences, no matter what he decides (407-17, 
438-54); he would rather not choose, and, though he hopes 
for the best, he does not expect it (453-4). 
The Danaids now realize that something must be done to secure 
the king's support - they threaten to hang themselves on the 
altar and Pelasgos gives in. The Danaids preface their threat 
with the injunction (455), 
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and once more the adjective aidoios bears the fullest sig- 
nificance; 
54 
the epithet has been ambivalent earlier in the 
play (cf. especially K; öo: u t-rrl in 194), and so it is here; 
the threat is an end of aº(oi. t hciY6t in the sense that the 
chorus abandon their formal appeals to the aidos which is 
the right of suppliants, but, more pertinently, it is so 
because they no longer show the aidos. urged on them by their 
father, they no longer speak 
wS 6 rgNucf. s 'fi"CF'ýrýt(195) . 
Paradoxically, however, the Danaids' abandonment of aicýsLot 
XOVOLallows the king's ads for the wrath of Zeus, protector 
of suppliants, to prevail over his aidos for the opinions of 
the mo ; he still stesses the terrible consequences of 
heeding the appeal (468-71,474-7), but now realizes that 
there is no escaping miasma if he does not heed it (472-3), 
and concludes (478-9, picking up the words of the chorus in 
347,385,427): 
OMwj pcdotVKvl 
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Aidos is thus central to Pelasgos' decision; it is a decision 
in the full sense of the word, for it results from 
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consideration of two alternatives, and from an estimation of 
the consequences of those alternatives, and of the respons- 
ibility the individual will bear for his decision. 
55 Admit- 
tedly, the decision does not immediately spring from the 
recognition of the consequences, 
56 but this is because the 
king's aidos, which is produced by an evaluation of the 
consequences of both courses of action, leads him to impasse; 
it is precisely because he can decide that he finds it so 
difficult to do so, even to the extent of trying to evade the 
decision entirely; it is also true that the Danaids' threat 
tips the scales in their favour, 
57 
and that, as a result of 
the threat, he speaks of the necessity of heeding the wrath 
of Zeus, 
58 but the threat is not something entirely new; it 
makes the prospect of miasma (473) inevitable, but this 
prospect has always been evisaged as a consequence of dis- 
regarding the plea (366,375,429-33) and ana e in 478 refers 
not to some form of external compulsion, 
59 but to the virtual 
compulsion that is imposed upon a man of ordinary sensibilities 
by the recognition that the consequences of alternative (a) 
are really much more serious than those of alternative (b). 
Pelasgos' decision has been elaborately prepared for by his 
twin concerns, to avoid pollution and the anger of the gods 
and to avoid a war which will harm his people and leave him 
open to censure; he does not forget these concerns, rather 
they coalesce, when he realizes that. the prospect of incon- 
ceivable pollution which, because it defiles the city's altar, 
will defile the whole city, is now imminent. The compulsion 
is not absolute, but arises from the king's own appraisal of 
the situation. 
This is not to say that the decision is taken in absolute 
freedom; since the play presents a recognizable human being 
acting in a plausible situation with a full awareness of the 
difficulty of his choice (a difficulty which is also desc- 
ribed as ananke in 439-40), it would be impossible for his 
choice to be absolutely free, to exist, as it were, indepen- 
dently of the conflicting claims on either side and of the 
king's own character; decisions in real life also do not 
happen like that. Let it also be noted that the king's prog- 
176 
ress towards a decision has been portrayed with great psycho- 
logical realism; 
60 he would rather not choose, because 
recognition of the alternatives produces aidos, which leads 
to amechania; this aidos, this uncertainty and desire to 
avoid bringing any unpleasant consequences upon oneself, is 
the mark not of one who cannot decide, but of one who knows 
that he can, of one, one might almost say, who is subject to 
the existentialist's fear of freedom. 
61 
This psychological realism is not confined to Supp.; the so- 
called "carpet-scene" of the Agamemnon has been much discussed, 
and its importance variously estimated; 
62 here, too, we find 
that the workings of aidos give us important clues as to the 
meaning of the scene. Klytaimestra's invitation to tread 
purple begins at 905, but we should notice in the foregoing 
line }d ävo 5J a-rr4sTw , for phthonos is to be a key word in 
what follows, and, referring as it does to both human and 
divine disapproval (and there is frequently an ambiguity in 
this scene as to which of these is meant), it will be relevant 
to our discussion of aidos; Klytaimestra expresses the wish 
that her praise of Agamemnon will not attract phthonos, but 
her plan in the scene to come is precisely that; to attract 
phthonos to her husband. 
The invitation follows, from 905-13, and ends with deliberate 
ambiguity between the meaning Klytaimestra's words have for 
herself alone and that which they have for Agamemnon; the 
latter's refusal comes at 914-30, and almost immediately he 
raises questions of appropriateness and propriety (916-7), 
going on vehemently to reject oriental luxury and effeminacy 
(918-20) before coming to the idea of phthonos (921-4): 
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To tread the strewn purple, then, would be to attract phthonos, 
and, since the contrast between Agamenon's mortality and the 
honours proper for the gods is emphatically drawn, there can 
be no doubt that it is divine resentment which the king has 
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in mind; as a result of this conviction he recognizes the 
danger of doing as his wife asks, and is afraid. But although 
he does not wish to be honoured as a god he does wish to be 
honoured (925), and this concern that his success be adnow- 
ledged is also evident in the following two lines, of which 
the sense must surely be, "Fame shouts aloud, without foot- 
wipers and embroideries" (Denniston and Page, ad loc. ), 
rather than, "Different is the ring of the words 'footmats' 
and 'embroideries" (Fraenkel ad loc., following Blass); it 
is this concern for his own reputation which Klytaimestra 
will go on to exploit. 
Stichomythia now begins, and Klytaimestra resorts to an 
argument which prefigures one form of sophistic relativism, 
the idea that the character of an act varies according to 
circumstance and agent; 
63 in, for example, the Dissoi Logoi 
such arguments are used to prove that the same act can be 
both aischron and alo etc. or that aischron and kalo are 
"the same"; here Klytaimestra exploits not the variable 
character of the act, but the variability of the agent and the 
situation; at 933-4 she gets Agamemnon to agree that it would 
not be discreditable to tread purple if one had vowed to the 
gods to do so, 
64 
and at 935-6 he admits that Priam would 
readily do what he fears to do; it is for Agamemnon to point 
out that. his situation differs from that in 933 and that he 
is not Priam and this he fails to do; nor does he remember 
his rejection of oriental pomp only lines before; 
65 to the 
audience, however, the relativity of the act to both agent 
and situation will be only too clear, and they will recognize 
that what may be acceptable in other circumstances or for 
other people is not acceptable for Agamemnon. 
At 937-8 aidos enters the picture; Agamemnon has shown his 
reluctance to walk on the purple vestments, and has expressed 
his reluctance in terms of Phobos and concern for phthonos, 
yet his concern for his honour has also been revealed, and 
in these lines Klytaimestra manages to reduce the former 
concern by appealing to the latter: 
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The earlier references to phthonos have been general enough 
to allow one who wished to to regard them as concerned only 
with human envy, and this is what Klytaimestra chooses to do 
here; she interprets Agamemnon's reluctance as aidos, and 
relates this aidos exclusively to popular disapproval; her 
husband indicates by his reply that he is concerned at the 
prospect of others' disapproval, but Klytaimestra's ocvOCAnrtto 
is pointed, and Agamemnon, having drawn a proper distinction 
between honours appropriate for men and gods in 922-5, might 
have pointed out that it is not only human disapproval which 
he fears. 66 He makes no direct reply to Klytaimestra's 
observation that one whose success is not resented is also 
not to be envied, and it is clearly by this argument that 
his scruples are finally allayed; his desire to attract 
positive envy as proof of his success outweighs his fear of 
critical resentment; 
67 he has been persuaded that the aidos 
which arose instinctively with the thought that it would not 
be quite right for him to walk on the vestments is merely 
fear of the reproach of other, inferior mortals, and he has 
been encouraged to imagine that one of his pre-eminence can 
afford to ignore such dos. 
68 
Agamemnon gives in at 944, but although his fear of others' 
disapproval has been dispelled, traces of ads remain; he 
takes off his shoes (944-7), lest his treading on the vestments 
of the gods (N-w- 1946) attract phthonos; again the word is 
used without qualification, and it is possible to regard it 
as referring to a residual fear of human criticism or to an 
instinctive concern for divine resentment; at any rate, his 
undoing of his shoes as a means of avoiding phthonos is 
explained in terms of dos (948-9): 
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Agamemnon thus shows his awareness that what he is about to 
do is inappropriate; although, then, he now wants to walk on 
the vestments and he believes that popular disapproval can 
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be overcome, his aidos nevertheless persists, because it is 
not equivalent to the calculation, can I get away with it? 
Rather it is a sense that all is not well, that what he is 
about to do is dangerous in terms of the values and religious 
beliefs of his society; he hopes to mitigate his offence by 
taking off his shoes, but the effect of this concession to 
aidos is to reveal that he is doing wrong. 
69 
Agamemnon's aidos is therefore important in the scheme of 
the play; as a sign that something is wrong it takes its 
place at the begining of a crescendo of apprehension which 
builds from this point on and culminates in the paroxysms of 
Kassandra. It has been maintained 
70 that, had Agamemnon 
committed any real offence in this scene, the chorus would 
surely comment upon it; it is true that the chorus do not 
criticize the king openly, but immediately Klytaimestra has 
finished speaking the lines which accompany Agamemnon's entry 
into the palace they pick up the apprehension which the 
latter has expessed by means of aidos, and sing of the 
prophetic fear which now vexes their hearts (975-87). In this 
connexion de Romilly71 writes: 
"En un sens, on peut dire que, par definition, toute 
peur est annonce d'un malheur, prediction d'un malheur; 
mais ce qui rend 'prophetique' la crainte des viellards, 
c'est qu'avant d'etre cette prediction, elle est la 
donnee premiere sur laquelle celle-ci s'appuie. Et, si 
ce trouble meme du corps est du ä quelque sentiment de 
l'äme, il faut bien alors qu'il soit assez peu conscient 
et assez peu raisonne pour n'etre d'abord sensible que 
sous cette forme indirecte. " 
She goes on to show that prophetic fear may be taken as a 
sign that the order of the universe is upset, 
72 
and to 
demonstrate how the chorus' fear prefigures Kassandra's 
hysteria. 73 One could go further, however, 
an. d 
place Agamemnon's 
aidos at the beginning of this chain, and we should notice 
that the apprehension which the king describes at 923-4 as 
Phobos is similar to that described in 948 as aidos; the 
contribution of aidos to the creation of tension is therefore 
considerable, as it was in Supp. 
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Agamemnon's concern for his reputation, which leads him into 
error in the "carpet-scene" is also ev ident in the chorus' 
u 
description of his decision74 to sacrifice Iphigeneia in the 
parodos. His choice in this matter is clearly set out; either 
he can do what would, in normal circumstances, be unthinkable 
and sacrifice his daughter, 
75 
or he can give up his leader- 
ship of the alliance and, as he puts it, desert (206-13). It 
is noticeable that Agamemnon sees the choice in terms similar 
to those in which Pelasgos sees his; both alternatives are 
09 (206-8, cf. Supp. 342,347)76 and both will have serious 
consequences (211, cf. Supp. 442); Agamemnon's amechania, then, 
is not presented as vividly or as painfully as is Pelasgos' 
(simply because we do not see its effects before our eyes), 
but both characters are in similar positions; and just as 
Pelasgos comes to favour one alternative over the other as a 
result of the Danaids' threat, so for Agamemnon the scales 
are tipped by his concern for his reputation. 
77 Fraenkel may 
be right to call the rhetorical question in 212-3 - 
-rT-ws h c-Eäva. YE Wb"*%tc. 
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"impossible; " 
-/but it is only impossible for Agamemnon; the possibility 
of desertion is rejected by him, not by Aeschylus, 
78 
and its 
rejection is simply part of the motivation of the character. 
It is Agamemnon, moreover, who chooses the pejorative term 
>ru'ävcvs, "by which", as Lesky well points out, 
79 , he 
envisages the disgrace and shame he would incur by deserting 
his post"; he thus chomses to put his own honour before his 
loyalty to the family, 80 and, while this concern for his 
honour, this aidos (for despite the absence of the word 
itself, the self-conscious fear of disgrace can hardly be 
anything else) may be entirely understandable in one of his 
position, may, indeed, have been viewed sympathetically by the 
audience$1it nevertheless leads him to commit a great crime 
against his own family. We saw that the king in Sup p., while 
still unable to decide, was subject to two kinds of aidos; 
so, perhaps, is Agamemnon, for aidos for his daughter, aidos 
at a breach of philia, may well have balanced aidos at the 
prospect of disgrace, until the latter eventually prevailed. 
This impression is confirmed by the chorus' designation of 
Ihis 
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delusion (-rrgeoeocr9d, 223) as (222); Agamemnon 
will have known as well as they do that it is aischron to 
kill a member of one's own family, and that knowledge would 
presumably lead to aidos when he was faced with the prospect. 
In the next play of the trilogy a similar form of aidos 
affects Orestes when he too is faced with the prospect of 
killing one whcnhe should not kill (cf. 930). 
82 At 896-8 
Klytaimestra bares her breast83 and appeals to her son's 
aidos for this emotive feature of the mother-child relation- 
ship, as does Hekabe at Il. 22.82-4,84 aidos which is both of 
the general variety, owed to all members of one's family, 
especially one's parents, and that which is related to the 
requirement to show gratitude, appropriate among all phi oi. 
This appeal destroys Orestes' resolve, and he asks (899): 
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This question is all the more striking for being absolutely 
unthinkable in any normal context, 
85 
as was Agamemnon's 
intention to kill Iphigeneia. Unlike Agamemnon, however, 
Orestes is not really involved in deliberation between two 
alternatives, rather a decision already made is in danger of 
being undone in the face of his recognition of the full 
horror of its consequences. 
86 There are two deliberative 
subjunctives in line 899, and Orestes is thus clearly faced 
with a choice; he is free to spare his mother, although, 
reminded by Pylades of the danger of making enemies of the 
gods, he does not do so. 
87 Yet as in all the other passages 
we have considered in this connexion, particularly the 
"carpet-scene" of Ag., the ignoring of aidos is not intended 
to go without notice; some believe that the hesitation 
represented by ads mitigates Orestes' guilt, 
88 but it is 
more likely that the converse is true, that his aidos is a 
sure sign that what he is about to do is wrong in terms of 
the most deeply held traditional beliefs, and it is certainly 
true that it is never claimed in Eum. that Orestes' 
hesitation is a sign of his moral innocence; neither Orestes 
nor Apollo pleads for mitigating circumstances in the third 
play, instead insisting on the Justice of his case; in the 
Present instance, however, ads shows that Orestes' deed, 
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regardless of its dike, 
89 is at variance with traditional 
values. It is Orestes' awareness of these values, 
90 
which 
produces his aidos, and his aidos is a clear, instinctive 
sign that all is not well. 
We have seen that the rejection of aidos may sometimes be a 
danger sign; now we shall consider more passages in which it 
is explicitly rejected, although with a certain difference 
of emphasis. Snell, Scenes from Greek Drama, 1-22F uses fr. 
225M as a basis for the delineation of a particular feature 
of Aesötylean tragedy, which he also regards as a new element 
in the development of Greek society. 
91 The beginning of each 
line in the papyrus is lost, but the general sense is clear 
enough for our purposes; as printed by Mette, the fragment 
(lines 9-14) reads: 
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According to Snell, 
93 
K ýws FL (12) means, 
"I do not care what you think. I shall stand by what I 
have done, by my convictions, and shall carry it through 
against your resistance. " 
He thus sees the fragment as the first indication of a 
tendency towards subjective evaluation of one's own conduct 
without reference to the universal standards of society, as, 
in fact, an indication of the development of a personal moral 
conscience. He recognizes that it is not in itself new that 
someone should reject aidos (referring to Archilochos' 
insouciance over the loss of his shield) 
94 
and he might also 
have mentioned any of a number of characters in Homer who 
are, for whatever reason, insensitive to aidos; these 
characters, however, do not say "I am not ashamed", and 
therein lies something of a difference; people who say "I am 
not ashamed" are usually either trying to, conceal the effect 
the criticisms of others are having on them, 
95 
or seeking to 
183 
oppose their evaluation of an act or a situation to that of 
other people, and clearly in the latter instance the 
possibility of subjective judgement of one's own actions 
does arise. Here Achilles is clearly setting his own esti- 
mation of himself and his prowess against the loyalty to the 
army as a whole which is demanded by others; this, however, 
was also his position in the Iliad, where his refusal to act 
as aidos for his comrades demands is equally apparent. 
96 The 
emphasis in the fragment, it must be admitted, is somewhat 
different; in the Iliad Achilles wishes his own opinion of 
himself to be validated by the other Achaeans; here he seems 
to exult in his own knowledge of his worth without reference 
to the opinions of others; we cannot be sure, however, that 
his desire for recognition of his prowess was not stressed 
elsewhere in the play, and should notice that he manifests a 
similar awareness of his own value to the army at 11.9.348-55. 
The aidos which he rejects in this fragment may relate to 
either or both of two factors; Achilles has uttered a great 
boast, and we can tell from the descriptions of the Argives 
in the Redepaare scene in Septem that such boasting is seen 
as discreditable; he has also declared himself superior to 
all the other leaders of the Achaeans, and thus he is without 
that aidos which one owes one's peers or one's superiors. 
97 
It may be that the wider purpose of this passage was to 
reveal the extent of Achilles' anaideia; the situation is 
certainly somewhat different from that of the Iliad, where, 
until his rejection of appropriate compensation, Achilles' 
anger was regarded as understandable; here it appears (line 1) 
that the other Achaeans have already threatened that he 
should be stoned for his treason or his desertion, and he is 
thus remaining firm in his position in the face of the 
strongest disapproval from his fellows; while, then, we 
should be aware that this passage may characterize his 
attitude as reprehensible, we should also admit that Snell's 
position does carry a great deal of weight; Achilles is 
certainly standing up for his own principles in the face of 
popular disapproval. . 
Snell is also right in identifying other Aeschylean passages 
184 
which are similar in tone, but wrong to assert that Aeschylus 
is the first author to compose passages with such a tone; 
98 
for Solon 32W, which we have already discussed, 
99 in which 
the verdict of popular opinion is disputed and opposed to 
Solon's own conviction that he has behaved creditably, is, 
if anything, a clearer example of the phenomenon Snell 
discusses than 225M. Bearing in mind, then, that Aeschylus 
is not the first to present the subjective evaluation of 
one's own conduct at variance with popular opinion, we may 
his work. 
go on to examine other, similar passages in 
Snell cites the following from Ag., in all of which Klytai- 
mestra is the speaker: 613-4 - 
-ToL i'bý o wo ios' 1k7$ ofxloc. -cs 
oü1C IKIf, cC S 
ws 
yvvi. U ycvvoeLv 
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The first of these passages is superficially similar to 225M, 
in that lack of inhibition regarding a boast is the subject; 
but Klytaimestra has been feigning loyalty to her husband, and 
loyalty is precisely the virtue expected of a noble woman 
and a good wife; while there may be some suggestion that 
modesty normally prevents one speaking of one's own virtues, 
the underlying meaning of Klytaimestra's words is that her 
boast, assuming it to be true, as she says it is, does her 
credit, because it reveals that she has fulfilled society's 
expectations of a dutiful wife. 
In the second passage she prefaces a speech explaining her 
longing for her husband during his absence with an assertion 
185 
that she will not be ashamed to speak of her love for her 
husband, because time has blunted her inhibition with regard 
to such private matters. In both these passages the aidos 
which Klytaimestra claims to ignore is, on the surface at 
least, of an insignificant kind, but the point of these 
lines for the meaning of the play is that they are lies; it 
was probably well established at this time that deceit is 
aischron, 
100 
and the audience will realize that Klytaimestra's 
denials of aidos101 conceal her more significant lack of 
aidos with regard to her deceit. 
102 It is this, the essence 
of her anaideia, which emerges in the third passage; here she 
does attempt to justify conduct which aidos might have 
reference 
prevented with to the right of retaliation, the need 
to fight duplicity with duplicity, and so the passage may be 
considered as an instance of the individual's subjective 
appraisal of the situation overcoming convention, but still 
her lack of aidos with regard to telling lies, which in turn 
suggests her lack of aidos for her husband and for the 
limitations imposed on her as a woman, is evident; the 
effect of all three passages is cumulative; Klytaimestra is 
entirely without aidos, which, for a woman, is possibly more 
reprehensible than it is for a man. 
103 
The conviction that one is right, then, may actually reveal 
that one is wrong, at least in terms of traditional values, 
104 
but we must bear in mind that, even if the insistence of 
Achilles and Klytaimestra on their own rights is morally 
reprehensible and an indication of their a aAeia, the 
language that they use clearly implies that the argument that 
one's own evaluation of one's conduct is more important than 
"what people say" was far from unknown in Aeschylus' time. 
Two other passages reveal a similar outlook, but neither may 
safely be used as evidence for the practices of Aeschylus; 
Snell presumably omits Septem 1029-30 from his account because 
of the doubts about the authenticity of the end of the play, 
105 
but he includes pY 266, to which similar reservations apply. 
In the former Antigone argues much as she does in Sophokles' 
play, 
106 
that she is not ashamed to disobey the order that 
Polyneikes should not be buried, while in the latter Prometheus' 
186 
proud admission that he willingly did wrong (14"K(riv) reveals 
that he is not concerned that others should mock him for his 
Krwc; in choosing the term which his enemies might more 
readily apply to his deed he resembles Solon in fr. 32; in both 
these cases a subjective idea of right is opposed to the 
judgement of others, and even if both are later than Aeschylus, 
they show that the phenomenon first observed in Solon, though 




becomes common in fifth century literature. 
We have now covered most of the instances of dos etc. in 
Aeschylus; comment on some passages, however, has been 
reserved until now, in order that we may observe how sebas 
and its cognates, which, as we have already seen, often occur 
in similar contexts to those in which our terms are regularly 
found, have, to a large extent, taken over many of the 
functions of aidos in Aeschylus; the takeover is not complete, 
however, and the considerable degree of overlap which exists 
allows us to discover what the terms have in common. 
The most obvious point of contact is to be found at Pers. 694 
-704: 
Xo. 6Ej ONlxL v -rr orttýFÖýactý 
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The chorus first describe their inhibition as sebas, which 
arises from their "ancient dread" of their former king, but 
Dareios himself paraphrases it as aidos, before the chorus go 
on to reiterate their reserve in terms of fear, which the king 
desribes as deos. 
109 The connexion with fear places these 
usages in the category, "respect for one of superior status" 
187 
in which aidos is often found in Homer, while the chorus' 
reluctance to look Dareios' ghost in the face (694), indicates 
that this characteristic shame-reaction, which is often found 
in contexts which we should describe in terms of modesty, 
embarrassment or simply shame, also occurs in contexts which 
seem to us to involve respect; the similarity of the manifes- 
tations of inhibition across the range of these usages is 
presumably one reason why the Greek can apply one term to all. 
Most important for our purposes here, however, are the 
inhibitory force of sebas, its closeness to dos and the 
association of both with fear. 
In other passages we find that aidos and sebas are used almost 
interchangeably in contexts which are, to all intents and 
purposes, identical. We might compare, for example, Sup . 222-3, 
'Try vi iV f is vag ýcrwý/ -rwvtjr Kai L &-V 
with line 345 of the same play, 
at S'0 ,U ar 
v 
-r-C Vi "VPCV - [-UX EcwfE CT- 5A>c.. 
& 
v-1 . 
Similarly, aidos is the response to the suppliant at 641, but 
sebas describes the same response at 815 (cf. Eum. 151). One's 
reaction to the god of suppliants may be aidos (Supp. 478-9) 
or sebas (671-2). 
We are familiar enough with aidos as 
_a 
reaction to another's 
power; such seems to be the aidos of the chorus at gg. 362-4: 
L. 
( 16 t 
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Here aidos is not general reverence for a deity but awe at 
his power, power which has been manifested in the punishment 
of Paris. 
110 
In Aeschylus, however, sebas is much more common 
than aidos in such applications; in Supp. 755-6, for example, 
the collocation of sebas and fear found in the Persae passage 
recurs in 8owJ 6e(-1 A cooles , while at x. 912 - oü c1e / ýt/SC 
YEv6 e ovs ae 
xS, 
-n- kVvV - it is clear that Orestes' sebas is 
to be akin to fear and to be directed at the power of a 
mother's curse. 
188 
Two passages in Ag. show how sebizo works as did aideomai in 
Homer in describing the response of inferior to (mortal) 
superior; at 258-60 the chorus address Klytaimestra as follows: 
vjKW ( I/ 
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Similar are the terms in which they greet Agamemnon at 785-7: 
"rrws "rreonror-J; T'ws ýE CC- 
Kýtýýoý xäCLTOS; 
The presence of Ti4LV in 259 is instructive; we decided that, 
in Homer, ads could be a reaction to another's tim , be he 
an equal or a superior, 
ill 
and a similar idea of "honouring" 
seems to exist in sebas. 
Both aideomai and the verbs based on sebas, in fact, occur 
frequently in contexts where ideas of "honouring", "choosing" 
or "favouring" are present, and their sense in such contexts 
seems to approximate to -fL1%av or -jrCorL V. At Cho. 106-8, for 
example, the chorus-leader explains that she honours (ici6oo vy) 
Agamemnon's tomb as if it were an altar, and Elektra accepts 
her aidos. At Eum. 760 Orestes claims that Zeus became his 
saviour, -'rrKy"JoV ^it$ G4tS lt"6of, which Verrall translates, 
"In pity of my father's fate, " and Gagarin112 paraphrases, 
"... a sense of respect and shame at his father's death, " but 
the point is that Zeus has preferred, i. e. considered more 
important, the death of Agamemnon to that of Klytaimestra; 
similarly, Athevne says (at 739-40),,, 
o ütw vV oý cKoSoJ -r-e or yi l fu o'd of 
öc /s k- roc vo 
J's'1 
cýw, vý &fE-! C 
(r 
rc rtro v/ý 
and the chorus recapitulate the argument of Apollo at 640 with 
the words -rr cr oS -Trco. r Zcrvs Lq while 
the similarity in 
sense between aideomai and Teorl,, ^&w is confirmed by the use 
of Teo-a"144 (governing -r o lcfwq tPos, equivalent to ai 4ýoü, wrvos 
ToKEas) and ocs 
föpvos together at 545-9. Eum. 760, then, means 
"putting my father's fate first", or, if ýw! Cos may mean not 
"death", but "portion", "honouring the paternal portion". 
113 
In all these passages, it seems, the idea of "honouring 
regularly present in aideomai when it governs a personal 
189 
object, transfers the verb somewhat from its normal usage; 
114 
is used in a similar sense at Eum. 715 and 749.14 
Containing the idea of "honouring", then, sebas is frequently 
the reaction to one of superior power; it appears from Cho. 
55-7, however, that it does not simply respond to naked 
power, for the new regime of Klytaimestra and Aigisthos, 
although not lacking in power, is said to have lost the sebas 
which once belonged to the royal house, and thus to have 
lost the respect of the people. Sebas, then, is not simply 
fear of the powerful, but rather a reaction which encompasses 
positive admiration for legitimate authority. 
115 Similarly, 
at Ag. 1612 the chorus, despite the fact that he has already 
assumed the place of ruler, refuse to show any sebas for 
Aigisthos. At PV 937 Prometheus urges the chorus, 
6E'ou 
I -Treo(Eüxo) c. r r& -roy/ Kea 
ToLYC PC &C . 
i 
and, although he clearly sees -ro ec-&t%/ as the reaction of 
the weak to the strong, regardless of the character of the 
latter's power, the connexion with flattery shows that it 
must also entail an active expression of one's admiration 
for its object. 
Aidos, as we have seen on numerous occasions, is particularly 
common in relationships with one's parents, family, friends 
and in those which involve strangers. and guests; in Aeschylus, 
se bas, too, is found in these contexts. At Supp. 707-9 it is 
one of the "ordinances of Dike" that parents should receive 
the sebas of their children, and at Eum. 269-72 lack of sebas 
for the gods, a guest or one's parents are the offences which 
are rewarded by -r, 15 
(L 
Kv1 s eiº-JcK, and all may easily be 
regarded as examples of anaideia. Likewise, we have already 
seen116 that Eteokles and Polyneikes were said to have 
perished öc rkp(, L 
SLaVOK 
, and this must refer fundamentally 
to their lack of familial aidos. 
As a reaction to those of special status, sebas, as we have 
seen, is very often directed towards the gods; although aidos 
now also occurs with greater frequency in this connexion, it 
appears from Aeschylus and other fifth century literature, 
190 
both poetry and prose, that sebas is the more typical term 
used to designate man's attitude to god; see Septem 529-30, 
Supp. 222-3,921-2, Cho. 960, Eum. 12-3 and 897.541-2 also 
reveals, paradoxically, that the gods are entitled to sebas; 
Prometheus, a god, feels too much sebas for mortals, and it 
is implied that this is an inversion of the normal pattern. 
Mortals, however, can attract a proper amount of sebas (see, 
e. g., Aq. 925117), and it should certainly not be inferred 
that sebas is an exclusively religious concept, particularly 
since, on its first appearances in Homer, 
117ait bears no 
such exclusive reference. As a result of the frequent associ- 
ation with the gods, however, the adjectives eusebes, asebes, 
dussebes and the corresponding nouns most often occur in 
religious contexts, 
118 
although they can refer to general 
right and wrongdoing, 
119 (particularly because the gods now 
have such an interest in human conduct) and hence they can 
also desiribe proper or improper behaviour in contexts in 
which the gods have a particular interest. 
120 
So far we have used sebas and aidos as shorthand for the 
complexes of terms related to these concepts; in Aeschylus, 
however, there is frequently a difference of usage between 
the two; whereas in Homer sebas denoted the individual's 
reaction to another person or some object which aroused his 
awe, 
121 in Aeschylus it most often refers to that quality 
which occasions such a reaction in others; Eum. 92 is an 
obvious example - ff, 
(&L-rML ZGu$ --OP 
EKVrwV (j c5 ; *O 
d(, 
WfOXL 
OkiS'W is not found. In this sense, sebas is often spoken of 
as the possession of the gods - PV 1091,122 Supp. 396, x. 644; 
similarly, at Ag. 515, Hermes is described as t1v sebas of 
heralds, i. e. that which heralds sebein. Elsewhere sebas can 
designate anything which one the virginity of Europa 
at fr. 145M. 5 and the homosexual relationship between Achilles 
and Patroklos in 228M; 
123 from the latter we see both that 
Baas is, like aidos, relevant to relationships of philia, 
and that sebas, in its objective sense, can attract aidos 
... oJic tratlltu). Sometimes there is no need to decide 
L 
whether sebas is the objective quality or the subjective 
reaction; at Eum. 885, for example, 11 Oots rEýocs the genitive 
191 
may be either possessive ("the majesty of Persuasion") or 
objective ("the respect which Persuasion commands") and in 
Supp. 83-5 the altar which is a r(t,, S may be an object 
of respect to the SoLVv%oies, mortals or both; similarly at 
755 of the same play 0J 
ea'p 
may be the things which the 
gods fEýuvet. or the things, belonging to the gods, which 
men fFf ovrl- ; since the subjective sense appears to be the 
older, it appears that, from the meaning "awe", the term 
develops to mean, "that which occasions awe", a process we 
see beginning in h. Hom. Cer. 10-1.124 In many cases, such as 
these last, the distinction will not be clearly made, if it 
was felt at all, and the clearest example of this is Cho. 
55-7 (p. 189), where sebas must be both the quality in the 
royal house which arouses the respect of the people and that 
respect itself, which now "stands aside". 
125 A distinction 
must, however, be made at Cho. 243, in order that the text be 
properly understood; Elektra has recognized her brother and 
exclaims: 
-rcLr-rrrS 9('4ö5 ý(O' (. 1,14 
E(05 C"'q 
It is important to see that these words imply nothing about 
Orestes' attitude to Elektra; 
126 
os means not "loyal" 




'' L- W4 means "bringing me something to sebein", not 
"bringing me your respect. " Elektra means that she has relied 
upon Orestes and felt sebas for him all these years, and she 
now realizes that he has, by his appearance, shown himself 
worthy of this regard (it seems most likely that ý(O( is 
equivalent to 
i'' I(Ox (on which see Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, 
§39)). 
In other passages the active sense, "respect" is unambiguously 
what is required; To ... TEkovT14 (t ,S at SUP . 707 must surely 
mean "respect for one's parents"ý 
while 
the sebas of the 
townspeople at Eum. 690 is clearly their reaction to the 
power of the Areiopagos (equivalent to Tö ý+vý K cILfFýý 6Eßov1e 
in 749). In conclusion, then, the usage of the substantives 
sebas and aidos differs, in that the duality of sebas is 
much more regular than the duality of aidos; 
128 
nor is there 
complete correspondence in the usage of other terms belonging 
192 
to the same groups; while the usage of the verbs may overlap, 
the same is not true of, for example, aidoios and eusebes, 
the former being normally passive in sense129 and the latter 
normally active; asebeia or dussebeia, however, may refer to 
similar kinds of conduct to anaideia, provided the latter has 
only a general sense; for sebas and its cognates have no 
explicit reference in Aeschylus to popular disapproval or 
concern for one's own reputation. In general in Aeschylus, 
and in the other tragedians, sebas and aidos only overlap 
where both take a personal or quasi-personal object, that is, 
in situations where both may be rendered as "respect"; in 
Homer, as we saw, 
130 
sebomai etc. could be followed by an 
infinitive, and thus behave like aideomai, but in Aeschylus 
we find this happening only at ers. 694-6 (p. 186 above), and 
there the chorus' inhibitory sebas is based on their sebas 
(= respect) for their former king; the two groups of terms 
are obviously very close, and, even in Homer, there may 
already be some contamination from one to the other, but if 
aidos is to be distinguished from sebas at all, it will 
surely be in its concern with the image of the self (the 
"ego ideal"131) and with the prospect of action which is in 
conflict with that image that the distinction is to be found. 
bas etc. are certainly more common in Aeschylus than aidos 
and its. cognates, and instances of the former are most 
numerous in two plays, Supp. and Eum.; in the former sebas 
works closely with aid os, which is not surprising since the 
plot centres on an act of supplication and since, while aidos 
is commonly linked with the reaction of the supplicated, 
sebas is particularly associated with the gods, whose 
concern for suppliants is central to the ritual. Iniiu . 
sebas is concerned mainly with crime and deterrence, and, on 
occasion, dos also intervenes. There are some 20 instances 
of sebas etc. in the play; many of these have already been 
discussed, and most of the rest occur in two passages of the 
trial scene at Athens. At 482-8 Athene explains that the new 
process of justice which she is about to lay down will 
involve evidence and witnesses, and the thesmos of oaths for 
which the jurors will feel aidos (483-4). 
132 The chorus, 
193 
however, are concerned that the new method of punishment may 
not have the deterrent effect of the old, and in their song 
(490-565) they worry that, if their power is destroyed, 
kindred murder will go unavenged, and there will be nothing 
to prevent the murder of mothers and fathers (490-516). The 
example of the punishment of the guilty, then, is necessary 
to deter others, and it is on this point that they enlarge 
at 517-25: 
k' i CEVWV vw 
'fKirroV 
4-i 
/ ý6ýV Kýc B ýj VOJ 
ýf ýeCeý 
öwýeovECV 
TC , vº v 
ýE JV oc F 'ý' 
132a 
K0" coca// a\(V- y wV 
The utility of fear (-Tb 
(41V 'I ) is thus explained; 
133 fear 
of punishment causes one to check impulses to transgress, 
and to sebein Dike; sebas is thus associated with fear once 
more, but, as we saw in connexion with Cio. 55-7,134 the two 
are not exactly synonymous, as the chorus go on immediately 
to suggest at 526-30: 
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Fear of punishment, then, is not to be carried to the extent 
of despotic coercion; there are rewards as well as punish- 
ments (534-7). 
In the next stanza (538-49) the thought of Ti S ... 
EvT oe V ((floc, 
L%LICO º (522-5) is taken up by w -l oci'j'ü(oK. A 
ietc (539), and 
the two concepts are again linked at 545-9: 
Teo5 "raS'F/TCS TaKýwý äEfýKs !ý TeoTýwV 
K a%ý FVOTý"U j 
Oc I 
fo 05 TI. 5 C il W. 
Here ýFýws Er 0' -7r( irCwVand ocilö, vu s are virtually synonyms, 135 
194 
and the specific virtues commended are those which aidos 
traditionally upholds, but which Aeschylus can also describe 
as maintained by sebas, 
136 
Respect for one's parents and for 
xenoi are among the most canonical of Greek virtues, and it 
would appear that the chorus believe that these are kept in 
force by their kind of dike, by that fear of punishment which 
is maintained by example; the aidos which they would like to 
see is, in fact, related to punishments in 541-3; to disregard 
aidos is to be distracted by kerdos, 137 and for this punish- 
ment awaits; aidos, then, seems no less closely related to 
fear of punishment than sebas, 
138 but both are also used of 
the reverence accorded properly constituted power, and thus 
both imply more than simple fear; it is noticeable, however, 
that the frequent connexion of aidos with the consequences 
of popular disapproval is not mentioned; the Furies are 
uniquely concerned with respect for auth1ority. 
The Furies' song concludes with two stanzas on the rewards 
for justice and the punishments for its opposites, and a 
debate on the merits of Orestes' case follows, until, at 
681ff., Athene puts the matter to the judges and explains to 
them their duties; she now describes the thesmos (681) which 
she had promised to institute at 483-4, and, in effect, she 
attempts to allay the chorus' fears point by point; at 690-1 
the necessity of fear and sebas as a means of promoting just 
behaviour is affirmed, and, at 696-9, the views of the chorus 
%r ýTI äveccXo4 find an exact echo; the citizens are to sebein Irb 
p4, 
'Tt (E. -s-vTo,. uvod (cf. 526-7), the efficacy of 'rD EtvW is 
stated (cf. 517-9), and it is assumed that it is only fear 
which makes mortals just (cf. 520-5). Athene, then, institut- 
ionalizes fear and sebas and gives them utility in the state, 
but it is also shown that these qualities have always been 
instrumental in the maintenance of justice; their new utility 
seems to lie in their new objectivity, their lack of 
partiality in the context of a court of law, for it is made 
clear that the new system of justice is to be superior to 
old (700-6): 
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Here sebasUlrefers to the new system itself; it is to be an 
object of awe to the citizens, of which they will be afraid, 
but which will also be aidoion, and this suggests that we 
are not to imagine a state ruled by mere coercion; the 
Areiopagos will be incorruptible, and will deserve the 
respect of the people. 
Fear of punishment, then, produces sebas for the agencies 
which have the power to enforce it, be they the avenging 
Furies or a homicide court, and, in view of 539 and 705, in 
which aidos also enters the picture, it seems that that 
feeling, too, is aroused by the forces of punishment and 
deterrence; the stress, however, is on sebas, and this 
accords with the far greater frequency of that term in the 
sense "respect for those of special status". The association 
of aidos with fear is traditional, and is found in contexts 
in which the fear is fear of disgrace and in those in which 
it is fear of the power of another person; if aidos is to 
differ from sebas at all (and in many cases, as we have seen, 
there is no practical difference in application), a provis- 
ional distinction might be found in the contrast between the 
ultimate reference to oneself contained in aidos (though it 
must be admitted that such a reference is rarely expressed 
in contexts in which aideomai takes a personal object, in 
the sense "respect") and the other-directed reference of 
se bas; sebas, it seems, is an enlightened form of fear, 
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based on the acknowledgement of superior power, yet 
contingent upon the nature of that power and one's reaction 
to it; if it is concerned with consequences for oneself it 
is with the consequences of concrete sanctions that it is 
concerned, rather than with the effect punishments will have 
on one's own status and reputation, which is the ultimate 
reference of aidos. 
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The utility of fear in the state is, as de Romilly points 
out, 
140 
recognized by later writers, particularly Plato, and 
aidos (and aischune) have their part to play in the Platonic 
"good fear"; for Plato, however, aidos in this context is 
not simply the respect which the institutions of the state 
command, but the traditional fear of disgrace which prevents 
transgression, 141 and, while this may lie behind the aidos 
which occurs in Eum., it is not explicitly mentioned. 
De Romilly also shows that the fear inspired by the Areiopagos 
is the healthy counterpart of the terror which affects 
the characters earlier in the trilogy, 
42 
and with which, as 
we saw, 
143 Agamemnon's aidos has a certain amount to do; 
this sequence of distortion in Ag. Cho. and resolution 
in Eum. has been shown to occur in several of the image- 
patterns of the trilogy. 
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The varieUs disruptions reflected 
in the imagery of the trilogy also reflect the disturbance 
in the world order, a disturbance which results fundamentally 
from crime; the aidos of Agamemnon and the fear of the chorus 
which we have already looked at represent the instinctiveiof 
human beings that there is some disturbance, that something 
is not quite right. In his presentation of the fear which 
torments the guilty (e. g. at Ag. 179-80)145 Aeschylus anti- 
cipates Demokritos' and Antiphon's descriptions of the 
psychological disturbance which affects those who have, as 
we should say, a bad conscience, 
146 
and in his use of dos 
as an instinctive sense that a contemplated act conflicts 
with one's internal awareness of moral standards, whether 
these are described as one's own or those of society, 
147 he 
o 
certainly shows his recognition the phenomena of consci- 
ence, 
148 but, as we have seen, this awareness that all is 
not well is not restricted to the agent, but is diffused 
among those who merely look on, and is ultimately 
regarded as inspired by the gods; Aeschylus, then, does not 
present conscience unambiguously as such, but he has 
recognized the phenomenon and presentedýin a way which is 
psychologically convincing; we should notice in particular 
how his representation of aidos as an instinctive form of 
conscience which often leads to indecision and uncertainty 
is central to his use of psychological realism. 
149 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE. 
1. I do not use the word "wrong" in any exclusively moral 
sense; aidos is also the reaction to conduct which is wrong 
in the sense that it is inappropriate. 
2. Dareios applies hybris etc. only to the conduct of the 
army (although 9eKr4% in 831 refers to Xerxes), and it is 
therefore probably unwise to see his remarks as explaining 
the actions of its commander (Gagarin, Aeschylean Drama, 47-8), 
although many critics (Dodds, GI, P. 39, Winnington-Ingram, 
Studies, c. 1, Lesky, Greek Tragic Poetry, p. 54) do see 
Dareios' comments as an inspired revelation of the nature of 
the conduct of both Xerxes and the army, of which the play's 
other characters have only a partial grasp. 
3. On this fragment, see Lloyd-Jones, J-iS 1956,59-60, and 
in Loeb Aeschylus (ed. H. W. Smyth, 11 
2) 
appendix 576-81; on 
the identity of this child of Zeus and Hera (probably Ares), 
see the latter discussion. 
4. On the text of 444, see Broadhead ad loc.. The idea of 
dying aischrös also occurs at frr. 225M. 21 (Snell's 
restoration; the sense is not clear, but perhaps Achilles 
means to reproach Patroklos for deserting him (cf. 228,229M) 
or, more likely, he is speaking of the death (by stoning) 
which the army has in mind for him) and 309M (where the 
disgrace arises from the fact that the deceased has been 
cheated of his property). 
4a. Studies, p. 31. 
5. See below, pp. 170-1. 
6. Cf. Hutchinson on 409. 
7. ibid.. 
8. See Gagarin, Aeschylean Drama, 188-9n. 29; on Athenian law 
in this matter, see MacDowell, Ath. Homicide Law, P. 77, The 
Law in Classical Athens, 114,124-5. 
9. Cf. Dover, GPM, p. 210; in the Od. the actions of Klytai- 
mestra and Aigisthos are described as ae ea (cf. pp. 20-1 and 
n. 48, p. 98 above), and at Odd. 1.35 Zeus describes Aigisthos' 
seduction of Klytaimestra as while at 37-43 we 
learn that he was directly warned by the gods about his 
conduct; clear signs, surely, that adultery is to be regarded 
as discreditable for the adulterer. 
198 
10. pp. 171-6. 
11. See Kopperschmidt, Die Hikesie, 55-7, Lesky, Greek Tragic 
Poetr , p. 63. 
12. Cf. von Erffa, p. 87, and Friis Johansen and Whittle, ad loc.. 
13. Cf. Od. 17.578 (pp. 107-8n. 150, and note also the adverb 
in 0.19.243) and (Homer) Ep. 2.2,6.6 (pp. 126-7 above); on 
the coexistence of both senses, cf. P. 146 above on P. I. 2.37. 
14. See Friis Johansen and Whittle on both 1 and 192, and cf. 
von Erffa, p. 87, who suggests that an active sense for aidoios 
in 192 might be supported by 815, `( 
So" Ji' ß"c3 fE 0(-v 
(addressed to Zeus). 
I 
15. Gould, JHS 1973, p. 87, using some of the examples cited 
from Supp. as his evidence. 
16. Homer; see 64-70 above; Sophokles, pp. 217-8below; Euripides, 
363-84 below. 
17. On the two types of supplication, see Kopperschmidt, 
46-53, Burian, Suppliant Drama, 1,4-5, Gould, 75-8; on self- 
abasement in personal supplication, see Gould, 79,94-5. 
18. See below, 301-2 ; Menelaos does supplicate Theonoe, but 
he attempts to avoid self-humiliation - he feels that it 
would diminish his reputation as the captor of Troy to clasp 
her knees or to weep, and he expresses this inhibition as 
aischune (= aidos). 
19. Aidoios also ocurs as a simple, honorific epithet at Ag. 
600 (used of Agamemnon by his wife). 
20. On aidos and oaths, cf. p. 123 above and 210-1 below. Von 
Erffa, P. 95, suggests that oL t 
fK' dß`1 T-1 &i may have been 
an Attic legal formula, but there appears to be no evidence 
for this. 
21. It seems sensible to treat the few relevant passages in 
PV in this chapter simply because of the traditional associ- 
ation with Aeschylus, although it is probably not by him 
(see Griffith, The Authenticity of the Prometheus Bound); it 
seems most likely, however, that it is fifth century in date 
(Griffith, p. 253), and so legitimate evidence for the general 
usage of the period, though not for any generalizations about 
Aeschylus. 
22. So Griffith, comm. ad loc.; von Erffa interprets the 
Oceanids'aidos as a feeling or condition which is disturbed 
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by the noise of Prometheus' binding (91-2), but fails to say 
what kind of feeling or condition it might be. 
22a. Cf. Cho. 917, where Orestes is drawing on traditional 
shyness regarding sexuality when he claims that he is ashamed 
(aischumomai) to speak of his mother's liaison with Aigisthos; 
speak of it he does, however, and Klytaimestra knows exactly 
what he means; see Garvie, ad loc.. 
23. If Danaos does have any specific Ex 9Coc. in mind at 1008, 
it is not clear who they are; probably not Aegyptos and his 
sons, although it just might be possible that they could take 
a perverse pleasure in Danaos' disgrace, even though it would 
entail that of their prospective daughters-in-law and wives; 
see further Friis Johansen and Whittle III, p. 290. 
24. P. 163 above (cf. in general p. 71 and n. 193). 
25. Cf. Burian, p. 68. 
26. See Garvie, Aeschylus' Supplices, P. 222, Friis Johansen 
and Whittle I, P. 32, III, P. 290, Lesky, Greek Tragic Poetry, 
p. 66. 
27. See Garvie, Sup p., 215-23 for a discussion (and further 
reff. ); cf. Friis Johansen and Whittle I, 30-3. 
28. For the text and interpretation, see Garvie, ad loc. 
(his preference for -r" rr bc(? c e3 over -roT«Cx") in 664 does not 
affect the passage for our purposes). 
29. Cf. Od. 18.184, p. 73 above (also pp. 71-4); see also Garvie, 
ad loc.,. Gould, JHS 1973, p. 87n. 65 (also IH 1980, p. 56). 
30. Cf. pp. 8-9,55-6,57,107n. 150,117-8. 
31. See pp. 107n. 140,108n. 151,117-8,165 above. 
32. pp. 8 and 55 above. 
33. So Friis Johansen and Whittle, ad loc.. 
34. Von Erffa, p. 90. 
35. The interpretation of the scholiast, followed by some edd. 
and rejected by Friis Johansen and Whittle, ad loc.; their 
objection, that aidos is not found of retrospective shame 
(in the basic sense of shame occasioned by an event in the 
befoye Euripides 
pasta, is invalid; Io's aidos could be the same as that of 
Kassandra at Ag. 1203-4 (p. 167 above); for aideomai used of 
an event in the past, cf. pp. 37,132-3 above; simply because 
Io's ads may arise from'her past sufferings does not mean 
that it must be tantamount to guilt. 
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36. Cf. pp. 135-6 above. 
01 37. Below, pp. 186-96; note that the «ý«S """ ii(' ' 
deYV&. 1 of 
228M is expresses as ý. ý . 
i4 im- -r&jV rw-l 4v rFý-js ö/,,.. iA r in 229M. 
38. If this approach assumes that Aeschylus had an interest 
in individual characterization and psychology, so be it. 
Psychology and character are inte gral to plot, action and 
the creation of tension in Aeschylus, although, it need 
hardly be said, he did not indulge in characterization for 
its own sake; on this topic in general, see Jones, OO 
Aristotle and Greek Tragedy, 30-3,37-8 (on ethos in Arist. 
Poetics) and 77-81 (against characterization in A. ), and 
contrast P. E. Easterling, GR 1973,3-19, Winnington-Ingram, 
Studies, P. 141, Dover, JHS 1973,58-69, esp. 69; the approach 
of Hutchinson, Septem, xxxiv-v, is less tentative and has 
much to commend it. 
39. P. 96. 
40. For his desire to fight Polyneikes, see 692,718-9 (where 
it is combined with a belief in the inevitability of the 
conflict); for the belief that the confrontation is determined 
by the curse, 653-9,695-7. Eteokles never considers the 
possibility that he might not face his brother, even though 
the chorus urge him to do so (698); the question of free will 
and compulsion, then, often brought in here (see Winnington- 
Ingram, Studies, 16-7n. 3 for reff. ), does not really arise, 
for, however the curse may work (and we must assume that it 
does have objective existence), it does not conflict with 
his desire; the question of choice versus compulsion would 
be more relevant had Eteokles wished to resist the force of 
the curse; Prima facie it is not impossible for him to refuse 
to face his brother (see Hutchinson on 653-719 (p. 149) and 
contrast Lloyd-Jones, cQ 1959, p. 86, who says that he had 
"no choice"); the effect of the Redepaare scene, with its 
mixture of tenses, is to suggest that, despite the curse, 
Eteokles could choose to position himself at another gate 
(see Lesky, 1961,8-10 (also JHS 1966,83-4, Greek Tragic 
Poetr , 58,60), R. D. Dawe, PCPS 1963,33-7 (esp. 37), Winning- 
ton-Ingram, Studies, p. 24; Hutchinson (on 369-652, pp. 104-5) 
does not believe either that Aeschylus did not intend to make 
it clear whether or not all the postings had been made (Lesky, 
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Dawe) or that some have been made, some not (Winnington- 
Ingram), but nevertheless holds that "the audience must not 
think that the seventh gate has already been allotted"). 
41. Cf. Gagarin, Aeschylean Drama, p. 124, Winnington-Ingram, 
35-6,39. 
42. So Hutchinson on 653-719 (p. 149), comparing I1.6.441-3, 
where aidos does occur; Snell, Aischylos, p. 83 has the same 
comparison, but, wrongly, believes that Eteokles fears not 
the disgrace of imputed cowardice, but that of injustice; 
Eteokles' concern for military success and glory, however, 
resurfaces at 716-7. 
43. Class, Gewissensregungen, p. 33 argues for coincidence of 
human and divine motives, and rightly rules out the possibi- 
lity of a Gewissensentscheidung in the passage; he seems to 
imply, however, that the curse is more important than the 
personal motives, and this is brought out more fully by 
Stebler, Entstehung und Entwicklung, p. 35, who recognizes the 
combination of motives, but remarks, "Wo magische Notwendig- 
keit wirkt, gibt es keine Möglichkeit des Entrinnens. " 
44. So Winnington-Ingram, Studies, 36-40. 
45. See the discussion of Gagarin, Aeschylean Drama, 6-11, 
17-8,20 etc.. 
46. pp. 164-6 above. 
47. Cf. Lesky, Greek Tragic Poetry, p. 64. 
48. See Friis Johansen and Whittle, ad loc.. 
49. This is probably a legitimate distinction; see Gould, JHS 
1973, p. 89; on miasma as the result should any harm come to 
those who supplicate at an altar, see Parker, asma, 182-6, 
esp. 185. 
50. On his amechania here, see Snell, Aischylos, P. 60, 
Kopperschnidt, P. 62, Lesky, Greek Tragic Poetry, 64-5. 
51. See Gould, Ji 1973, p. 82 for this tactic. 
52. eint -rC&e º rwJ (399) is most naturally taken as conces- 
sive rather than conditional; Pelasgos has the power to 
decide for himself, but such is the gravity of the matter 
and of the implications of his decision for the city that 
he does not want to; see Friis Johansen and Whittle ad loc., 
and cf. their notes on 365-9,368-9,484-5. Pelasgos is thus 
not constrained by a democratic constitution, although his 
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statements of his power at 250ff. are certainly tempered 
somewhat by his subsequent stress on the rOle of the demos; 
see Burian, Suppliant Drama, 53-7. 
53. The comparison is also made by Friis Johansen and Whittle, 
on 401. 
54. Cf. pp. 164-6 above. 
55. On the importance of Pelasgos' decision, see Snell, 
Aischylos, 52-65, Class, Gewissensregungen, 30-3, Lesky, JHS 
1966,78-80. 
56. Lesky, JHS 1966, p. 80, Rivier, REG 1968,18,34-6. 
57. Lesky, JHS 1966, p. 79. 
58. Lesky, 79-80. 
59. So Rivier, p. 18 and Stebler, p. 94, who seems to imagine 
that the gods somehow force Pelasgos to accept the suppli-, 
cation. 
60. See the. important remarks of Lesky, JHS 1966, p. 80. 
61. Cf. Snell, Aischylos, p. 143. 
62. For two contrasting views, see Fraenkel on 948 (on the 
importance of the scene), Dawe, PCPS 1963, p. 48n. 2 (on the 
unimportance of the scene); see also Easterling, gR 1973,10-1. 
63. This is "non-sceptical" relativism; see below, pp. 568-70. 
64. On the correct interpretation of these lines, see Fraenkel, 
ad loc., and cf. Winnington-Ingram, Studies, p. 92. 
65. See Easterling, P. 13, Winnington-Ingram, p. 92. 
66. Cf. Easterling, ibid.. 
67. See Page on 931ff.. 
Crºsf0r(ýýy ,ib; ý(,. . 69. cf. 69. Cf. von Erffa, p. 94; unfortunately he persists in 
regarding aidos in such phrases (where the noun is followed 
by an infinitive,. cf. 11.17.336 and O d. 3.24 (p. 29 above)) as 
equivalent to airlCiJ c(rL ; although to say, "there is aidos 
to do x" (i. e. the prospect arouses the aidos of those faced 
with it) may come to the same thing as "it is aischron to do 
x", aidos does not mean "disgrace" in this context. 
70. By Dawe, PCPS 1963, p. 48n. 2; contrast Easterling, 10-12. 
71. La Crainte, 73-4. 
72. P. 78. 
73. P. 75. 
74. The chorus describe Agamemnon's consideration of two 
alternatives, and his eventual preference for one over the 
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other, and so it can hardly be maintained that he does not 
have a choice; ananke in 218 probably refers to the necessary 
consequences of the decision (Snell, Aischylos, p. 143), but 
even if it does not, Dover (JHS 1973, p. 65) is right to point 
out that, "Many a 
T Koc. I. are resistible in principle" - ananke 
may encompass motive and circumstance, and does not necess- 
arily imply absolute compulsion. Those who claim that 
Agamemnon has no choice include Page (introd. to the ed. of 
Denniston and Page, xxiii-ix) and Lloyd-Jones, CQ 1962,187- 
99, esp. 191-2; Rivier, REG 1968,9-10, recognizes that he 
does have a choice, but stresses his lack of freedom (cf. 
Stebler, p. 53); one might, however, do the same in the case 
of anyone faced with a difficult choice. Hammond, JHS 1965, 
p. 47, sensibly points out that those who say that Agamemnon 
has no choice can only mean "no real choice". We are hardly 
justified, however, in treating his choice from an austerely 
philosophical perspective; Agamemnon is liable for the 
sacrifice of Iphigeneia no matter how far his freedom of 
choice is restricted, and his act calls forth Klytaimestra's 
retribution whatever the nature of his decision; see Gagarin, 
Aeschylean Drama, p. 197n. 17 (but notice that Gagarin also 
(n. 18) rejects the idea that Agamemnon is absolutely 
compelled to act as he does). 
75. Gagarin, p. 92, 
76. P. 172 above. 
77. See Lesky, JHS 1966, p. 81. 
78. As Page believes (introd. p. xxvii). 
79. JHSS 1966, p. 81. 
80. See Gagarin, p. 92 and cf. Stebler, p. 53. 
81. See Dover, 1S 1973, p. 66. 
82. The meaning of this line for Orestes is probably that, 
although he recognizes that it is wrong in any normal circum- 
stance to kill one's mother, his own deed is justified as 
retribution for Klytaimestra's, which, for him, is the 
initial wrong; for the audience, however, the words will be 
a sign that Orestes' vengeance is thematically and morally 
parallel with that of his his mother; see Garvie, ad loc., 
and, for the view that Orestes here expresses his realization 
that what he is about to do is wrong, see Pearson, Popular 
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Ethics, p. 20 (cf. Snell, Aischylos, p. 120). 
83. Or, probably, the actor playing her makes some equivalent 
gesture (Garvie, ad loc. ). 
85. Cf. Gagarin, P. 99. 
In. 84. See p. 46 (with n. 113) above. 
86. Orestes' "decision" precedes the play's beginning 
(Rivier, 28-9, Stebler, p. 31), but his resolve is strengthened 
at several points, notably in the kommos; for the view that 
Orestes fully realizes what his decision involves only at 
899, cf. Garvie, ad loc.. 
87. Snell (Aischylos, 133-4) is thus correct in stressing 
Orestes' choice, but wrong to see it as a struggle in his 
heart between divine forces (cf. Class, p. 44); Klytaimestra's 
Erinyes have not yet entered the equation, and Agamemnon's 
Erinyes desire the same end as Apollo; cf. Garvie, Cho., 
introd. p. xxxii. Rivier, 25,28-9 (cf. Stebler, p. 91) main- 
tains that Orestes has no choice, but see the remarks of 
Garvie on 899; the very mention of the punishments laid down 
by Apollo should Orestes disobey his command (271-96) shows 
that disobedience is not impossible (Garvie, p. xxxi). 
88. e. g. W. Arrowsmith, Tulane Drama Review, 3.3 (1959) p. 49. 
89. On dik e as retributive justice in A., see Gagarin, 25-6, 
76-80,83-4,146-7, etc.. 
90. Orestes' act is thus in conflict with his internalized 
awareness of the standards of his society, and his aidos 
arises instinctively from this awareness, which must be seen 
as a form of conscience (Snell, Aischylus, 131,133, Stebler, 
p. 91); Stebler stresses Orestes' Gewissens-Not, yet maintains 
that his personal conscience is overcome by divine compulsion; 
but Apollo does not compel, at least not absolutely. Earlier 
in her work (p. 1j)! quotes C. G. Jung's distinction between 
"ethical conscience", involving reflexion and conscious 
deliberation, and "moral conscience", which is activated 
ins t nctively; I do not know that the terms used to make 
the distinction are helpful, but the distinction in itself 
is valid; Orestes' aidos clearly belongs to the latter cate- 
ancj 
gory, one could make a case for the argument that a'dos 
always, even when explicitly related to "other people", 
implies this form of conscience; this might, perhaps, avoid 
the confusion which arises from the assumption that, when 
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"conscience" is mentioned with regard to Homer or classical 
Greek literature, a private, personal, reflective or "ethical" 
conscience is meant. 
91. The authenticity of the fragment has been disputed (see 
Page, Sel. - Pap. III, 136-41, Lloyd-Jones, Aeschylus red. 
Smyth] II2,590-3), but Page's literary/dramatic arguments 
against are hardly conclusive; the balance of probability is 
still that the fragment is by A.; see Lesky, Greek Tracic 
Poetry, p. 101; certainly Snell's argument, and the analogies 
he draws with other, Aeschylean passages, deserve to be 
discussed. 
92. Snell (Scenes, p. 8) restores KctC"t/M' , which would make 
Achilles' (for he is assumed to be the speaker) lack of aidos 
the more striking, but his argument would still apply even 
if he read o/6 EIj 
ý; 
0JK Fcý P with a question mark at the end 
of the line (attributed by Lloyd-Jones to Schadewaldt) might 
be a better restoration. 
93. P. 8, cf. Stebler, p. 69, who, like Snell, also cites Ag. 
1373 and, unlike him, Sept. 1029-30. 
95. ýffiA Pthe 
child's cry, "Sticks and stones .... 
to 
96. Cf. 47-8,53 above. 
97. P. 53 above. 
98. See Scenes, p. 9. 
99. pp. 132-4 above. 
100. See pp. 142-4 on deceit in Thgn.; cf. PV 685 (which is 
doubtless later in date than the passages under discussion); 
also Adkins, ME, p. 181. 
101. aI rxvvovýxt in 856 expresses exactly the same sense as 
would ^%c(etYam. and, indeed, in every case where aischunomai 
occurs in A. (Ag. 1373, Cho. 917 (n. 22a above), Sept-1029) 
aideomai might also be used. 
102. The audience may also have gasped on hearing of K """ 
t1f wt in 856-7, thinking first of Klytaimestra's adultery 
with Aigisthos (cf. Snell, Aischylos, P. 122; Fraenkel, on 856, 
denies the double meaning, but there is no good reason to do 
so). 
103. Cf. Fraenkel on 1373 (which he rejates to 856). 
104. As Snell recognizes, Scenes, 10-11. 
105. On this topic, see Hutchinson on 1005-78, Lesky, Gree k 
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Tragic Poetry, 61-2; for an argument for authenticity, see 
Lloyd-Jones, CQ 1959,80-115; further lit, in all three. 
106. See below, pp. 22S-4. 
107. Paris in particular is scarcely perturbed that others 
accuse him of slacking and cowardice (pp. 33-4 above), and it 
should be noted that he defends his own skills (the gifts of 
Aphrodite, 11.3.64-6) in the face of Hektor's criticism; we 
may be intended, however, to see Paris as a bad example. 
108. See pp. 134-5 above. 
109. On LiarwA see Broadhead on200-2; Wilamowitz' suggestion 
that (t , -dA (for MSS tf-cý.., K, A ) is a form arising from 
ft. 
c 
seems more likely to be right than do either the assumption 




sfJi. I 14 v/ 
3. 
v. u, or Hermann's suggestion cý 
i 
t Fýwc("I speed" 
"I flee"?? ); the connexion with fear is, in any case, 
guaranteed by 
065 in 703; this is the only certain instance 
of 46'4&3 in A. - see Italie, Index, s. v. and cf. de Romilly, 
La Crainte, 59 and 111n. 1. 
110. Cf. von Erffa, 93-4; on Paris' crime, cf. pp. 163-4 above. 
111. pp. 48-55. 
112. Aeschylean Drama, p. 78. 
113. Von Erffa, p. 92, interprets the line correctly, dismis- 
sing Wilamowitz' translation, which is the same as Verrall's; 
Italie (s. v. ) gives only mors as the meaning of /n es, 5, but 
here and at 640 it could mean "portion", although "death" is 
more likely at 739. 
114. For sebo etc. meaning "honour" in a more straightforward 
sense, cf. Supp. 1024-5, A_g. 274,779-80,833,1612 and Cho. 637. 
115. Such is clearly the sense of rF(S. ýS ... V 
v' ;S 
the point would be yet more emphatically made if ýoýEirwý J 
'*rts 
(58-9) were intended to draw the contrast between the sebas 
attracted by the rule of Agamemnon and the fear which is the 
people's response to the new tyranny, but this makes the 
connexion with the words immediately following difficult, 
and, on balance, it is more likely that it is Klytaimestra's 
fear (perhaps both cause and effect of the people's withdrawal 
of respect) to which the chorus refer; see Garvie on 58-60. 
116. p. 171 above. 
117. p. 177. 
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117a. pp. 92-3 above. 
118. e. g. As.. 338,372, Cho. 122, Eum. 910. 
119. Sup . 941, Eum. 532. 
120. Sup . 340,419 (supplication), Cho. 704 (xeria). 
121. i. e. like aidos; see p. 92, and cf. 125-6. 
122. Cf. the similar vocative (of the dead Agamemnon) at Cho. 
157-8. 
123. Cf. P. 169 above. 
124. See p. 125 above. 
125. Cf. Garvie, ad loc.. 
126. See Roisman, Loyalty, p. 107 and contrast Garvie, ad loc.. 
127. Roisman, p. 112. 
127a. In Eum. 545 (1GKtWV Ce aS GV3 'Ir[OTI'S) may mean "honour- 
ing the majesty of parents" or "placing due importance on 
the respect which parents deserve. " 
128. Although aidos = that which one A S-c-ýZrct is found - 
pp. 97n. 35,116,120 above - but not in A.. 
129. But see pp. 164-6 above. 
130. pp. 92-3 above. 
131. See p. 2 above. 
132. Cf. p. 166 above. 
132a. The idea of fear is what is wanted in 522 (cf. 699); 
c-v 4 výw seems the most likely emendation. 
133. Cf. de Romilly, La Crainte, p. 111. 
134. Cf. P. 189 above. 
135. Cf. P. 188 above. 
136. Cf. P. 189 above. 
137. Cf. pp. 119-21,144,150-1 above. 
138. Von Erffa, p. 104, claims that aidos and sebas are to be 
distinguished by the latter's association with fear of 
punishment, an association which aidos is supposed not to 
share; neither, however, is equivalent to fear of punishment, 
and it appears from this passage that punishment awaits both 
those who show no sebas and those who show no aidos; both 
aidos and sebas respond to power, and the ability to punish 
demonstrates power. 
139. On "good fear" in Eum., cf. C. W. Macleod, 1982, 
135-6, de Romilly, La Crainte, 113-4. 
140. La Crainte, 112-3. 
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141. See Pl. Laws 647a, 699c (aidos), 647b, 671d (aischune). 
142. P. 114; cf. Macleod, JHS 1983, p. 135. 
143. Cf. P. 179 above. 
144. See Macleod, p. 138; cf. J. J. Peradotto, AJP 1964,378-93, 
F. I. Zeitlin, TAPA 1965,463-508,1966,645-53, J. A. Haldane, 
, TES 1965,33-41, and T. N. Gantz, JHS 1977,28-38. 
145. See Class, Gewissensregungen, 35-41 on these lines. 
146. See below, Pp. 546-7,561-2. 
147. See, for example, Aq. 948, Cho-889 (pp. 178-9,181 above). 
148. Cf. Stebler, p. 95. 
149. With regard to other terms which are close to aideomai 
etc., we should not leave hazomai entirely out of account; 
if aideomai and sebo etc. are frequently identical in sense, 
so hazomai expresses similar ideas of fear, respect and 
honour as do sebo etc.; see Pers. 589 (abs., of obeisance to 
royal power), Sup . 652 
(pers. obj., = "respect", "stand in 
awe of"), 884 (quasi-pers. obj., _ "respect"), Eum. 389 (abs. 




Although Sophokles does use aidos and its relatives diff- 
erently from Aeschylus, our approach to the younger poet need 
not differ substantially from that employed in the previous 
chapter; we might agree with von Erffa that aidos has not the 
same connexion with moral responsibility in Sophokles as in 
Aeschylus1 (although we might also feel that, under the 
influence of Snell, he has exaggerated the importance of that 
concept in the latter); we should not, however, so along with 
his contention that we have no opportunity, as we had in 
Aeschylus' Supplices, to observe the operation of aidos over 
the course of an entire play; 
2 
as in Aeschylus, we shall be 
concerned first of all with the meaning of the relevant terms 
in individual passages, then with the röle of the concepts 
they represent in the motivation of characters, and thirdly 
with the implications of our findings for the interpretation 
of the plays as a whole; and in all of the extant plays, with 
the possible exception of the PT, the complex of values based 
on aidos can make a significant, sometimes a crucial, 
contribution to our understanding of the drama. 
The extant plays of Sophokles belong to an age in which the 
idea that there are two sides to every story became a common- 
place, and problems based on sophistic relativism - that 
people may differ over the meanings of words, may have 
subjective ideas of what is right and what is true, that 
people find it difficult, sometimes impossible to communicate - 
loom large in his work. Sophokles understands partiality, 
aware that people often hold views or attitudes that are 
contradictory and that they interpret events and situations 
to suit themselves; accordingly, one kind of aidos is 
frequently set against another in his work, and his charac- 
ters often have only a partial grasp of what aidos is, and of 
what course of action it dictates; if the tragic element 
in the plays of Aeschylus often (to us at least) depends on 
the interplay of freedom and necessity, much of the tragic 
force in Sophokles, it seems to me, centres on an essential 
conflict of values. 
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Our terms occur with relative frequency in Oedipus Tyrannus, 
but the passages concerned are largely heterogeneous, and are 
not central to the meaning of the drama. At 354-5 Oedipus 
accuses Teiresias of anaideia 
GVTWJ ov c&6 
j 'S Cr k%VIro'S TO d"C- 
and his outrage seems to stem from a belief that the seer is 
failing to accord him the respect his status demands and, 
perhaps, from a conviction that his accusations will soon be 
proved false; Teiresias' anaideia would then lie in his dis- 
regard of the consequences (disgrace) of making accusations 
against a superior which may easily be refuted. At 635-6 
Iokaste, finding Oedipus and Kreon in dispute, delivers the 
following reproach, based on their neglect of the ills of 
the city: 
Ov C-Ira t! x vv/G-6O& ý'1 S 
uvrw vveovs- Is Cctoc kLvaüv'rrj c i<oc 
Her words refer to the duty of the leaders of the community 
to work in its interests in time of trouble, and seem to 
imply the right of its members to criticize their betters 
when they fail to do so; the lines thus recall passages like 
Il. 13.292-3, where Idomeneus foresees nemesis as the reaction 
of those who might see himself and Meriones engaged in con- 
, 
versation rather than in battle. 
3 Iokaste's eIfi'oc tfx vYI-f6<r. 
then, indicates that it is discreditable (aischron? ) to put 
personal differences before the good of the community, and 
suggests that the competitive concern for personal honour 
evidenced in the quarrel should be subordinated to a concern 
for the charge of failure in co-operation. 
We have noted a connexion between a' os and oaths already, 
particularly in the phrase KL 
ýtcf&it 'r'im eo"(Ko' in the Eumen- 
ides. 4 The same phrase is found at 0I. 647, where Oedipus is 
asked to "respect" an oath sworn not by himself, as in the 
Aeschylean passages, but by Kreon; here the power of the oath 
itself is to be the object of his aidos, and this power seems 
analogous to that of the gods who are its guarantors (note 
Ifövý öC KOJ aitýEýdEt j OC- v). In 648 Iokaste gives Oedipus 
other grounds on which to aideisthai, asking for aidos for 
21 1 
herself (presumably on the grounds of their marital philia) 
and for the chorus ( who, as bystanders, might judge his 
present, excessive conduct adversely). The chorus themselves 
then (652-3) take up the appeal, and ask that Oedipus should 
feel aidos for Kreon, both because he has proved his worth 
in the past and because he is now "big in oath". Again Idos 
is operative in connexion with oaths, but now it is the 
swearer of the oath, not the oath itself, which commands 
aidos. In this case the aidos felt for the individual seems 
broadly similar to that accorded suppliants; in both the 
swearing of an oath and supplication the sanction of divine 
punishment is invoked, albeit slightly differently in each 
case; the suppliant is protected by the gods from harm while 
the swearer of an oath invokes divine destruction on himself 
in the event of his perjury; nevertheless, the divine element 
signifies a powerful situation, and aidos may be the reaction 
to that power. In addition, both supplication and the swear- 
ing of an oath create ý tension by placing structures of 
honour in a position of stress; the suppliant abandons his 
claim to honour, while the swearer of an oath commits his 
honour on the question of its veracity and its fulfilment; 
to refuse to believe one who has sworn an oath is to 
challenge his honour or to consider it worthless; to do the 
opposite is to recognize his honour, and to recognize another 
person's honour, or time, may be expressed as aidos. 
5 
At 1078-9 Oedipus, having learned of his status as a foundling 
but not yet of his true origin, imagines that Iokaste's 
hurried departure is to be attributed to shame at his low 
birth: % 
k `ir c rw or `l V X( 
1w 
j YvN µbýofý 
Oedipus himself is not troubled that he might be the child 
of a slave rather than the king's son he believed himself to 
be, but he imagines that women may be more sensitive about 
such things. 
6 
It seems to me, although the opinion is based 
on nothing more than Sprachgefühl, that this is one passage 
which 
in/aischunomai is not interchangeable with aideomai; one 
could perhaps aideisthail ones 
s own dusaeneia, but the most 
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natural interpretation of 'fºýf cv evELa I T'ýý% ýýv1r11/ Dc 
ff 
Tk1 
would surely be "she respects my low birth. " 
The normal identity of meaning of the two verbs is, however, 
brought out at 1424-8, where Kreon appeals, presumably to a 
group of attendants, as follows: 
cckk' t-i -r-O( 9vv-rwd 7 Ka fo L(xv t-ý8' E1 i 
. Y(F Vfekx 
Tiv' G. )V 'Ti-äVi"a % Crdwvur4N 
JAO(K 
CC Kaý. A vrc , ov OUT' ELKVwac 'rv p 
ýTr 
ýVtvýT 
Ö» ßG05 t F(äs 1ýTE 
¢ws ýCo6ýE E14L . /44 There is quite clearly no effective distinction between the 
00 tt&6 is used with a human two verbs here; true, KaTatrXw 
but 
and KºS'fLfO& with a divine, the roles could easily 
have been reversed. The disgrace and the pollution with 
reference to which the attendants are expected to feel aidos 
(or aischune) are not their own, yet it is they who are 
responsible for the fact that Oedipus may be seen by men and 
by the Sun, 7 and so they are felt to share any reproach or 
revulsion which the exposure of his pollution may arouse. 
8 
If aidos is to be the reaction of those whose duty it is to 
keep Oedipus out of sight, then we might expect that Oedipus 
himself would be all the more liable to feel aidos; in fact, 
no word of aidos ever crosses his lips. 
Oedipus' ills, however., are quite manifestly also grounds for 
reproach. Kreon prefaces the remarks quoted above with a 
denial that he has come to mock or to reproach 
SV4LAZrJ (. 1423) 
his misfortunes, while Oedipus himself at 1486-1502 (see 
especially 1494, 
öY(, (. S*l , and 1500, 
ÖVCoLSC-4L6e& ) recognizes 
that his daughters will be taunted with the deeds of. their 
father for the rest of their lives. He also, at 1407-8, 
laments the fact that he has committed "all the acts which 
are aischista among men, " and goes on to say that, since he 
has done that which it is not kalo either to speak of or to 
do, he should be concealed or put to death, in order that he 
may never be seen again (1409-12). Oedipus is thus quite 
aware of his own disgrace, and in wishing to be removed from 
sight he is exhibiting both a classic shame reaction and the 
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kind of aidos which Kreon urges on the attendants at 1424-8. 
Much more importantly, however, his self-blinding is also 
related to his desire for concealment, and therefore to his 
shame. Conceptually, unseeing and unseen are very close, and 
by depriving himself of sight Oedipus expresses the same 
impu]se which later drives him to seek concealment. At the 
same time, in motivating his self-blinding, he claims that 
he'was driven to that act by his inability to face the pros- 
pect of looking upon his father and mother in Hades (as well 
as that of having to look upon his children and the entire 
city of Thebes) (1371-83), 
9 
and inability to face others is 
also a classic shame reaction; we have also seen repeatedly 
that shame is in general closely related to ideas of seeing 
and visibility, and particularly associated with the eyes. 
Oedipus also, however, wishes to be shown to the people 
of Thebes (so says the Ej 
äYrF, \os at 1287-9); this may be 
regarded as a sign of the complexity of his psychology (of his 
desire to punish himself by exposing himself to revulsion) 
or as a consequence of Sophokles' need to motivate his entr- 
ance; or perhaps it is both. 
It is not, however, simply the prospect of others' reproach 
which troubles Oedipus; his words in the exodos often take 
the form of the strongest self-reproach (e. g. 1337-46) and 
he is clearly horrified by what he has done (1357-61,1398- 
1408); he also wishes to be punished (1409-15), and even 
expresses remorse over his wrongful accusation of Kreon 
(1419-21); his pain, which is so vividly presented, lies not 
so much in fear of disgrace but in his knowledge of what he 
has done, in his /4v y Ka1Cw4(1318); he is "wretched both in 
his fate and in his knowledge of it, " say the chorus at 1347. 
If Oedipus' reaction, then, is one of shame, his shame is 
clearly based on an internal awareness of the horror of what 
he has done; this being so, his reaction is also compatible 
with the emotion which we should call guilt. 
10 We remember, 
too, that he is unable to face his parents; is this because 
he has failed to live up to their ideals or because he fears 
them as agents of punishment? In the psychoanalytical defin- 




parents were said to be the focus of guilt, loving parents 
(and the example they provide) of shame feelings. It is 
quite clear, however, that Oedipus' crimes are both trans- 
gressions of the most profoundly felt traditional imperatives 
and a failure to conform to the ideals set by other people, 
and so once again the distinction between guilt (the 
internalized interdictions of punitive parents) and shame 
(based on the idea of one's social role formed by identific- 
ation with parents and others) as the concomitants of trans- 
gression and failure respectively is of little help to us. 
Where one's internal awareness of the character of one's own 
actions is concerned there will be virtually no effective 
difference between anxiety described as shame and that desc- 
ribed as guilt, and it would be entirely arbitrary to 
state categorically that Oedipus is suffering from the one 
rather than the other. 
The Trachiniae does have its share of instances of the terms 
with which we are concerned, but most of these, as in OT, 
are of comparatively minor importance. At 65-6 Deianeira, 
recasting the advice of the Nurse (that it is "fitting" - 
&%K j, 56 - that Hyllos should go in search of his father) 
in rather stronger terms, declares that it is a source of 
aischune that Hyllos has failed to ascertain his father's 
whereabouts. The disgrace here clearly lies in the son's 
failure to fulfil his duty towards his father, and thus 
arises from a neglect of the imperatives of family loyalty. 
At 448 we find a general usage of 'Tv Oc*fneohI in Deianeira's 
assertion that she regards Iole as "jointly responsible for 
that which is not at all of a shameful kind and that which 
does me no harm. "12 This is a very odd way to put it, and 
the use of "&"r . tri `c suggests that Deianeira does hold Iole 
jointly responsible in some sense, 
13 
although she may well 
be sincere in saying that she does not regard that for which 
she bears joint responsibility as aischron. The adjective is 
used in the most general of senses here; Deianeira means 
simply to suggest that Iole has done nothing with which she 
can find fault; it is unlikely that there is any reference 
to Athenian law regarding concubinage.. 
14At 1271-2 the 
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adjective aischra is used of the situation as it stands at 
the end of the play, and this, principally the death of 
Herakles, is said (by Hyllos) to be discreditable for the 
gods. The disgrace to which the gods are liable in Hyllos' 
eyes seems to lie in their indifference to human suffering, 
and perhaps specifically in the fact that, as he sees it, 
Zeus has failed to protect his son, has failed to live up to 
the expectation that he would protect him created by (e. g. ) 
the chorus' rhetorical question at 139-40 - 
E'rFt TL (WJE 
1 
TýKVUIäL z /ýOU%ud it tSEV 
15 
The most important instances of aischron and aischune in the 
play occur in connexion with the nature of Deianeira's 
stratagem to win back Herakles' love. At 596-7 she affirms 
her resolve to go ahead with her secret plan, explaining: 
wS ( KO-tw 
KO N'e eoc -rr; a((JS ovirer' aiixvvI -rrC, dy. 
There is just a slight hint of a paradox in these words, in 
the idea that one can do aischra and not be implicated in 
aischune, and there seems to be something of a tension bet- 
ween the idea of aischra which are objectively so, whether 
the deeds so described are public knowledge or not, and that 
of aischra which only become so when others know of them. 
Behind this passage seems to lie a particular contemporary 
controversy, the problem of "doing wrong in secret" and how 
to prevent it. There was certainly a school of thought which 
held that only punishments and the thought of popular disap- 
proval could deter people from wrongdoing, and that acts 
which were illegal or regarded as discreditable could be 
perpetrated with equanimity provided they remained 
undetected, 
16 
and it is this sort of argument which Deianeira 
employs here. Perhaps many in the audience held similar views, 
and probably these sentiments did not sound particularly 
shocking at the stage of the action at which they were 
uttered, but they are put to the test in the rest of the 
drama, and Deianeira is proved wrong. 
Her mistake is emphas}zed at 721-2, where, having seen the 
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effect of the poison on the tuft of wool used to smear the 
thAh 
robe and fearing the worst, she resolves to die rather4endure 
life with her reputation destroyed. She thus recognizes that 
her deceit will involve her in aischune and that her 
conviction that she could avoid disgrace provided her deceit 
remained secret was ill-founded. One qualification of the 
idea that one can do as one likes provided one's deeds remain 
secret thus seems to be that human beings can never be sure 
of the consequences of their actions. 
17 The immoralist 
position is thus shown to be flawed even in its own prudent- 
ial terms. Deianeira's deceit, then, has disastrous con- 
sequences, and she cannot live with the disgrace which will 
result; thematically, her earlier misgivings, expressed in 
the request that her plan be kept secret in order that, if 
it be aischron, she should not be involved in disgrace, serve 
as an indication of the dubiety of what she was about to do; 
her concern there that she should not fall in aischune must 
be related to aidos with regard to the execution of the plan 
per se, and this aidos she ignores, but she cannot ignore 
the same impulse a second time when her mistake is about to 
become known. 
In the face of Hyllos' accusations Deianeira departs in 
silence, and Class18 is probably right to see this silence 
as an indication of her conscience of her own shame and 
guilt. The chorus are also aware that her silence will be 
taken as a sign of her culpability, and protest (813-4): 
-rL r if ä 
ferr 
rt$ " vv I<'V &. de' 
& (3VvV&Ka 
i 
r -wr. c -r KaTi 
C I'll; 
If Deianeira's silence is the result of aidos then the sent- 







Kah ovvT4 öVjý ocxos, 
With this von Erffa19 well compares frag. adesp. 528N - 





In both these cases the type of aidos condemned is that which 
prevents outspokenness on one's own behalf, and, in general, 
this is the usual ground for the deprecation of the need for 
aidos. 
20 
In the Trach. passage, it is clear from the chorus- 
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leader's words that she believes that there is a plea which 
Deianeira could make in her own defence, and obviously this 
defence would be based on a proper distinction between acts 
perorated in ignorance and those committed intentionally, a 
distinction made by the chorus at 841-8 and by Hyllos at 
1122-3. Deianeira's shame, however, considers results rather 
than intentions, and in this she is every bit as hard on 
herself as is Herakles, to whom the argument that she acted 
in i gnorance is meaningless (1124-5, and in the sticho- 
mythia from 1126-37). In representing Deianeira as more 
concerned with results than with the knowledge, which she 
must have possessed, that she did not intend to kill Herakles, 
Sophokles is, however, not revealing his own origins in an 
Adkinsian "results culture", but rather portraying a woman 
acting as real people often do. 
21 Before concluding our 
discussion of this play, we should note in passing that 
Herakles himself seems to be motivated by something very 
like aidos in his desire to be removed from the sight of men 
and from the scene of his triumph at 799-802,22 and when he 
expresses his resentment that he should be brought low by a 
mere woman, be reduced, in fact, to the status of a woman 
himself (1062-3,1071-5). 
The Oedipus Coloneus is a suppliant drama, and since the 
process of supplication provides the play with its dramatic 
impetus, we do find, as we might expect, given the close 
association of dos with that process, much that is relevant 
to our enquiry. The standard motifs of suppliant drama, how- 
ever, are employed in complex and unusual ways, 
23 
and the 
role of aid os is accordingly not as straightforward as one 
might expect. 
Oedipus himself does not refer to aidos in any of his appeals 
to the stranger, to the chorus and to Theseus; already in 
this respect he is an atypical suppliant. It is, in fact, 
left to Antigone to employ a more typical suppliant appeal 
at the point at which her father is in danger of being 
expelled from the country. 
24 Her plea, at 237-53, is essen- 
tially an appeal for pity and for aidos; the chorus are apo- 
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strophized as aidophrones25 and their dos for Oedipus is 
requested at 247, while Antigone pleads for pity for herself 
at 242, and the wretched state of both suppliants is stressed 
(241,244-5,246,248). The chorus do feel pity (255), but 
their doubts about Oedipus have not been dispelled, and this 
is why the latter now makes his famous speech of self-vindi- 
cation. 
26 
The result of the combination of these two, very 
different appeals is that the chorus abandon their intention 
to expel Oedipus and instead await the arrival of their 
king (294-5). 
The expectation that the suppliants would have to repeat 
their plea for protection before Theseus, however, is disap- 
pointed; 
27 
the king enters at 551, recognizes Oedipus and 
expresses his pity (556), basing his sympathy on a recognit- 
ion of common humanity (567-9); it is impossible to be sure, 
but it is at least possible that Theseus is subject to a 
particularly altruistic form of a dos. 
28 However that may be, 
more readily recognizable forms of aidos have their parts to 
play in his acceptance of Oedipus as suppliant; at 636 he 
says that he will allow Oedipus to remain out of sebas 
((EPL4'96Ls) for his status as a suppliant and divine protege 
and for the tie of xenia which exists between them, and we 
saw in connexion with Aeschylus' Supplices that aidos and 
sebas are virtually interchangeable as responses to suppli- 
ants. 
29 Aid os is also in evidence in lines 902-3, where 
Theseus, despatching his attendants to free Antigone and 
Ismene, speaks of the danger of ridicule should he fail to 
protect those whom he has taken into his care; concern for 
one's reputation as a strong protector is very often an 
important motive in ensuring that the supplicated continues 
actively to protect the suppliant. 
30 
In the scene of confrontation between Oedipus and Kreon the 
only detail which need concern us is the latter's anaideia, 
with which he is twice charged, first at 863, where the 
basis for the charge lies in his attempt to lay hands on 
Oedipus, and for the second time at 960, where Oedipus is 
reacting to his speech in denunciation of his parricide and 
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incest. Both these passages reveal the traditional associ- 
ation of anaideia with bris; in the former, Kreon's threat 
to seize another person, treating him as tantamount to a 
slave, is clearly hybristic, and in the latter the two ideas 
are explicitly related; Oedipus accuses Kreon of anaideia 
and hybris, but suggests that his insults harm himself rather 
than their intended target: 
i X ýý ' CC ý'CC cSý5 T UV Ka EýýJ/ý/ý lý EtJ ! <6 Ls 
It OTC- e of c. ov 1 c-(QVTCS) I 'a'vo, -ro dE ; 
Although the speaker of these lines is hardly unbiased, 
their wording does suggest that, in certain circumstances, 
the attempt to dishonour (Ka. (ývý4ýýýEtf) someone else can 
rebound to the discredit of the person making the affront. 
Kreon's anaideia is revealed in one further passage, at 978- 




-riýh^, ý, oJ ° E'lcatl1(üvý Yoc, ý, ýUS 
oveýs oý, tvc vý ý1s ocýocýKajwJ ice-&. v 
s Ee ý,. ý T"DCx ; OLOV 
Firstly, Kreon might have felt aidos at speaking of that 
which should not be spoken of, 
32 
of that which is anosion 
(981), but, as Oedipus points out, Iokaste was his sister, 
and(both)out of^family loyalty and a sense of family shame 
he should refrain from mentioning her disgrace; that he does 
so reveals his disregard for propriety, his anaideia. 
33 
After Kreon (who plays the part of the enemy herald)34 has 
been seen off, the pattern of the suppliant drama is comp- 
lete, 35 but it is at this point that a second suppliant 
appears, Oedipus' son, Polyneikes. Oedipus is at first 
determined not to see him, but eventually gives in on two 
grounds, having noted Theseus' remark on the sanctity of 
Polyneikes' place of supplication and on the possibilty of 
divine displeasure (1179-80), and out of deference to his 
daughter's plea (1189-91): 
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As she does in the drama which bears her name, Antigone 
subjects retributive justice to a higher standard, the 
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em's of the familial relationship; since she is appealing 
to a sense of loyalty to one's philoi, it would seem that 
dos, though not mentioned, is relevant, for it is aidos 
which dictates the avoidance of strife and promotes loyalty 
within the family; aidos will thus be the reponse which 
Antigone seeks to arouse in her father (the reponse to the 
imperative, the themis she mentions), while the actions of 
Polyneikes (i ... 
(vrrep&`evarc) 
will also be breaches of 
the same kind of aidos. 
It is therefore interesting to note that Polyneikes, having 
left the altar of Poseidon, appeals to similar standards as 
does his sister. While it is obviously in his interests, as 
a suppliant seeking help and forgiveness from his father, to 
set a high value on such standards, the fact that he is not 
disinterested need not lead us to suppose that he is 
insincere or that he is being presented unsympathetically; 
36 
his sympathy for his father and his sister is quite spontan- 
eous and he is candid in admitting his own : faults (1254- 
66), and there is no sign that he is dissimulating. In the 
face of his previous ill-treatment of Oedipus, he asks for 
aidos at 1267-9: 
6rL Yý Kä \Z ºý ý/ 
. 
6-vv f9a Kos fýe 
vwýý 
>> S'ws E1r e, L5 1tX(L, Käß Tý03 öoý ýacrýý 
TýOcc a. ýToc {ýºý-fW .. 
Aidos is here urged with a view to obtaining forgiveness and 
is opposed to resentment for a wrong done which would encou- 
rage retaliation rather than compassion; it is also invested 
with a considerable importance, "sharing the throne of Zeus 
in all things. " These sentiments are clearly extremely 
idealistic, but they are not totally subjective or without 
foundation in traditional thought; aidos is the response 
usually demanded by suppliants and it is the norm among 
members of the same family and, indeed, among all philoi; 
its importance in human affairs in general is also recog- 
nized. 
37 The problem in this particular case is that Poly- 
neikes has already wronged his father, and so the aidos- 
standard conflicts with another, the need for retaliation to 
Preserve one's time, for dike, and the confrontation 
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of these two traditional sets of imperatives produces the 
d. emma which exists in all those tragedies in which retali- 
ation is pursued or contemplated within the family. 
Oedipus himself makes this opposition of aidos and dike 
quite explicit in his speech at 1375-82: 
Tvloýard) CCCas 6, f , -j wJ I J(&E T'ý aJýKý 
Erw 
v T' va K och vVýCoe v 
ox 
uvs E>& tVCL 
1Vac. wrof -TVvs cý vTý vdravrras f ß&i /1 
kt'' arýoc T`J Cot Tuýhý TaT(ö 
-rai wc5 ý vroJ , a`ýk iiä. e Tä vü, t 
Eýý wV . ,ý, -rVL ae -rv d-&' Reef< K Kxl -Ds (o 1$ 
ýYZIVJV3 
c Ký , vv ý-cSe os 
Zý vos orýý( c+ýývý S voNwý5 . 4 
Just as Antigone and Polyneikes had stressed the importance 
of aidos over that of dike, so Oedipus does the opposite. He 
does not, however, depreciate aidos, but rather insists that 
his sons were the first to neglect it; they failed T&vs 
38 11 { VThU tflL CF(&LJ . to show a parent the aidos 
he deserves. 
In failing to sebein (or aideisthai) they have deprived him 
of tim e (1378), 
39 
and dike (Zeus' J uiVErc vS in a pointed 
rejoinder to 1267-8) demands that he treat them as they 
treated him. In referring to dik e Oedipus obviously appeals 
to a principle which the audience will have understood as a 
traditional and powerful one, and they will also have ident- 
ified -r I ur-varotvYic, S ýEýH. J as one of the canons of tradit- 
ional values, yet it is by no means certain that Oedipus' 
harshness, not to mention his curse, is to be commended. 
40 
His wrath, for example, conflicts with the idealism not only 
of Polyneikes, who is biased, but also of Antigone, who 
behaves impartially towards both her father and her brother, 
and his rejection of supplication, "the only such formal 
suppliant appeal rejected in all of Greek tragedy. "41 cont- 
rasts sharply with the humanity of Theseus, surely an admir- 
able character. Oedipus, then, if we wish to evaluate his 
character in terms of moral virtue, comes off badly in com- 
parison with these two figures; significantly, though, 
before the play is over a distinct parallelism emerges bet- 
ween him and Polyneikes. 
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At 1399-1413 Polyneikes declares his intention to face his 
brother and begs Antigone to see to his funeral should their 
father's curse be fulfilled; now Antigone becomes, figurat- 
ively, the suppliant (iKE, r-&vw re , 1414), but once again her 
plea that conflict within the family should be avoided is 
ignored; Polyneikes claims it would be impossible to lead 
his army back "having once trembled" (1418-9) and goes on 
(1422-3): 
o, I f$ / To EvrN V, Ka i Tä -Ife t-Ir, 
&V" ýCr 
ov-rw y(-Xaißou -r4 Koc(ILtV1T'av -rro C« . 
These words reveal that Polyneikes is certainly subject to a 
familiar kind of aidos, but it is of a very different nature 
to that which he urged on his father at 1267-9 - not the 
aidos for another human being which would lead one to abandon 
retribution but that which envisages one's own humiliation 
and which demands retribution as vindication of one's own 
honour. Some hold that the contrast between these two 
attitudes reveals Polyneikes' essential hypocrisy and self- 
ishness, 42 yet his reaction, though tragic, is a traditional' 
and an understandable one. 
43 The fact remains, however, that 
he appeals to familial and other-regarding aidos when 
attempting to dissuade his father from pursuit of dike and 
consideration of his own injured tim e, yet disregards it 
when his own desire for revenge and his concern for his own 
honour intervene; his partiality, then, overcomes his ideal- 
ism, I and there is an obvious, Sophoclean irony in the way in 
which this comes about, not the least part of which is the 
eventual similarity which emerges between father and son. 
44 
If there is any lesson in this it is that self-regarding 
motives tend, in the way of things, to outweigh other-regard- 
ing impulses. As a symbol that this is simply "the way things 
are" Oedipus, who embodies the principles of retaliatory 
justice, of "helping one's friends and harming one's 
enemies", is elevated to the status of a hero, becomes part 
of the universal order which seems to make it likely that 
men will act as he did towards Polyneikes. 
45 And yet, even 
though this may be the way the world works, and even though 
it may be unalterable, there are other examples to follow: 
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those of Antigone and Theseus. 
There is only one reference to aidos46 in the Antigone, but 
it is one which illustrates very well the temperament of the 
heroine and the degree to which it is impossible for her to 
communicate with, her adversary, Kreon. At line 508 sticho- 
mythia begins between Kreon and Antigone, the issue the 
degree of support which the latter's defiance enjoys among 
the chorus and the people of Thebes. Kreon maintains that 
Antigone is alone in thinking that her deed is glorious, 
that it is pleasing to the old men of the chorus, and that 
he is simply taking advantage of the prerogative of the 
absolute ruler to do and say what he will; at 509 Antigone 
replies with a reiteration of her belief that the chorus 
side with her, but Kreon prefers to ignore this, and to 
insist that their opposition to her conduct is an acknow- 
ledged fact (510): 
Cu ýý of < E'Tra ý 
ýý Twv cri- c We L3 Cl 
To this, however, Antigone's answer is unexpected (511): 
i 
o U'd2V' yäe Oct rýC r/v' -tvS ö 6-R-)c 
(yxVM df"" 
Kreon's question insinuates that Antigone is out of step 
with popular opinion, and that she should feel aidos on that 
account; 
47 he reproaches her, in effect, with failure to 
conform, failure to react as did Ismene, who affirmed the 
i 
inability of women to oppose men or to act ýcý ýC'akc, -ruý(61-2, 
78-9). 48 The aidos to which Kreon refers, then, would, if 
Antigone were susceptible to it, be based simply on the 
qor)duct 
knowledge that others disapproved of one s, regardless of 
one's evaluation of it, and this is, of course, a recognizable 
and traditional form of aidos. 
49 Antigonetxplains her lack 
of aidos, however, with reference to quite different stand- 
ards. In effect, thepuestion she answers is not, "Do you 
rot feel shame if you think differently from these men? " but, 
"Do you not feel shame at what you have done? " For her, any 
aidos she might feel would depend on her own interpretation 
of her action, not on that of other people, and even though 
her statement in line 511 is quite in keeping with tradit- 
ional values (all things being equal, most people would have 
agreed that it is not aischron to honour one's kin), 50 the 
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fact remains that she clearly feels able to decide for her- 
self what is and is not aischron. 
51 For Antigone, then, it 
is her own personal conscience rather than convention which 
determines the character of her actions; Kreon exemplifies 
an entirely contrary attitude, and the chance of their comm- 
unicating is slim. 
52 
Similar problems of communication and partiality are to be 
found in the drama in which aidos plays its greatest Sophok- 
lean role, the Ajax. Much has been written about the Homeric 
atmosphere of this play, 
53 
about similarities between Ajax 
and the Homeric Achilles, 
54 
and between the Sophoklean and 
the Homeric Ajax; 
55 
and it is certainly true that the values 
exhibited in martial contexts in the Iliad form the moral 
background to the play, and that the play does contain "the 
one conspicuous and extensive reproduction by Sophocles of a 
specific Homeric passage" 
56 (. ßj.. 430-595, recalling 11.6.390- 
502). Yet the Ajax in Sophokles' play is much more extreme 
in his pursuit of time than anyone in Homer, 
57 
and, as has 
been pointed out; 
58 $omeric motifs are employed for contrast 
as well as for comparison; and there is the figure of Odys- 
seus, whose conduct must be judged on the basis of different, 
though still related standards. 
One of the'essential attitudes which-the play explores is 
expressed by Athena in line 79; Odysseus begs her not to call 
Ajax out of his tent, on the grounds of their enmity, and 
she replies: 
aVc Ylehws l oLeros dis Ex0'eä S rekacVý 
The supposition that pleasure is to be found in the disgrace 
of one's enemies, as we shall see, is shared by all but one 
of the chaacters of the play; it assumes a strict polarity 
of friends and enemies and notions of the importance of 
"what people say" which are quite traditional. That Ajax 
himself shares these attitudes is shown by his first appear- 
ance on stage; he is pleased with his "success" and wishes 
to boast of it (96), and in one sense, this is a traditional 
or "Homeric" attitude, for Ajax believes he has defeated his 
enemies and expects that his strength and prowess in doing 
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so will be recognized; yet the echthroi he believes he has 
attacked are his fellow warriors, those who should be his 
iloi, and the Homeric ideal in disputes between phi of is 
compromise. For Ajax, however, his own time is paramount (98) 
and he clearly does not believe that it could be diminished 
by breaches of the social apects of the heroic code. 
59 
With the entrance of the chorus we see how Ajax' disgrace 
affects his iloi; they are disturbed at the duskleia of 
what they have heard (141-3) and they are reluctant to 
believe the reports of those who would rejoice in their 
leader's misfortune (150-7), regarding the account as 
fabricated by Odysseus and simply as a sign of the envy 
which the great of heart inevitably attract; if true, how- 
ever, Ajax' disgrace reflects badly on them, and, considering 
an alternative explanation (that Artemis may have driven him 
to slaughter the beasts), they refer to the goddess as /nocrte 
ai 
vvKs lý äs (174). An important word in this context is 
hbris, for it is in terms of hybris that the chorus describe 
the reaction of Ajax' enemies to his misfortune (151-3): 
% W41 -rt 
xs 0 k-ý 
üwJ 
C T &V h a¬ ac. ýc-us Xa 4ý ýýk oý 
100, 'MS cot. S hXtftI 1<4X, 
Now, hybris is a pejorative term, and so the chorus clearly 
see the. exultation of others in Ajax: ills as discreditable, 
but it is also clear that they are using the word in a 
polemical sense; the b is of Ajax' enemies is not of the 
same kind as his own, 
60 for clearly a violent and insane 
attack on defenceless beasts, or the attempt to slaughter 
one's fellow warriors, might be regarded as hVbris by a 
majority of people, even those who are disinterested, while 
the grounds for the accusation of hybris by the chorus seems 
to lie in the simple fact that those at whom the charge is 
levelled are drawing attention to Ajax' disgrace (for r'Z 
fOLS äxtrii'/ Kote t (seems to imply that at least those who 
hear the story believe it, rather than that they are simply 
going along with a tale which they know to be an invention); 
thus it is the mockery of one's enemies which they regard as 
hybris, and while there are some indications in earlier 
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literature that such mockery or exultation is not to be pur- 
sued, 
61 it is generally accepted that one's enemies will 
mock, and certainly Ajax himself had plans to humiliate his 
thought he 
enemy, Odysseus, when he/had him in his power (105-17). 
While, then, the chorus might, if pressed to express the 
matter in general terms, be able to come up with some form- 
ulation such as "it is not kalon to exult in another's mis- 
fortune, " they obviously regard such exultation as natural, 
and in calling it bris they are only succumbing to the 
temptation to regard as discreditable in others what one 
might oneself do in identical circumstances. This, of course, 
is an entirely natural tendency, 
62 but it is one which marks 
out the use of br's by Ajax' partisans as different from 
its use in Homer, where, even if those who levelled charges 
of hybris were not impartial, the actions so designated were 
of a type which would be generally recognized as such; in 
this play the possibility that hybris may be partial is a 
real one. 
The question of Ajax' aidos is first raised at 344-5, where 
the chorus-leader asks Tekmessa to open the door to Ajax' 
hut and expresses the hope that he will be seized by aidos 
when he catches sight of his followers. Given the chorus' 
concern for Ajax, this aidos can hardly be of the kind which 
would cause him any pain; it cannot therefore be ads at 
what he has done or aidos at mockery arising from what he 
has done. It seems, then, that this aidos is related to 
keeping up appearances, to pulling oneself together; the 
hope is that Ajax will compose himself on this basis, ashamed 
to be seen raging or grieving before his inferiors. When 
Ajax does appear, however, he gives every impression of 
being troubled by another kind of aidos; he contrasts his 
present atimia with his past greatness (364-5,418-27) and 
imagines the mockery of his enemies (367,382); significantly, 
he also believes he has been treated with hum bris (367); he 
does not reflect on the fact that this hybris (presumably 
perpetrated by Athena) only served to deflect him from the 
murder of his fellows. It is entirely, then, with the pros- 
Pect of humiliation that he is concerned, and the moral 
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character of his actions is no consideration for him at 
all. 
63 
With the end of the epirrhematic scene which heralded Ajax' 
second appearance on stage he begins to speak in iambics, at 
first going over much of the same ground again (430-80), but 
eventually being drawn into that dialogue with Tekmessa 
which is so clearly based on the farewell of Hektor and 
Andromache in Iliad 6. The subject of his first speech is 
still his atimia (440), which he contrasts with the eukleia 
of his father (434-6), and this leads him to thoughts of the 
original slight, the judgement of the arms (441-4), of the 
Atreidai who should now be dead but who will instead be able 
to mock him (445-56) and of the further disgrace of the 
slaughter of the animals (453). So much for the past; now 
(456-80) he contemplates the future, and in doing so picks 
up several of the points raised in the first part of the 
speech. Chiefly, his thoughts return to his father, who, it 
would appear, is the very focus of his aidos; 
64 for he is 
unable to contemplate facing his father without some proof 
of his success at Troy (and inability to look at others is a 
sign of aidos) 
65 
and he is determined to show him 
that he is not unworthy of his birth or his inherited nature 
(470-2). All this leads him on to thoughts of death, for it 
would be aischron . to live on when one is 
beset by 
troubles (473-6); 66 he ends with a statement, similar to 
that made by Deianeira, 
67 
of his devotion to his own eugeneia: 
oc iýit vý r oc %t 
wS jV Ka h W3 Tý v1ºýýrVic c 
1 0V Evr ' xýeI . 1. 
(479-80) 
After the choral comment that Ajax' speech was entirely like 
him, but that he should still give in to the advice of his 
2i (481-4) it is the turn of Tekmessa to speak. As Kirk- 
wood says, "She presents a concept of values and duty 
significantly opposed to that of Ajax, "68 but she does so 
not because the suppositions on which she bases her argument 
are entirely different from those on which Ajax bases his, 
but because, to a large extent, she exploits contradictory 
aspects of the complex of values to which he himself sub- 
scribes. 69 
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Tekmessa begins with fate (485-6), particularly her own (487 
-90), which was to become Ajax' concubine; as such she 
appeals to him on the basis of their sexual relationship, 
her own feelings for him, and the power of Zeus, guardian of 
the hearth and home (490-3), but her appeal is couched in 
terms which he should be liable to understand; for it is to 
his concern for his time that she appeals, and thus to a 
kind of aidos which does not differ greatly from that which 
he has already manifested (494-5): 
/V'X I ý" cc twtý Oý LY Dý rFlýý1/ 
iý aBGýY 
r+ IItI I^ .0 
-rwg dwJ virr Ex (3e wJ x-c,. J c -Ls -rc vL. 
The aidos to which she appeals, then, may promote co-operat- 
ion, but should Ajax decide to co-operate he would be doing 
so on a basis of self-interest. 
70 Tekemessa then continues 
in her attempt to deflect Ajax' self-regarding aidos away 
from the disgrace which he is presently experiencing to 
thoughts of the disgrace which would result were he? expose 
his dependants to humiliation, and pictures herself and her 
child as slaves, reminding Ajax of what people will say and 
of the consequences of this for his honour (500-5): 
L. Klt. l 'MS TI KC O' IC' O+Cr yK 
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, At C. L 
rrv ftr; C vö E Irre aTuJ, 
. 01 
o t, as A11-6re e. a är6' V' r" tý k uý -r cc . % 
TaLocvr' c 
lat. a; ýýý ýc ýt"äT7 Toýýa KWI rw6 
Line 505 is transitional; from the implicit notion of aidos 
at the prospect of the taunts of others Tekmessa now turns 
to the aidos which one owes one's philoi, particularly one's 
parents (506-510), and to pity, which she invokes in the 
name of their son. There is a change of emphasis here, but 
it is not a particularly great one, for the other-regarding 
aidos to which she now appeals is only the other side of the 
coin in relation to the self-regarding aidos she sought to 
arouse in the earlier part of her speech, since aidos for 
one's parents may be based both on respect for their special 
status and on the. idea that respect for one's parents is a 
duty which it is discreditable to neglect; Ajax' concern for 
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his reputation may therefore be activated by the thought 
that he has left himself open to reproach by abandoning his 
parents. Similarly, although in appealing to pity for Eury- 
sakes Tekmessa is appealing to an emotion which is normally 
regarded as altruistic, 
71 
she also stresses both the boy's 
ignoble status as an orphan and Ajax' responsibility for it 
(510-13), and it is surely discreditable in itself that a 
hero's son should be in such a pitiful condition; Tekmessa's 
appeals to self-regarding and other-regarding impulses, then, 
are closely related. Likewise, when she comes to speak, in 
language recalling that of Andromache at. Il. 6.413-30, of the 
pitiful nature of her own condition (514-9), it is not to 
pity itself which she appeals, but to charis, the obligation 
to show gratitude (520-2), which she represents as a duty of 
the eugenes (523-4), and while to return a kindness is to 
benefit another person, the impulse to do so may be based on 
the knowledge that reciprocity is an imperative which it is 
discreditable to ignore; and in suggesting that Ajax will 
not be regarded as a jü). &vI5 öcvº1C if he fails to return the 
charis of their relationship Tekmessa is clearly attempting 
to arouse his aidos at the prospect of conduct which would 
be unfitting for one of his status. 
The definition of eugeneia, the idea with which both Ajax 
and Tekmessa end their speeches, is one aspect of the conf- 
lict of values between the two, 
72 
and related to this is 
their difference over that which the eugenes should find 
disgraceful, over aidos and its proper object. As Reinhardt 
says, 
"Ajax' thoughts of his father, his home, his son, 
respect and shame (aidos) are to him reasons for committing 
suicide; but precisely the same ideas appear to Tecmessa 
as reasons for not committing suicide ... ., 
73 
They do, then, place quite different interpretations on the 
same material, and in the sequel Ajax is not persuaded; 
effectively, they do "speak different languages. " 
74 But the 
breakdown in communication is not total, and so Reinhardt is 
wrong to say: 
75 
"... they speak without communicating, ... for each 
speaks his own language to which the other does not 
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listen. The words of the wife die away without a syl- 
lable having reached her husband's ears, and vice versa 
... neither speech refers to the other, they do not 
touch or lead to any argument for or against ... ." 
This is quite simply not true; Tekmessa's whole speech takes 
its argument from that of Ajax, and it is expressed in terms 
which are likely to strike a chord in him; and strike a 
chord they do, for although Ajax does not reply directly to 
Tekmessa, in his speech to his son (550-77) he does answer 
her on precisely those points on which she attempted to 
arouse his aidos; he declares that the boy will not suffer 
hybris or lobe (560-1) because Teukros and his fellow 
Salaminians (the chorus) will protect him (562-6), and is 
confident that his son will be able to perform the function 
of providing for his parents (567-70). It is not, then, that 
he denies that the eventualities set out by Tekmessa would 
harm his posthumous honour, simply that he does not believe 
that they will come about. Only for Tekmessa's appeal to 
cas has he no answer (although he does express his pity 
for her and the child at 652-3), 
76 
and this suggests that he 
is not susceptible to her claim that to fail to show charis 
would be to impair his euaeneia. 
Ajax concludes his general reflections in the Trugrede with 
remarks. on the mutability of friendship and enmity (678-83), 
and in the remainder of the play it is the theme of friends 
and enemies which is to dominate. Following Ajax' death it 
is not simply his loss which disturbs his friends, but also 
the thought of the mockery of his enemies; they seem to take 
over from the hero his concern for his reputation. At 954-5 
Tekmessa describes her woe as Odysseus' joy, and the chorus 
take up this idea, lamenting the mockery and hybris of 
Odysseus and the Atreidai which they regardas inevitable 
(955-60); once more the equation of the mockery of one's 
enemies with hybris, already noted, is apparent. It is fully 
expected that others will mock; Teukros echoes the sentiments 
of Athena at 79 when he says (988-9): 
ý'c, ýºuva(t -rravTFs KFt7%. t"vvt. s t'Ti'fryrr)ºav. 
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and when the chorus-leader sees Menelaos approaching he 
immediately assumes that mockery is his intention (1042-3): 
c-rrvJ 
tae 
jly%\ 9ecv ýwT4 
ý ýk -i 
Tax aV WNWOLs 
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There are clearly two strands of thought in such passages, 
that it is discreditable to mock a dead enemy (and some 
support for this idea may be found in the Iliad, at least to 
the extent that it appears to be discreditable there to 
mutilate a dead enemy; exultation over a dead foe, however, 
is common and passes without censure) and that it is natural 
to do so (an idea arising from the notion that it is right 
to harm one's enemies and that their humiliation is one's 
own glory). 
77 
The chorus and Teukros, then, are concerned at the prospect 
of the mockery of others, and while there may be something 
of a general concern that Ajax should receive his due honour 
in this concern, they must also be alarmed at the prospect 
that they will, because of their relationship with the dead 
hero, be implicated in such mockery; this concern for their 
collective honour will presumably also be aidos. Interest- 
ingly enough, this aidos, which is perhaps a typical male 
warrior's attitude, is not shared-by the woman, Tekmessa, 
who takes the attitude that the mockery of the Atreidai can 
be ignored, and finds comfort in the fact that they will 
feel the lack of Ajax in battle (961.5); she accepts that 
they will mock, but maintains that their mockery will not 
harm its target (966-70), and that Odysseus' hybris will 
thus be in vain (971); this is roughly the attitude of 
Apollo at fl. 24.54,78 and clearly it was one which it was 
possible to hold; clearly too, however, it requires a 
certain amount of detachment from ideals of honour and time 
(such as may be found in women and gods? ) which the other 
characters are unable to share. 
79 
When Menelaos does appear we learn that he does, in fact, 
intend to dishonour Ajax (by depriving him of a tomb, 1062-6) 
and that his motivation in doing so is one of retaliation 
for the dishonour which Ajax attempted to inflict on him and 
his fellows; had "one of the gods" not intervened they would 
232 
have perished au'r)CýeTw loýotuý 1057-9) . 
Menelaos also has important remarks to make on the nature of 
Ajax' error; his attack on the cattle was hybris (1061), 
80 
and so was his attempt on the lives of his comrades and his 
superiors; at 1071-86 Menelaos sets Ajax' disobedience in a 
wider, civic context: 
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In its stress on the utility of (the traditionally related 
ideas of) fear and a os in the state this speech is partic- 
ularly reminiscent of similar arguments in Aeschylus' 
Eumenides, 81 and probably makes use of ideas which are both 
traditional and part of contemporary discussion of the 
nature of civic life and the need for justice in the 
community; the traditional element may be seen in the impor- 
tance accorded aidos (here synonymous with aischune) and in 
the presence of hybris as the consequence of its absence, 
82 
while the idea that it is fear, of both punishment and dis- 
grace, which makes one amenable to state or military author- 
ity seems to reflect the fifth century preoccupation with 
the question, "why should one be moral? "83 Also worthy of 
note is the, by now familiar, association of aidos and soph- 
rosvne (1075-6); 
84 in the Trugrede Ajax, feigning his con- 
version to sophrosyne, hinted at his rejection of it; here 
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the lack of sophrosyne is associated with lack of aidos, and 
this confirms our suggestion85 that Ajax was without any 
aidos for the representatives of authority; and this is 
clearly Menelaos' belief, too. 
In general, Menelaos' remarks seem to be justified as an 
analysis of Ajax' conduct; there is certainly nothing "dis- 
tasteful" in his observations on the need for fear and aidos 
in promoting ordered behaviour, 
86 
and Pearson is probably 
correct to see his remarks as an "orthodox exposition of the 
civic virtues; "87 the chorus-leader calls them yV 
7p. 604 xx 
at 1091. Seen in their wider context, however, these gnomai 
emerge in a different light, for Menelaos uses Ajax' hybris 
and lack of aidos as justification for his own retaliation 
(1067-70,1085-90); he thus manifests a similar concern to 
that which motivated his enemy, 
88 
and sets up a parallelism 
between them which emerges quite explicitly at 1087-8: 
j roVra(0V VV -r- L- -T'0. (OLXAoc T OwV' uý6tvrlS V VV /4,1 (1 
'0 
In spite of his commendable remarks on aidos and deos, then, 
Menelaos sees hybris not as a bad thing which one should not 
perpetrate at all, but as a legitimate weapon against one's 
enemies; he thus lives up to the expectation created by 1042 
-3, and merits the chorus-leader's comment 
(1091-2): 
M EV(rh oC, C-, /"'''1 y'Vvj/". tq v-ru (, rJir45 6a 
1 
O. s 
C-La. vros IV U04vewc% V1,1(1 rFv1 89 
The partiality of hybris, then, already very prominent, is 
maintained. 
90 
The exchanges which follow between Teukros and the Atreidai 
are nothing more than invective, and no purpose is achieved; 
91 
accusations of hybris (1151,1258) and lack of sophrosyne 
(1259) fly, and Agamemnon and Teukros attempt to bring 
aischune on each other by mutual accusations of barbarian 
origins (1259-63,1291-8), the latter adding, for good measure, 
some unsavoury details from the history of the Pelopidai. It 
is Teukros, however, who finally comes back to the issue at 
hand, suggesting that the occasion for shame («)y''I44 1305) 
is not his own birth, but Agamemnon's conduct in denying 
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burial to Ajax (e1t-xuCXvvH 1307); each has attempted to 
excite the other's shame over facts which were entirely 
outwith his control, but eventually Teukros raises the 
question of shame over one's own actions, the assumption, as 
ever, that it is discreditable to insult the dead. The 
possibility of different interpretations of what is aischron 
is also raised in the earlier exchange, where both Menelaos 
--and Teukros maintain that it would be aischron for them to 
continue the argument, the former claiming that, it would be 
aischron for him if people learned that he was wasting words 
in the attempt to control one who could be controlled by 
force (1159-60), and the latter retorting that it is aisc - 
jston for him to listen to one who is talking rubbish 
(1161-2); but this is mere invective. 
At 1316 Odysseus enters; we have been encouraged to believe 
that he, too, will exult in Ajax' misfortunes (953-4,955-60, 
971), yet the chorus-leader hopes that he can break up the 
quarrel (1316-7); the audience, perhaps, having seen the 
prologue, will be even more confident that he will not take 
sides. And this, in fact, he immediately refuses to do 
(1320-4), forcing Agamemnon to admit that he has not only 
received, but also dealt ct r1c'(roJS )coo-'A$ . In his speech at 
1332-45 he states his opposition to the prohibition of 
burial, gives his reasons, and restates Ajax' tim . At 1336- 
41 he declares that his enmity will not lead him to deny 
that Ajax was aristos at Troy, after Achilles, to deny him, 
that is, the time he deserves; he thus distances his personal 
bias, his hatred, from his estimation of Ajax' worth, and 
this is something Agamemnon and Menelaos have signally 
failed to do. Odysseus bases his impulses on dike: to leave 
Ajax unburied is to give in to the temptations of force 
and to trample on dike (1332-5); Ajax' arete means that it 
is not just that he be dishonoured by Agamemnon (1342 - 
wiff' 
Ovil ocv EvücKws Dc-rcýKoclp. rü 6IL, cf. 1363); to dishonour 
Ajax is not to destroy him, but the laws of the gods (1343-4); 
and it is not dikaion to harm the esthlos in death, even out 
of hatred (1344-5). Odysseus thus clearly subscribes to the 
belief, which has been reiterated throughout the play, that 
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it is wrong to-exult in others' misfortunes, and particularly 
that it is wrong to insult the dead, and his idea of dike 
thus happens to coincide with that of Teukros at 1125,92 but 
his appeal to these standards enjoys greater validity by 
reason of its impartiality. 
But what precisely are Odysseus' principles in opposing the 
dishonouring and non-burial of Ajax? He responds to his 
enemy's arete and is reluctant to deprive him of time, and, 
to a large extent, the belief that it is proper to accord 
others the time they deserve is a Homeric one. 
93 To do so in 
Homer could be seen as aidos, and so it is here; in answer 
to Agamemnon's question, h1C M411 vCKVN((1356) Odys- 
seus replies (1357): 




So Odysseus experiences a positive feeling of respect for 
Ajax' arete; but this is also allied to a general feeling 
that it is not right to deprive others of such respect, and 
this feeling is expressed in terms of dike. Winnington- 
Ingram is thus right to say that dike "is presented in terms 
of time. "94 But the term is not defined at all, 
95 
and seems 
to answer to little more than Odysseus' subjective conviction 
that there are limits which should not be transgressed. 
96 
This vague idea of limit is also a traditional one, 
97 
and it 
is one which Odysseus develops in the ensuing exchange with 
Agamemnon. At 1347 he refers to a standard which is related 
to his idea of dike, that of-r& K"choV, when he says 4ý^ftruvv 
výviý. '' 14 n. crfLv Ký, )ct, 
ý, 
and he follows up the implication 
that it is not kalon to hate the dead by urging Agamemnon 
% 
ýn xý 6ý 'A r ¬LCI) KEýýEarýJ T&LJ lo %. l -v_XoLs(1349) . 
These, too, are traditional ideas, related to the vague 
"standard of appropriateness" which was so prominent in 
Homer, 98 and to the notion that one can go too far in the 
pursuit of gain found in Hesiod and Theognis. 
99 
So Odysseus is following certain traditional, if vaguely 
articulated, beliefs; but the most striking aspect of his 
response to the situation is that it is unexpected and 
shared by none of the other characters.. 
100 In particular, 
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Agamemnon gives in not because he believes or even under- 
stands what Odysseus says (he continues to think in terms of 
friendship and enmity (1356,1360) and of his own reputation 
(1362)), but out of deference to their friendship (1370-1), 
while Teukros, in refusing to allow Odysseus to participate 
100a 
in Ajax' burial (in spite of his desire to do so), reaffirms 
the polarity of friends and enemies at the play's close 
(1393-1401). Odysseus, then, is isolated, and his ideas of 
i 
Tc KakoIand dike depend on his own sensitivity, his own 
interpretation of right and wrong, his own personal moral 
conscience. 
101 His response also, I feel sure, depends on 
aidos; he describes his response to Ajax' aee as aidos at 
1357, and aidos is traditionally the reaction to the ideas 
of excess and inappropriateness which he rejects. It should, 
then, be clear that this aidos is not simply an impulse to 
conform, not simply a fear of being out of step with conven- 
tion, because it is based on principles which are subjective 
and activated instinctively; Odysseus could clearly -"get away 
with"maltreating Ajax' body', and so popular disapproval is 
not a consideration with him; and yet his aidos is based on 
ideas which are quite traditional. Behind his response to 
the body of Ajax and its burial, then, lies a realization, 
which may or may not be "new", that to behave in accordance 
with traditional ideals depends on the sensitivity of the 
individual rather tVarY 
lon fear of punishment or disgrace. 
102 
Like the Ajax, the Electra is a play of retaliation, of 
reciprocity and of non-communication, and this emerges with 
greatest relevance to our theme in the agon between Elektra 
and Klytaimestra which stands at its heart. It soon emerges, 
however, that the axon is itself representative of a recur- 
rent process, a process of retaliation and mutual recrimina- 
tion. 103 The background to this is one of atimia, 
104 
and 
concern for tine, both Agamemnon's and her own, is Elektra's 
chief motivating force; she alone, she says (100-2), 
has pity for her father's ignoble death, and she will per- 
severe with her lamentation until vengeance is achieved (103 
-20). She resents Aigisthos'`usurpation of her father's 
prerogatives (266-74, cf. Chrysothemis at 419-21), and 
describes (442-6) how Agamemnon's atimia is reinforced by 
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the mutilation of his body (cf. the chorus at 486-7). She 
believes, too, that she herself will win fame by restoring 
her father's honour (975-83), while at 1153, believing 
Orestes dead and contemplating her own ruin as well as that 
of her father, she imagines the mockery of her enemies 
(YE) w61 OYEx QCoý). Her own atimia is also recognized by 
Orestes at 1181 and 1427. 
Out of this background of atimia grows the process which we 
shall see at work in the ago n. We first see Elektra consumed 
by grief; later we learn that her grief is her only means of 
retaliation against her father's murderers (352-6): 
ý 
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Her grief and her 
miserable 
condition, then, are to her a 
means of restoring Agamemnon's time, and her persistence in 
grief is thus a deliberate act of retaliation for wrong done; 
as Whitman says, 
105 it is "the one proof that she is still a 
princess. " Her concern for her time, however, which presumably 
involves aidos at her disgrace, has a particularly masculine 
tinge, which emerges in her assertion (in line 351) that the 
course suggested by Chrysothemis (moderation and compliance 
towards authority, the "normal" woman's reaction) is tant- 
amount to cowardice (deilia). 
Elektra, then, lives and acts as she does in order to annoy 
her enemies, and it is not, therefore, surprising that she 
regards their conduct as motivated by a similar concern; 
indeed, she regards the conduct of Klytaimestra and Aigisthos 
as specifically designed to undermine her status. At 271-4 
she describes the sexual union of her father's murderers as 
"the ultimate hybris", while at 278-93 she describes the 
kind of thing her mother says when she reproaches her 
(CýSOV& j&t, 288) and insults her (eJ vß(. 
f 4, l. 293) in the face 
of her troubles; of her mother's part in the process of 
recrimination, then, she is clearly aware. She returns to 
238 
the theme of the sexual relationship between her mother and 
Aigisthos at 586, where she calls it ot. i Cýc«r, c -rk*'vrk,  
tcr, 
which recalls rjv 'r&ic&urxL*cv v/ýCLJ in 271, possibly this 
refers to the disgrace of Klytaimestra's adultery, possibly 
to the distaste Elektra feels for the acts themselves, but 
it is certainly clear that she resents these ergs, and she 
may feel that their "ugliness" diminishes the honour of her 
father and herself. Something of the atmosphere of the Ajax 
is recalled when, at 790 and 794, Elektra, believing Orestes 
dead, assumes that her mother will react with hybris to his 
death. 
It is in this atmosphere of insult and enmity that the agora 
takes place, and it is in the axon that the true nature of 
the relationship between Elektra and Klytaimestra is revealed. 
Klytaimestra enters at 516, and refers first of all to her 
daughter's unmaidenly conduct; Elektra is "on the loose" as 
a result of the absence of Aigisthos, and is thus able to 
remain out of doors, "shaming her philoi (516-8). " This 
argument is clearly based on traditional ideas of the role 
of women which we have met before, 
106 
and presumably also on 
the seclusion of respectable women in contemporary Athens. 
Klytaimestra's point here is that such conduct, because the 
disgrace of one member of the family affects the others, 
reflects badly upon her, but in order to do that it must 
also reflect badly on Elektra herself; Elektra thus under- 
takes action which is discreditable to herself in order to 
bring shame on her mother (for there can hardly be any doubt 
but that oai rxw&LV 
J 
%, kovs is Elektra's intention). 
Klytaimestra's next words are very important; Elektra is 
afraid of Aigisthos, she says, but has no regard for her, 
and she continues (520-524): 
Ka ýrtrý "tro c( Ire os Ti"uýkuýS ýý 
Eý 6«'S cue ýýý. c koLL -tte'ýoc ct K3s 
Aw, Koc 0 výe Lj V91C A ýý lýaý Ta ßäa tYw 
Cr výiýýv 
Xý 
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We have already seen the truth of this; Elektra does denounce 
239 
Klytaimestra often and in front of many, does regard her 
rule as unjust, and does see her mother's actions as bs 
against herself. 
107 Klytaimestra's awareness of the charges 
Elektra makes against her corresponds to a converse awareness 
on the part of Elektra (278-93, p. 237 above), and also 
reveals her awareness of the process in which she is ' 
that 
involved, and it is to this ., _ she refers 
in 523-4, k' -KwS 
... 
OK/K691. The reciprocal and retaliatory nature of the 
process is thus apparent; Klytaimestra justifies her conduct 
in terms of retaliation for the insults of the other, and 
Elektra does the same. We should also be prepared to see the 
importance of shame in all this, for shame (the subjective 
reaction) and disgrace (the objective state) are the result 
of KA 3 Il)%vc. t, J and the aim of Kac. Kws 
it1, 
- 
Klytaimestra now proceeds to a justification of the murder 
of Agamemnon with reference to the murder of Iphigeneia, and 
Elektra duly responds with a statement of her interpretation 
of the same events (525-609). Thus they debate the dike of 
Klytaimestra's deed, but there is no real attempt to per- 
suade, 
108 
and it is clear enough that this passage is but 
another round in a recurring pattern of mutual recrimination. 
109 
Both, for example, refer to previous arguments of the same 
type in the lines between the two speeches, Elektra at 552-3 
- "You cannot say I started it this time (v y )"- and 
Klytaimestra at 556-7 - "If this were the way you always 
spoke to me ... ." 
Klytaimestra's argument is simple; she killed Agamemnon 
justly because he sacrificed her daughter. Elektra's is less 
simple (558-60): ý`_, )% 
vacrtex j .1S 
TovT") onus yEV&Lr aV ac 
I 
fý c, w' 
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These words belong properly to the recurrent exchange of 
insults between the two rather than to the debate about dike, 
for Elektra, having dismissed the question of dike in 560, 
immediately goes on to argue that her mother's action was 
not dikaion in 561-76. Elektra is at pains to designate 
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Klytaimestra's conduct aischron, of course because she 
believes is was, but also because to implicate her in dis- 
grace is part of her strategy. 
Adkins, however, sees more in the passage: 
110 
"To say an action is aischron is to play the ace of 
trumps: to justify performing it, one cannot press 
the claim that it is dikaio, for that is of less 
importance, but must maintain that it. is in fact not 
aischron after all. " 
We can dismiss the curious assumption that, in any real con- 
text, a word may be an "ace of trumps, "111 for it is not 
central to Adkins' argument, which is, presumably, that if 
one accepts that one's conduct is aischron one cannot go on 
to justify it on other grounds, even those of dike. But this 
is also an artificial argument: if one did believe that one's 
conduct was dikaion, the judgement that it is also aischron 
would be unlikely to come from oneself. And yet there does 
exist a number of passages in which people do admit that 
they have acted or may act in a way commonly regarded as 
aischron, yet justify this in terms of the necessity of 
achieving some more important objective. Such, for example, 
is fr. 352 (Radt): 
Ký )t VV Cv VV VVKE 
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Any of those passages, moreover, of which there is a great 
number, in which someone is advised or decides to abandon 
aidos, which is the instinct which prevents one doing some- 
thing aischron, would also show that recognition that a given 
course of action is aischron does not mean that its perform- 
ance cannot be justified. 
113 Perhaps the most apposite 
parallel is that of Aeschylus' Orestes, 
114 
whose aidos at 
ch . 899 shows his awareness that it is normally aischron to 
kill one's mother, but who proceeds to do so on the basis of 
dike and the divine command, a basis on which he defends his 
action in Eumenides. And then there is the Elektra of this 
very play, who, as we shall see, recognizes that her own 
conduct is, in some respects at least, aischron, yet justi- 
241 
fies it in terms of the need for retaliation, for dike. 
115 
Characters can, then, justify conduct which they recognize 
as aischron in other terms; the fact that Elektra herself 
does so while denying her mother the same possibility is 
presumably part of the point of this passage. 
116 
The passage quoted above, however, is not Adkins' last word 
on the subject. Some pages further on 
117 he goes on to claim 
that Elektra's words in 558-60 constitute Sophokles' "solut- 
ion ... to the problem set by the crime within the family, 
" 
that is to say that Sophokles intends us to believe, with 
Elektra, that although it might have been just for Klytai- 
mestra to kill Agamemnon, she should not have done so, since 
to do so was aischron. This, indeed, is Elektra's position, 
but we can hardly be sure that it is Sophokles'. On the 
other hand, Elektra does have a certain amount of authority 
behind her statement here, in that the murder of a husband 
by a wife is traditionally aischron (Klytaimestra's deed is 
aischron even at -0d. 
11.432-4), 118 being both a fundamental 
breach of the tie of philia and against all the imperatives 
of loyalty to one's husband inherent in woman's arete. But 
if Elektra is "right" here she is, by the same token, wrong 
elsewhere in the play, and particularly at its conclusion, 
where, out of absolute commitment to retaliatory justice and 
other imperatives such as eusebeia towards her father, she 
takes part in the murder of her mother, another horrifying 
breach of philia and also traditionally aischron. Rather 
than solving the problem in 558-60, however, Sophokles 
represents it in its most fundamental aspect: injustice, 
wrong or insult calls forth retribution (dike), and the 
requirement to pursue dike is a powerful one, but to pursue 
it within one's family must inevitably involve an act which 
is aischron. 
119 
Elektra is thus able to state the problem which bedevils the 
history of her family, 
120 
yet is ignorant of the application 
of her words to herself. This becomes particularly apparent 
at 577-83, where she recognizes that Klytaimestra's case 
rests on the legitimacy of retaliation, a life for a life, 
242 
and suggests that rigid application of these principles 
would lead to her mother's own death: she would be first to 
die, she says, if she were to meet with dike (583). She thus 
recognizes, but depreciates, Klytaimestra's claim to dike, 
yet she herself acts on the same principle and will, as we 
who have seen Orestes know, realize the hypothesis of line 
583.121 Elektra's position, then, with regard to dike and 
aischune is very similar to that which she criticizes in her 
mother. 
At 584-94 Elektra argues that it was not, in fact, dike 
which drove her mother to kill her father, but sex: thus she 
returns to the idea of the shamefulness of Klytaimestra's 
conduct: Klytaimestra commits -9-kvrw4 
ix (586) 
with Aigisthos, and it would be aischron (593) for her to 
say that this was retaliation for the death of Iphigeneia; 
for it is not kalon to marry enemies for the sake of one's 
daughter. The essence of this accusation is Klytaimestra's 
breach of women's arete in her disloyalty to her husband; 
her adultery is aischron in itself, and even more so in that 
the adulterer is an enemy of the lawful husband (a sign of 
still more flagrant disloyalty). It is thus clear that these 
charges have some foundation in terms of traditional values, 
but it is equally apparent that Elektra raises them because 
the deeds she criticizes are a particular source of annoyance 
to her, 122 and because it is her particular purpose to shame 
her mother. 
In the final section of her speech, however, as her own 
temper rises, it is the possibility of the shamefulness of 
her own conduct which comes to the fore. At 595 she abandons 
her argument on the nature of her mother's conduct, and 
recognizes that she will never convince her that she is 
right, 
123 because her only concern is a daughter's abuse of 
a mother (596-7); this, of course, is exactly Klytaimestra's 
complaint at 523-4, and Elektra thus reveals, once more, her 
awareness of the process in which she is involved; and since 
abuse of one's mother is a breach of aidos and so presumably 
aischron, she also makes it clear that the accusations her 
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mother makes against her are similar to her own against her 
mother. This emerges even more clearly in the final words of 
her speech, as the exchange degenerates into the exchange of 
insults which we are to regard as the normal pattern of 
communication between the two (605-9): 
hC of (E GlS Oc rM TSEi TE- s$ 1ýýor º. 'ý d 
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f 
In urging her mother to call her anaides Elektra is 
presumably referring to the charge that she is deficient in 
the aidos which is properly due a mother, a charge to which 
she is certainly open and which Klytaimestra will make at 
612-5 and 622, but in urging her mother to denounce her at 
all she is. also affecting indifference with regard to her 
own reputation, and this suggests another kind of anaideia. 
It is also important that she acknowledges, albeit ironical- 
ly, the legitimacy of the charges her mother makes against 
her, and it is extremely significant that she suggests the 
possibility of a similarity in nature between them; in say- 
ing that she does not kataischunein her mother's Physis she 
is both offering a perversion of the traditional ideal, 
normally appropriate to men rather than to women, 
124 that 
one should live up to the reputation of one's parents and 
affecting irony, because it is clear that she is trying to 
shame her mother by imputing to her the negative qualities 
of 606-7, but the real irony is that the similarity in Physis 
between the two women is a real one. 
125 
Klytaimestra immediately takes up the challenge, accusing 
her daughter of hybris (613) 
126 
and anaidei a (ft, 4; 
VV15 
orreC 
615). This is not the first time that one character has, in 
effect, predicted what the other will say, 
127 
and it is 
difficult not to regard the interminable process of conflict 
in which they are involved as responsible for this obvious 
familiarity with the arguments of the other side. 
Elektra has just claimed that she was indifferent to any 
charge of anaideia her mother might make and to any damage 
244 
such a charge might do her reputation; her reaction to Klyt- 
aimestra's words in 612-5 is, therefore, surprising (616-21): 
u vv'/ cir r-rw -rk" exi-tq, 
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The complexity of Elektra's psychology and the depth of her 
insight into her own condition are at their most apparent 
here, 128 but even so she is unaware of the full implications 
of her words. It might be possible to regard the sentence 
I ptrvbbcvN ... i vrRKzrac as referring only 
to Elektra's failure 
to act in accordance with her status and thus to relatively 
minor breaches of decorum, such as being seen out of doors, 
or simply to the excessive nature of her grief, were it not 
for the fact that she says Twv S ý' air)cvvqJ 
Ex4ýd, for riv%( 
must refer to Klytaimestra's accusations of hybris and lack 
of aischune (= aidos), specifically lack of aischune for her 
mother. Elektra therefore does experience an instinctive 
feeling that her lack of regard for her mother is reprehens- 
ible, and she is aware that, in the ideal situation, she 
should feel aidos for her mother. She then goes on to Justify 
her unseasonable and unseemly conduct with regard to the 
need to retaliate (as, in effect, did Klytaimestra at 523-4): 
shameful deeds are taught by shameful deeds; is this not the 
justification of conduct which is aischron in terms of dike? 
Such justification is thus (pace Adkins) clearly possible: 
the significance is that, while Elektra exploits this line 
of argument herself, she refuses to allow Klytaimestra to do 
the same. 
In 605-9 Elektra suggested that if she was full of anaideia, 
this was due to the Physis she inherited from her mother; in 
616-21 she accepts the charge of anaideia, but explains it 
in terms of the education she has received at her mother's 
hands (ýKöýitlCeTýt ): in terms of both heredity or antecedent 
capacity (physis) and education (nomos) Elektra's character 
is the counterpart of her mother's. 129 
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The argument between the two is about to end, but before it 
does the positions of the participants are reiterated. At 
622-3 Klytaimestra explodes: 
W iý eE wn räVa. c. 
ýC-S 6Cvt. ý K4C C -r4/%/ 
C 7'rl 
% K aý t T/ ä/ ' -roc 
äGOr 
aJ KJ -Tr"0 K, 
The exclamation, ' Oec`r'a'Ad4 (again fulfilling the expec- 
tation created in 607) gets to what is, for Klytaimestra, 
the heart of the matter: Elektra is her child, yet she has 
no aidos for her mother. Yet Elektra has just shown signs 
that she is aware of this, and that it troubles her, but 
Klytaimestra hears only one more reference to her pc'rh10 .c 
ir-ex r%iI. 4ec. Elektra had just all but admitted that there was 
wrong on both sides, but her mother cannot accept this: she 
wishes to be all right, and Elektra's complaint o, 
l' &7r rtaCet 
KictfsLd(629) is justified. On the other hand, Elektra's moment 
of weakness was short, and, stung to anger once more by the 
accusation of anaideia, she again tries"to justify her con- 
duct with reference to her mother's actions (62.1-5): 
(U T&L 
iº Y0 (sls VLV) 0%) K Lýw ýV r° e T'4 E-ls 
-rvv(YoJ -rß I' E rc TvVS 
Klytaimestra's deeds provoke Elektra's words, to the extent 
that the words themselves are Klytaimestra's: the process of 
retaliation is again emphasized, and the point that words 
are Elektra's weapons is forcefully made. 
130 Yet Elektra 
also describes her retaliation, which so far consists solely 
of words, as ergs at 608, and as pragmata which she is 
compelled to "do" at 620-1, so her implication that Klytai- 
mestra is wrong and she right because words are less impor- 
tant than deeds should be rejected; for the purposes of 
retaliation they are equivalent, 
131 
and the audience also 
knows that Elektra's turn to act will come. 
In the agora, then, the theme of shame keeps before our eyes 
a parallelism between Elektra and Klytaimestra and a balance 
of contradictions in Elektra's own conduct. There is also, 
however, a passage at an earlier point in the play's action 
which contributes to the same effect. The kommos which 
doubles as the parodos of the play comes to an end with five 
lines in which dos appears in a traditional guise (245-50): 
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t4i T_& U 
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The theme of the departure of aidos from a corrupt and 
troubled world is a common one, 
132 
while the notion that 
punishment of the guilty will reinforce traditional values 
recalls the arguments of the Furies in Eumenides. 
133 In this 
passage both aidos and eusebeia may be the impulses which 
prevent one committing murder, especially within the family, 
but there may also be a subsidiary notion in both that both 
these qualities, and perhaps especially eusebeia, are 
required in those who avenge the murder of their kin. It is 
interesting that Elektra, like Aeschylus' Furies and Menelaos 
in ax, in stressing the röle of deterrence, imagines that 
aidos will be the effect of the example of other's punish- 
ment; this need not mean, however, that aidos is simply fear 
of punishment; it may, for example, be the impulse which 
inhibits the specific sort of crime which is envisaged in 
each case, or it may be respect for the agents of punishment 
or for the corpus of beliefs which demands punishment. 
Elektra, then, believes that her conduct holds out some hope 
that aidos will be maintained; in her very next utterance, 
however, the theme of aidos resurfaces in rather a different 
light; already at lines 254-60 she expresses sentiments 
which are very close to those of 616-21, admitting that her 
own conduct is discreditable but justifying it in terms of 
the need to retaliate: 
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Particularly noticeable are the words of compulsion in both 
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places (256, cf. 620). Although Elektra's aischune here is 
less significant than in the later passage (here it is merely 
embarrassment regarding conduct which is unfitting for a 
woman of her status, while at 616 it also implies disquiet 
with regard to her lack of aidos for her mother), there are 
strong verbal echoes, and it is important that Elektra recog- 
nizes something of the ambivalence of her conduct; her 
aischune indicates that she is not behaving as a noble woman 
should in normal circumstances, yet she justifies her conduct 
in terms of loyalty to her own eugeneia; 
134 
while the 
"compulsion" which makes her act in this way is only absolute 
given her own values and outlook, it is part of her tragedy 
that she does feel herself compelled to act in ways which 
she perceives (with more or less clarity) to be discredit- 
Oci ýýcCtýs TäS able. At 989 she tells her sister, 
Sid air. V 
KPC. k ws -nq vKorL4, yet her own eugene ia compels her to ,Sy 
ii oc, f)KCwYand she admits (608) that by nature (Ire f v(. ) she 
might be full of anaideia). 
So Elektra's statement that she is acting to safeguard aidos 
is immediately qualified by a statement that this very con- 
duct causes her to act in ways which aidos (or aischune) 
should normally preclude; her lack of aidos in this respect, 
moreover, is dictated by her aidos for one of her parents, 
and this suggests a corresponding lack of a d"s for the 
other parent, a hint which is taken up later in the play. 
There was also mention of eusebeia in 250, and just as her 
statement of the need for aidos was immediately balanced by 
the opening lines of her speech at 254-60, so her remark 
about eusebeia is qualified by the words with which she con- 
cludes the same speech at 307-9; unless her father's 
murderers pay the penalty, she claimed, eusebeia would depart 
from the earth; she thus sets herself up as champion of 
eusebeia, a position she maintains throughout the play; 
135 
it is therefore surprising that she ends the speech, in which 
she justifies her retaliation in terms of the insults she 
has suffered at her mother's hands, with the words: 
1 t, . EV UVV TOLUvrbL5., ouTt d$JlCUv4-LI 4 L)X, (j 
^ 
OJf' EürE-ße'I Irpc CC TLJ ' ähh' ev TIAj KaKOLS 
flO)chy 'lrr' ävaßk7 ýcKscý. -ryýýýýýý 1r06K14'. 
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The pursuit of eusebeia, then, necessitates its negation, 
136 
and once more compulsion is stressed. No doubt the meaning 
of both these lines and those at 254-60 for Elektra herself 
is that propriety (for the reference of sophronein and 
eusebein in 307-8, as of aischunomai in 254, is to behaviour 
which is proper for an unmarried noblewoman) must be sacri- 
ficed to higher imperatives suchas loyalty to one's father, 
but the effect of these two passages, coming at the beginning 
and the end of her speech, is to highlight the problematic 
nature of her conduct and to reveal that she is not without 
qualms in that respect; indeed, the very parallelism between 
Elektra and her mother which emerges in the agon is fore- 
shadowed - "in the midst of evil it is necessary to practise 
evil. " Both justify conduct which is aischron in terms of 
dike. 137 
Before leaving the Electra there is one more passage which 
might be considered, both because the concept of aidos goes 
some way to explaining itjnd because it relates thematically 
to those already discussed. We have already seen that it is, 
at least by the fifth century, aischron to tell lies; 
138 
this emerges particularly in the Philoctetes, but is also 
assumed in other Sophoklean passages, such as frr. 352139 and 
79 (Radt). 140 The same idea also helps explain . i. 59-66, 
where Orestes experiences some discomfort at the thought of 
practising deceit, but dismisses his scruple by imagining the 
kleos he will win. His hesitation, slight though it is, is 
presumably based on an awareness that lies are generally 
thought discreditable, and might thus be regarded as aidos. 
He too, then, like his sister and his mother, pursues an aim 
he considers justified by discreditable means, 
141 
and in his 
deceit sets up a parallelism between himself and his father's 
murderers, whose action is frequently described as deceit- 
ful. 142 Segal writes, 
143 "Treachery and deceit ... seldom 
come off well in Sophocles; " neither, I feel, does the dis- 
regarding of a feeling of aidos, and not only in Sophokles; 
Orestes' hesitation at 59-66 is almost as clear a sign of 
the ambivalent nature of what he plans to do as is the aidos 
of his Aeschylean counterpart at Choo. 899. 
249 
Discussion of attitudes to deceit brings us to the Philo- 
ctetes, a play in which there is no instance of the word 
aidos but which nevertheless provides us with a perceptive 
and convincing account of the operation of the concept in 
circumstances in which the ethical suppositions on which it 
rests are put to the test. Once again, we shall be concerned 
with the opposition of conflicting aspects of a complex of 
traditional attitudes and with the notion that the inter- 
pretation of key terms can differ from individual to in- 
dividual. 
Odysseus first alludes to the deception of Philoktetes in 
lines 50-3, in which he prepares Neoptolemos for the hearing 
of something kainon (52), in the execution of which the boy 
must prove himself gennaios (51); much of the remainder of 
the play will concern itself with the question of whether 
one who is truly gennaios can bring himself to carry out 
such a plan. The plan is then unveiled (54-69); Neoptolemos 
is to claim that he left Troy in anger at being denied the 
arms of his father; this is a "heroic" response, and an 
extreme one at that, for although Achilles contemplates 
sailing away from Troy in the Iliad, 
144 he never does so. At 
64-7, on the other hand, Odysseus' own unheroic nature is 
revealed; Neoptolemos may say anything he likes against him 
in the course of his tale; nothing, no matter how bad, will 
cause him pain. This Odysseus, then, does not care what 
people say about him - he is anaides. 
144a 
The subject of anaideia is raised explicitly in the lines 
with which Odysseus concludes his speech, where he returns 
to the idea of the foreignness of deceit to the son of 
Achilles (79-85): 145 
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To practise deceit, then, requires anaideia146 ar may be 
described as "contriving kaka". Odysseus, then, is not 
ignorant of the orthodox attitude to deceit, and does recog- 
nize that deceit is usually condemned in these terms; that 
he uses the pejorative terms at all is a'sign of the dis- 
creditable nature of his plan. He is also aware of the kind 
of language used to commend those who avoid deceit (dikaios 
and eusebes), and realizes that other people, though not 
himself, may value their reputations for the possession of 
the qualities of dikaiosyne and eusebeia. It is with the 
desire to forestall such a concern for reputation that he 
stresses that one's reputation for these qualities is not 
irretrievably lost through one discreditable act; more than 
this, however, he also implies that success (fie) in itself 
can secure a reputation for dikaiosyne and eusebeia; thus, 
as with his use of gennaios in 51, he retains the prescript- 
ive sense of these words (he does not deny that a reputation 
for eusebeia is a good thing to have) but distorts the 
descriptive (implying that one can act in a way normally 
considered adikon or dussebes and yet still be called dikaios 
and eusebes). 
As both his use of anaides and his stress that deceit will 
not damage Neoptolemos' reputation make clear, it is the 
latter's aidos that he is trying to forestall. He assumes, 
therefore, and not unreasonably given the traditional con- 
nexion between ads and "what people say", that he will be 
able to do so if he allays any fears that he might have that 
his reputation will suffer. Yet he himself also makes pointed 
reference to Neoptolemos' Physis (79-80), and this suggests 
something more than a mere concern for reputation; if it is 
against one's Physis to act in a certain way, will the 
intellectual realization that one can act in that way without 
suffering any harm to one's reputation be enough to enable 
one to carry out the action without qualms? This question is 
already foreshadowed by the reference to Neoptolemos' Physis, 
but it is one of which Odysseus at this point seems unaware; 
for him the end-justifies the means and it is his belief 
that any doubts about the moral character of a given course 
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of action can be dispelled by the knowledge that it can be 
carried out with no ill effects. 
Neoptolemos' reply (86-95) seems at first to rule out the 
prospect of his acquiescence in Odysseus' scheme, for he 
both paraphrases the aidos which the plan arouses in him 
(cy3 K) t. J 86, rekffK' dTvrw , 87) and refers to the 
incompatibility of such conduct with his physis. 
147 His 
reaction, then, is instinctive, as we might expect from one 
whose Physis it is to reject deceit. Yet although Neoptolemos 
may be subject to aidos in his reaction to the prospect of 
deceit, another sort of aidos is at work on him in rather a 
different way; he would rather capture Philoktetes by force 
(90-2), but this does not mean he is ready to abandon the 
enterprise entirely; he has been sent as Odysseus' assistant 
by the army, and he is reluctant to be called a traitor 
(ös v -9-COG"r15 Kochct & AA , 93-4) . One kind of concern for his 
reputation, different even from that envisaged by Odysseus, 
thus makes him susceptible to Odysseus' arguments; but he is 
still not ready to give in; he would rather behave honourably 
and fail (v# j týwJ 
e- 
st sac J, 94-5) than succeed basely 
(v vKZ KotKiiý 95). 
and )Coc, icwj in a co-operative Neoptolemos thus uses kx'A ' IIVS 
sense, and values means and intentions over ends and results. 
Yet neither kalos nor kakos is confined to the co-operative 
sphere, and the ambiguity inherent in the terms will facil- 
itate his persuasion, for in the passage of stichomythia 
which follows he is forced to choose between competitive and 
co-operative standards. At first, however, he remains true 
to his principles (100): 
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The possibility of persuasion is then explored, but Odysseus 
rules this out. The stichomythia continues (108-11): 
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The two clearly differ fundamentally over the definition of 
252 
what is aischron, and Neoptolemos is not impressed by yet 
another subordination of end to means; his question, 11Z3 ov' 
/)E-rtV T($ ... ; alludes to the common manifestation of aidos 
in the eyes, and to the fact that aidos makes it difficult 
to look upon one who regards one's conduct as discredit- 
able. 
148 Odysseus' sophistic149 arguments, then, do not con- 
vince the youth, yet in 112 he asks after the nature of the 
kerdos to which reference was made in 111, and, on learning 
that he cannot become the sacker of Troy without Philoktetes' 
arrows, agrees to the deception (120): 
tw ' -r-a1ýrw -s 
bra/ a iiýJ. 7V 'ý L3- 
Odysseus does hold out other inducements, to the effect that 
Neoptolemos' reputation will not suffer through the deceit 
(he will be called both sophos and agathos, 119), but it is 
by the possibility that he may lose the glory of being the 
sacker of Troy that he is convinced, not by these. The pos- 
ition of neither has changed: Odysseus still promotes end 
over means and Neoptolemos still holds that lies are aischron; 
it is simply that he is willing to abandon his aischune in 
order to win fame as a warrior, and at this point he believes 
that to do so will be as easy as Odysseus says it is. He is 
plainly portrayed as naive (he is eager to do the right 
thing, to do his duty and behave honourably (93-5), and his 
idealistic incredulity that Odysseus should expect him to 
deceive (100,108,110) is probably intended to reveal his 
extreme innocence), and his swift abandonment of his untested 
principles may have struck many in the original audience as 
the inevitable compromising of youthful idealism in a harsh 
world. 
At the same time, however, although Odysseus is very much 
the cynical relativist, he has been made to give several 
indications that he is making the worse cause appear the 
better; he uses the pejorative terms kaka (80) and eds 
(111) of his scheme, and his redefinitions of gennaios, 
dikaios, eusebes and aischron, all of which, for him, are 
applicable or otherwise depending on whether a success has 
been gained, only imply that these words do have a meaning 
on which most people are agreed. The audience will also, 
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then, have been well aware of the reprehensible nature of 
the plan and will have realised that, in ignoring a feeling 
of aidos or aischune, Neoptolemos is doing something which 
rarely comes off well'in tragedy. It will not, needless to 
say, have appeared inevitable at this point that he will 
undergo a change of heart, yet the foundations on which this 
change will be based have already been laid; there is the 
question of his Physis and his concern for his reputation, 
and it is only when he is faced with the loss of reputation 
in the eyes of another person that the demands of his Physis 
will reassert themselves. 
Neoptolemos' decision to abandon his aischune is very soon 
put to the test by his association with Philoktetes. First 
of all, the plan requires that Neoptolemos win the confidence 
of his prey, and accordingly a form of philia, though based 
on deceit, is created between the two. Even this false 
friendship, however, brings him into contact with a human 
being whose ethical suppositions seem close to his own, as 
he expressed them in the prologue. 
150 Then there is the 
possibility of pity, which is raised, in all sincerity, it 
seems, 
151 by the chorus at 169-90. Neoptolemos is also 
placed in a position of stress by Philoktetes' supplication, 
which takes place at 468-506, after the former had made as 
if to depart at 461, and although the irony of this passage 
is that Philoktetes entreats Neoptolemos to do exactly that 
which it is his intention to do (to take him on board ship), 
part of the effect of the appeal is also to reveal to Neop- 
tolemos that the arguments used by Odysseus in the prologue 
may also be used to quite different ends and that there are 
alternatives to his definitions of important terms. 
i 
From 485 (-n crJcirVW dF %(uVDC(L) it appears that Philoktetes 
does make the ritual contact of "full" supplication, and in 
doing so thus creates a situation of tension in which aidos 
is felt to be appropriate; we have seen that Neoptolemos is 
susceptible to aidos and it can hardly be that the supplic- 
ation has no effect on him, especially when he is faced with 
the appeal to pity (501) of a lame and helpless individual 
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grovelling at his feet. Most important of all, though, Philo- 
ktetes also employs the regular suppliant appeal that the 
reputation of the supplicated will suffer if he does not 
grant protection; 
152 he thus uses the same argument from 
reputation as did Odysseus, and, to complete the parallel, 
employs many of the same terms (473-9): 
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To Odysseus' perverse definition of gennaios in 51 Philo- 
ktetes now opposes a general formulation with which few 
would disagree and offers Neoptolemos eukleia if he helps 
. him and an 
dv&tdvs 
oü Kac, hýJ if he does not. The chief point of 
these suppositions is that they agree with those of Neo- 
ptolemos in the prologue; if he still holds the same views 
about what is and is not aischron as he did there, and if he 
accepts that the sennaios does hate the aischron, then he 
would, at least if he thought logically about itayo concede 
that he is not behaving as a gennaios should; this prospect 
might cause him some discomfort, and he. _ might consider 
that Odysseus' implication that he could practise deceit and 
remain sennaios was a false one. 
Rose 153 claims that Philoktetes' idea of gennaios, "boldness" 
(475 and 481)154 
5 ub away" from "traditional heroic 
virtues" and implies that he is adapting these terms to 
an application which is not their traditional one. This, 
however, is not the case; we saw in Theognis155 how any 
number of co-operative moral virtues could be seen as 
requirements of those designated by essentially aristocratic 
terms like cennaios, and should remember that for an audience 
watching a play in 409 B. C. it is not only the harshest 
elements of the morality of the Iliad which are "traditional". 
Similarly, there are instances enough in the Odyssey of good 
reputation being acquired by helping others, 156 and this is 
255 
of particular relevance in the case of those who help sup- 
pliants. The idea, moreover, that the gennaios (or agathos) 
should pursue rä x(ºlcr 
v' and reject -r% al. n6 
d is fundament- 
al, 
157 
and we have already noted that it seems, by the time 
of this play, to be firmly established that lying is 
aischron. 
158 I feel sure, then, that both Neoptolemos and 
the audience will recognize Philoktetes' use of these terms 
as the more normal and traditional, and the effect of the 
passage is that Neoptolemos is reminded of standards of 
behaviour to which he himself seemed to subscribe and of all 
the imperatives of loyalty to one's Physis and one's noble 
birth which the proper use of the term gennaios entails. 
Neoptolemos accepts the supplication, but, as far as we can 
tell, only because it advances the plan of Odysseus; there 
is as yet no sign of any genuine aidos on his part, either 
at his own conduct or for Philoktetes. At 524-5, however, he 
does feign one sort of aidos: the chorus (507-18) and their 
leader (522-3), as part of the deceit, have affirmed their 
pity for Philoktetes and their willingness to convey him 
homewards, and Neoptolemos affects embarrassment that he 
should show less initiative in helping a xenos than his 
inferiors: 
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There is anote of aristocratic politeness about this, and 
it may be that he is simulating the gentlemanly qualities 
which Philoktetes expects of the cennaios; it is certainly 
true that his use of aischra in the context of failure to 
help another echoes the latter's words at 475-9.159 The words 
are, however, a simulation, and we have no way of knowing if 
they conceal any real aidos of Neoptolemos' part. 
The deceit continues through the Merchant-scene, but the 
attempt to get Philoktetes on board ship must be abandoned 
when he succumbs to an attack of his illness; Neoptolemos' 
resolution in the pursuit of deception is now put to another 
test, confronted with the pain of. a suffering human being. 
When Philoktetes, exhausted, falls asleep, the chorus urge 
256 
Neoetolemos to take the bow and leave the man (827-38). This 
is impossible, he replies, for the prophecy demanded both 
(841); he goes on (842): 
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As Winnington-Ingram notes, 
160 in this sentence Neoptolemos 
combines the twin considerations between which he had to 
decide in the prologue, the idea that it is disgraceful to 
fail and the idea that it is disgraceful to lie; to say that 
one has achieved what one has not is both to fail and to lie 
about it. It is, however, the competitive aspect which is 
the stronger, and the disgrace which is explicitly referred 
to is that of leaving an enterprise unfinished, and this is 
the context in which the word aischron makes its first 
appearances in Greek literature. 
161 
It is extremely difficult to know how to interpret these 
words: on the one hand, he does not simply carry out Odys- 
seus' original plan, the aim of which seemed to be the 
acquisition of the bow and arrows (77-8,113-5); on the other, it 
does not seem that his statement that the prophecy mentioned 
both Philoktetes and his weapons is a mere excuse; even 
Odysseus (at 101) said that he must capture Philoktetes, and 
the Merchant, too, seems in no doubt but that both the bow 
and the man are required (591-7); we should assume, then, 
that Neoptolemos does believe what he says about the 
prophecy. 
162 At the same time, he also echoes both Philo- 
ktetes' terminology at 476-7 and his own of the prologue, 
and it can hardly be that thoughts of the moral character of 
deceit and the contradiction this poses to his desire for a 
good reputation do not enter his head when he uses these 
terms; in this connexion it may be relevant to mention that 
this is not the first time that he has prevaricated (cf. 
639-40), and it is thus possible that his expression of a 
conventional kind of aidos (his words in 842 are virtually a 
gnome) conceals a growing uncertainty about how he should 
behave. 
However this may be, when Philoktetes awakes it is not long 
before Neoptolemos expresses the pain which the deception 
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causes him, and when he does so he indicates that his dis- 
comfort is not something new, but something which has been 
vexing him-TM r-t(906,913). At 874-6 Philoktetes congratulates 
Neoptolemos on the "ease" (El C-vxFe K) with which he bore 
the sight and sound of his sufferings, and attributes this 
to his Physis, which is 6vyEV, 15 ... l< C-Ur-6~1, but Neo- 
ptolemos' position is far from easy - he has reached the 
point at which he can eo on no longer. He first gives 
expression to his aporia at 897: 
163 Philoktetes asks if the 
"difficulty" ) of the disease has persuaded him 
not to take him on board ship (900-1), but in fact the 
tSvrxEC"K of the disease has persuaded him in quite another 
direction, and produced in him a different sort of (ý-vrX(, 
"ýC-e"c: 
ölP výýt (vfXeCEUC vý 
, 
C(JTOJ výý 
Ta kL -riwJ -rLS ýý, r Ta p1 Od KorK (903-4). 
Philoktetes' own pain, then, has induced an analogous pain 
in Neoptolemos, 164 the pain of conscience, Gewissensnot. 
165 
His feeling is clearly instinctive, 
166 it arises in spite of 
the efforts he must have made already to ignore it, but it 
is also reflective, based on an appreciation of his own 
Physis and on a prolonged confrontation of a dilemma, a 
choice between two possible courses of action. That this 
feeling may also be described as aidos is suggested by -roc hj 
-WCOf(iWj(, since it is aidos which prevents unfitting or 
unseemly conduct, and confirmed by 906: 
i 
oci ()Ceäs ocvoV4* " TOý/T 
o(viwý. 
ýL T'a)t#cL . 
Fear of appearing "base"167 and concern for "how things look" 
quite clearly indicate aidos, and this ads is based on the 
fact that he has "hidden what he should not and spoken the 
most aischron of words" (908-9). It is thus clear that this 
aidos has a retrospective aspect: it is based on action in 
the past. It is also, however, articulated with the familiar 
reference to the future disapproval of others OCVVV c. ); 
but this does not mean that Neoptolemos is simply afraid of 
the judgement of others. Despite his concern for the outward 
aspect of his conduct he has no very clear idea of exactly 
whose disapproval he might incur, unless that of Philoktetes. 
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There is also the question of his physis: to do what is not 
fitting is to abandon one's Physis (903-4). Neoptolemos thus 
believes that he has acted contrary to his essential nature, 
and it is this, the thought that he has not been true to 
himself, which causes him pain. He does not simply acknow- 
ledge that other people find deceit disgraceful; he states, 
tout court, that deceit is wrong ( a'rº11 fcc, + , 909), and it is 
part of his very being to believe that this is so. 
168 
Stebler169 claims that Neoptolemos' Physis cannot be seen as 
"seine eigentliche Ich-Natut", his own idea of his self, 
because it also contains imperatives based on loyalty to 
aristocratic virtue, represented by the accumulation of 
terms like gennaios and eugenes, and to his father (cf. 904- 
5, also 89); but Neoptolemos is of noble birth, and his 
background must be an essential part of himself; in living 
up tý7aaristocratic standards he is also being true to him- 
self. His concern to live up to the image of his father is 
also an important point, and particularly relevant to our 
discussion in that the paternal model is a frequent focus of 
a dos; 
171 but reference to this model does not indicate 
observance of external standards, given that a human being's 
most deeply internalized moral standards are likely to be 
based on precisely this source of reference. We have 
mentioned the difficulty of deciding whether fear of falling 
short of parental standards can be regarded as exclusively a 
shame or a guilt reaction before; 
12 in this case, too, it 
would be possible to describe Neoptolemos' aidos in terms of 
both, but wrong to claim that either could exclude the other. 
Neoptolemos, then, is subject to aidos, and his psychology 
in doing so is skilfully and realistically presented; thus 
the combination of the reaction, "what will others think of 
me, " and the reference to personal standards is entirely 
natural. Philoktetes' response to his discomfort also lays 
stress on the fact that his conduct so far is occasion for 
aidos. The victim's denunciation of the deceit at 927-9 is 
vehement, and at 929-30 he asks: 
I1i/ir^ 
of o t-rro ((w1 , vý, ae wJ 
TUf "TºeG6TeýaýGý ? "GJ C KFT'ýý W dxETý C. i 
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If Neoptolemos' discomfort has not already shown him that 
this question should be answered in the affirmative, then 
his own observations at 934-5 do; Neoptolemos, he notices, 
no longer speaks to him but turns his head away, not because 
he is deaf to his appeals for the return of the bow, but 
because he is ashamed. 
173 At 967-8, still pleading for the 
return of the bow, Philoktetes once more reminds Neoptolemos 
of the discreditable nature of deceit, and urges him not to 
set up an oneidos for himself in the eyes of men. 
174 Thereby 
he is clearly trying to arouse aidos at the thought of 
others' disapproval, but, as we have already seen, Neoptol- 
emos' aidos is not solely concerned with the opirions of 
others. 
Philoktetes' appeal can only have increased Neoptolemos' 
difficulty, and the latter's direct response to the mention 
of an oneidos is an expression of despair (969-70). The 
arrival of Odysseus precludes any decision for the moment, 
and he remains silent during the exchange between the two 
old enemies; even in his silence, however, he apparently 
gives signs of his discomfort, and Philoktetes regards his 
pain as provoked by both remorse and pity (1011-2). Neoptol- 
emos has, then, recovered his principles of the prologue, and 
both Philoktetes and Odysseus recognize this, the former 
attributing his conduct to an education in aischra at the 
hands of bad men in lines 971-2, and the latter acknowledging 
that his gennaiotes could lead him to jeopardize their 
mission (1068, ? %h 'n'Cgg 
k4Vr(6 
+ Y4vvOL 
03 'rrte WV) . This recog- 
nition of Negtolemos' qualities of decency and nobility on 
the part of Odysseus is not new (cf. 79-80), but his use of 
gennaios here contrasts with that at line 51, and reveals 
that he is aware of the ordinary significance of the word; 
there he maintained the prescriptive force of the term while 
distorting its descriptive meaning; here he does virtually 
the opposite, applying the word to the impulse to feel pity 
and to help others, but denying that this impulse is desir- 
able. This use of cennaios thus agrees with that of Philo- 
ktetes at 475-6 (he repeats it in the same sense at 1402), 
and there can be little doubt but that we are supposed to 
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regard this as the proper application of the word. 
175 
Philoktetes referred to Neoptolemos' hamartia at 1012, and 
in the prologue Neoptolemos himself declared that he would 
rather KvAws wv äj "r* ,j than v, -- v 1<*KZJ94-5) : it is 
once more with Neoptolemos' hamartia that we are concerned 
when he and Odysseus return to the stage at 1222. At 1224 
Neoptolemos says that he intends to undo his previous hamar- 
tia, and at 1228 he defines this as consisting in his ýrTrocroc 
i 
ocitxCoLl. in the attempt to capture Philoktetes; 
176 
at 1234 he 
explains his desire to give back the bow, and bases this on 
the recognition that he acquired it aischrös and without 
dike, and again, this must refer to deceit. Odysseus then 
replies with a threat that the Achaean army will prevent him 
giving back the bow (1241-3) and with a blatantly specious 
argument that he has, in any case, no right to give it back 
since it was his, Odysseus', plan which secured its capture 
in the first place (1247-8)! In reply to this Neoptolemos 




Neoptolemos, then, recognizes that he has done wrong in 
committing his hamartia, and takes full responsibility upon 
himself; 178 he feels that his conduct has been aischron and 
this suggests that his reaction to it is one of aidos. In 
this scene, moreover, his shame is entirely directed at his 
past actions, and there is not the slightest hint that he is 
concerned at the prospect of future damage to his reputation. 
He j concerned, however, to make good his error, and this 
indicates the presence of the emotion we should describe as 
remorse. It is clear, then, that in this passage we are 
confronted with an individual who acts according to the 
dictates of his own conscience, who, like Odysseus in Ajax 
or the Antigone of the play which bears her name, 
179 has his 
own ideas of right and wrong, ka o and aischron, and . is 
prepared to defy the group in order to carry his convictions 
through (1250-1). 180 His terminology, however, is still that 
of dos, and it is therefore of the greatest inportance for 
us that these terms, particularly aischron, which seems to 
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have an intrinsic reference to the external aspect of an 
action or situation (to "how things look"), can be used 
in the context of an individual's retrospective evaluation 
of his own conduct, his internal moral conscience. Sophokles, 
it appears, has recognized that when a human being exper- 
iences aidos, he is not simply reacting to the prospect of 
the disapproval of others, but responding on the basis of 
moral standards which have become part of his internal con- 
science. Any feeling of aidos, of course, even when it is 
explicitly related to "other people", will indicate the 
activation of an internal source of reference based on the 
standards of society, 
181 but the importance of this passage, 
and, to an only slightly lesser extent, of Neoptolemos' 
earlier manifestations of aidos at 895-975, lies in their 
presentation of the working of the internalized standard as 
such. We have met passages in which a subjective evaluation 
of one's own conduct is used as an explanation for the 
absence of any pang of aidos, 
182 but it is only in the 
Philoctetes and the Ajax that we have so. far encountered a 
clear representation of aidos operating as the individual's 
subjective awareness that a certain course of action is 
against his own principles. 
183 The realization, then, that 
aidos can work in this way will presumably be a phenomenon 
of the later fifth century, and we shall meet it again in 
the fragments of Demokritos. 
184 
There is a certain paradox in all this; Neoptolemos' aidos 
is based on interpretations of key terms like aischron and 
gennaios which must roughly correspond to the orthodox fifth 
century senses of these words, yet in responding to convent- 
ional standards he is forced to use his own subjective 
judgement and to defy the rest of his society; the subjective 
aspect of his aidos is thrown into relief by the fact that 
it entails a corresponding neglect of aidos with regard to 
the criticisms of others, and thus the roots of Necto)emos' 
aid os in hiss c: or, science are highlighted in a way in which 
they would not. be. in one whose ethical assumptions were 
shared by the rest of his society. Philoktetes, however, 
does subscribe to the same ethical standards as Neoptolemos 
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eventually does, and the bond created between them, in 
effect, creates a society outwith that represented by Odys- 
seus, and it i 
Athe 
values of this society that Neoptolemos 
responds. 
185 An even deeper paradox than this, however, con- 
fronts the audience of the play: the relationship between 
Philoktetes and Neoptolemos and the commendable conduct of 
the latter surely demonstrate the fundamental lack of 
respectability of the argument that the end justifies the 
means; and yet in this case the end must be achieved, and it 
is the will of the gods that it should be so. There is thus 
no comfortable solution in which the spectator may bask, but 
rather each member of the audience, each reader of the play 
is compelled closely to examine his own values in the face 
of this fundamental paradox. 
The relative paucity of , 
instances of aidos in Sophokles' 
work belies the great importance of the concept itself; the 
poet's use of different kinds of aidos and his creation of 
tension between them form an important part of his technique, 
and the influence of contemporary thought is clearly shown 
in the partiality with which his characters often approach 
the terms with which we are concerned. As regards usage, we 
find that aidos, having already given way in many areas to 
sebas, is now less frequent than aischune; aischunomai etc. 
occur ten times, aideomai etc. six times in Sophokles, and 
both are increasingly used not of apprehension for the future 
but of concern over an action in the present. Neither is 
used with an infinitive, but both occur ' with 
present participles (aischunomai etc. A1.1307, Ant. 540, OT. 635, 
Phil. 929,1383; aideomai A1.506-7), and two instances with Ct 
(Ant. 510 (epaideomai), x. 254 (aischunomai)) reinforce this 
connexion with present action. This is obviously a sign of a 
certain shift in usage, and it is certainly significant that 
these verbs are now used more frequently of an action which 
is already begun than to inhibit one which is merely contem- 
plated, and perhaps this concern with the character of one's 
present actions does facilitate a move towards a subjective 
interpretation of one's own conduct, but no very sweeping 
conclusion should be drawn about changes in values or 
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society; it is obvious, for example, that aidos with regard 
to one's present conduct may still be related to others' 
future disapproval (e. g. Ant. 510). In the remaining instances 
the two verbs take a direct object. 
Other terms. 
Sebas etc. occur with great frequency in Sophokles, but the 
pattern of usage is very similar to that noted in the last 
chapter, and it would be to overburden an already prolix 
discussion to attempt any systematic treatment of these 
terms. Worthy of note, however, is the increasing number of 
very general uses of eusebes, asebes etc. to commend or 
denigrate conduct; this does affect aidos to a certain 
extent, because, as von Erffa points out, 
186 
an action which 
could be described as aischron might now also be termed 
dussebes. 
The present participle of hazomai occurs at 0.155 in a con- 
text of religious fear. aýaýýý seems to make good sense at 
OC. 134 (its force being equivalent to tC-ýovroc) but the active 
occurs nowhere else. 
Nemesis etc. are found five times (El. 792,1466-7, Phil. 518, 
601-2, OC. 1753) in the sense of divine anger, only once as 
popular disapproval (Phil. 1193). 
NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR. 
1. von Erffa, p. 107. 
2. ibid. 
3. The famous speech of Sarpedon to Glaukos at I1.12.310-28 
similarly implies that heroes have a duty to protect their 
communities and that the protected have a right to demand 
protection. 
4. Cf. above, p. 166 (with n. 20, p. 198). 
5. On honour and oaths, see also Pitt-Rivers in Peristiany 
(ed. ) Honour and Shame, 32-4. 
6. The explanation is presumably intended to forestall any 
objection that O. "should" have guessed the truth from the 
manner of Iok. 's departure; it is not tremendously plausible, 
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but it does have the effect of stressing the extent of O. 's 
delusion. Burian, Suppliant Drama, p. 291n. 37, suggests that 
there may be irony in the lines, to the effect that Iok. 
really is ashamed of O. 's "misbegetting". 
7. On the Sun as the god who sees all and so most resents 
pollution, see Parker, Miasma, 293,310,316-7. 
8. Because people shun and express revulsion for that which 
is polluted, the consequences of pollution and disgrace con- 
verge; see Parker, Miasma, 94,205,313-8. 
9. See Class, Gewissensregungen, p. 74. 
10. On O. 's guilt feelings, see Class, Gewissensregungen, 
84-8, Stebler, Entstehung und Entwicklung, 82,95-8; I should 
not dispute the general import of their observations, but 
both, it seems to me, place too much emphasis on O. 's 
repeated references to his kaka. Stebler, p. 97, claims that 
k. c Vol 9, in the exodosLis doppelsinnnig ... als Unglück und Leid, 
Schlechtes und Böses; " there is, however, no instance of the 
word in which the primary sense is not "misfortunes" rather 
than "misdeeds" (see esp. 1330 ICCkaic ... it 
OE'). O. , as Class 
(p. 87) Points out, bears no Schuld in the subjective sense, 
he is not "morally responsible" for what he has done, yet he 
still experiences a Schuldgefühl which is extremely natural 
("Oidipus wäre kein Mensch, wenn die Stimme des Gewissens 
bei ihm ausbliebe, " Class, ibid. ); this distinction, however, 
does not rest on the interpretation of his kaka as "misdeeds". 
11. Cf. above, 2-4. In addition, if there is any truth in 
Devereux' assertion (JHS 1973,36-49) that O. 's self-blinding 
is a symbolic form of castration, we might relate this (as a 
sign of guilt) to Piers' dictum (p. 2 above) that the uncons- 
cious threat implied in guilt anxiety is mutilation (castr- 
ation). 
12. understanding-roe with both phrases (so Easterling and 
Jebb, ad loc. ). 
13. From 444 and 462-3 it appears that she believes that 
Iole is in love with H., not only that he is in love with her. 
14. As suggested by Jebb, ad loc. and Bowra, Sophoclean 
T aaedy, p. 127. 
15. Hyllos himself raised the question of-re , 4ttXXovr, c at 1270, and although he cannot foresee it, the audience must 
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be intended to think of the sequel, the apotheosis, and to 
recognize that Zeus is not aboulos where Herakles is con- 
cerned. See Easterling ad loc. and her introd., 10-1. On the 
idea that the gods can be implicated in disgrace at all con- 
trast fr. 276R (von Erffa, 122-3,125). 
16. On the problem of %ýK6(` 
Ký«(TKVýiJ and sophistic 
approaches to it, see below, pp. 541-65. 
17. Cf. Dover, GPM, p. 223. 
18. P. 76. 
19. p. 115. 
20. Cf. above, pp. 8-9,117-8,168-9. 
21. Cf. above, p. 35. "Results" and "intentions" are, however, 
part of the dialectic of the play; Dei. makes allowances for 
the influence of Eros on both H. and Iole, and does not 
consider her husband responsible for betraying her (436-69), 
and, as we saw, both the chorus-leader and Hyllos recognize 
her moral innocence. H., on the other hand, considers only 
results, both in the case of Dei. and in that of Lichas, 
who is put to death despite his ignorance of the nature of 
the gifts he brought (772-80, esp. 773 - -r*1 0%1 
0, xi fl '), 
H. 's values thus differ from those of the other characters 
(cf. in general Segal, CS 1977,119-23), but Dei., as we 
noted, adopts his, results-based approach in her resolve to 
die. This is only one aspect of the parallelism between the 
two in the self-chosen manner of their deaths. 
22. Yet he wishes to show his body to all at 1078-80. 
23. See Kopperschmidt, Die Hikesie, 89-91, Burian, Suppliant 
Drama, 207-62, Phoenix 1974,408-29 (esp. 409-21). 
24. O. has already been persuaded to leave the sacred pre- 
cinct and to relinquish contact with it; his supplication, 
and Antigone's plea, is thereafter "figurative" (Gould's 
terminology, JHS 1973, p. 77) and it might therefore be easier 
for the chorus to have him expelled from Attica (a reaction 
they exhibit on learning of his identity (229-36)). 
25. Aidophron first occurs at E. A1c. 659, and was presumably 
coined in order to convey the sense "showing aidos" which 
can only ambiguously be expressed by aidoios. 
26. As Adkins points out (ME, P. 105) Oedipus' language in 
expressing his moral innocence (that he suffered rather than 
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did, 266-7, cf. 538-9) is novel, and clearly akin to the 
kind of argument found in the tetralogies of Antiphon (esp. 
Tetr. 3. d. 3-6), but we should not follow Burian (Suppliant 
Drama, p. 222n. 26, Phoenix 1974, p. 414) in assuming from this 
that the passages present a "distinction between objective 
guilt (pollution) and moral responsibility" which is also 
novel; this distinction is already present in Athenian 
homicide law, which was very far from "new" when OC was 
written (see Gagarin, Drakon and Early Athenian Homicide Law, 
p. 1 etc. ), and which distinguished between intentional, 
unintentional and justified homicide, regardless of pollution 
(cf. MacDowell, Athenian Homicide Law, 47,58-81). -Thus in 
OC O. 's pollution is still relevant, even though he maintains 
his essential innocence (see, e. g., 1132-4); pollution still 
adheres to him even though he is Va1º&j Kß. 6c j (548: he is so, 
it seems, because he acted in self-defence and in ignorance, 
270-2,547-8), and this pollution is presumably indelible 
because of the intrinsic horror of the crimes of parricide 
and incest (cf. Parker, Miasma, P. 124). Lesky, Greek Tragic 
Poetry, p. 177, claims that the "distinction between subject- 
ive and objective guilt" is "completely foreign to the 
earlier Oidipous play. " This is not entirely true, since the 
exangelos at 1230 distinguishes between the suicide of 
Iokaste and the blinding of Oedipus, which are hekonta, and 
other kaka, presumably the parricide and incest, which are 
akonta; this distinction is, of course, meaningless to O. 
himself in the Tyrannus, but not because it was not under- 
stood by the Athenians when the play was produced. 
On the subject of lines 258-91, we should note the presence 
of the argument from the reputation of the supplicated at 
258-62,282-3; essentially, this is an appeal to aidos, but 
of-a more self-regarding kind than the simple appeal for 
aidos qua suppliant. Perhaps, too, the whole argument on O. 's 
moral innocence is a variation of another common suppliant 
appeal, the argument that the suppliant's position is 
dikaion (cf. A. Supp. 343,384,395,406,419,430). 
27. See Burian, Suppliant Drama, P. 231, Phoenix 1974, p. 414. 
28. Cf. the sentiments of Odysseus at Ai. 121-6 and n. 102 
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below. 
29. Cf. above, p. 187. 
30. Cf. below, rp. 363-8¢. 
31. I should print a question mark (Dawe) rather than a 
colon (Pearson) after T 
KX'. 
32. This is how 0. describes his crimes at OT. 1409 (p. 212 
above). 
33. Cf. von Erffa, p. 118. 
34. Burian, Suppliant Drama, p. 235, Phoenix 1974, p. 418. 
35. locc. cit., p. 242, p. 421 resp.. 
36. See Burian, Suppliant Drama, p. 247-8, Phoenix 1974,472- 
5, Whitman, Sophocles, p. 211, Winnington-Ingram, Sophocles, 
p. 276, and contrast Kirkwood, Study, p. 152. 
37. Cf. Hesiod, WD. 197-201 (120-1 above) and Thgn. 83-6, 
289-92,647-8 (p. 138 above). 
38. aideisthai could easily replace sebein in this context. 
39. The connexion between aidos, sebas and time is apparent 
in this passage; see above, pp. 188-9. 
40. Cf. Burian, Suppliant Drama, p. 254. 
41. Burian, Suppliant Drama, p. 250. 
42. Kirkwood, Study, 152-3. 
43. It is, for example. the reaction of the other brother at 
A. Sept. 683-5 (p. 170 above); we might also note how both Pol. 
in OC and Et. in Sept. act in fulfilment of the curse out of 
concern for their honour and the desire to do battle; in OC. 
1424-5 Antigone makes explicit comment on this: 
IN Ia 11 ötKj Tsc -r-&W 
ý 
vvv ws is ýý(ýeJ eKcýECFCý 
avTC- 9 f) als d-¢ 
wv L}OCKT'J el o(1M it, J 
°e' 
Burian, Suppliant Drama, p. 253n. 73 writes, 
"There are few more poignant illustrations of the Greek 
conception of prophecy as determining the future not by 
itself, but only in conjunction with human will. " 
44. See Winnington-Ingram, Sophocles, 276-7. 
45. Cf. in general Winninston-Innrar, 277-9,325-9. 
46. There are, however, several minor uses of related terms: 
the concept of aischrokerdeia (the pursuit of wealth or 
advantage by dishonest means) is mentioned by Teiresias at 
1056 as a particular failing of monarchy, and Kreon uses 
the adjective aischros with a similar reference to base gain 
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at Z'39,313 and 1047 (cf. Haimon at 747); at 710-1 Haimon 
declares that open-mindedness and flexibility are not 
aischron for one who is sophos, i. e. that they will not be 
taken as a sign of weakness. Self-regarding aidos is also a 
Prominent motive in both main characters: at line 5 the 
statement of Antigone that there is nothing aischron or 
atimon which is not part of the ills of her family is but 
one indication of the concern for her own reputation and for 
the honour of her family which is one of her chief motivating 
forces throughout the play (cf. Gellie, Sophocles, 30-1). 
Kreon, too, is motivated by concern for his owm status: it 
is a matter of honour to him that he should not be worsted 
by a woman (484-5,525,677-80) or by his son, a mere boy 
(726-7), himself the slave of a woman (746,756). 
47. Kreon thus "makes the fact of Antigone's deviation a 
reproach against her" (Jones, Aristotle, p. 199). 
48. The Phrase 4L4 (A rw4 recurs at 907 in Antigone's speech 
to the chorus which draws its argument from Hdt. 3.119. 
While I tend to agree with those who reject this passage, I 
do not believe that the repetition of this phrase influences 
the argument one way or the other. 
49. Cf. (e. g. ) 29-35 above. 
50. The idea of T"'$ örwýrýý«YxvvýS d--c/ raises the possib- 
ility, sebein and aideisthai being so close in this type of 
context, that Antigone feels aidos for her brother. This 
aidos would be the kind which one owes all one's philoi, 
especially one's family, and clearly it would be possible 
for her response towards Polyneikes to be so designated, but 
Sophokles achieves a significant effect by describing it in 
terms of sebas and by exploiting the varying senses and 
applications of sebein, eusebeia etc. (on which see Adkins, 
RR, 132-8). Sebas is not originally or exclusively a relig- 
ious term (see pp. 92-3 above), but with its relatives it is 
comprnly used of the response to the divine, and it is this 
application of the words, together with that centred on 
loyalty within the family, that Sophokles assigns to Ant- 
igone (511,922-4,943; on eusebeia as her Bewea rund, see 
Stebler, P. 108). Haimon also supports her form of eusebeia 
at 745, and Kreon recognizes its religious nature (777-80), 
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but expresses contempt for it. For him, to sebein is to be a 
patriot, to obey those in authority, and, in the final ana- 
lysis, to bow to his own power (166,301,514,516,730,744). 
The sense of respect for authority or for those of greater 
power or status, we recall, might also be covered by aidos, 
although, as we saw in Aeschylus (pp. 186-96 above), sebas is 
now much more common in such contexts. 
The chorus also have pronouncements to make on the nature of 
eusebeia: at 872-5 they recognize that both Antigone's and 
Kreon's kinds of eusebeia are entitled to be so called, and 
point out the former's failure to recognize the totality of 
the concept (cf. the second antistrophe of the "Ode on Man", 
365-75, where both respect for the law and reverence for the 
gods are seen as desirable). In the end, however, it is Ant- 
igone's eusebeia which is seen as more important and Kreon's 
failure to grasp this which is condemned: xýºý 
ýý Toc ýS (ýEýýý/ 
/ttv1 6'1 ocr6jrj 7J. 1349-50 (on the two choral comments, cf. 
Kirkwood, Study, p. 126). 
Kreon and Antigone, then, differ in their conceptions of 
aidos and eusebeia, as well as on the meanings of a number 
of common words (cf. Goheen, Imagery, p. 17, Kirkwood, Study, 
P. 125, Knox, Heroic Temper, p. 90). 
51. See von Erffa, 108-9, Stebler, p. 69; Adkins (R, p. 184) 
misses the point, which is that Kreon does not ask Antigone 
"whether she is not ashamed of having tried to bury Poly- 
neikes in defiance of his orders. " 
52. See n. 50. On Antigone's "conscience", see Stebler, 107- 
11. As Stebler points out (p. 107, cf. Gellie, Sophocles, 29 
and 32) Antigone has a number of motives, but one of them is 
certainly her independent recognition of an absolute moral 
imperative. 
53. See especially Kirkwood, "Homer and Sophocles' Ajax", 
and Winnington-Ingram, Sophocles, 15-9. 
54. Winnington-Ingram, p. 17, cf. Whitman, Sophocles, p. 64. 
55. Kirkwood, "Homer", 59-62, Winnington-Ingram, p. 16 (on 
Ajax' "preoccupation with aidos" in the Iliad). 
56. Kirkwood, "Homer", p. 56. 
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57. Winnington-Ingram, 16-9. 
58. Kirkwood, "Homer". 57-9,62,65,67; Winnington-Ingram, p. 16. 
59. On his concern for his time and atimia, see Knox, Heroic 
Temper, p. 29, Winnington-Ingram, p. 27; on his disregard for 
his social context, Winnnington-Ingram, p. 24. 
60. Ajax' conduct is described as hybris at 1061 (cf. 1088) 
by the far from impartial Menelaos, but surely this estimat- 
ion of the indiscriminate slaughter of animals might be 
shared by anyone. Hybris on Ajax' part is also implied by 
Athena at 132-3 and by the Messenger's report of Kalchas' 
explanation of the goddess' wrath at 758-70. 
61. See, for example, Odysseus' words to Eurykleia at Od. 22. 
411-2. 
62. Cf. Adkins, I($, p. 61. 
63. See Winnington-Ingram, p. 27, Stebler, p. 67, Class, p. 72; 
the latter, however, also writes: 
"Hier kommt mit zwingender Eindringlichkeit einem 
Menschen zum klaren, vollen Bewußtsein, daß er etwas 
vollbracht hat, wofür er ganz verantwortlich ist und 
das sich nicht mehr rückgängig machen läßt. " 
And: 
"Von der vc'(sS der Aias ... läßt sich eine Linie ziehen 
zur vorog des euripideischen Orestes, der unter dem 
schlechten Gewissen leidet, nämlich dem Bewußtsein, 
Furchtbares getan zu haben. " 
Aj« does realize what he has done, and that his action will 
have its consequences, but he attributes its initiation not 
to himself as a responsible agent, but to Athena (367,401-2); 
and the fact that he is not troubled by the rightness or 
wrongness of what he has done, but only by the ignominy in 
which it involves him, is part of his extreme concern with 
his honour, part of his character, and is in no way attrib- 
utable to the play's early date; the difference between 
Ajax and E. 's Orestes need not be seen in terms of develop- 
ment towards a greater understanding of "conscience". 
64. Ajax' concentration on his father here reveals the 
strength of his attachment to the heroic warrior ideal; in 
the Iliad it is the father's hope that his son will be a 
better warrior than he is (Hektor at 6.479, recalled by Ajax 
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at , 
Ai. 550-1) and the father shares in the son's glory (6.446, 
8.285); the converse is also true, and both Glaukos in the 
Iliad (6.209) and Telemachos in the Odyssey (24.508) are 
reminded by their fathers of the need to preserve family 
honour (on all these, cf. P. 28 above). To let one's father 
down, then, is clearly occasion for aidos; perhaps we should 
remember, however, how Kluckhohn and Leighton saw the 
feeling that one is unworthy of one's parents as guilt or 
conscience (p. 5 above); it may simply depend on the choice 
of vocabulary whether such a feeling is shame or guilt, even 
in terms of Piers' distinction between failure and trans- 
gression (p. 3 above), since to let one's parents or one's 
father down is both to fail to live up to an ideal and to 
trafSaress injunctions like vNtt14 
(cf. pp. 213-4 above). 
65.462-5, wk -poi "v üýaýR SIAwf'i r).; notice also that Ajax 
imagines that his father will be'unable to look upon him; on 
such behaviour as a sign of aidos cf. pp. 2,6n. 4,106n. 127,126, 
213 above; as a sign of aidos the inability to look others 
in the face may simply be an indication of embarrassment or 
a sign that one shares the negative judgement of one's own 
conduct which one expects in others, and thus a sign of con- 
science (a Gewissensregung, Class, 74-5). 
66. Hence the truth of Whitman's remark on the symbolism of 
Kalchas' Pronouncement that Athena's anger is destined to 
end with the present day (756-7): "if Ajax can be induced to 
endure one day of disgrace ... he will 
live on for any 
number of days" (Sophocles, p. 70). This is, in effect, what 
Ajax says at 475-6. 
67. Cf. pp. 215-6 above; devotion to their own standards of 
euaeneia is a characteristic of the heroes; see Knox, Heroic 
Tempe , p. 28, and cf. in general H. Diller, WS 1956,70-85. 
68. Study, p. 105. 
69. See Winnington-Ingram, 18-9,29-31. 
70. Cf. pp. 28-9,38-42 above; Andromache's appeal at 11.6.432 
is similar, and Hektor reveals that he is affected by it at 
454-65. 
71. Cf. Kirkwood, Stud , p. 106. 
72. Winninston-Ingram (p. 29) refers to Tekmessa's use of 
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eugenes as "a 'persuasive' redefinition" of Ajax', but the 
idea that the man of good birth should return favours is 
certainly not foreign to the traditionalist outlook of 
(e. g. ) the Theognid corpus (cf. above, pp. 135-7). Winnington- 
Ingram may be right, however, to suggest (p. 30) that more 
obviously self-regarding concerns may override such senti- 
ments, and, in particular, that the claims of a concubine to 
charis may not be particularly strong; the fact remains, 
however, that Tekmessa bases her argument on aspects of the 
heroic code. 
73. Sophocles (Eng. trans. ), 21-2. 
74. Segal, Tragedy and Civilisation, p. 134; cf. Knox, Heroic 
Tempe , p. 90, on Antigone and Kreon (n. 50 above). 
75. loc. cit. (n. 73). 
76. In the Trugrede, the content of which concerns us only 
to the extent that mention of sebas for the Atreidai by 
virtue of their status as leaders (667-8) and of "yielding", 
raises the possibility of the aidos which one owes one's 
superiors. Since I believe that Ajax is dissimulating in 
this speech, it follows that I should regard him as without 
this kind of aidos (cf. Winnington-Ingram, p. 49, contrast 
(e. g. ) M. Sicherl, YCS 1977, p. 82); furthermore, I do not 
believe that he accepts any recognizable kind of sophrosyne 
in this speech, in spite of his reference to that concept in 
677 (cf.. Winnington-Ingram, 50-6, Segal, Tragedy and Civil- 
isation, 119 and 150, contrast Sicherl, 82-8, Whitman, 
Sophocles, p. 77); the general approach to the Trugrede of 
Winnington-Ingram (47-56) and Lesky (Greek Tragic Poetry, 
p. 127) is the one I should myself follow. On "yielding" in 
Sophokles in general, see Diller, W 1956,75-8. As to his 
pity for Tekmessa and Eurysakes, there is no certain indic- 
ation as to whether this is genuine or feigned, although, to 
me, both his ironical use of the pejorative efýýkýv6ý W in 
651 and his brusque dismissal of pity in 580 suggest the 
latter. 
77. Cf. pp. 225-6 above. 
78. Where he says that Achilles o. u<&5trt not Hektor but 
"dumb earth". 
79. Thus at fl. 24.406-9 Priam is concerned lest Achilles may 
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have mutilated his son's body, and, at 411-23, Hermes is at 
pains to reassure him. 
80. Cf. P. 225 and n. 60 above. 
g1. CF. 142 -& above. . 8 1. Cf. 
fºthe 
Theognidean passages on pp. 137-8 above. 
8:. Cf. below, pp. 549-65 ; the argument given by Menelaos 
seems essentially to correspond with the Protagorean posit- 
ion, as far as we can tell (below, pp. 550-6 ). 
P. W. Rose, HSCP 1976, p. 53 identifies soteria as a sophistic 
Stichwort, the aim of the pre-social struggle for survival 
which is analogous to the state of man before the acct sition 
of a dos and dike in Plato's Prot. myth (Prot. 322a-b); here, 
however, as, indeed, in the Phil. (see Rose, p. 79 on Phil. 
1396) soteria is the product of aischune and deos (so at 
wich 
Prot. 322b. 6 in trying and failing to found cities were 
seeking 1*6 ci ; this, however, they only achieve with 
the acquisition of -rr n 
ul 
-rn vl through dike and aidos). 
84. Cf. pp. 56 and 137-8 above. 
8$. In n. 76 above. 
86. That his remarks are distasteful is stated by Whitman, 
Sophocles, p. 78. Whitman also writes of Menelaos' "Spartan- 
ism" (cf. Jebb, ad loc. ); this description is tenable, in 
view of the similarity of the remarks of Archidamos at Thuc. 
1.84.3 (pp. 454-7 below). 
87. Popular Ethics, p. 194. 
88. Cf. 1134 and Kirkwood, Stud , p. 107. 
89. In using commendable arguments for discreditable ends 
Menelaos thus bears comparison with the Kreon of the Ant.; 
cf. Winnington-Ingram, 62-3. The position of Odysseus in 
Phil. is in some ways the converse of this; his aims are 
desirable but his methods discreditable. 
90. One wonders, however, whether, with the prohibition of 
burial, the hybris of Ajax' enemies does not take on a more 
objective character; denial of burial is certainly seen as 
an infringement of divine law in the Ant., and in this play 
it is opposed by the morally scrupulous Odysseus; for the 
idea that it was Sophokles' own belief that denial of burial 
was always wrong (even thoughjit was carried out with some 
frquency in real-life Athens) see G. Cerri, Legislazione 
orale e tragedia greca, 17-50. It is certainly worth remark- 
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ing that the partiality of choral comments decreases some- 
what from that point on; see the leader's criticism of Teuk- 
ros' abuse of Menelaos at 1119-20, implying that, cv Kat#75 
dignity and moderation should be shown by all (and cf. 1264 
-5). 
91. Another breakdown of communication; see Segal, Tragedy 
and Civilisation, p. 135. 
92. Cf. Winnington-Ingram, p. 66. 
93. Cf. above, pp. 48-55. 
94. P. 66. 
95. See Pearson, Popular Ethics, p. 195. 
96. Although the laws of the gods are also relevant here 
(1343-4). The two points are, however, separate: Odysseus 
believes that it is not dikaion to derive Ajax of time and 
that it is not dikaion to transgress the laws of the gods 
(cf. Winnington-Ingram, p. 67). 
97. Cf. above, pp. 81-4 etc.. 
98. Cf. above, pp-. -10-25,82-4 etc.. 
99. Cf. above, pp. 119-21,142-5. For aischrokerdeia cf. Ant. 
298-9,313-4,1045-7,1056 and von Erffa, p. 124. 
100. On its unexpectedness, see 1382. Of course, Teukros and 
the chorus would not dispute what Odysseus says, but their 
concern for Ajax and his body is partial where his is not. 
100a. Odysseus is thus denied the opportunity to act as did 
Achilles in 11.24, where he prepared his enemy's body for 
burial (571-90, cf. 6.418-9, where Achilles personally sees 
to the burial of Eetion, for whom he felt sebas). 
101. This is, in effect, denied by Stebler, p. 71, who, while 
recognizing that Odysseus acts out of concern for dike, 
nevertheless writes: 
"Im Blickpunkt steht noch nicht das eigene Selbst, das eine 
Verletzung der göttlichen v? l. o nicht mit sich verein- 
baren kann, aus tiefst-innerer, wesensmässiger Gefolg- 
schaft, sondern die 
ot. 
k, , die , die zu wahren sind, 
damit der Mensch weiter in ungetrübter Beziehung zu den 
Göttern stehen kann ... ." 
The idea of "das eigene Selbst ... " she finds in Ant. (pp. 
106-16 of her work), but I see no difference between Odys- 
seus' conviction that one should not break divine law and 
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Antigone's; both dike and the laws of the gods in Ai. are 
interpreted in line with Odysseus' own moral principles, and 
so, just like Antigone, he is opposing his own moral cons- 
cience to the will of other people; in that he is disinter- 
ested where Antigone is not he is, in fact, a clearer example 
of the phenomenon. 
102. On the relevance of this to Demokritos B264 etc. see 
below, pp. 559-65 . Odysseus does, of course, motivate his 
conduct in several different ways: there is the aspect which 
most concerns us, his sense of what is dikaion and ka on; 
then there is his belief that divine law forbids the exposure 
of a corpse; and there is his characteristic (in this play) 
humanity, his ability to see his own fate in that of another, 
which is expressed at both the begining (121-6) and the end 
(1365-7) of the play (cf. Theseus at OC. 567-9, p. 218 above). 
At both points he points out that his pity for Ajax as a 
human being is based on consideration of his own interests 
as well as those of his enemy, and Jones, Aristotle, 184-8, 
is at pains to explain this element of self-interest to "the 
reader educated in a morality of altruism" (p. 186). I do not 
think, however, that his sentiments will have placed any 
strain on those familiar with the phrase (often repeated in 
justification of Christian altruism), "There but for the 
grace of God go I. " 
103. Cf. Winnington-Ingram, 222-3. 
104. Knox, Heroic Temper, 28-30, Winnington-Ingram, 240-1. 
105. Sophocles, p. 165. 
106. Cf. above, pp. 71-6,167-9 and Kells on 517-8. 
107. Oeoatrroc in 521 also suggests hybris (Jebb compares Pl. 
Laws 630b) and lack of aidos. 
108. Kirkwood, Study, p. 140. 
109. Whitman, p. 158, Winnington-Ingram, 219-22. 
110. M$, p. 156. 
111. See Dover, JHS 1983, p. 41. 
112. Adkins denies that au to-ke/ is the equivalent of 
aischron in Homer (IR, 43-4), which is in itself unlikely, 
but there is no equivalent denial with regard to later 
poetry. 
113. In addition to those passages already considered (pp. 8- 
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9,117-9,134-5,185,216 above), cf. E. IA. 1341-4, Thuc. 1.83.1, 
84.1,5.101,111.3-4,8.27.2-3 (below, pp. 331,452-3,467-9). 
114. See pp. 181-2 above. 
115. That the position of the Orestes of this play is 
similar is argued below, p. 248. 
116. Cf. Winnington-Ingram, 220-1. 
117. P. 185. 
118. Cf. P. 75 above. 
119. For the aischron-dikaion antithesis in the same context 
cf. E. E1.1050-1, Or. 194 (below, pp. 359-60). 
120. Notice how at 515 the chorus term the family history 
one of aikeia right back to the death of Myrtilos. 
121. Cf. Segal, TAPA 1966,536,540, Winnington-Ingram, p. 221, 
Keils on 582-3. 
122. Cf. P. 238 above. 
123. Just as Klytaimestra recognizes that her arguments will 
not persuade Elektra (547,550-1, cf. Winnington-Ingram, 
p. 221). 
124. Cf. above, p. 227 and n. 64 (etc. ). 
125. Cf. Kirkwood, Study, P. 140, Segal, TAPA 1966, p. 499, 
Winnington-Ingram, p. 246. 
126. The offence which, as she recognized (522-4), Elektra 
most often attributed to her (cf. 271,790,794). 
127. Cf. 287-93,520-2,595-7. 
128. See Whitman, P. 165, Lesky, Greek Tragic Poetry, p. 167, 
and on the self-awareness of Sophokles' charcters in general, 
Diller, WS 1956,70-85. Stebler, p. 87, sees Elektra's 
aischune here as "eine bestimmte Form des Gewissens. " 




see below, PP-551-4. 
130. See Segal, Tragedy and Civilisation, P. 283, Woodard, 
Essays, 131-2; on words and deeds in the play in general, 
see Woodard, HSCP 1964,163-205,1965,195-233, Essays, 
125ff. and cf. Segal, TAPA 1966,531-5. 
131. Cf. Winnington-Ingram, p. 225. 
132. Cf. Hes. WD. 197-200 (p. 120 above), Thgn. 289-92,647-8 
(p. 138 above), E. Med. 439-40 (P. 354 below). 
133. Eum. 490-516, p. 193 above. 
134. Cf. n. 67 above. 
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135. See 589-90,968-9, and cf, the chorus at 1058-97; 
Elektra claims eusebeia for herself no less than does 
Antigone (n. 50 above); cf. Lesky, Greek Tragic Poetry, 163-4. 
136. Cf. Winnington-Ingram, P. 225. The sentiment contrasts 
with that of the Aeschylean Elektra, who wanted to be r&+&v- 
7 
Grr-rc-eXand cuýE-ý6Fý1- r than her mother (Cho. 140-1); J. T. 
Sheppard (CR 1918, p. 137) suggests that the sophrosyne and 
eusebeia of Elektra may have become proverbial, and (CQ 1918, 
84-5) develops the idea that Sophokles' treatment of these 
themes reveals the essential contradiction in Elektra's 
conduct which constitutes her tragedy; on the contrast 
between E1.307-9 and Cho. 140-1, cf. also Segal, TAPA 1966, 
p. 500 and Lesky, Greek Tragic Poetry, p. 163. 
137.308-9 clearly bear comparison with 621; cf. Winnington- 
Ingram, 223-4. We might also consider in this connexion 1382 
-3, where Elektra prays to Apollo, "Reveal to men the ways 
in which the gods reward dussebeia; " as Segal (TAPA 1966, 
p. 525) points out, this is an ominous prayer for one who 
cannot eusebein. 
138. Cf. P. 185 and n. 100 (p. 205) above. 





0.3 Lr&üs 140. wp. 644 ry , 
%ß" 
v, 1<&I 
141. Cf. Segal, TAPA 1966,483-4,510, Kells, introd. p. 6. In 
particular of ö'V rvJ owevvis an obvious over- 
stepping of the mark, and will alert the spectator to the 
possibility of aischrokerdeia and the traditional pejorative 
significance of kerdos (cf. n. 99 above). Segal, TAPA 1966, 
p. 511 and Kirkwood, Study, p. 147n. 33 compare Phil. 108-9. 
142. See 114,125,197,279,638 etc.; Segal, TAPA 1966, p. 511, 
Tragedy and Civilisation, p. 254. 
143. TAPA 1966, p. 475. 
144.8.9.356-63. 
144a. Cf. 607-8. 
145. Achilles' hatred of duplicity appears at (. 9.312-3; 
cf. Knox, Heroic Temper, p. 121. 
146. Webster's explanation (ad loc. ) of the syntax of 83 
seems to me to be most likely to be right; he explains 6-i$ 
as adverbial, comparing eo Kai 
\1 
, T. 78, and e. 3 
f(v, y, u as acc. of duration; von Erffa, p. 117, also rejects 
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Jebb's idea that öcsL-fZ3 and fCKhü could both qualify, 
but his explanation (that c-"S g. c, ýýc-ý _ "for the purpose of 
a shameless act") seems to require -fc. just as much as the 
other interpretation which he, like Jebb, rejects (that G-S 
avtic Sc-S could = tL3 avtLI7C-c4 would require the article. 
147. N. 's awareness of his own Physis will prove important; 
see Diller, WS 1956, p. 71. 
148. Cf. n. 65 above, Class, P. 74, Stebler, P. 103; N. 's use 
i 
of T'&kýAA lrK also hints at anaideia, which is commonly felt 
to require "boldness" or "daring". 
149. Aside from Odysseus' obvious promotion of To 
over 
7% SLIk-AIL64 the influence of sophistic thought may also be 
seen in his use of 
T(, 
iriaOIva, c in 109; soteria is an important 
idea in the play and, as Rose, HSCP 1976, p. 53 points out, 
possibly a term borrowed from sophistic Kulturentstehungs- 
theorien (cf. n. 83 above). f 
150. See Rose, HSCP 1976,64-80, on the development of ties 
of friendship between the two men which eventually become 
genuine; Rose relates this to sophistic "social contract" 
theories, the idea that morals and values arise from a 
recognition that it is in the interests of all to live 
together in political communities without harming each other. 
On real points of contact between the two even before Neo- 
ptolemos confesses his deceit, see Rose, p. 67, on 411-60, 
where there does seem to be a genuine agreement between them 
on which of the heroes at Troy were chrestoi and which kakoi; 
cf. Alt, Hermes 1961, p. 151, Kirkwood, Study, p. 146. 
151. Rose, P. 66 and n. 42. 
152. Cf. OC. 258-62,282-3 (n. 27 above) and 902-3 (p. 218 and 
n. 30 above). 
153. P. 68. 
i 
154. Cf. Odysseus' injunction, -r& /%4, at 82. 
155. Above, pp. 139-40. 
156. Cf. in general pp. 60-3,109nJ65. 
157. Cf Adkins, M. $, p. 189 (on aischron and agathos in the 
prologue of this play). 
158. Above p. 248 (with nn. ad loc. ). 
159. Cf. Rose, p. 69 (who, however, claims that Neoptolemos 
imitates Philoktetes' "untraditionally humane ethics. "). 
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160. p. 288. 
161. Cf. pp. 16-7 above. 
162. On the progressive revelation of the prophecy, see 
Winnington-Ingram, p. 292; as he points out, there can 
scarcely be any doubt but that the final version, given by 
Neoptolemos at 1324-36, is the authoritative one, for it is 
endorsed by Herakles; it is pointless to ask, in connexion 
with that passage or with this, how N. knows and why he does 
not say what he knows sooner; see further Alt, Hermes 1961, 
141-74 and (with some criticism of her approach) Lesky, 
Greek Tragic Poetry, 175-6 (with further reff. ). 
162a. Cf. 966 and, on the significance of 7rKh. 9l in these 
lines, Lesky, P. 172, Winnington-Ingram, p. 284. 
163. His aporia is the dominant note of this scene; cf. 895, 
908,969,974; Alt, 159,163, Stebler, 104-5, Lesky, p. 172. 
164. See Rose, p. 73 and cf. Segal, Tragedy and Civilisation, 
p. 336. 
165. Cf. Stebler, P. 104. For words indicating N. 's pain, see 
806,906,913,1011. 
166. Cf. Alt, p. 160. 
167. Applied to a person aischros usually bears a physical 
sense ("ugly"); for this transferred use cf. 1284. 
168. Neoptolemos' moral standards and his aidos thus seem to 
be part of his Physis, but this hardly allows us to attribute 
to Sophokles the view that aidos can exist 
ýVt&L (on this 
question see below, 551-4 ), first of all because the poet 
is not writing a systematic discourse on nomos and Physis 
and secondly because it is not necessary to suppose that, 
because a certain kind of aidos is part of one's Physis as a 
young adult, it is inherited and innate. From the play 
itself it emerges that both innate capacity and education 
(the education Neoptolemos receives at the hands of Philok- 
tetes) are necessary for the development of a sound 
character (see Rose, 85-9); this is the Protagorean/Demokrit- 
ean position (below, pp. 551-2,562-3) and it is therefore 
possible that Sophokles was aware of ideas such as that 
found in Demok. B33DK, to the effect that education can 
create a new Physis. 
169. P. 104. 
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170. On N. 's aristocratic si see Diller, WS 1956, p. 71, 
Lesky, Greek Tragic Poetry, p. 175 (191-2 on Physis in S. in 
general); the aristocratic aspect of the references to 
Physis should not be exaggerated, however, to the extent of 
claiming that, in N., S. dramatises the "Pindaric" notion of 
inherited virtue; N. 's essential "nobility" and his Physis 
must meet with the proper education to become effective (see 
Rose, p. 87) and, as Winnington-Ingram (p. 310) suggests, 
terms originally denoting aristocratic virtues may have long 
since become "simply those of traditional morality. " 
171. Cf. P. 227 and nn. 64 and 65 above. 
172. Cf. pp. 5,213-4 (with n. 11) and n. 64 (pp. 270-1) above. 
173. See Class, p. 73 and cf. 110 (p. 252 and n. 148 above). 
174. Cf. his words at 477. 
175. Rose, p. 90, recognizes that Odysseus' redefinition of 
gennaios at 51 is specious, and that in 1368 the word is 
used in a popularly acceptable sense, but as we saw (p. 254 
and n. 153 above), refuses to allow that Philoktetes' also 
uses the term in a sense which is recognizably conventional 
at 475-6; on the various interpretations of this word, see 
also Alt, P. 147, and H. C. Avery, iiermes 1965, p. 289. 
176. Cf. Philoktetes at 1136. 
177. On hamartia aischra in this passage Adkins (ME, p. 183) 
writes: "Under traditional values, a hamartia aischra is a 
mistake that has led to a failure. " At no period, however, 
is there any intrinsic reference to failure in the adjective 
aischros (cf. pp. 13-8 above), except in so far as to do 
something aischron is to fail to match some standard of 
propriety; the standard in question, however, could be any 
one of a large number of traditional imperatives, and need 
not simply be the requirement to succeed per se. Correspond- 
ingly, the rest of Adkins' remarks on this passage are 
invalid. He goes on: 
"To be able to use such a phrase as hamartia aischra in 
a situation where a success has been gained, indicates 
a firmly rooted change in values ... . The new usage is 
_sufficiently 
rooted to be understood without explanation, 
but only a minor assault might be needed to overset it. " 
Since he finds it "significant" (ibid. ) that this phrase 
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occurs in a late play of Sophokles, Adkins presumably 
regards the "change in values" as a phenomenon of the latter 
half of the fifth century; yet in Hesiod success was not to 
be pursued at all. costs, and similar ideas are expressed in 
Theognis; to steal is to gain a success of sorts, but in 
Theognis theft (the pursuit of kerdos by improper means) is 
aischron (cf. P. 144 above, and note that in Thgn. 607-10 it 
is profit made from deceit which is aischron). One could 
even claim that the "firmly rooted change" goes back to the 
beginning of Greek literature, for although the evidence for 
the usage of aischron in Homer is scant, the suitors of the 
Odyssey could, despite their manifest success, be implicated 
in aischos by others' criticisms (see pp. 14-6,58 and 108n. 
152 above). 
178. Stebler, p. 106, notes the absence of any attempt to 
excuse himself. 
179. Cf. above, pp. 223-4,234-6. 
180. Cf. Rose, p. 76, who notes that this pastage "does mark 
a particularly self-conscious internalization of the heroic 
'shame' ethic; terms which normally derive their validity 
from the approval or disapproval of the group are here held 
up as a basis for defying the group's opinion. " Rose also 
relates this to sophistic thought, and hints at Demokritos, 
but does not mention the passages which would best illustrate 
the phenomenon, namely Demok. B84,244,264. 
181. Cf. (e. g. ) pp. 3-4,87-90 above. 
182. Cf. 132-4,182-6 above. 
183. On Neotolemos' conscience Stebler (p. 106) writes: 
"Neoptolemos' kurze Angaben von 1234 ... und 1246 ... 
zeigen weiter, daß er mit der Vorstellung seines 
i Gewissens-Inhalts den inneren kx vwdes spontanen Rechts- 
Empfindens umgreift, noch nicht aber sein Ich als 
zentrale Instanz (noch nicht: 'Ich habe getan, was mir 
nicht entspricht. ') - In Antigone werden wir auch dieser 
Stufe von Ich- und Gewissens-Bewußtsein begegnen. " 
This is quite arbitrary: Neoptolemos says, "Ich habe getan, 
was mir nicht entspricht" at 902-3; Stebler is aware that 
this might seem to contradict her remarks here, but claims 
(n. 255, p. 151) that in spite of the stress on Physis and -fä 
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p -reoxrwars in those lines, the presence of other motives 
(concern for noble birth, status, shame, cf. P. 258 above) 
renders the meaning quite different from Ant. 523 (Ant. 's 
famous statement about her loving Physis). But Neoptolemos' 
Physis drives him just as much as Antigone's drives her, and 
the latter, too, is subject to motives other than loyalty to 
her Physis. Neither do I see why a phenomenon which can be 
present in Ant. should be seen as "not yet" present in Phil.. 
From her note 256 (p. 151) it seems that Stebler regards 
Antigone's positive commitment to do what is right as more 
important than Neoptolemos' retrospective, "bad" conscience, 
but this, again, appears to me a quite arbitrary preference. 
184. See below, pp. 559-65. 
185. Cf. Rose, 64-80. 
186. P. 125. 
283 
5. EURIPIDES 
In Euripides, while aidos etc. are not generally of the same 
importance for the overall interpretation of individual 
plays as we found them to be in Aeschylus and Sophokles (the 
Hippolytus is an obvious exception), the frequency of the 
words with which we are concerned is greatly increased, and 
this, combined with the comparative wealth of our knowledge 
of Euripides as against the other two major tragedians, 
allows us to examine the usage of the relevant terms over a 
range whose width can only be paralleled by that afforded by 
the Homeric Poems. Euripides is often named as the poet who 
brought realism to the Athenian stage, and while judgements 
of this kind must be subject to careful qualification, it is 
certainly true that there is often a greater domesticity in 
the background of his plays, and it is this relative domest- 
icity which enables us to gain something of the insight 
provided by the Odyssey into the workings of aidos in every- 
day contexts. 
Euripides, like Homer, provides us with a number of 
instances of aidos in the martial context: at I-icld. 813-6 the 
Messenger describes the cowardice of Eurystheus in the face 
of a challenge from his opponents: 
bd VV 1-L- -ruS Kh vio vra5 ai SC-, r&&(S Xa rWV 
OUr oc. uTus pcUTOJ 
r*9 
LO(V d--r , oxr bus w4 
E ýl (} C-t ýi GTv iºýtýt ö Gýý vS OC )t KtýtM. ýv 
Iä 
CJý S 
J KaKýrrvs AW 
As in the Iliad, aidos, here inoperative, is felt to prevent 
cowardice; Tavs Ki L)vq re, S lklcýC-ýfýtýs expresses exactly the 
Homeric reaction - one is concerned for the opinion of those 
who might witness one's cowardice. 
1 There is, however, a 
zeugma of two senses of the verb here, for while line 813 
conveys the sense of (e. g. ) oc l 
öECc. 
' the 
phrase ai S'cr S ... jý'GAc' "V is very far from Homeric, 
2 
since, 
if aideomai took a direct object in Homer, that object was 
always personal, and referred either to those who might wit- 
ness one's actions or to the direct recipient of one's 
actions; the use of the impersonal object here suggests not 
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"I feel shame before", but "I am ashamed of", and the phrase, 
6TeAT 4u3 wJ , probably concessive in force, seems to add to 
the criticism of Eurystheus' failure to reject cowardice out 
of aidos. The Messenger's suggestion, then, seems to be that 
Eurystheus showed no regard either for the opinions of 
others or for his own status as a general, and it thus seems 
to be expected that one will refrain from discreditable 
conduct both because it will damage one's reputation in the 
eyes of others and because one considers it unworthy of one- 
self, regardless of what others may say. We have already 
noted that any feeling of aidos, any fear of loss of reput- 
ation presupposes a claim to honour, a subjective idea of 
one's own worth, 
3 
but the novelty of this passage is that 
this subjective or "internal" aspect is explicitly referred 
to beside the external source of reference, the judgement of 
other people. 
4 
The thought behind the passage is still the 
traditional one, that cowardice is aischron, but it is 
recognized that when one rejects a course of action as 
aischron one is not simply responding to the prospect of 
others' disapproval. A notion of "self-respect" has entered 
the picture, and with it a possible relationship to Demok- 
ritos' 
e 
wvröý aIs646ýwý .5 
This passage is also important in that it is the first in 
which we have met aideisthai governing an impersonal object 
in the sense "I am ashamed of x. " In this particular case it 
is not absolutely necessary to regard the force of 
oic) (iJ 
I #I as retrospective (xiÖfA(AS ... 
4(k 
xd might simply para- 
phrase a; ýcýý}Ets 
IFtküs 
'¬ 
'&(&*. L) but it will be clear that 
this sense of the verb does facilitate the retrospective 
usage, and we shall indeed consider instances of aideisthai 
in the sense of shame over one's own past actions. 
6 Obviously 
some development in the usage of the verb has taken place, 
since in Homer aidos was uniquely prospective and took only 
a personal or quasi-personal object, and this development 
should presumably be related to the frequency of instances 
of aideomai and aischunomai with a present participle in 
Sophokles: 1 ads and aischune, it seems, come increasingly 
to be concerned with one's reactions to one's own present or 
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past conduct, rather than with the inhibition of action in 
the future. Barrett, in his note on Hipp. 244, notes this 
development, but his explanation of it, in terms of contam- 
ination of aideisthai from aischunesthai, is highly question- 
7a 
able. In Homer, the usage of both verbs is parallel, and in 
the one passage in which aischunomai governs a direct 
object8 it does so in exactly the same way as aideomai. 
There is, moreover, no instance of aischunomai with an 
accusative of the wrong done which is earlier than this 
present passage, and while aischunomai is much more common 
with the participial construction in Sophokles than aideomai, 
this reflects only the obsolescence of the latter, 
9 
not a 
particular association of the former with shame over one's 
own conduct. We have, in fact, met only one passage in which 
either verb might legitimately be translated "I am ashamed 
of x", and this was in the context not of shame over one's 
own actions, but of shame over another person's low birth 
(01.1079); 10 I expressed some hesitation as to whether 
aischunomai in that passage could be replaced by aideomai 
without a change of meaning, but the fact remains that r+ 
JurreVEuc/ 
... oc3#rxvv&r1L clearly means "she is ashamed of my 
low birth, " not "she respects my low birth. " QT and Hcld. 
are probably roughly contemporary (if anything, the latter 
is likely to be the older), 
11 but even if the OT were 
unquestionably the older, one previous instance of aischun- 
omai + acc. in the sense "I am ashamed of x" would hardly be 
enough to prove that passages like the present one, in which 
aideomai has that sense, arise from contamination from the 
one verb to the other; since instances of both verbs in this 
application appear at roughly the same time, it is most 
likely that both, as synonyms, develop this particular 
meaning in a parallel fashion. 
Later in the same speech (839-40) the Messenger reports the 
exhortations to bravery which arose as battle was joined: 
'O fa. j 'fýýýJaS ý- 'd TÜJ 'iýeýcýwJ ývý 
6T[`C-i0oVTE-S - OV K 
äc ýý C-r' oc i ýxvvýý ? ýýk& 
These lines clearly recall similar appeals in the Iliad, 12 
the only slight difference being the reference to the col- 
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lective honour of the polis rather than the personal honour 
of the individual warrior or his collective honour vis-ä-vis 
his comrades, family or dependants. 
13 Eurystheus, the Mess- 
enger reports (828-9), employs a similar appeal to aidos 
when he urges his men not to disgrace (kataischunai) their 
homeland in the forthcoming battle, while at 700-1 Iolaos 
expresses the traditional idea that cowardice and staying at 
home are aischron in affirming his determination to fight. 
Iolaos is again the speaker at 541-2 where, responding to 
Makaria's decision to offer herself in sacrifice, he says: 
aud 'i airxvvv)wL 
TUtS äuts > o'o<<t -rj -rvx 7 a'cY-vv1^0-t. 
If ov J' ocº. r)vvrct is not a litotes fors "I am very proud", 
then the aischune which Iolaos disclaims may be explained as 
the reluctance of a warrior to be outdone in heroism by a 
woman14 (the chorus-leader has just described Makaria's 
proposal as the ultimate in heroism). 
That victory is alon, defeat aischron is stated quite 
plainly by Theseus at Supp. 529-30, while the idea that it is 
aischron to flee underlies Helen's appeal to Menelaos to 
abandon his aidos at Hel. 805. At Tro. 1190-1 Hekabe claims 
that the report that grown warriors killed the child, Asty- 
anax, out of fear will bring disgrace to the Greeks; at Hcld. 
1000-8 and iF. 155-70 the killing of an enemy's children is 
represented as a prudent means of securing one's own position 
and avoiding vengeance, but in both these passages the 
speaker is far from impartial, and clearly such an extension 
of enmity is of the type which some, like the Odysseus of 
Sophokles' Ajax, might regard as distasteful. In the Troades 
passage it is clearly Hekabe's intention, in the absence of 
any more effective means of retaliation, to implicate the 
Greeks in disgrace, but her evaluation of their conduct 
need not be rejected on that account. Also in Tro. we find 
an exception to the rule that defeat is aischron, in a pass- 
age which urges consideration not Just of the outcome of the 
conflict, but of the way in which the participants fought 
(401-2): 
ý, ,// ýý d fj TtJtý C)Uo(.,, 6TE avas vJ K ai "sc s i1ö)#L 
Koc. xi jö i1C-ýýaC 
ý /wvý 
Koc wj ýý efv-, < 3. 
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This appears to be an extension by analogy of the Homeric 
idea that to die bravely in battle is not aischron, 
15 but 
the analogy may break down in that, whereas an individual 
who is killed in battle can be honoured by his fellows or 
his community, which has an interest in promoting the idea 
that death in battle can be glorious, a city which is 
destroyed will be unable to confer honours on itself, and, 
unless it belongs to an alliance of some kind, might be less 
likely to find praise for its noble stand in the wider world. 
Thus, in the immediate context, the chorus-leader (406-7) 
takes no comfort from Kassandra's words; clearly, though, her 
remarks do represent the kind of sentiments to which the 
defeated might turn in self-consolation. 
We have already seen in Aeschylus' Septem and Sophokles' OC 
to 
how the sons of Oedipus are presented as driven/mutual 
destruction and fulfilment of the father's curse by their 
concern for their honour. 
16 In Phoenissae Eteokles is 
subject to exactly the same motivation, and the similarity 
of his justification of his action in terms of the insult to 
his time to that of his namesake in Aeschylus and his brother 
in Sophokles suggests that this aspect of the brothers' 
motivation had become a to pos. The relevant lines are 509-14: 
7//LI 
aý/KVýiLý, c ),, K -ru rr', N/W o, 
/ 
rL5 11o)5 
-Tuv )c a010/ c'ScaCE . T("3 
de -r&Lr orilXuva, ýnaL1 
ý7ýhUýS 
-r vi t'cc Tý f3ý; ý4vr, ý. 1% O ÖýV VV 
TuxýýV A Xc1. EL " Tail ýae äV 
ý7ý 
. acs ý r` & VOLT' G V&tZ$ C-t Iý VK7ýG(,! /U J4 6S 
Eteokles represents himself as concerned both for his own 
reputation and for that of his city, but his justification 
is couched in terms which reveal it as pure selfishness; to 
say that it is anandria to give up the greater share in 
exchange for the smaller is surely to confuse greed with 
manliness, while the concern lest Thebes should incur an 
oneidos by giving in to a foreign force barely conceals a 
preoccupation with Eteokles' own honour (&t ... -ificC&L p/ d&., 
7-cý . What were understandable motives in Aeschylus and 
Sophokles have become base and mean in Euripides, and Eteok- 
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les' selfishness is further highlighted by contrast with the 
fairness of his brother and through the criticism of his 
mother. 
17 This is the first time we have met aischunomai with 
a noun clause: von Erffa18 suggests that the verb has its 
"root meaning" ("I consider it aischrorO, but aideomai must 
also virtually mean "I consider it aischron, and, in fact, 
occurs with a comparable noun clause at Hcld. 43-4.18a 
There is another character in Pho. who acts to preserve his 
reputation and avoid the charge of cowardice, but the 
motives of Menoikeus, who, according to Teiresias (913-4), 
must be sacrificed to secure the safety of Thebes, are 
presented in a much more favourable light. Kreon, the boy's 
father, conceives a plan to convey his son out of the city 
and save his life, but Menoikeus, having first assured his 
father that he is ready to leave the city, soon reveals his 
resolve to take his own life. Important in this decision is 
his belief that to flee would be to implicate himself in 
cowardice (994), but Menoikeus' concern for his reputation 
is combined with a strong sense of duty and responsibility 
to others; at 995-6 he says that there is no excuse for his 
betrayal of the land that bore him, and thus combines the 
idea of the opinion of other people (6un(vWýeiiI) with loyalty 
to his country, a duty which is related to the requirement i 
to show loyalty to one's parents ( 
I, E rC-Wtifo (996) makes 
plain the quasi-familial relationship) and other philoi. Self- 
regarding (or "competitive") and other-regarding ("co- 
operative") motives are further entwined at 999-1005: 
i%ýI/ 
ac4 "scc-I r, cc " oL /"% OC-r ora i/ tilbvA40Gt. 




r räy6$ 'irKs ' ärirt g) Cv wö1! V 
r"/ýrtý fýxvýýfý 
TCV W lcIC/ it BF oaf( 
M, 
tYsL '7['ac1 O ü7rtý 
GW FQE ! -TC-`ac, T61 "c ACM fCx " v1n -i 'o falls Ti &X tJ "t &o vro J 4_c-ý. loos ws £JwX f} "vi5 
OM[-F lam. 
ý" ö-fro 
VaJSuj Koc. ICOS Oe v1 rO 1L. 
He is concerned, then, at the charge of cowardice, about how 
he will compare with others who face death in battleind 
about how he might appear to others, but he also considers 
his responsibility to others, and it is on the co-operative 
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note that he ends his speech (1015-8): 
Et r, -C X^ PW4 t Kaýrýs u Tt_ C) UVoavrv TLS 
SI-Ä90I TaJTý Käs Fý G< VGA f 
t1. 
&L l1i 
Z' J% (i/ 
-rrDTeCo LjW XI< I/ oc V Pct Ir"r, º6-u ckarrovwJ 
TC(-Ieký"VIC, t -re, i`OL1 J/ 6JTU7CLGV aJ. 
The combination of self- and other-regarding impulses in the 
motivation of this character is indissoluble. This will, 
I take it, partly be a result of the fact that it is tradit- 
ionally reprehensible, and so bad for oneself, to fail in 
one's duty to others, but it might also be related to con- 
temporary debate with regard to how far other-regarding 
behaviour is compatible with self-interest. 
19 In Menoikeus 
there is a perfect coincidence of the two, and he undertakes 
the ultimate subjection of self to community out of concern 
for his own reputation. That other-regarding behaviour is 
often motivated in this way is a particular Euripidean theme 
which we shall meet again; another recurrent technique is the 
way in which a given action or attitude is shown to be harm- 
ful or reprehensible in one situation or individual, helpful 
or commendable in another. This, too, may be related to 
contemporary thought, in particular to the idea that the 
character of a particular entity or course of action is not 
fixed but dependent on circumstances, 
20 
and there may be 
something of this behind the contrast between Eteokles and 
Menoikeus; to be concerned about one's reputation is, it 
seems, not always bad, but sometimes bad, sometimes good. 
It is almost certain both that the Rhesus is not by Eurip- 
ides and that its date places it outwith the period with 
which we are concerned. 
21 Without, however, drawing any 
conclusions about the practice of Euripides, we might note 
in passing that the play does contain several passages which, 
not surprisingly given the thoroughly "Iliadic" background, 
refer to the traditional idea that cowardice and defeat are 
aischron (see 82,102-4,489-91,589-90,756-7,808-10)? The 
disgraceful nature of Rhesos' death, aischron at 756-7 
because he was killed in bed, is contrasted with the glory 
of a brave death in battle at 758-61. 
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It is not only in the context of battle, however, that we 
find characters expressing concern for their reputations; 
such concern is explicitly related to aidos at Alc. 725-8, 
where Admetos is involved in recrimination with his father: 
A1. trav7 rE'vt, evroý. CfvrK'itC_S rý. J ävý 
G. KaKt äwuý/ýL\l vv v1& -(. davuVTL /0-41L 
FUG cý 4V Ti Y- I 
/. 
c s . 
`+ sä you. /ý eis -rr-x'. ýC-" 11 O v'+( ä v0LýJs - -r, j fd' E¢ 11 v CS ä4 ova . To be unconcerned about what people say is, as we have seen 
before, anaideia. Pheres, however, picks up the idea of 
anaideia and uses it in a different sense; he may be anaides, 
but Alkestis was not, in that she gave up her life for her 
husband. The aidos which Pheres admits he lacks, then, which 
is concern for what others may say of oneself, differs from 
that exemplified by Alkestis, which is respect for one's 
philoi; the distinction answers to the double use of 
aideomai with a direct object in Homer, on the one hand 
expressing awareness of the criticisms of those who witness 
one's actions, on the other signifying concern for the 
direct recipients of one's actions. Both senses may, however, 
come together, in that society in general may disapprove of 
a failure to show aidos towards one who deserves it, and so 
aidos for the recipients of one's actions may easily encom- 
pass aidos at "what people say", and this is very much what 
happens in this agora between Admetos and Pheres, as each 
accuses the other-both of failure to show respect for others 
and of acting in a way which people will regard as discred- 
itable. 
Admetos charges his father, in effect, with a breach of two 
different kinds of aidos: his major accusation is that it 
was cowardly of the old man to refuse to die in his son's 
place (642,717,721,723), but it is also part of his case 
that his father failed to return an obligation of charis: 
Admetos did not dishonour his father, but was aidophron 
towards him (658-9), 23 yet, he implies (660-1), his aidos 
was not returned. Pheres' own accusations against his son 
are exactly parallel: Admetos reproaches others with coward- 
ice, yet he has been outdone in bravery by a woman and is a 
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coward himself (696-8,701-2), while his determination to 
avoid death has convicted him of anaideia (694-6): 
äv'ýovJ T"'+ý 90"V&t' 
K ý. yS -rt E6w%J1J TcJrrý ý ýý T vx +ý Vi 
-raýrýJ KoGToLKTýGs 
Each, then, accuses the other of anaideia and seeks to 
implicate his opponent in disgrace; that this is a common 
tactic in such exchanges of invective is suggested by the 
similar exchange of insults in Sophokles' Electra. 
24 Here 
Admetos' anaideia seems to lie in his neglect of accepted 
limits of human conduct, his disregard for the opinions of 
other people in seeking someone to die in his stead and, 
p erhaps, his lack of aidos for his wife. 
25 
Pheres, as we have seen, virtually admits the validity of 
his son's accusation of anaideia: similarly Admetos, in a 
quieter moment, reveals that he is sensitive to exactly the 
charges made by his father, when, in the Homeric manner, he 
imagines "what someone will say" (954-7): 
Eý6c. da aerrs Ex6ý as &w Kv/Ec -rxC& 
rc Jai , X, 6 . V5 wýbý, 
ös uý FC 6-r> EýocýElý/ 
ähß' ýjd t ýh ý av, - JO äý ýx 
cý 
E vy eJ "/ý- ý, ý ' Kä f' äv &i, '(. 
9-a 
KcF t 
Perhaps the idea that Admetos has failed in his obligations 
to-his wife lies somewhere behind this passage, but much 
more prominent is his concern for his own reputation for 
manliness, which he expresses in language which clearly 
reveals that he is subject to aidos. Such aidos is also part 
of the motivation of Alkestis at 315-6, where she expresses 
a concern lest some future stepmother spoil her daughter's 
hopes of a good marriage by spreading an "ugly rumour" 
( -RC vt&X oýra k? A1 
%. 
c) : not only would this harm the 
child and her reputation, it would also reflect badly on the 
mother. 
Concern for time and the need to restore honour through 
vengeance is a common theme in the surving plays which deal 
with the fortunes of the House of Atreus: at E1.274 it seems 
that Electra considers even the slightest hint that her 
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brother will not restore the honour of the family disgrace- 
ful, for in answer to the question, what will Orestes do, if 
he returns to Argos? she replies: 




'' 4i11 Su Yace V. U'/ 
äKM'1 
; 
As in the other tragedians, the desire to forestall the 
mockery of others often plays a considerable role in the 
motivation of Euripides' characters. Such a desire, for 
example, determines Medea's resolve to kill Jason's new 
bride by poisoning rather than by any other means (381-5): 
ý: h ýýpºýýoý. ot 
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A similar concern is in evidence at 404-6, where she imagines 
the mockery which she will incur as a result of Jason's 
abandoning her, daughter of a noble father and descendant of 
the Sun, in favour of a member of the-"Sisyphean" royal 
house of Corinth. Like many another tragic heroine, 
26 
Medea's concern for her status, a concern borrowed, perhaps, 
from traditional male ideas of honour, is acute. 
Another woman deeply influenced by the fear of disgrace is 
Megara in HE. At 282-3 she expresses her belief that it is 
inevitable that she and her fellow-suppliants will be put to 
death; Lykos has already (238-46) threatened to burn them at 
the altar if they refuse to leave its sanctuary. For Megara, 
however, such a death is intolerable, since to afford one's 
enemies an opportunity to mock is a fate worse than death 
(284-6); the house to which the suppliants belong is 
glorious, and they must not betray it (287); 
27 
to do so 
would be to impair Amphitryon's fame as a warrior (288-9), 
and while Herakles' own fame is secure (290), 
28 he would not 
wish to be associated with the kind of disgrace which would 
accrue to his family as a result of such a passive death 
(291-3); 29 for noble parents are afflicted by their child- 
ren's disgrace. 
30 Again, such concern for honour and fame is 
of a kind which is more appropriate for men than for women, 
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The idea of the ge16s of others, particularly one's enemies, 
recurs at IT. 502, where Orestes explains his reluctance to 
divulge his name - P 
vwý/ýJNwl 0 pwuVTL-S 0V r- > 
o. J 
. 
At Ba. 828 Pentheus' aidos at dressing up in women's clothing 
(cf. 836) is clearly based on a fear of ridicule, but his 
aidos is dispelled by the assurance that this would be the 
only means of avoiding detection by the Maenads on whom he 
wishes to spy (837) and that he will be led through deserted 
streets (841); of this plan he approves, as a means of 
avoiding the mockery of his opponents (842). That Pentheus 
should be mocked, however, is exactly the intention of his 
tormentor, who wishes to enhance his victory by public 
humiliation of his victim (854-6). 
At Or. 1102 Orestes declares Menelaos, properly his philos, 
to be an echthros and vows vengeance. Then follow the seiz- 
ure of Hermione and "murder" of Helen. At 1554 Menelaos 
rushes in, aware that his daughter is prisoner and believing 
that his wife is dead (1558-9); the only concern to which he 
gives voice, however, is his concern for his reputation and 
his fear of the mockery of his enemy (1559-_60): 
+-o0 1rCVKiovot) ä Xkä -1-0'03 
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Fear of the mockery of others, especially of one's enemies, 
31 
is thus a major consideration with many Euripidean charac- 
ters, and no doubt such a concern was a common feature of the 
everyday experience of real-life Athenians, but it is worth 
noticing that such motivation often emerges in an unfavour- 
able light; Medea's fear of mockery, for example, leads to 
murder, and not only of her enemies, while Menelaos, at IA. 
371-2, uses his resentment of the mockery of the Trojans in 
justification of the sacrifice of Iphigeneia; similarly 
Megara's fear of mockery is based on an outlook of despair 
which turns out to be ill-founded. Perhaps, then, the poet 
sometimes suggests that such concerns can be harmful. 
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At Hcld. 567-71 Demophon, in rejecting a course of action 
which he considers aischron, thus suggests that he may be 
motivated by aidos, aidos which seems to be based on his 
obligations to Makaria, who has requested that her sacrifice 
be attended only by women: 
E rTOO. T ac. w Toc. 
) v'ot roe &Evivi E"rk 
K öc i Tü cl ai ýý 
öJ 
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Makaria's request, and Demophon's recognition that it is a 
request to be Kor/u. EL(O-, t w., A j, relate to ideas of the 
impropriety of young women mixing with men, but Demophon's 
assertion that it would be aischron for him to deny her 
request is based on the girl's bravery and on r# 
(ck 
ee'LGJ 
Makaria's bravery, then, seems to give her a right to have 
her request granted, and this is presumably because it is 
felt to be correct to give honour where honour is due. Some- 
thing of this sense may be covered by Tü 
fi. Kai. &nl, but it is 
possible that this also refers to the fact that Demophon 
feels himself bound by a debt of gratitude, in that Makaria's 
self-sacrifice, which she herself has already Justified with 
reference to the charis which she and her kin owe the Athen- 
ians (503-6), frees Demophon from the dilemma of being 
forced either to acquire a rep u tation for abandoning supp- 
liants (461-3) or to enter a battle which he knows he cannot 
win (since it has been prophesied that the sacrifice of a 
virgin is required in order to defeat the Argives). 
32 
Distaste at leaving an enterprise unfinished was one of the 
senses covered by the term aischron in the Iliad, 
33 
and it 
is a sentiment which finds expression again at x. 1240-2, 
where Agamemnon explains why he feels himself obliged to 
arbitrate in the dispute between Hekabe and Polymestor: 
ax(ý(-L'/OIL L-V wýý TJýXUr LAC K/ývb(,  Koc{COCý 
oý, ws dýo'rý. 
/'ýirý 
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Agamemn may be dissimulating here (he has already given 
indications that he is concerned lest others think that he 
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has taken Hekabe's side for the sake of his concubine, Kass- 
andra (850-6), and it may be that he is attempting to 
conceal the fact that he is not disinterested), but his 
explanation of his intervention in terms of aischune, must 
at least be plausible, or its efficacy as an excuse would be 
minimal. 
The idea that it is aischron for one of a certain status to 
undertake work more suitable for his inferiors seems to 
underlie Adrastos' reaction to the Messenger's report that 
Theseus himself took part in the laying out of the Argive 
dead at Supp. 767: 
O Gw OV 
'AA 
FJ va rfo(Yý4&0( k'' c/ydCx oý , 
To this the Messenger replies (768): 
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The claim that such action is not aischron thus rests on the 
principle of the common humanity of the king and the dead, 
34 
and takes no account either of the menial nature of the task 
or of the possibility that it may involve Theseus in pollut- 
ion (an idea which might be alluded to in (ccv 
J. if not 
also in k )r t' /« 
pI ). It is easy to see how the handling 
of dead bodies might be considered distasteful on both these 
grounds, and thus it is likely that Adrastos' is a possible 
"ordinary man's" reaction; it is certainly one which is 
based on a feeling that other people will share his distaste 
for the task which Theseus has performed. The Messenger, 
however, uses the word aischron in a way which takes no 
account of what other people may say, but only of his own 
interpretation of the situation, which he obviously feels is 
shared by Theseus himself. The Messenger thus represents the 
increasing tendency, which we first noticed in Solon, 
35 
to 
decide on the basis of one's personal principles what is and 
is not aischron. 
36 Doubtless this contrast between ordinary 
and enlightened opinion37 is deliberately contrived by 
Euripides and, expressed in this way, a product of the age, 
sceptical of traditional values, to which he belonged; but 
while the contrast between different views of what is 
aischron may be "new", 
38 the humanity which the Messenger 
attributes to Theseus is not: twice in the Iliad39 Achilles 
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takes part in the burial of enemies he has killed himself, 
and there is no suggestion that it was at all aischron for 
him to do this. 
In Aeschylus' Agamemnon Agamemnon wished to walk on the 
garments strewn by his wife, yet experienced aidos at the 
prospect of doing so; in Choephori Orestes' dos led him to 
hesitate as he was about to gain the revenge he sought; and 
in Sophokles' Electra, while Orestes and his sister exper- 
ienced no misgivings when committing murder, both did show 
signs of aidos, Orestes with regard to his deceit, Elektra 
in connexion with her excessive and unfilial conduct. 
40 All 
these characters, then, experienced aidos even in the execu- 
tion of an action which they desired to perform, anct their 
disregard of this aidos, an anxiety created by their instin- 
ctive awareness that their conduct was not compatible with 
values to which they themselves subscribed, was an important 
indication of the questionable moral character of what they 
were about to do. The fact that Euripides employs this motif 
in his Electra suggests that it may have become a topos in 
plays with the Oresteian theme. Elektra's aidos (though 
aischunomai is the verb which is used) surfaces at E1.900-4: 
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Several features of this passage particularly recall the 
1 . 10 "Carpet scene" of the Ag. (cf. 902 n$ 
f(ýov ýöchj with 
ha. 947, /mi rL5 ... 
fl X&L J60Vuj, ýý904 with Ag. 937-8), and this 
adds strength to the supposition that Elektra's hesitation 
has a similar effect to that of Agamemnon, that it is a sign 
that she knows she is doing something discreditable. Both 
she and Orestes relate her aidos to fear of popular 
disapproval (phthonos in 902 seems to cover the sense of the 
Homeric nemesis), but it is significant that, whereas the 
latter regards it as sufficient simply to assure his sister 
that she has no reason to fear disapproval, her misgivings 
are not entirely dispelled (904): her expressed concern for 
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"what people say", then, conceals a vestige of a moral 
scruple which knows that Yw uO vý{ Lý G-ýJ is wrong in princ- 
iple. 42 
In the ion, Ion's concern for his reputation manifests 
itself in two ways: firstly he is apprehensive lest he incur 
the resentment of the Athenians in taking up a position of 
importance in the city despite being, as he believes, the 
incomer son of an incomer king. The Athenians, he is aware, 
are autochthonoi and resent incomers (589-90), and he is 
afraid that he will incur their disapproval no matter how he 
acts: if he keeps quiet out of fear of the reproach of being 
an outsider, they will call him a nobody (593-4), and if he 
is at once active in the state, his inferiors will hate him 
and the upper classes, who remain aloof from politics, will 
mock him and call him a fool for courting popular disapprov- 
al (595-601). Ion's aidos, as seems to be the norm among 
young men, 
43 is obviously acute (he reiterates it at 631-2) 
44 
but it is also understandable, since the chorus of Athenian 
women give expression to their city's hatred of foreigners 
at 719-22 and 1074-5.45 
The other aspect of Ion's. aidos is his fear that he may turn 
out to be of low or servile birth. This is expressed at 1382 
-3, where he opines that it would be better never to discover 
his mother than to find that she was a slave, and at 1526, 
where he describes the possibility that Kreousa bore him as 
the result of an illicit relationship as -roi l ot; woI. 
46 
The opinion that slavery is discreditable in itself is, as 
one might expect, not shared by slaves; the outlook of Kre- 
ousa's old retainer at 854-6 differs sharply from that of 
Ion: 
e, / Xaý rL -ro. S oot1Xowrt/ ai)rx/w / 
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In claiming that only the name of slavery brings disgrace 
and that a slave who is esthlos is no more kakos than a free 
man the speaker applies these terms exclusively to moral 
qualities, 47 and thus ignores both their traditional use as 
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terms of rank and the tendency to assume that those who are 
socially "good" are also morally "good". 
48 Perhaps, then, 
these sentiments would be unlikely to find widespread accept- 
ance, but they do at least reveal both that those of low 
status might still be protective of their honour49 and that 
the equation of birth with moral worth was beginning to be 
challenged, 
50 
Loss of status is a frequent ground for shame in Hec.; at 
551-2 Talthybios reports Polyxena's words as she begged to 
be allowed to die without constraint: 
v vckCO«< YKC 
cýavýý Kek) (&M. /3a. rL)L$ at e DC f)(vva/Kt . 
Hekabe bemoans her own fate in a similar vein at 822: 
avr1 ý' 6ir' ai'(fitCok's ^%'N lxwras OI) i/A L. 
Here her distress is genuine, but it is feigned at 968-73, 
where she expands on the theme of her loss of status as a 
ruse to mislead Polymestor. It is perhaps true, as she says, 
that she is unable to look him in the eye, but this is more 
likely to be because she is plotting vengeance against him 
than because she is ashamed of her present condition: 
51 
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The inability to look another person in the face, the concern 
at being seen and the downcast eyes are all typical concomi- 
tants of aidos (which is here treated as synonymous with 
aischune). The deception is thus convincing, and Polymestor 
regards the reaction which Hekabe feigns as quite natural 
(976). 
The eponymous heroine of the-Electra is another character 
whose loss of status disturbs her. She dwells on it with 
much exaggeration52 at 300-13, ending (312-3) with an 
expression of her shame53 that she, whose hand was once 
sought by Kastor, now a god, should now be married to a 
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peasant. Her obsession with her reduced circumstances resur- 
faces at 404-5, where she berates her husband for inviting 
guests "greater than himself" to his humble abode, while at 
658 her conviction that Klytaimestra will come to her on 
hearing of her childbirth is explained in terms of the 
desire she imagines her mother will conceive to bemoan the 
wretched circumstances of the birth. Elektra's preoccupation 
with her status is only one aspect of the theme of social 
class in the play. Elektra's marriage to the Farmer allows 
the poet, in fact, to explore the legitimacy of traditional 
class attitudes. 
The Farmer, it turns out, is no less conscious of his status 
than Elektra, and, just like her, he experiences aischune at 
the divergence in their rank. He is proud of the fact that 
he comes from a noble family (ov 
clºj Tora yE L-ýFýxýMc, 36), 
but the wealth and nobility of his line has declined, and so 
his present low status makes him inhibited with regard to 
the rich. He feels that he would aischunein Elektra if he 
were to sleep with her (43-4), and goes on (45-6): 
PC i rh 
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At 261 it is suggested that the Farmer is also afraid of the 
punishment of Orestes, and so does not attempt to take Elek- 
tra by force for that reason, but even there it is recog- 
nized that he is sophron by nature, and it appears from the 
present passage that a feeling of his own unworthiness is 
just as important a consideration with him as the prudential 
fear of punishment. His awareness of his low status, then, 
leads him to show regard for others, while Elektra's causes 
her to think only of herself. The Farmer's consideration for 
other people is also revealed at 47-9, where he expresses 
his sympathy for Orestes on account of Elektra's "unhappy 
marriage" and assumed at 364-5, where Orestes believes that 
the Farmer is motivated by an unwillingness to destroy his 
(Orestes') reputation. The two siblings are thoroughly 
appreciative of the Farmer's awareness of his own place in 
society, and express their approbation in terms of his euse- 
bei (253-4) and his sophrosyne (261). 54 Paradoxically, how- 
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ever, they also express it by means of words which refer in 
their origin to noble birth: he is gennaios at 253 and 262, 
and it is recognition of the poor man's essential "nobility" 
which leads Orestes to his disquisition on the proper 
application of terms like euandria, gennaios, kakos, agathos 
and eugenes at 367-90.55 The wider paradox behind this 
speculation is that, while it is the Farmer's awareness and 
acceptance of class distinctions which lead him to act as he 
does, his conduct leads to conclusions which undermine 
these very distinctions. 
56 In all this, aidos is of some 
importance, because it is, in effect, the Farmer's aidos 
with regard to his own status vis-A-vis others and the aidos 
which makes it impossible for him to consider dishonouring 
another person which earn him these terms of praise and 
which allow him to emerge favourably in the comparison with 
the the two representatives of the noble house of Atreus 
whose aidos, such as it is, is entirely self-regarding. 
In the Hele much is made of the discrepancy between Mene- 
laos' fame as a warrior and his present sorry condition as 
the victim of a shipwreck. At 414-7 he expresses his discom- 
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At 790-1 it is Helen who is affected by her husband's sudden 
drop in status, when she expresses her horror that he has 
been forced to beg for food at the door of a barbaros, while 
his own aidos resurfaces at 845-6, where he explains his 
"decision" to die in Egypt with Helen in terms of his desire 
not to spoil the fame he won at Troy: 
%(I%, '% / Tv p wýý. ýc ýoct a Ký. focýrxVVw KXEO$ 
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His concerns are the same at 947-9, where he explains his 
refusal to supplicate Theonoe: 
7t%,! "/ 
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Clearly Menelaos carries his concern for his kleos to ext- 
remes, and he cuts a rather ridiculous figure in doing so, 
but this is to be attributed to the comic/melodramatic nat- 
ure of the play rather than to the supposition that such 
concern is inherently ridiculous or pompous (though neither 
is it always entirely without overtones of pomposity). Like- 
wise, Menelaos' assertion that to undertake supplication is 
to become a coward may be an exaggeration, but it is none- 
theless true that supplication does involve the self-abase- 
ment of the suppliant and the abdication on his part of his 
claim to parity with the supplicated; the ads which he is 
then felt to command is thus based on his abandonment of his 
claim to time, although in another sense the aidos of the 
supplicated is a response to the time which is invested in 
the suppliant by the gods. 
58 Clearly, whether one decides to 
undergo this ritual humiliation will depend on the strength 
of the regard (the a' os) one has for one's own status and 
on what is at stake. 
59 
Menelaos is clearly not one to admit inferiority to anyone, 
but the aidos which inhibits supplication is also to be 
found in a more serious context at Pho. 1622-4, where Oedipus 
tells Kreon: 
Koc w o3 
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The aidos experienced by Menelaos and Oedipus is explicitly 
disclaimed by Klytaimestra at . 
I. 900-2: 
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For Klytaimestra, then, the benefit she hopes to gain by 
supplication outweighs her concern for her status, although 
it is doubtless concern for her status which prompts this 
justification of its temporary abandonment. She clearly 
feels that aidos on her part would be a hindrance in the 
circumstances, and that is why she rephrases c21r^L4-r87r C 
as fe',, ^Vuvo/KXc.: semnos comes from the same root as sebein, 
and, as we have seen, aideisthai and se bei are virtually 
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interchangeable when they describe the response of supplic- 
ated to suppliant, 
60 but semnos itself has a particular 
pejorative overtone when applied to a mortal, 
61 
and in using 
the verb acr. ývýaý, ýý here Klytaimestra expresses her belief 
that, in the present circumstances, aidos would be something 
akin to "pomposity". 
In Makaria's speech at Hcld. 500-34 concern for the status of 
herself and her family is combined with fear of mockery, the 
obligation to show gratitude and other, practical considera- 
tions. Having stated her intention to offer herself in 
sacrifice, she goes on to explain why she believes it is 
both necessary and honourable that she should do so. Her 
first point, at 503-6, resembles that made by Menoikeus at 
10.999-100262 - where others are prepared to be brave, it 
is discreditable not to follow their example; but whereas 
Menoikeus was referring to the example of his fellow citi- 
zens, Makaria refers to that of the foreign state which has 
decided to aid the suppliants in whose number she belongs. 
The Athenians' act of kindness demands the repayment of the 
charis, and i? 
not be fitting for the Herakleidai to appear 
inferior to them in their sense of honour. 
63 The Athenians' 
bravery, then, demands a charis of bravery from the supp- 
liants, and to fail to live up to their example would be 
seen as cowardice, would invite the mockery of others, and 
imply that Herakles' children were unworthy of him; how can 
this be fitting for chrestoi (507-10)? Better (and more 
fitting, KKkkcoJ , 511) to be killed at the hands of one's 
enemies than to show such cowardice. 
64 
One alternative to her self-sacrifice, that the Herakleidai 
should allow the Athenians to fight on their behalf and be 
defeated, is thus rejected as dishonourable; Makaria now 
goes on to reject another, that she and her fellow suppliants 
should leave Attica, on the same grounds, for in following 
this course she would be forced to become a beggar, which is 
dishonourable in itself, and would be subject to the taunts 
of others (515-9): 
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This future conditional expresses exactly the sense of the 
ii "-' 65 Homeric, ociJL4 ac c ... ý... ý -rroTE -rt5 and the imaginary 
reproaches of -r-t3 are still a major consideration. It is 
particularly noticeable in this passage how quickly Makaria's 
thoughts turn from the loss of status involved in wandering 
from place to place to the more masculine and militaristic 
notion of cowardice. In the following lines, however, it is 
to her own material position in the event of her not commit- 
ting suicide that she returns; if she were bereft of her 
brothers (here she seems to imagine another eventuality), 
she would be alone in a position of anaxia, and no one would 
wish to marry her, and this is not a situation which one as 
episemos as she could endure (520-7). This fear of loss of 
status, however, which might be appropriate in a woman of 
noble birth, she prefaces with a remark drawn from notions 
of honour which are more normally associated withtre male 
(to the effect that it would be a betrayal of her brothers 
if she were to survive them, 520-2), and she concludes her 
speech with an affirmation which is the converse of all that 
she has said before: whereas it would be disgraceful for her 
to seek to avoid death, actively to pursue it would bring 
her the renown of having saved her brothers and of refusing 
to ýý1o ux Ftv/(530-4). Like Menoikeus in FJ1Q., then, 
Makaria undertakes the ultimate subjection of her own inter- 
ests to those of others precisely out of concern for her own 
status, and effects a perfect combination of self- and other- 
regarding behaviour. That she does so is clearly intended to 
be seen as commendable, and it is perhaps all the more so in 
that she is a woman : no less than that of Megara in ,I 
her 
conduct is a /AAr 
All the passages considered so far broadly concern the 
regard characters express for their own status and their 
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fear of loss of face. Some, admittedly, do carry these con- 
cerns too far, while in others a preoccupation with personal 
honour leads to terrible consequences, but this is not true 
in every case, and so it seems most probable that the 
frequency with which these anxieties are expressed reflects 
the extent to which regard for one's own status in the eyes 
of others was part of the motivation and outlook of ordinary 
Athenians. 
Such concerns, specifically expressed as aidos, are prominent 
in Herakles' reaction on awakening to the enormity of his 
crime in HF, but Herakles' aidos deserves particular discus- 
sion because of the questions it raises about the relation- 
ship between aidos, guilt and pollution. Herakles learns of 
what he has done at 1135-9, and his first connected utter- 
ance thereafter begins at 1146, where he immediately con- 
ceives his wish to kill himself. 
66 As his thoughts turn to 
methods of suicide his language becomes increasingly meta- 
phorical, and he conceives an image of himself as dikastes 
of his own crime (1150), before considering the possibility 
that he might burn from his flesh the duskleia which awaits 
him (1151-52). As well as by grief, then, he is motivated by 
a desire to punish himself and fear of disgrace. 
67 It is not 
only, therefore, that he feels he will inckr reproach, 
although this concern will weigh heavily with him; the idea 
that he has done wrong and must be punished is also present, 
and this implies remorse and the feeling which we should 
call guilt. There is also a hint of one further strand: 
lines 1151-2 are a metaphor from the ritual of purification 
by fire, 68 but the object of purification here is not asm 
but duskleia, and this is only the first of several combin- 
ations of the two ideas in this part of the play. 
Herakles thus alludes to the disgrace which he imagines will 
result from what he has done before Theseus arrives, but 
it is certainly true, as Parker points out, 
69 that the 
former's shame increases noticeably with the arrival of the 
latter, a witness and a philos whom Herakles respects (1154). 
At 1155-6 he exclaims, 
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öý fýý (ÖM, t-r ýýK oý c TE t<vo K -ro 
S ýýý1,. ý ýc e ý' ýc¢ck rocrw 
E vwý 4,44 Z i. 
The arrival of another person, then, leads to fear of being 
seen, a typical aidos reaction. Together with this fear, 
however, there is also a fear that Theseus will be affected 
by Herakles' pollution. 
70 Both these considerations lead 
Herakles to remove himself from Theseus' sight, as he 
explains at 1159-62: 
k' oTL 7L'(-)Ol t9 6C 
XW(Kö iýý (). 
pý º rx &L 01( rß. 3 
I Sc- 
04 4vvS KaKöls º 
-r aý OC) W K4 '"W 
Se Te o! 'r( rTre Lov oaf t4 %. rc 
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Veiling of one's head is another typical aidos reaction, a 
consequence of the fear of being seer#nd of the general 
association of aidos with seeing and the eyes, but if pollu- 
tion can be transmitted by sight, the veiling of one's head 
is an obvious means of avoiding affecting others. Herakles' 
concern lest he transmit his pollution to Theseus, moreover, 
is only a particular aspect of the desire not to involve 
outsiders in one's troubles which is expressed by means of 
the verb aischunomai at Or. 281-2 and IA. 981-2.72 In more 
ways than one, then, Herakles' aidos and his awareness of 
his pollution are inextricably linked. This is entirely 
natural, for as Parker shows, 
73 
the immediate danger of 
pollution for the polluted party lies not in the pollution 
itself but in the reaction of others to it, and the reaction 
of others (horror, revulsion, reproach) will have much the 
same effect on its recipient as would a similar reaction 
aroused for any other reason; there is thus "a convergence 
of the consequences of pollution and disgrace", 
74 
since it 
is a source of reproach to be polluted. Conversely, it is 
also worth noting that the reaction of other people to 
conduct which is considered shameful may be expressed in the 
language of pollution simply as a means of expressing the 
utmost moral revulsion. 
75 
When one also considers the fact 
that pollution is infectious and that ads seems to make 
one reluctant to cause unpleasantness to others, the close- 
ness of the association of aidos with pollution becomes 
apparent. 
This association is more or less present in several other 
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Euripidean passages in which the head is veiled in shame: at 
Hipp. 243-676 Phaidra asks the Nurse to cover her head, since 
she feels aidos at what she has said and has already made 
her aischune (here of the subjective reaction rather than of 
objective disgrace) plain by the lowering of her eyes. 
Clearly aidos at one's own conduct and shyness of being seen 
by others are more prominent here than any thought of pollu- 
tion, but the ultimate object of Phaidra's aidos, her illicit 
love for Hippolytos, is the kind of sexual transgression 
which might, at least figuratively, be described in terms of 
pollution, and, in fact, Hippolytos reacts to the Nurse's 
report of Phaidra's passion as if her very words brought 
contagion (653-5). 
77 The title of the first Hippolytos (I vr- 
-rävos) in itself informs us that the eponymous character 
veiled his head at some point, and since that reaction was 
presumably prompted by aidos it may have been accompanied by 
the following exclamation (fr. 436N2): 
7$ 
w-rrärvc'atSJS, 
E c'O e i--; t$ -rr. rN flc cr 4. s 
IrA 
The-shameful proposals of the Phaidraof that play are a 
sign of her lack of aidos/aischune, and this induces aidos 
in Hippolytos, and leads to the veiling of his head, again 
as if he might somehow be contaminated by contact with the 
shameful. On E. 1159 Wilamowitz compares Ox. 459-61, a very 
close parallel in that both Herakles and Orestes are poll- 
uted, both feel shame at what they have done (cf. Ii. 1160 
with Ox. 461) and both are reluctant to be seen by one who is 
bound to them by a tie of philia 
79 
Emphasis on the contagious aspect of pollution decreases 
after Theseus convinces Herakles, in his speech at 1214-28 
and in the stichomythia at 1229-54, that he will not be 
deterred from helping a friend by considerations of pollut- 
ion, 80 but Herakles is still afraid of reproach in the 
future, and part of his fear, at least, must be based on the 
awareness that those less enlightened than Theseus will shun 
him as polluted. 
81 Accordingly, at 1286-90 he imagines the 
reproaches of those he will encounter should he leave Thebes, 
and his shame persists to the end of the play, where, at 
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1423-4, he refers to the disgrace in which he has spent the 
house and the fact that he will henceforth be a wretched 
burden on Theseus. 
He has, however, by that point given up his intention to 
commit suicide, and aidos has its part to play in undoing 
his resolve: Herakles, in fact, is won over by the argument 
that failed to convince Sophokles' Ajax, that there is more 
occasion for aidos in choosing to kill oneself than in facing 
the tribulations of life, even a life beset by disgrace. 
82 
The thought that suicide is the coward's way out, however, 
is not overtly prompted by his interlocutor, but arises 
within himself (1347-51): 
83 
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In the same speech, at 1378-85, he wonders whether he will 
be able to carry his weapons, with which he killed his wife 
and children, in the future. So strongly does he feel that 
the weapons will be a reminder of his crimes that he sees 
them, metaphorically, as witnesses who will reproach him in 
future (1379-81); heýis still deeply troubled, then, by 
remorse, and the fact that he personifies his weapons and 
imagines their reproach suggests that he is also still sub- 
ject to aidos. Again, however, his concern for his past 
glory as a warrior and fear of future disgrace at the hands 
of his enemies lead him to persevere, to continue to be the 
Herakles he was (1382-5): 
äkköc öit &. iJ 
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dos is thus clearly of great importance in the play, and 
it works on Herakles in different ways: it both suggests the 
idea of suicide and encourages Herakles to stay alive. It 
also has two distinct aspects, one which is particularly 
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concerned with the judgement of others, another which is 
based on Herakles' own reaction to what he has done. 
84 
We have seen, for example, that Herakles wishes to remove 
himself from Theseus' sight and that he retains a concern 
for what other people will say of him in the future (1155-62, 
1286-90). Similarly, his decision to endure is grounded in 
his reluctance to be called a coward or to fall prey to his 
enemies (1347-8,1382-5). At the same time, however, his 
resolve to live also draws its strength from a renewed con- 
fidence in his own worth which enables him to face the pros- 
pect of future opprobrium, and we saw that his very first 
utterance on discovery of the murders contained not only a 
reference to his duskleia, but also a desire that he should 
receive his just punishment (1146-52). One passage not so 
far discussed reveals how these "inner" and "outer" aspects 
are combined. At 1199-1201 Amphitryon explains to Theseus 
why Herakles hides his head: 
k-KA¢t Lx v o1" i4 iX eý 
A ývý 
K rý jT 
f LVr\1 
. 
The zeugma of different applications of aideisthai recalls 
Hcld. 813-4 (pp. 283-4 above), and here, as there, the zeugma 
unites inhibitory and retrospective senses: 
85 
according to 
his father, Herakles feels inhibition at being seen by Thes- 
eus, respect for Theseus as his Philos8,6and shame at what he 
has done. There are, then, effectively three senses of the 
verb here, inhibition before a witness, concern for a philos 
(the Homeric usage of aideisthai with a direct object as 
respect for the recipient of one's actions), and retrospect- 
ive shame (the new usage of the verb with a direct object). 
There should be no doubt that Amphitryon is correct in 
attributing these motives to Herakles, for all he does, in 
fact, is rephrase the concerns expressed by Herakles himself 
at 1153-62 when he first saw Theseus approaching, namely 
fear of being seen, concern at implicating a philos in his 
troubles, and shame based on what he has done. In the pres- 
ent passage the most interesting aspect is Herakles' retro- 
spective shame, which raises the possibility that his aidos 
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here corresponds to guilt. 
The conclusion that this is the case, in fact, is inescap- 
able, because in giving the three objects of Herakles' aidos 
Amphitryon is clearly not simply saying the same thing 
three times over; if a. Le os -r6 641 4 
öý, 
ýK is to differ from 
09ý cSöý. týos oýec ýrc'ýccduý 
v. the difference must lie in the 
reference of the former to the judgement of others and of 
the latter to the character of one's owns actions and one's 
responsibility for them. It is significant, however, that it 
is Amphitryon who makes the distinction, rather than Herak- 
les: when Herakles speaks on the subject, he speaks simply 
of aidos, aischune, duskleia etc.; it is clear from what he 
says that*his aidos has different aspects, but to him these 
are all part of the one overwhelming feeling. Acordingly, 
when he speaks of his shame inhibitory and retrospective 
aspects are inseparable. Line 1160 is a good example: Herak- 
les e xplains his veiling of his head in the words, 
Ott r>ý 
v(,. 
«, l yoQ -rt 
S&Seoc/ 
--oL$ K ot$, 
and it is clear-that he regrets what he has done and that 
his horror of it instills in him a profound sense of shame; 
he knows that what he has done is reprehensible and feels 
responsible for it, yet this knowledge still produces inhib- 
ition and the desire to avoid the (possibly critical) gaze 
of others. The dative 'ruts ý4ýý. c ucs k KvLj, moreover, is 
not the object of his shame but the reason for it - it is a 
causal dative, 
87 
and the possibility thus arises that ocirxüv, ý 
'Ira& refers as much to prospective inhibition as to the 
recognition that one has done something disgraceful. In the 
same way, Herakles' feeling that his weapons will be a cons- 
tant source of reproach to him as they hang by his side 
(1378-81) is simply a projection of his inner shame at what 
he has done and of the fear that the memory of his crime 
will be hard to live with, but the fact that he projects 
these feelings to an external source of reference at all 
shows how the idea of guilt or remorse and the awareness that 
the object of his guilt may also be the object of others' 
reproach are combined within him. 
88 Let it be clear, however, 
that neither of these aspects cancels the other. 
89 
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It is important not to go to extremes in one's eagerness to 
discover what is new about the usage of aidos in the traged- 
ians; we saw in connexion with Homer90 that even prospective 
uses of aidos could entail an internal awareness that a 
given action was generally considered wrong in terms of 
traditional standards, standards which will have been deeply 
internalized because of their very uniformity, and so even 
uses which refer extelicitly to "other people" do not necess- 
arily imply simple adjustment to external standards. This 
internal aspect, the element of "conscience", is present, 
then, even in prospective uses, and is not a concomitant of 
the retrospective sense alone, but obviously the ability to 
use aideisthai and aischunesthai retrospectively increases 
the possibility that we will recognize in the retrospective 
application a subjective evaluation of the moral character 
of one's own actions, and this is clearly what we find in 




(E1L> Cw. In other passages, however, the 
retrospective and subjective aspect is combined with an 
inhibitory aspect which relates to the prospect of future 
reproach, and much as we had to emphasize the internal 
element of traditional, prospective aidos, so we must not 
underestimate the external element which often accompanies 
aidos based on one's past actions. 
91 Greek "realism", as 
Dover calls it, 
92 is able to encompass both these elements. 
Thus passages, like J. 1160, ' in which aischunomai is used 
with a causal dative need to be treated with some caution: 
it is important that the speaker is aware that his own cond- 
uct is disgraceful, but equally the thought that others will 
criticize him because of it may also be present. That this 
should be the case is shown by Hcld. 541-2: 
93 
, vf' oc i ý( v/ C! 
V ý. 
Here the dative is causal, as it is in x. 1160, but the 
question of retrospective shame does not arise, because 
Demophon's aischune is occasioned not by his own words, but 
by those of Makaria; he is not, therefore, Judging himself, 
but responding to the prospect that it may harm his reputat- 
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ion to be seen as inferior to a woman (responding, in this 
case, negatively). This is, naturally, based on his own idea 
of his own status and worth, but it does still take account 
of the opinions of others. This also seems to be the case in 
the other example of aischunomai with the dative at Or. 460-1: 
av tr' (sc. Tyndareus) aifwsý`'icc 
GSÖ M/n D-f' EknG --, / -r& LdCEFLe pC f/IA VLS. 
Here Orestes is clearly troubled by the enormity of what he 
has done, 94 but he is also afraid of adverse judgement at 
the hands of Tyndareus, and goes on to give 
specific 
grounds for his fear of disapproval from that quarter in 
particular. (He refers to the his own failure to repay his 
grandfather for his upbringing, and while his anxiety here 
will arise from an awareness that it is wrong to betray 
one's iloi, it nonetheless causes him to be afraid to face 
the one he has wronged. ) The situation in passages like this, 
then, is not dissimilar to that in I1.22.104-7,95 where Hek- 
tor is aware that he has caused the destruction of the host, 
-something which he knows is "wrong", but combines his aware- 
ness of his misdeed with a prospective fear of popular dis- 
approval. Similar are Apollo's aidos with regard to his past 
prohecies at IT. 713 (this leads him to drive Orestes, whose 
presence in Greece would be a constant reminder of the dis- 
reputable oracle and a possible source of reproach, as far 
away as possible), 
96 
and Menelaos' aidos at his tyche at 
f. 417, both of which find a place in von Erffa's list of 
instances of retrospective a dos. 
98 
The latter, in fact, is 
barely relevant at all in this connexion, since it deals not 
with shame over a misdeed regarded by society as reprehens- 
ible, but with simple embarrassment at Menelaos' present 
condition. 
The idea that discreditable action in the past should occas- 
ion inhibition in the present occurs at Tro. 1025-8, where 
Hekabe expresses her revulsion towards Helen, 
TaT'acý% leC L'rt'tatsý 
T(, ^ýK K'irt fk-U0 Lrv/ 
E E3E-ty -ro 6'w jýa a v'ocJc Locs Tr)&6 
lkuVraV 
&I V ºý, v. aýTj vvc. s 
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Perhaps there is also a suggestion in this passage that 
retrospective shame on Helen's part should have led her to 
punish herself, but the anaideia referred to specifically 
relates to the failure to show proper inhibition towards 
others on account of past transgressions. There is, then, 
both a retrospective aspect, Helen should recognize her 
faults and, as we should say, feel guilty about them, and a 
prospective, inhibitory aspect, in that she is expected to 
modify her conduct vis-ä-vis other people. 
99 Helen reacts 
almost as Hekabe would like at Or. 97-105, where she attempts 
to persuade Elektra to make an offering for her at Klytai- 
mestra's tomb: 
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Von Erffa100 is right to say of Helen in this passage that, 
"Der Grund für das aý rX vý" c liegt in der Vergangenheit, " 
but it is misleading of him to regard this as an instance of 
retrospective shame because line 98, cEcj OeL ... a"'x-1'1 0, C 
is a straightforward example of the traditional, prospective 
use of aischunomai with an infinitive. It would be more 
correct to say that Helen's prospective aidos (for so does 
Elektra interpret her aischune) is based on the knowledge 
that she has done something discreditable; in fact, though, 
it emerges that it is not the moral character of her past 
actions which concerns her as much as her fear of unpleasant- 
ness from those whose sons she led to their deaths. The 
association of aidos with fear of unpleasant consequences is 
traditional, but this can be more or less combined with a 
recognition that others' reproaches are justified: there is 
not much of this in Helen's aidos here, and in this respect 
she contrasts with Elektra, whose inability to look upon her 
mother's tomb is probably an indication of a kind of gidos 
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which is based exclusively on her recognition of the 
enormity of what she and Orestes have done. 
101 
Other passages deserve to be distinguished from those which 
deal with shame based on a knowledge that one has done wrong 
for the simple reason that, although the grounds for shame 
lie in the past, the action was not committed by the person 
who feels aidos but by someone else: with Hcld. 541-2 (pp. 310 
-1 above) compare Ion 341, IA. 848. One's own actions are, 
however, at issue at Ion 367 and I-Iipp. 244. In the former Ion 
advises Kreousa not to question the god about the child he 
fathendbecause he ocºc '&( t -ria T64Y/,. oc and although Ion 
t 
believes that the god is concerned to avoid exposure ('i. 
Ae x( vt. ), his use of Kir; cvvbfaL clearly refers to 
shame over a discreditable action in the past. In the Hipp. 
Zrice TK hAEy/J ( /-VL indicates passage Phaidra's pci cSový011 
her shame at her madness and possibly also at the indications 
she has given of her love for Hippolytos, but the inhibitory 
aspect is also clearly present in her desire for concealment 
and her reference to her) 
" 
o( turning to aischune, which 
presumably means that she has lowered her eyes out of shame 
at what she has done; both terms here, then, aideomai and 
aischune. have both a retrospective and an inhibitory aspect102 
Given the traditional prospective force of a dos it is 
entirely natural that the inhibitory aspect should exist 
beside the retrospective in passages in which a dos is 
occasioned by one's own past conduct, and thus the element 
of the retrospective, "bad" conscience in such passages must 
be seen as accompanying, not supplanting the sense that one 
is under the scrutiny of other people: both these elements 
can coexist. They coexist, for example, in the character of 
Orestes in the play of that name, whose conduct towards 
Tyndareus, mentioned above (p. 311), reveals how his aware- 
ness that he has done wrong leads to unwillingness to face 
the reproaches of others. His awareness that he has done 
wrong, however, emerges unambiguously as such in the famous 
line 396, where he describes his nosos as i 
v (VVE tLS 
ö'rl (UVOL AC 
(6 (V 
ýi/ ýKr, h, ýý j. 
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This line is universally seen as the first reference to the 
phenomenon of conscience as such in tragedy, 
103 
and it 
clearly relates to other passages in late fifth century lit- 
erature in which the phenomenon is described by means of the 
verb 
104 
rvvK fFVKt. Here the emphasis is on Orestes' intellec- 
tual apprehension of his crime, an apprehension which has, 
however, emotional and psychological consequences, 
105 
and 
thus there is no mention of aidos, which, although a result 
of the awareness of the character of one's actions, is not 
equivalent to it. Euripides thus separates the element of 
retrospective conscience from its effects and manifestations 
here, and identifies the rational element behind the emot- 
ional reaction. Elsewhere, however, it is clear that aidos 
is one of many aspects of Orestes' response to his crime: he 
hides his body, says Elektra at line 43,106 feels aidos at 
the approach of Tyndareus at 459-69, expresses a fear that 
he will cause the latter pain at 544-5,107 and claims he 
feels aidos at referring to Klytaimestra as his mother 
(557). 10$ From the wider action of the drama, then, it 
appears that Orestes' awareness of the enormity of what he 
has done does lead to aidos. 
In And. 804-15 the ideas of conscience, concern for reputat- 
ion and fear of unpleasant consequences are combined in a 
particularly ironic manner: the Nurse reports Hermiones 
remorse109 at her attempt to have Andromache and her child 
put to death: 
ý(e'roLt/ti 
rig( k'o 1' ai Ke ) 
XEjr, )j 
7Tac1 C ös T t'`o 1 frt , 4Jb&%. YDC ! uv, lý, R' 
0 ß(fr ac 
ocov oc, r6J ki-Pt Ve 
W 
lo, Ti o ýc ý/ T41v ýo< ä VIM -t-w v' ýý- , c, Jvw J 
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^ ºý +ýatýavý k7-C_LvaVý( -r'vS of )(, 
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The language of conscience (öVVVo« , 805,1 is )r' 814) is 
certainly used here, and the Nurse's interpretation of Herm- 
ione's horror at what she has tried to do and her represent- 
ation of it as 6 vv6td. 
110 
repentance and a subjective 
recognition that she has acted ev uKAws reveal a familiarity 
with the experiences of guilt and remorse. At the same time, 
however, the Nurse also makes it clear that Hermione fears 
punishment at the hand of Neoptolemos and the dishonour 
(A-rows, 809) which punishment would bring. 
112 It may be 
that we are to see all these motives as combined in Hermione, 
as indeed they might be in any individual, but Hermione has 
already revealed herself as an ignoble character and the 
moral sensibility which the Nurse attributes to her emerges 
only when she is bereft of her father's support and faced 
with the prospect of pKishment; when she reappears on stage, 
moreover, although her distress is acute, she is concerned 
with her conduct towards Andromache only in so far as it 
makes her own position vulnerable. 
113 The element of cons- 
cience in this passage, then, the element which measures 
one's own conduct in terms of one's internal standards of 
right and wrong, 
114 
may not be the slightest part of Herm- 
ione's response, but rather the attempt of her partisan, the 
Nurse, to place the best construction on her mistress' 
behaviour by suggesting that her distress is caused by a 
genuine recognition of her own moral error rather than panic 
at the thought of punishment. A similar attempt to place a 
good construction on ignoble behaviour is to be found at 
line 918 of the same play, where Andromache claims that 
Menelaos gave way to Peleus out of aidos; there was, however, 
no sign of aidos on his part in the scene between the two, 
and it seems that Andromache's implication of such sensitiv- 
ity to her father is simply an attempt to disarm Orestes' 
surprise that Menelaos should be defeated by a weak old man115 
Both these passages show how partiality can lead one to 
place a favourable interpretation on the actions of another 116 
which is not consonant with that person's true motives. 
We have seen that men often experience aidos at the prospect 
of acquiring a reputation for weakness or cowardice, and 
this concern can sometimes be shared by women. In normal 
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circumstances, however, the behaviour expected of women is 
different to that expected of men, and the chief elements of 
a woman's arete are loyalty to her husband and freedom from 
any imputation of sexual impropriety. Most regularly, then, 
women's aidos is concerned with breaches of these standards. 
In several of Euripides' plays the conduct of the woman who 
is traditionally the most conspicuously lacking in such 
aidos is discussed and criticized. 
117 
It is a premiss of the 
plot of the Helen that the vilification directed at the 
heroine is undeserved, and so the Helen of that play does 
experience a proper degree of aidos at sexual contact with a 
man other than her husband: at 66-7 she explains her supp- 
lication at the tomb of Proteus, which she carries out 
l -rte rW IAA. Y ý/ d oc. 
JaIa I( V vºý ö. 
At 696-7 she denies that she left Sparta '-if' oct r2(C u3 
r' 
(, s 
(cf. Or. 99), and at 932 she hopes that, on learning the " 
truth, people will restore her to 
-1 t4, '; we remember 
that at I0.1027118 her conduct in refusing to acknowledge 
that she had acted disgracefully was seen as anaideia and 
contrasted with -rk, 6wjea4; in the context, then, of women's 
modesty at least, aidos and sophrosyne seem very close. Both 
should prevent unfaithfulness, something which is aischron 
for a woman, as it is said to be with reference to Helen at 
Hec. 443, Tro. 773,1041,1114, Or. 118-9,1154,1361-2. To avoid 
any imputation of impropriety it is generally felt better 
that the respectable woman should remain indoors and apart 
from men as much as possible, since men are only too ready 
to charge the innocent with the faults of the guilty 
(fr. 493N2). 
At Hcld. 41-4 we see how aidos on the part of those who are 
in charge of young women leads them to keep their protegees 
in seclusion: 
119 
v1 rý ic. 
ü 
-t ^ (ýý it v -Tr'ýt, cf 
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E rt wlýE vac c'L) -r'J u-rr Y CD Lr 
w C-t Yýocs ýä. ý -Tý oý Fýtvoýs Oct ový 
7/16 
oc fe CJ .i -Tr ß w" 0 6-fa-'rC-i  I More normally, however, ads is the reaction of the woman 
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herself, and it must be such aidos which leads Makaria to 
explain, at lines 474-7 of the same play, her entrance among 
a group of strange men: 
VGl 0 8G (GS NAG lM vý 
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Thrasos is a typical antonym of aidos, and in employing this 
word Makaria is signalling her awareness that aidos should 
1 
normally prevent young women from mixing with men; in -r'b 
äwiC w&J we see another link between aidos and sophrosyne 
in this particular context, 
120 
In the Andromache the conduct of women is a theme of some 
importance. To be jealous if one's husband decides to take 
another woman, Andromache tells Hermione at 212-21, is a 
sign of 4cJVXJf'rLa h&Xa., 3 in a woman; to succumb to this is 
aischron, not only for Hermione but for all women, for men 
will use the example of the individual to confirm their 
prejudices about women in general; and yet men's charges are 
ýýf7- ýtrcxuýS justified, for women are more subject to 
than men; Hermione, Andromache implies, is letting the cause 
of all women down by undoing the value of all their efforts 
to overcome their sexual appetites. 
121 An agon then develops 
between the two women, and at 234-5 Hermione recognizes that 
her opponent is trying to claim the high moral ground: 
WSf Cu 
lie 
WV ,, % 
"c 
The attitude that a woman should not take an excessive int- 
erest in sex Hermione identifies as sophrosyne, but suggests 
that for Andromache to claim sophrosyne for herself is mere 
pretentiousness; once again122 we see how the attitude 
prompted by aidos can be seen, when viewed in a negative 
light, as semnotes. Andromache is not deterred, however, 
since Hermione's sexual jealousy is her main weapon in this 
agora, and at 238 she goes on to criticize her adversary for 
speaking of aischra, things which women with a proper sense 
of aidos should not mention. All women, Andromache concedes 
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once more (242) are preoccupied with sex, but a proper 
attitude to the subject is all important, and this is as 
true among the Trojans as among the Greeks (244): 
123 
Kä. k4L --A ý' 061dAe c Kic(ýýcJ' aiýxvv7J 
ýxFt. 
From 364-5 it appears that sophrosyne should prevent women 
taking the initiative in conversation with men: 
124 





Here -r'& rw fC" functions as that which opposes excess, just 
as did other terms connoting good sense did in Homer, and, 
presumably, the same behaviour could be described as aidos, 
just as it could be in Homer. Later in the play it is the 
sophrosyne of the women of Sparta, Menelaos' city, which is 
at issue: Menelaos has no right to speak amongst men, Peleus 
claims (590-5), because he could not even control his woman. 
Helen was not sophron (594), and this Peleus attributes to 
the general lack of sophrosyne among Spartan women, a result, 
as he sees it, of their athletic training (595-601). Men's 
honour is vulnerable through women, and this is the route 
Peleus chooses to launch his attack on Menelaos. At 876-7 
the Nurse, of whose concern for Hermione we have already125 
seen evidence, urges her mistress to avoid being seen outside 
the house: 
-rý .i Vt. 06 TwvIE ,M V' xi roc vy h IOCýy 5. 
Hec. 974-5 refers to the nomos that men and women should not 
meet face to face, and thus adds another reason for Hekabe's 
aidos towards Polymestor. Diggle deletes these lines, but, 
as we have already seen, they may be genuine and a product 
of Hekabe's search for excuses. 
126 Even if the lines are 
interpolated, however, their interpolation shows that a 
Greek-speaking person regarded this nom os as adequate 
explanation of a woman's aidos. 
The nomos is repeated by Elektra's peasant husband at E. 343 
-4, where he explains his annoyance at seeing his wife in 
conversation with two strangers: 
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The Farmer, as we have already seen, 
127 
is concerned for 
Elektra's reputation, and Elektra both appreciates his con- 
cern and recognizes that her conduct would in ordinary circ- 
umstances be discreditable, but justifies it in terms of the 
importance of the strangers' news (345-8). The concern shown 
here for a relatively minor breach of domestic decorum per- 
haps contrasts with the enormity of the crime which Elektra 
longs to perpetrate: such a contrast is certainly present at 
945-6`wherein the speech which she describes in advance as 
VEK eduS vpe l f-li (902), 127; she experiences the bashfulness 
which is normal in such circumstances 
128 
when she comes to 
criticize Aigisthos' adultery: 
kt- ýc ýJ) arg w-rrý ývwC 
ýwwý 
cj' OG? vL ý07/". K. 
That aidos is a young woman's reaction to sex and marriage 
in general is shown-by x. 372-6, where Iphigeneia describes 
her last glimpse of the infant Orestes at Aulis: 
_ . 11 w dill k irr N0 AN tfl-K Kak v/''ýjý'ýrw v 
cjsuvr occýEX'o av-r «VC-Lh ý XCy ac. v, 
0$ vu öXwh&) 
_6. 
K r(. -v1ry ß`r0 "c 
d, vv vj v-IT ' ai'(aus , WS cS ý1 ýýºEws 
/VL 6- 
Xx at 0, 
The girl's aidos with regard to her imminent marriage (note 
its manifestation in her modest glance through the veil) is 
apparently so inhibitory that she cannot embrace her brother; 
perhaps she sees him as a reminder both of the childhood she 
is leaving behind and of the quite different stage of life 
upon which she is entering. At Ox. 1047-8 the r6les are 
reversed, and it is-the male, Orestes, who experiences aidos 
at embracing the female, Elektra: 
6 /vt -rj L3 Kf. 
i a, ö. iLýae@PCI OEhw 
ýTXC 
(ý 
wý/. Tý voce Erý Pc, ý Jov oc.. TÖc. ) $ 
Here Orestes' aidos (which he overcomes in 1049-50) seems to 
stem from his desire to avoid an outward show of affection 
which may be regarded as unseemly or womanish. 
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Since it is the most basic element of the plot of the Ion 
that a woman has been raped it is to be expected that women's 
aidos is important in the play. Kreousa's first reference to 
the rape is an oblique one: at 288 she explains why she 
reacted with such vehemence (see 286) to Ion's mention of 
the Long Cliffs - she is "aware of something disgraceful" in 
1 
the caves : 
29 
vvýý vrtoý(t Pýý ý)( vvý Ttvi A, At 334 Kreousa 
tells Ion that she has a Mo 
vr6i 
I((ýTaV' to ask of Apollo, 
and, at 336, is about to 
/reveal 
its substance, until aidos 
intervenes: 
öriýýave [ý Ti V BGf D'> ' aý Sufý. c 
On one level Kreousa's inhibition will be caused by the 
nature of the story which she is about to tell, but her 
aidos has even more point when we remember that it is of the 
loss of her own virginity that she is about to speak. In 
line 337 Ion recognizes the inhibitory nature of aidos and 
hints at its traditional inefficaýy when action is required: 
o ü' Tä2 .c -tr'ý xý ýS of ýE J' ä(Y-cS 1 f3 CGS . 
Kreousa, however, overcomes her aidos and proceeds with the 
story of her "friend". Ion is shocked, and moved to exonerate 
the god: Kreousa's friend's tale must be an attempt to con- 
ceal a crime committed by a man (341): 
OU K EaV66 as 
ärcýCcicý aýýxvvrt. rc. 
This is another example of the use of aischunomai in the 
context of retrospective shame. The shame here, however, is 
directed not at something one has done but at something one 
has suffered; although a man who commits rape 
äc1i)CC-4., it is 
expected that the woman will be ashamed of the experience. 
That a woman should be ashamed of being raped, however, is 
not something which should surprise the modern reader. 
The suggestion that rape is disgraceful only for the victim, 
however, should, on the evidence of line 367, be resisted: 
there aischunomai is again used retrospectively, but this 
time it is the god's shame at his own wrongdoing which is at 
issue (365-7): 
h"cýýcd ýovXc-i c ýtýoý &L, U-Twt ; wJ 
v 
sä ý[ w 
ll \ -, S C"k YA wv Ot1 1I(vvEr. 4, L TO IT-(OtCW'. /V%I FE VLF/ I 
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As we noted already, 
130 
Apollo's aischune here envisaged by 
Ion encompasses both a retrospective awareness of the dis- 
creditable nature of his actions and a prospective fear of 
exposure, and we really have no way of telling which of 
these aspects is the stronger; it is simply assumed, quite 
naturally, that the god knows he has done something wrong 
and that it will distress him to be reminded of the fact. 
That Ion is correct in his explanation of the god's motives 
is shown by 1557-8, where Athena explains that she has been 
sent by Apollo, 
L/J 
-rwg -r 0CCV1. O( 1M(. , ýtlLj C-5 /w1-04 
There is presumably an element of ironic Götterkritik in 
this emphasis on the god's commission of human aischra and 
his human reaction to it; we might compare He . 884-6, where 
Theonod tells Helen that Aphrodite is trying to prevent her 
return to Greece lest she be shown up (p 'JIXC cQp and 
exposed as having bribed Paris to declare her the most 
beautiful with only a semblance of a marriage, and . 
1.713, 
where Orestes tells how Apollo drove him, a constant reminder 
to people of the oracle ordaining matricide, as far away 
from Greece as possible out of aidos at his past prophecies1.31 
Behind passages like these presumably lies the objection, 
articulated long before by Xenophanes, that men should not 
attribute their own faults and motives to the gods, a view 
which finds succinct expression in the well known line from 
the lost Bellerophon (fr. 292.7N2): 
132 
f1 1% p C-l O40G cri. J wrLJ 0es4nC&41 o'W C-taLY 0C-GL . 
At 392-400 Kreousa urges Ion not to reveal anything of what 
she has told him to Xouthos; her motive is presumably aidos 
lest her husband should ever find out about her own disgrace, 
but it is interesting that she feels herself able to explain 
her request in terms of aidos at the prospect of incurring 
reproach for having spoken about sex at all: say nothing, 
she says (395-6), pI rLV' K1'ýtVVIV kKý j/6f«, 1C&v; Vf. c WeVTM. 
ýc 
She 
ends with a gnome on the lot of women (398-400): 
` 
ON&( yvvaLKw/ fvrXC(J- -Tree, S °C("&docsý, 
Floc JT oc tS Kic. ýCx < <J a a, F3 oc. ý. , ý, sr K vß t 
ýVLIä'UV 'ßý OvTh) C(VrrvxEl j 
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We have seen that both the victim and the perpetrator are 
expected to be ashamed of rape, and while it is regrettable 
in our eyes that this should be so in the case of the former, 
we can nonetheless understand such a feeling. From this 
passage, however, in which Kreousa must be referring to male 
attitudes which Ion might be expected to understand, it 
emerges that Kreousa's "friend" would be considered a Kowj% 
- vv1 simply because she had once been raped, and that one 
who spoke to such a woman might be criticized by men simply 
for associating with her. In this respect the Greek attitude 
seems to differ, if not from our own, at least from that 
which we should like to be "our own", and, seen in this con- 
text, the intensity of Kreousa's aidos at her past experi- 
ences, which is, as Conacher points out, 
133 the chief 
obstacle to a speedy resolution of the complications of the 
play, becomes entirely understandable. 
Kreousa' aidos resurfaces every time she has to talk about 
her disgrace: 
wVAK4riy rl. 
ýR' ws ýE ö !C Ui'l acs oý ýKýý JW 
EV VOLS , Ott' 
J, ä-t"o%EL w; (859-961) 
XI r/XVV a^ ,1fwý yoi )XfW 
oýws (934 ) 
At 1471 she is forced to tell 
(. 
Ion that, although she is his 
mother, Xouthos is not hiS father, and at this prospect her 
aidos reappears, in the form oL ov o1 jw v&-kt1Soý. ýýý . Kreousa 
has clearly experienced this ads since the day of the rape. 
The actions of the god on that day, on the other hand, were (895) 
chat terized by anaideia, which must consist in his lack of 
respect for another's person, for the honour of the man who 
was in charge of the victim and for public opinion, which 
clearly decries such behaviour. 
In the Phoenissae Antigone is characterized as a young girl 
brought up in a proper degree of seclusion from the outside 
world. As such it is her duty to remain innocent of. men and 
be seen in public as little as possible. At 88-95 we learn 
from the Paidagogos that she has obtained special permission 
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from her mother in order to be able to watch the Argive army 
from a distance. Nonetheless, he feels it necessary to 
ensure that she comes into contact with none of the citizens 
(92-3), lest she and the Paidagogos himself incur ýeru5 
among the people. At 193-201 Antigone is urged to go back 
indoors, since the Paidagogos is concerned for her reputat- 
ion: there is a crowd of women (the chorus) approaching, and 
women love to seize the slightest opportunity to criticize 
each other. At 1275-9 Antigone shows the results of her 
upbringing: when her mother tells her to follow her to the 
field of battle she is shocked: 
Av. -rOl 4 1ýaý@Evwvrc3 
tKiXc. Tovt'; to. äv 
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Antigone's aidos at being seen among crowds of men is her 
instinctive response, which, however, she abandons on learn- 
ing what is at stake, 
134 thus disregarding convention and 
public opinion in favour of family loyalty: their characters 
are very different, but in this respect she resembles the 
Antigone of Sophokles' play, and probably the motif of 
Antigone's exclusive concern with her philoi had been 
proverbial since the production of that piece. 
Antigone rejects aidos again at 1485-90, this time describing 
the symptoms of the embarrassment which, because of her 
troubles, she no longer feels: 
I le -rroc c 
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The third affirmation of Antigone's commitment to her family 
which directly concerns us comes at 1691-2, where she has 
offered to share the ills of Oedipus' exile: 
09. DC' ýýý "c viij F} vfa-Tt l rVII -rv 
J ALA) -rOGTe 
% I%v. OU) rw¢ ovtiv(. YD'( )rE vvPvLK , -tränt(. Oedipus suggests that it would be unfitting for his daughter 
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to accompany him, a blind and polluted beggar who is bound, 
by his low status, his mean appearance and the horror of his 
crimes, to attract the revulsion of others; in this 
revulsion Antigone would share, both by simple association 
and because the life of a beggar is beneath the dignity of a 
well brought up young woman. Antigone, however, refers to 
different standards, and urges "an attention to facts rather 
than appearances. "135 She does not, however, simply ignore 
convention or discount the possibility of disapproval, but 
rather sees the situation in terms which are conditioned by 
her upbringing, as it is portrayed in the earlier part of 
the play. The only aischron she can imagine for one in her 
position is that of immodest behaviour: thus she maintains 
that, on inspection, her behaviour will be found to be 
perfectly sophron, and indeed, when it is found that she is 
exhibiting loyalty to her father, her conduct will appear 
aennaion. Clearly, then, she is urging attention to facts 
rather than appearances, but this does not mean that her 
reply is "not envisaged at all by traditional values, "136 
since the virtues which she feels will be recognized, modest 
behaviour and loyalty to one's father, are precisely those 
which are traditionally demanded of an unmarried girl. If 
there is any novelty at all in this passage, then, it is to 
be found in Antigone's confidence that others will share her 
own interpretation of her actions; but surely such optimism 
must always have been possible? 
The Bacchae furnishes two minor examples of aischron used of 
the adultery of married women. At 487-8 Dionysos rephrases 
Pentheus' cdk Lt, V and i'KOCOV , used of nocturnal infidelity, 
as aischron, while at 1062 the Messenger reports the latter's 
desire to witness the aischrourgia of the Maenads. 
The 
,I 
is richest of all the plays in examples of polite 
aidos towards the opposite sex. The chorus are first to give 
expression to this kind of aidos when they sing (at 185-91) 
of how they overcame their inhibitions and ventured to look 
upon the massed army of the Greeks: 
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For the symptoms we might compare the passage just discussed, 
Pho. 1485-90, while for the overall sense of the passage 
there is a particularly close parallel in (A. ) PV. 132-5,137 
for there, as here, women, who constitute the chorus of the 
play, explain their appearance and hence their abandonment 
of their customary aidos (aischune in the present passage is 
synonymous with aidos) in terms of their desire to see some- 
thing unusual. In this passage v&cih' EL (188) demonstrates 
the particular association of this type of aidos with youth. 
The chorus return to the theme of aidos at 558-72, a passage 
which is of great importance for its association of aidos, 
education and arete. 
138 In respect of these things the 
stanza has a general application, but it is prompted by ref- 
lections on the importance for women of moderation in love 
(543-57), and it thus ranges from particular reference to 
women's arete to a wider reference to arete and its develop- 
ment through education in general. The sequence of thought 
is as follows: a good education leads to arete (561-2), 
because rö KifECtaKc is o is (563), and enables one to 
discern, with the aid of intelligence, one's duty (564-6); 
good reputation is the result, and this leads to a fame 
which grows not old (566-7). Education thus instils aidos 
and aidos promotes aret , but there are different kinds of 
arete: for a woman it consists in shunning secret lovers, 
but for a man its forms are countless and it can make a city 
great (568-72). Women's arete thus has a more negative 
aspect than that of men. Just as the arete of men and women 
differs so will their education, and the aid os which educat- 
ion instils in a woman will presumably be based on the 
imperatives of staying indoors and keeping away from men 
(such has obviously been Antigone's education in j2hg. ). Yet 
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although the education of men and women may differ, and 
although the virtue thus acquired by eithertmay not be com- 
parable in scope or in detail, the process is the same in 
either case: education teaches the proper object of aidos 
and the practice of proper aidos will be recognized by soc- 
iety as virtue and appropriately rewarded (by doxa and 
kleos). 
Agamemnon, custodian of the honour of his wife and daughter, 
reminds both of the need to avoid contact with the world of 
men. At 678-9 he tells Iphigeneia to go indoors, explaining 
ö4d jvwt Kör acts -1 lse 
o 
, while at 735 he claims concern for 
Klytaimestra's honour as his reason for wishing to give his 
daughter away himself: 
Oü krc. kaf dv OXXW ö' 6 tlýntý4c((ýaC 6TC c. -r , L. 
The belief that women should not be seen in public and its 
consequences take on a comic tinge in the confrontation bet- 
ween Klytaimestra and Achilles, in which first the latter, 
then the former becomes acutely embarrassed. 
Klytaimestra addresses Achilles out of the blue at 819-20, 
and he is clearly startled (821-2): 
rrw 'ivrt W -rr 
r. i -wis 
-__IVý6 T Va iý 
yI 
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Achilles' exclamation recalls that of Hippolytos in the 
first version of the play that bears his name, 
139 
and if 
the echo is deliberate, those who caught it might have 
reflected on the contrast between the situation in which 
Hippolytos invokes aidos (when confronted with the incestuous 
love of his stepmother) and that in which Achilles does so 
(when confronted with a woman of distinguished appearance). 
Achilles' youthful aidos is obviously acute, activated as it 
is by the very sight of an unaccompanied woman. Klytaimestra 
approves of his aidos and interprets it as zophrosyne (824): 
aivN d ärt, dEr; -Cs 'r& rvieav. 
140 At 829 Achilles praises 
Klytaimestra's brevity in disclosing her identity and takes 
his leave - 
tt 
aiarx6oV JE /VuL yvVP-L c. d-v 
w? 
ºkhJ b0? L hS (830). 
She,. however, offers him her hand, as a prelude to their 
327 
becoming related by marriage: Achilles, again, is horrified, 
and again expresses his horror in terms of aidos; this time, 
however, his aidos has more than a slight prudential element: 
)A 




Achilles does not say that, out of respect for Agamemnon, he 
will refrain from touching his wife, but that he would 
respect him if he were to touch his wife, and this can only 
mean that in such circumstances he would be afraid of such 
action as Agamemnon might take. Achilles, however, does 
firmly believe that it is wrong ( F4"S) to lay hands on 
another man's wife. 
'J 
Klytaimestra continues to speak on the subject of the wed- 
ding, and regards Achilles' incredulity as another kind of 
a dos, bashfulness (839-40): 
-r . rcv -rd j" ýý-IrE¢v+c6, l OLL ((6-<<Ykc c ups 
Achilles, then, as she sees it, is suffering from shyness at 
meeting new people and coyness with regard to marriage in 
general, and this general inhibition with regard to marriage 
recalls the similar reaction of Iphigeneia at 11.372-6.141 
Soon, however, it is Klytaimestra's turn to be embarrassed, 
as she discovers that Achilles knows nothing of the supposed 
wedding and realizes that she has been deceived (847-8): 
ä ick ' Ti eircvO . cS Lv. 
i ;ý V1 ff'-vrý ý, cýn, ovs 
Gý 0VIr , v, 5 Cr 
'jo (cd ai 
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While h1t(vvra,. r. CS. is clearly another instance of aideomai 
with an impersonal object and so must refer to shame occas- 
ioned by an event in the past, once more the reference of 
phrase as a whole is to present inhibition or embarrassment. 
Klytaimestra has not herself done anything shameful, rather 
she has been placed in an embarrassing situation by someone 
else; she feels herself exposed, perhaps fears the mockery 
of others, and recognizes that she has "made a fool of her- 
self"; ýiSovp . -r.. 
(t 
, then, means something like "I am 
embarrassed at this. " Achilles recognizes Klytaimestra's 
Plight and urges her to bear it lightly: significantly, he 
draws the conclusion that the two may have been the victim 
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of a practical joke (849-50); he thus recognizes that Klyt- 
aimestra's aidos is based on a feeling that she has been 
made to act in a way which is unworthy of her and liable to 
attract the mockery of others. Despite his words of consol- 
ation, Klytaimestra's aidos persists, manifested in her 
downcast eyes142 as she makes to quit the scene (851-2): 
A. 0v race O &L3 (' ETA C-iroeW, 
V ý"1 S G-VGýN rSVý k af. l -rr 61 &v( of VoLl LA 
Lombard 143 is right to say that there is a particular effect 
of parallelism and contrast in the way in which Achilles' 
aidos, which impels him to leave the scene, is balanced by 
that of Klytaimestra, which impels her to the same end, but 
I see no evidence in this passage for his assertion that the 
poet is employing "a technique of juxtaposition and contrast" 
which is intended "to highlight the difference between trad- 
itional notions, motivated by external sanctions, and more 
advanced concepts, grounded in inner ethical attitudes. "144 
The contrast, to me, appears to be between two recognizably 
traditional forms of aidos: Achilles' shyness at mixing with 
a woman is both an inner ethical attitude, in that it oper- 
ates in him instinctively and is part of his upbringing and 
social role, and a response to the external standard of con- 
vention; he both feels it is wrong to associate with another 
man's woman and worries about what people will say should 
they witness his doing so. There is, on the other hand, 
scarcely any sign of an inner ethical attitude in Klytai- 
mestra's response, for she is not judging her own actions, 
but only responding to the effect the actions of another 
have on her; no doubt she deprecates the deception which has 
been perpetrated against her, but this attitude is not equi- 
valent to her aidos, which relates to the fact that she has 
been treated in a way which she sees as undermining her 
status (-rirtr&vb0, ft&v#L', 847, -rr'o. d f AWj A, 852) . Her embarrass- 
ment, then, has nothing to do with "a subjective feeling of 
inner shame for having actually told a lie": 
145teJ45 
T-Ev vj 
(852) does not refer to a belief that lies are aischron as 
such, but to the fact that Klytaimestra has been shown to 
have been talking about a marriage which did not exist; she 
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is standing face to face with one who knows that she has been 
talking virtual nonsense and who realizes that she, a woman 
of her status, has been the victim of a hoax; accordingly, 
her reaction is not "inner shame", but straightforward 
embarrassment, which may be a profoudly "inner" experience, 
but is nonetheless produced by no "inner ethical attitude. "146 
One thing Klytaimestra has learned from this exchange is 
that Achilles has a young man's susceptibility towards 
aidos, and she will go on to exploit this susceptibility in 
the subsequent scene in which she pleads with him for help: 
we shall discuss this scene, however, when we come to the 
topic of supplication. 
147 Once the supplication is concluded, 
though, Achilles shows the same regard for Klytaimestra's 
womanly virtue as he did when first he saw her (1028-32): 
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This notion, based on the community of honour within the 
family, that a woman's father may suffer disgrace as a 
result of his daughter's conduct, gets to the heart of the 
basis of the prohibition on women being seen abroad in the 
structure of male honour: men's honour is vulnerable through 
women. 
Iphigeneia herself in this play is one of those young women, 
like Makaria in Hcld. and Antigone in Ehg., who are presented 
initially as inexperienced and full of the modest aidos 
which is particularly appropriate in those of their sex and 
age, but who eventually reject the maiden's röle out of 
devotion to some higher cause. 
148 We first hear of her aidos 
at second hand, when, at 992-7, Klytaimestra asks Achilles: 
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This is a difficult passage, but the general sense is clear: 
if Iphigeneia were to come, she would conduct herself with 
aidos. This must mean that Iphigeneia would not entirely 
abandon her aidos at undertaking the "unmaideity" action of 
supplication: supplication is "unmaidenly" because it 
requires ritual self-abasement, 
149 
and a maiden's aidos 
should normally prevent such behaviour. Klytaimestra, how- 
ever, asserts that her daughter will be able to perform 
supplication while retaining her aidos, thus enjoying the 
best of both worlds; she will supplicate, but she will not 
humiliate herself totally, and the aidos for her own status 
which she retains will somehow be manifested in the look of 
her eye. When manifested in the eyes aidos indicates that 
the gaze is averted downwards, and although eAGvtceu/ does 
not immediately suggest "downcast", this must also be the 
case here: 
150 Iphigeneia's gaze will be downcast, but still 
Ck&VVC-eoJ. On the whole, however, it would be better, Klyt- 
aimestra goes on, if the girl stayed at home, since her 
modest regard for her virginity is acute. This seems to be 
the force of s'F/V!. yK f fpv 
v1L: d*(r1-vvvrrwC is middle, and 
governs the accusative a clumsy rendering might be, 
"that of which she considers semnon really is semnon", 
151 
From here, however, I part company with von Erffa, who 
claims 
152 
that üpwwj S ... ai 
d'cQßwI- x(cwV means not, "Never- 
theless one must show aidos as far as is possible, " but 
"Nevertheless one must show aidos only as far as is poss- 
ible. " I doubt if the Greek can mean this, and would suggest 
as an alternative the explanation that line 997 is a slight 
correction of the impression Klytaimestra feels she may have 
given in 996: rr vvvtr, c. has the same overtone of "pretent- 
iousness" as did the same verb at 901 
153 
and the noun semno- 
tes at 1344; while, then, (Gý^V"k rite ý'Fý"v vaTwc. does mean 
that Iphigeneia's modesty is justified, the use of the pej- 
orative word leads Klytaimestra to correct any impression 
that her daughter's modesty is mere semnotes, and thus she 
adds that a proper sense of aidos is a good thing. There may 
be a suggestion in this that there does come a time when it 
is no longer possible to aideisthai, but the primary signif- 
icance of 997 is that Iphigeneia would be right to cling to her 
LP tIZ5 
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as long as it is not absolutely necessary, as it would be if 
Achilles insisted on her undertaking personal supplication, 
that she should abandon it. 
153a 
At 1341-4 Iphigeneia voices her own aidos, but this time it 
is her mother's opinion that she should abandon it. At 1338 
the girl sees a crowd of men approaching, and on learning 
that her "bridegroom", Achilles, is among them, her aidos 
becomes so acute that she wishes to hide herself (1340). The 
passage continues: 
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By simple variatio Iphigeneia refers to her embarrassment, 
occasioned first of all by the approach of men per se, then 
by the thought of facing Achilles, whom she had thought she 
was to marry, 
154 
as both aischune and aidos. Klytaimestra, 
however, in paraphrasing the girl's aidos as habrotes and 
semnotes, is not simply recasting her daughter's words, but 
placing a negative construction on her conduct. The ineffi- 
cacy of aidos in certain circumstances is proverbial, but 
recognition that the same feeling can be both harmful and 
beneficial depending on circumstance may also owe something 
to the relativist thought of some of the sophists. 
155 In 
this passage, Klytaimestra dismisses aidos as unhelpful in 
the present circumstances in a way which is quite familiar, 
but it is perhaps significant that she has recourse to two 
other, pejorative terms in speaking of unhelpful aidos; this 
perhaps relates to contemporary interest in the proper def- 
initions of words, and the topic for debate, as it were, 
might be, is aidos always aidos, even in circumstances in 
which it is unhelpful? This is a question which seems also 
to exercise Phaidra in the Hippolytus, where the notion that 
a concept which changes its prescriptive force (whether it 
is "good" or "bad") according to context might better be 
given a different name is also important. 
156 
The Rhesus offers one example of women's aidos. At 926-8 the 
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Muse addresses her dead son, Rhesos: 
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This is exactly the reaction of Kreousa in In. Superfici- 
ally, the zeugma, fuIrf oVv, 1s ai ývýýu. ývºý KA,,. -7r-x&--vkC vV appears 
'0 a % ýs similar to (e. g. ) uji& ruS I<Xv&vri j aicSElEýFis 
r. 
rJ o'ar ALVrI 
airüNCkte4J (Hcld. 813-4), 
157 but whereas there the impers- 
onal object designates the conduct of which the agent should 
be ashamed, here it is the positive quality which aidos 
seeks to protect, the object, that is, of the agent's res- 
pect. The expression here, then, does not differ from that 
158 Od. 16.75=19.527,58r. uVly r'Ki("ýivý -rfüýtas ýh ýö 1 ýhýºýý . 
In the Hippolytus aidos plays its most prominent Euripidean 
röle, and it is a considerable motivating force in both the 
central characters. The concept does work in different ways 
in the play, but its overall prominence is surely to be 
attributed to the playwright's focusing on the theme of 
the power of sex and the effects of resistance to it. 
Idos is one of the qualities which Hippolytos claims as 
exclusively his own: lines 73-81 show how it fits into his 
private world: 
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Hippolytos brings Artemis, a garland from a sacred meadow, 
pure and untouched like himself; the personified Aidos her- 
self is the gardener, and the flowers are to be plucked only 
by those whose sophrosyne is innate. Hippolytos' insistence, 
then, is on purity and its exclusivity, 
159 
and on Physis 
rather than nom os as the chief determinant of both character 
and worth. l6(fWith his very first utterances in the play he 
333 
affirms his devotion to Artemis, and to the head of that 
devotion he subsumes the qualities which he regards as part- 
icularly his own: aidos, sophrosyne161 and, in 83 (Cv)(e o'$ 
Alro), 
eusebeia. 
162 Most important for our purposes here is 
the association of aidos and sophrosyne: the association is 
one we have met many times before, and it goes back to the 
Odyssey; Telemachos' youthful modesty and shyness, for 
example, could be described as both aidos and saophrosyne, 
163 
and the same youthful qualities are combined in the Achilles 
of x, 
164 in whom the connexion of aidos and sophrosvne with 
proper behaviour towards the opposite sex offers probably 
the closest parallel with the present instance. The combina- 
tion of the-two concepts in a sexual context, however, is, 
in the work of Euripides at least, much more common in pass- 
ages dealing with the conduct of women than with regard to 
that of men, 
165 
and it thus seems a reasonable inference 
that Hippolytos' devotion to chastity represents the coalit- 
ion of an exaggerated form of that Aidos which is felt 
normal in young men and a perversion of ideals of aidos and 
sophrosyne which, when tied to the sexual sphere, are more 
appropriate to young women than to young men. 
166 
The partiality and one-sidedness of Hippolytos' virtues is 
apparent even from the prologue of the play: his aidos and 
his sophrosyne must be seen, as he himself sees them, in the 
light of his devotion to Artemis, which he regards as euseb- 
g: yet devotion to Artemis entails rejection of Aphrodite, 
and this is neither eusebeia nor sophrosyne. So, too, his 
association of aidos with the latter indicates his partial 
grasp of the concept: Aidos gardens for those whose sophro- 
svne is innate, and presumably this implies that aidos is 
also innate in such people; yet it is scarcely possible that 
aidos should be innate, given its traditional association 
with observance of the conventional values of society, since 
no one is born knowing what society expects of them. Nor is 
there much support in contemporary thought for the idea that 
aidos does exist by nature: elsewhere in Euripides aidos is 
explicitly associated with education, 
167 
and this corresponds 
with the position as stated in Plato's Protaaoras myth. 168 
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Hippolytos' rejection of education, then, and his belief 
that aidos can exist without it, afford a futher indication 
of of his one-sided and elitist view of the world. 
At 993-1001 Hippolytos refers to aidos once more, and 
although the aidos itself is of a rather different kind from 
that in 78, it is nonetheless still rooted in his particular 
lifestyle and related to the companion virtues of sophrosyne 
and eusebeia" 
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Once again we see the youth's conviction of his own rectitude 
and his pre-eminence in sophrosyne, 
169 
and again his tend- 
ency is to regard the virtues which he feels are particularly 
his as interchangeable, since it certainly seems that his 
statement that he knows how to reverence the gods and to 
associate with those who possess aidos is intended to demon- 
strate his sophrosyne; it is therefore significant that he 
goes on to imply (in 1002-7) that the lifestyle to which he 
refers in these lines has been such that it is impossible 
that anyone should regard him as having been tainted by 
sex; there may thus be an assumption in these lines that 
sophrosyne, aidos and eusebeia inevitably promote sexual 
chastity. On the surface, however, the aidos which he ment- 
ions is of a familiar kind, that which ensures loyalty among 
philoi, and this reference to the impeccable conduct of his 
hunting companions must strike Theseus as particularly 
irrelevant, but mention of loyalty to one's philoi has a 
specific point, since the crimes which Hippolytos claims his 
philoi avoid are precisely those of Phaidra: she was disloyal 
to Theseus in his absence (unlike Hippolytos, 1001-2), andit 
was she who treated another philos, Hippolytos himself, in 
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the manner described in 997-9.170 Theseus is also unlikely 
to understand the reference to Hippolytos' eusebeia for the 
gods (996) in anything but the most general sense, but it is 
likely that the point of this line lies in its allusion to 
Hippol--ytos' eventual decision, after initial reluctance in 
the notorious line 612, to keep the oath not to reveal to 
anyone the subject of his conversation with the Nurse. It is 
cý 
this compunction which Hippolytos calls i"4 Fv-rllS&S in 656, 
and it is perhaps ironic that in the present passage the 
virtue to which he alludes is exactly that which prevents 
Theseus understanding the allusion. We remember that the 
keeping of an oath is frequently regarded as a demand of 
aidos: 
171 Hippolytos, however, refers only to his"eusebeia, 
and while it may simply be that the two terms are virtually 
interchangeable in this context (since aidos for one's oath 
also entails aidos for the gods who are its guarantors, and 
because eusebeia might simply imply the kind of proper 
behaviour which is promoted by ad s), he does use the term 
in a specific rather than a general way: for him the aidos 
which is normally felt as a result of the public nature of 
the oath is less important than reverence for its divine 
guarantors, and the opinions of those before whom the oath 
was sworn (in this case, the Nurse alone) do not enter his 
calculation. 
Hippolytos, of course, remains true to his principles to the 
end of the play: the eusebeia he feels with regard to his 
oath, then, is a powerful force. He also conspicuously main- 
tains his particular brand of sophrosyne, with which aidos 
is very closely connected, and so he - remains true to 
his own conception of his Physis as he articulates it at 79- 
81: this is not to say that he is correct in regarding these 
qualities as innate, merely that his own principles are 
sufficiently deeply-rooted to stand the severest test. At 
997-1001 he implies that Phaidra was without aidos: this is 
far from true, but there is nonetheless a difference in the 
attitudes of the two principals to the concept: Hippolytos 
is quite sure what aidos is and sees it as an element of his 
inherited nature, while his very unconventionality indicates 
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that he has little time for the aidos of ordinary people 
which simply promotes conformity to traditional standards; 
ultimately he chooses to keep his oath rather than to clear 
his good name. Phaidra, on the other hand, does care what 
people say about her and does show concern for conventional 
standards; she does have her own standards of right and 
wrong, but finds it difficult to live up to them; she even 
has her doubts about what aidos is. 
Phaidra's aidos develops and changes as the play progresses, 
but its basis is to be found in the fundamental demands of 
women's arete - Phaidra struggles to be faithful to her hus- 
band and to shun secret lovers, just as the chorus recommend 
at 7.568-70.172 The basic supposition is that adultery is 
aischron, both for the woman and for the deceived husband. 
Theseus describes the crime he attributes to his son as 
aischron for himself at 944-5,1165 and 1171-2; 
173 
at 1040 he 
claims that it involves him in at mia and at 1050 he sees it 
as dussebeia. 
174 Phaidra, in turn, reveals her awareness 
that it would be aischron for her to give in to her passion 
at 331,408,411,499 and 503-6.175 The Nurse, on the other 
hand, after her initial shock which tends to confirm the 
validity of traditional standards, becomes openly contemptu- 
ous of them, and so at 462-6 she suggests that in practice 
-rK 
p4 gX are often ignored, while at 500-1 she argues from 
expediency that aischra are better for'Phaidra than kala. 
These are clearly shocking sentiments, and the Nurse is 
obviously drawing on contempor4r' ideas of the superiority of 
self-interest to morality; she does not, however, emerge 
with any credit for doing so. 
176 
supposed 
It also seems certain that Hippolytos'/adultery is aischron 
for himself: at 944-5, while Theseus does say that his own 
X4kr(< have been disgraced by his son, he also claims that 
Hippolytos stands revealed (ef0(, 
Yxtrat) 
as flagrantly 
K#tKLrr"$, and at 946 he expresses his revulsion by regarding 
his son as polluted. The crime imputed to Hippolytos, of 
course, is not simple adultery, but involves both incest and 
the destruction of a philia relationship, yet it still seems 
337 
likely that adultery could be considered aischron for the 
male adulterer: in the Odyssey Aigisthos' adultery is seen 
as discreditable to himself as well as to Agamemnon, 
177 
and 
the suitors' disregard for Odysseus' honour by seeking the 
178 
hand of his wife is roundly condemned. Adultery entails an 
assault on the honour of the woman's legitimate guardian, 
and for that reason, as Dover points out, 
179 is seen as 
aischron for the adulterer at Dissoi Logoi 2.5. One wonders, 
however, how the adultery of one who seduced an enemy's wife 
or daughter might be viewed: at Dissoi Logoi 2.7 it is said 
to be kalon to harm one's enemy. 
When we first see Phaidra it is not long before she gives 
voice to her aidos: indeed aidos is the dominant aspect of 
her reaction on recovering her senses (239-49): 
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The realization that she has suffered an attack of temporary 
insanity and the very fact of coming to her senses cause 
her pain, 
180 
and allied to her pain is a feeling of embarr- 
assment at her uninhibited ravings. It is probable, however, 
that aidos is a wider aspect of Phaidra's condition than 
simply embarrassment at her unseemly conduct while mad: 
behind her aidos at her madness there is surely aidos at the 
nature of the desires which have driven her mad (the desires 
which she describes as a miasma at 317), 
181 
and possibly 
also aidos at the indications she feels she may already have 
given of her love for Hippolytos. 
When she next mentions her aidos, however, it appears in a 
338 
different guise. At 325-6 the Nurse, seeking to discover the 
reason behind her mistress' desire for death undertakes 
supplication by clasping her hand and her knees, refusing to 
let go. Immediately the supplication begins the idea of 
revealing her secret seems to become more attractive to 
Phaidra (329-35): 
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Phaidra thus gives in, explicitly at least, out of aidos for 
the Nurse's supplication. 
182 At 329, however, the idea that 
her struggle against her passion brings her credit also 
crosses her mind, and it is after the Nurse's suggestion 
that she will enjoy greater time by divulging her secret 
that she gives in. There are thus two strands to her decision 
to give in: she believes that her resistance to her desires 
will win the approval of others and she is unable to resist 
the Nurse's supplication. Both these motives are important: 
it is certainly true that her concern for her time reveals a 
desire to share her knowledge of her passion and her struggle 
against it, 
183 but the Nurse's supplication also creates the 
situation in which she can give in to this desire, 
184 
and 
breaks a deadlock which might otherwise never have been 
broken; had Phaidra not given in she would have been obliged 
to attempt to break the Nurse's hold by force, something 
which it is unlikely that she would do in her present weak 
condition and which would entail a flagrant disregard for the 
sanctity of the suppliant gesture and all that it implies. 
Phaidra, then, wants to give in, but she does so in a situ- 
ation in which the pressure on her to give in is intense. 
From this passage it emerges that Phaidra's concern for her 
reputation is working in two ways: her very concealment of 
her love for Hippolytos is motivated by the knowledge that 
her passion is discreditable and harmful to her good name, 
339 
yet she also believes that she is being virtuous in resist- 
ing her love and that her reputation might be positively 
enhanced if her resistance became known. There is an obvious 
incompatibility in these two positions, since, in order to 
enjoy time for her resistance, Phaidra must reveal its 
object, a passion which is disgraceful, a miasma which might 
attract the revulsion of others; she is, then, clearly conf- 
used, and it is this confusion, I believe, which lies behind 
the notoriously problematic lines 375-87, in which Phaidra 
expresses her views on the ambivalence of aidos. 
Interpretations of these lines are as many as there are 





while many, despite their merits, fail to satisfy 
the requirements of the text at every point. 
187 The passage 
in question runs as follows: 
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Phaidra thus concludes this part of her speech with remarks 
about the traditional ambivalence of aidos, and it seems 
particularly likely that the poet had one of the best known 
expositions of this ambivalence, Hesiod, 11D. 317-9,188 in 
mind when he composed these lines. There are, however, many 
other passages in which the negative side of ad is 
st5-6pgd99 n7 Euripides himself we may compare Ion 336-7; 
189 
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This fragment is closest to the present passage in its 
explicit identification of good and bad aidos, but in that 
it presumably refers to the need to overcome aidos to achieve 
a desired purpose it belongs to the same category as other 
passages we have seen. The ambivalence of Phaidra's aidos, 
however, is different, and the difference emerges clearly in 
comparison with the Ereck--heus fragment. If, as seems likely, 
the bad aidos of the fragment is that which Erechtheus him- 
self experiences on learning that he must sacrifice his 
daughter, 191 then it must refer to a form of aidos which in 
normal circumstances would be commendable and understandable 
but in the present causes the agent distress and inhibits an 
action which must be carried out; this is the normal ambi- 
valence of aidos, desirable in most circumstances but harmful 
when an absence of restraint is required. Phaidra's bad 
aidos is obviously similar, but differs in that it inhibits 
not simply the effort which is required to achieve a necess- 
ary or desirable end, but the impulse to do what is morally 
right; Erechtheus' aidos recognizes that-the action which it 
inhibits is normally seen as aischron, whereas in Phaidra 
i 
the instinct which normally discerns 7ö &i/xeoV prevents 
her carrying out T: KKhv4. Thus a knowledge of the tradit- 
ional ambivalence of aidos does not adequately account for 
the particular ambivalence of the concept in the present 
192 
passage. 
It has been suggested that Phaidra's remarks in the lines 
quoted have no very definite application to her own situat- 
ion, that she is simply speaking generally. 
193 Well, her 
observations are certainly couched in general terms, but 
since she goes on to apply her conclusions on the nature of 
gnome and its role in preventing wrongdoing to her own situ- 
ation at 391ff. it can hardly be that her words at 375-87 
have no reference to herself; 
194 her own struggle against 
eros must have provoked her general reflections, and her 
general reflections must then relate to her own experience. 
It is also prima facie unlikely that her mention of aidos is 
not intended to be referred to the part which as has 
played in the action so far. 
341 
We, like the audience in the theatre, have considered the 
part played by aidos so far, and so we should be in a posit- 
ion to discover what aidos means in the present passage. 
First of all, we should establish the nature of Ti K4 '/ in 
Phaidra's particular case: this can only be one of two 
things, either absolute resistance to any feeling of love 
for Hippolytos from the outset, or the resolution to overcome 
her passion once and for all by killing herself. It is diff- 
icult to see how aidos could prevent the execution of Tö u1ý"v 
in the first case: if Phaidra had simply shown the resolution 
required to banish any thought of love from her mind, what 
would the object of her aidos have been? If, however, -s Kg> --J 
relates to suicide, we can refer the aidos which stands in 
its way to Phaidra's conduct earlier in the play. At 239-49 
Phaidra experiences aidos at her condition and declares that 
it would be better to die than to return to her senses; her 
aidos at this point leads her to conceal both herself and 
her love, and suggests the idea of death as a means of 
escape. This, as Dodds points out, will presumably be the 
"not bad" aidos of 385.195 The only other passage in which 
Phaidra refers to aidos prior to her discussion at 373ff. is 
335, where she feels aidos for the Nurse's supplication: 
Dodds relates this to the bad aidos of 386.196 This is cert- 
ainly on the right track, but it is not simply the aidos 
towards the suppliant which is to be seen as put before-r6 
i 
kA'J, although it is certainly true that in responding to 
the supplication Phaidra does place dos before her resolve 
to keep her love concealed. The clue lies in lines 329 and 
331, where Phaidra also refers obliquely to her aidos, 
saying that the concealment of her love, which is prompted 
by aidos because her love is aischron, brings her credit and 
represents the creation of esthl out of aischra. 
This positive desire for her virtue to be recognized was, as 
we saw, one of Phaidra's motives in revealing the truth 
about her passion. We should notice, then, how her concern 
for her time springs from her aidos and how this relates 
specifically to the negative aspect of aidos in 386: 
197 for 
Phaidra the knowledge that it is kalon to follow-the dictates 
342 
of her aidos is not enough; she feels a certain pride that 
she is resisting her passion and wishes others to know about 
it; it is actually part of her aidos, the good aidos which 
rejects adultery, that she takes a certain pleasure in it 
and wishes others to know of her struggle. This is the sense 
in which aidos is included in the list of pleasures at 382 
-5.198 The pleasurable aspect of her resistance to her love 
for Hippolytos, then, causes her to disclose the reasons 
for her distress, but this, together with the aidos she felt 
for the Nurse as a suppliant, is immediately seen as a mis- 
take: the Nurse immediately reacts with horror (352,353-61) 
and, significantly, Phaidra's own initial reaction is to 
pretend that she has not, in fact, revealed the object of 
her passion (352). At the point at which she delivers her 
speech on the ambivalence of aidos, then, Phaidra feels that 
the correct course would have been to die without revealing 
her love: this is why she feels that the aidos she accorded 
the Nurse's supplication and the pleasure which she took in 
her good aidos were not "in place"the kairos was not clear 
(386) and the pleasurable aspect of aidos, gratified by 
showing aidos towards the Nurse, proved harmful. 
199 Aid os 
thus has different aspects, and varies in character accord- 
ing to circumstance. 
200 All that remains is to explain how 
it may be seen as a "burden on the house. " Firstly, there is 
no need to refer this to the ultimate consequences of the 
actions of the Nurse on learning Phaidra's secret: 
201 if 
is to be taken literally it may be referred to the fear, 
which Phaidra articulates at 419-25, that exposure of her 
passion may involve her husband and her children in disgrace; 
the idea of the o' o is particularly relevant in that, at 
424-5, she foresees real and practical disabilities for her 
sons in their civic life as a result of her kaka, and, in as 
much as this disgrace would have to result from her revelat- 
ion to the Nurse of her love, the aidos which occasioned 
that revelation may legitimately be seen as an iýxaos oýKwý . 
Alternatively, ocxýos (, i Kwv/ may mean no more than that Phaidra 
regards ads as a burden on herself, perhaps because her 
misplaced and mistaken aidos has led to exposure of her pass- 




she feels that the pleasurable aidos which 
caused her to vacillate has given way to a painful feeling 
of guilt and self-disgust. Taken as a whole, this difficult 
passage shows that aidos is, as Winnington-Ingram says, 
203 
"playing a dubious part in the action, " and this is the case 
in a number of different and complex ways; there is certainly 
more to its elucidation than the simple identification of 
one instance of good aidos and one of bad, but it is none- 
theless true that Phaidra's previous references to the con- 
cept do reinforce the impression of the ambivalence of aidos 
and thus should be referred to her doubts about it at 385-7. 
The twin aspects of Phaidra's aidos, the shame with regard 
to conduct which she firmly believes is wrong and the aware- 
ness that in following this aidos she is acting in accordance 
with convention and therefore commendably, are probably 
extremely close, but Segal is certainly right to identify 
"internal" and "external" strands to her aidos. 
204 Had her 
private shame at her illicit passion been activated on its 
own there would be no play, but as it is that aspect of her 
aidos which relates to "other people" leads her first of all 
to reveal her secret and then, in the subsequent action of 
the play, to take steps to ensure that her reputation is not 
diminished after her death. Immediately after her speech on 
the nature of wrongdoing we see how she is affected both by 
a genuine awareness of her moral duty and a concern for what 
people will say of her. 
At 392ff. she explains the forms which her resistance to her 
passion has taken: first she attempted to conceal her "sick- 
ness", then to overcome it by sophrosyne, and finally she 
decided to be rid of it by means of suicide (393-402); this 
last she describes as the "best of counsels" (402), and it 
should, therefore, be clear that this course is the one 
which she regards as To KakoJ and which is promoted by her 
aidos in its helpful aspect. The benefit of such a course, 
she goes on to explain (403-4), would have been that it 
would have ensured that her disgraceful passion remained 
concealed. She knows that her love is aischron (thus she 
344 
expresses her subjective awareness of the moral character of 
her own actions), yet she is also concerned that no one 
should find out about it. 
205 Thus her aidos encompasses both 
a consciousness of right and wrong and a fear of disapproval. 
This is the normal pattern, and in ordinary circumstances 
implies no real dichotomy of motivation. In Phaidra, however, 
the inner and outer aspects of her reaction to her love 
create a conflict, and the essence of this conflict is 
present in the lines under discussion, for in 403-4 - 
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- she refers to the two elements in her motivation, recog- 
nition of the discreditable nature of her love which dictates 
concealment, and the desire for praise when acting commend- 
ably, which conflict in her confrontation with the Nurse and 
which ultimately prove her undoing. The duality of her 
motivation continues to assert itself in the rest of her 
speech (to 430): at 405-14 she expresses her revulsion for 
the idea of adultery and for those who practise it, and at 
413-4 indicates that for her a mere semblance of sophrosvne 
is not enough; a woman, she believes, must be truly loyal to 
her husband. 
At 415-8 she describes in greater detail the conduct of the 
kind of woman she despises, and indicates that she could 
never behave as they do: 
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Idos is nbt mentioned here, but is certainly relevant: A 
Phaidra is amazed that adulterous women are able to look 
their husbands in the face and to look upon the darkness 
which is their accomplice or the rooms in which they have 
committed their crimes. Thus she expresses her view that a 
consciousness of wrongdoing should produce inhibition when 
faced either with those who are the victims or with that 
which is a reminder of the crimes, 
206 
and this clearly sug- 
gests aidos. She thus indicates her own view that a knowledge 
of one's own misdeed would be insupportable, but she also 
345 
exhibits a tendency (and this is a traditional component of 
the feeling of aidos) to project the subjective awareness of 
the character of one's own conduct onto the judgement of 
other people; thus the darkness and the rooms of the house 
are treated as witnesses to the crime who might bring about 
its exposure. 
207 Again, this subjective sense of guilt and 
the fear of reproach will be present to varying degrees in 
any feeling of aidos which relates to one's own past actions, 
but in Phaidra's case it is part of the particular purpose of 
the poet to explore how far the two strands may conflict. 
The two aspects of Phaidra's aidos continue to be reflected 
in the remainder of her speech. From her remarks at 415-8 on 
what Barrett rightly describes as "the consciousness of a 
secret guilt", she moves to the effects that any disgrace on 
her part would have on the reputation of her husband and 
especially on that of her children (419-25). The transition 
is effected effortlessly, and Phaidra refers to the idea of 
conscience on the one hand and that of the harm caused by 
popular disapproval on the other as two sides of the same 
coin (as, indeed, they are in most traditional applications 
of aidos etc. ), but in her own case her concern for her 
reputation has already had the effect of revealing that 
which her conscience told her should be concealed, and the 
indications that she gives in the present passage that she 
is acutely concerned that her sons should be able to hold 
their heads high rather than be inhibited by their knowledge 
of their mother's disgrace208 constitute the first hint of 
the action which she will later take against Hippolytos out 
of her concern for her reputation. 
Phaidra concludes her speech with a remark on the importance 
of gnome which is surely fairly conclusive proof that the 
whole section from 391-430, which begins and ends with gnome 
and in which the concept of aidos is so prominent, is to be 
referred to her general remarks at 373-87. Phaidra thus 
believes that her gnome will stand her in good stead, and 
goes on to express a wish that she may never be seen among 
those whom time shows up as kakoi (428-30): all this, we 
,. 
346 
should remember, is in explanation of her resolve to escape 
her disgraceful condition in death; she is confident, then, 
that her intellectual recognition of her moral duty will 
enable'to carry out the course of action which her aidos and 
her conscience demand. She has, however, already recognized 
i 
that people place obstacles before 7G Ka>6/, and that one of 
these is a burdensome form of aidos; in speaking, in effect, 
of her aidos in 392-430 she had, as it were, recombined its 
twin aspects, which shows that she did not fully understand 
what the two aspects were, but in spite of this uneasy 
coalition of that which was separated at 385-7 there are 
indications enough that aidos is still working upon her in 
different ways. Phaidra, then, believes that she is now 
about to act in accordance with the good aidos, but that 
aidos which she has already called bad is still present. ° 
The chorus, like Phaidra in the latter part of her speech, 
see no conflict between doing what is right and preserving 
one's reputation, hence their comment on Phaidra's speech 
(431-2); 
209 
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The Nurse, on the other hand, once she has decided to 
attempt to minimize the influence of traditional morality on 
her mistress, goes on to describe the good aidos as bad, 
for when Phaidra reaffirms her determination not to allow 
pleasure to deflect her from -rä K, rh 
v (486-9 particularly 
recalls 382-4), she describes the aidos which lies behind 
the reference to eukleia210 as mere semnotes (r6 vr. uýcýs, 
490). 211 As in Phaidra's own disquisition on aidos the 
sophistic concern for the proper definition of words and the 
idea that the same response might be described in different 
terms is relevant here. For the present, however, Phaidra 
sticks to her resolve, concentrating (in 499,503 and 505) on 
that which is really aischron rather than the Nurse's insist- 
ence that aischra are better for her than kala. 
Soon, however, Phaidra vacillates again, her ads assuaged, 
and allows the Nurse to approach Hippolytos. Her illicit 
347 
passion is thus revealed to an even wider audience, and, just 
as the Nurse's initial horror on hearing her secret caused 
Phaidra to be ashamed and embarrassed, so Hippoly- 
tos' particularly vehement reaction212 produces the same 
response, and Phaidra once again experiences shame at her 
love (685-6): 
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The verb kakunomai213 is usually seen as analogous to aisch- 
unomai, 
214 but if it may bear some sense like "I feel myself 
kake" it might be regarded as indicative of the kind of self- 
disgust which Phaidra expressed when she called her love a 
miasma at 317. At any rate, Phaidra's aidos at the nature of 
her passion is once more expressed, and once more215 it 
causes her pain. Immediately, however, she turns from shame 
at the impulses which she finds reprehensible in herself to 
the idea of her reputation: she imagines that Hippolytos will 
tell others what the Nurse told him, and imagines the harm 
this will do to her honour (687-92). Her concern for her own 
reputation and for that of her family leads her to thoughts 
of death (715-21): 
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As at 386 she is concerned for her oikos (cüip, ovs, 719), and 
her inability to face Theseus both testifies to her aidos and 
recalls her prediction that she would be unable to do so at 
416; most importantly, however, she is concerned to preserve 
her own reputation and that of her sons, and this recalls 
both 421-5 and the very desire for a good reputation which 
caused her to reveal her secret to the Nurse in the first 
place. This, in turn, leads her to formulate her plan to 
denounce Hippolytos and teach him sophrosyne (728-31): once 
again, then, she puts aidos, fear of disgrace, before ro KxX 
J 
and for the pleasure of revenge undertakes unjustly to dest- 
348 
roy another human being. 
26 Ironically, too, since Hippolytos 
had no intention of breaking his oath, the truth is revealed 
at the end of the play only because of the action Phaidra 
took to avoid exposure. Disaster comes upon ner because she 
is unsure about aidos: she does the right thing in reacting 
with aidos to her passion, but this aidos causes her pain; 
at the same time her awareness that she is doing the right 
thing causes her to take a certain pleasure in her aidos, 
although she knows (486-9) that true eukj eia is better than 
superficial pleasure and (382-5) that it is harmful to take 
pleasure in aidos. Her aidos, then, is truly "double": the 
aidos which she experiences at impulses which she knows are 
wrong makes her the sympathetic figure that she is, the 
"good" Phaidra of this play as opposed to the "bad" Phaidra 
of the first Hippolytus, but the aidos which she relates to 
the judgement of others ultimately leads to the exposure of 
her desires and the deceitful and vindictive destruction of 
another person. The separation of aspects of aidos which are 
traditionally part of the whole is doubtless artificial, but 
it certainly allows the poet to explore the traditional 
ambivalence of the concept in a new and searching way. The 
chorus are unaware of the implications of all that is brought 
out about the twofold nature of aidos, but at 770-5, in 
their summing up of Phaidra's motivation, they unwittingly 
give expression to its twin aspects: Phaidra was ashamed of 
her lot, 
217 
and concerned to preserve her reputation: 
218 
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It is worth pointing out that Hippolytos' moral principles 
do not have this duality: the eusebeia which causes him to 
keep even an oath which was improperly extracted from him219 
remains with him till the end; he, too, is faced with the 
ruin of his reputation, yet this does not lead him to break 
his oath. 
220 His eusebeia, then, like his aidos and his 
sophrosyne, is not influenced by other people, yet this is 
precisely the cause of his own undoing. Much is made in the 
349 
play of the concept of sophrosyne, 
221 
which in Phaidra's 
case is linked to hei aidos and in Hippolytos' to both aidos 
and eusebeia. Yet it is the particular form which these 
qualities take in them which proves disastrous in both their 
cases. Neither's sophrosyne, then, can be true 5-op osy. e, 
if "safe thinking" produces disaster: the kairos, the play 
seems to tell us, is all important - there are no absolutes. 
Women, we have noticed, form a category in which the sense 
of aidos is expected to be strong: conversely, the old form 
a category which is felt particularly to attract the aidos 
of others. Thus at And. 917-8 the aidos which is normally 
felt towards the old allows Hermione to place a favourable 
interpretation on her father's inability to impose his will 
on the ancient Peleus. 
222 
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Similarly, at c3ä. 263-5 the chorus-leader accuses Pentheus 
not only of impiety and failure to show aidos for the gods, 
223 
but also of a lack o# aidos for his grandfather, whose wor- 
ship of Dionysos he has ridiculed; failing in all these res- 
pects, Pentheus, it i:: claimed, is a disgrace to his house. 
From lines 204-9 and J65 of the same play, however, it emer- 
ges that the old, venerable as they are, are expected to 
conduct themselves with certain amount of decorum: in the 
former passage Teiresias mentions the possibilty that others 
will regard his participation in the orgiastic rites of the 
new god as evidence of a lack of aischune (= aidos in the 
traditional sense of "respect") for his old age, while in 
the latter he informs us that it would be aischron were he 
and Kadmos to fall. 
We have already seen from the HE that dos can make one 
reluctant to involve others in one's own misfortunes: 
224 
the 
aidos involved here will be a form of that which one feels 
for the direct recipients of one's actions, and will be 
based both on a fear of the other's disapproval and on one's 
recognition of his status. Such aidos is also in evidence in 
the following passages: 
350 
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In both these passages the speaker experiences aischune at 
involving another in his/her problems, and it does not seem 
to matter whether those involved are philoi or not, for 
while in the former Orestes is speaking to his sister, Elek- 
tra, and exhibiting a certain concern for her reputation as 
a respectable woman, in the latter Klytaimestra and Achilles 
have only just met. 
The idea that one'z. business is one's own and no one else's 
also lies behind iß. 327-3i,, where Agamemnon, having discov- 
ered that Menelaos has intercepted his letter to Klytaimest- 
ra, vents his fury on his brother: 
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Agamemnon, then, regards it as anaischuntia, a synonym of 
anaideia, that Menelaos has interfered in his affairs, thus 
showing the disregard for another's rights and status which 
is regularly seen as a breach of aidos. Menelaos, however, 
experienced no aidos at the time and is unrepentant in the 
present, simply because he feels he can ignore his brother's 
disapproval. 
Agamemnon's anger persists at least as far as 378-80, where 
he prefaces his criticisms with the following: 
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So he wishes to abuse Menelaos, but from a position of moral 
superiority. Sophrosyne and anaideia are here opposed, sug- 
gesting once again the closeness of the former to a' os, 
351 
anaid a is seen as manifested in an unflinching gaze, just 
as aidos commonly is in downcast eyes, 
L25 
and the fact that 
Menelaos is Agamemnon's brother seems to have some influence 
on the latter's aidos: one does not abuse one's philoi. It 
will be seen, then, that aidos and sophrosyne here are con- 
cerned with general ideas of appropriateness and moderation, 
just as aidos and terms denoting "good sense" often were in 
the Odyssey. 226 
Agamemnon's recriminations against Menelaos are interrupted 
by the arrival of the messenger who is the escort of Klytai- 
mestra, Iphigeneia and Orestes. Such is the king's porig at 
this eventuality that he feels himself liable to weep, and 
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That a man should experience aidos at the thought of weeping 
is natural: 
227 
that Agamemnon should feel it at not shedding 
a tear, however, is remarkable; it seems that he is the sort 227a 
of person who weeps when he feels he should. Details like 
this obviously help to make up the characterization of Aga- 
memnon as ineffectual and slightly pompous, and the lines 
which precede the remarks quoted confirm this: at 446-9 ae 
envies those of low birth their ability to say what they- 
like and to weep when they feel like it, and contrasts this 
boon with the poverty of the nobleman's nature in that res- 
pect; people like himself must protect themselves with their 
own self-importance ('pc. $ , 450) and are slaves to popular 
opinion (449-50). It is thus apparent that Agamemnon has an 
acute concern for his "image" and that he bases his conduct 
upon what other people will say; in effect, he denounces his 
own pomposity out of his own mouth. In the character of this 
figure, then, the traditional nobleman's concern for his 
reputation, elesewhere seen as quite normal, is held up as 
something faintly ridiculous, and this is, in fact, a theme 
of the play as a whole: for just as Agamemnon's identificat- 
ion of aidos as a virtue of those of noble birth (380,446-53) 
352 
reveals his essential pomposity and is equated with KoS, 
2`$ 
so do other characters, notably Klytaimestra, express the 
idea that, in certain circumstances, a too profound regard 
for one's own status may be not ados, but mere semnotes or 
habrotes. 229 Similarly the one other character whose concern 
for his image surpasses even that of Agamemnon (namely Ach- 
illes) also emerges in a faintly ridiculous light. 
230 
This 
play, then, like the Hippolytos, explores the idea of burden- 
some aidos, but in a rather more satirical vein. 
We have already seen many times that it is aischron to tell' 
lies. 231 At And. 435-8 Andromache charges Menelaos with 
deceit, and is astounded when he does not deny the charge, 
but glories in it: thus at 451-2 she terms his pursuit of 
his aims by saying one thing and doing another aischrokerdeia. 
At IA. 1144-5, however, Agamemnon declines to follow a simi- 
lar path: he knows that Klytaimestra knows the truth, and 
recognizes that to claim that he did not intend to sacrifice 
Iphigeneia would be a brazen disregard for Klytaimestra's 
knowledge to the contrary; to persist in claiming that an 
untruth is true even when others know that it is not is 
therefore anaideia (or anaischuntia): 
232 
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We have already had occasion to note that in Euripides, as 
elsewhere, one's iloi have a special right to aidos. In 
some plays the motif of ilia is of particular importance, 
and among these is the Alcestis: Alkestis herself is pre- 
eminently loyal to her husband, and as such a model of fem- 
inine arete, 
233 
while the mutual responsibility expected in 
both her and Admetos as iloi is repeatedly mentioned. 
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At 277-9 Admetos tells his wife: 
(ci Oct ý{ýýM. ýýj GýKfT 
äV C-LI 
EV tot. u' Gý KPf. I)S14 K -&L 
This is answered by Alkestis at 282-4: 
E l(w` o'F -9-/ E-r, &EVOU/*c KavrL* Tv S 6t1S 
xýj Ka rK r-r ocCo( ¢ w, -rz ý' ý, iý &e x4 
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11 6 ýýuýý, tEýoc and -ire /ý C-v ". c. are parallel terms, 
235 
which des- 
cribe the reciprocal respect owed by both parties to a rela- 
tionship of philia. The reciprocal nature of the relationship 
is shown by Admetos' words at 433-4: 
i äfL OL dL 
TL,. v]$ 
E1t&- 
i- výKý äv r' 
tvý 
/v'im` %. %'cvi . 
Aidos enters the picture at 728, where Pheres, accused of 
anaideia by his son, points out that such a charge could not 
be levelled against Alkestis, 
236 
and the idea that Admetos 
nimself may have manifested anaideia in ask ging 
his wife to 
die for him may be present at 954-7,237 for although the lack of 
husband's'aidos in that passage is specifically referred to 
his cowardice in refusing to face death, the fact that he 
persuaded his wife to die in his stead is also mentioned in 
a way that suggests that this, too, is discreditable (and 
Admetos does mention his debt of gratitude to Alkestis in 
950-3). The idea that Admetos does owe his wife a debt of 
gratitude which it would be discreditable of him to ignore 
is brought out more fully at 1057-61, where he explains his 
inability to accept the woman Herakles has brought him in 
terms of fear of reproach from both people in general, 
and his dead wife in particular: 
238 
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Although Admetos does express himself in terms of the rep- 
roach of others, it is clear that he feels himself under an 
obligation which his own principles lead him to honour: the 
reproach of his fellow-citizens may be a real possibility, 
but criticism on the part of Alkestis is surely a less pres- 
sing sanction; even if he does believe that she could rep- 
roach him from beyond the grave, his fear still reveals a 
personal awareness that it would not be right to betray his 
wife. It is worth noticing that the positive force of this 
obligation, to respect one's benefactor, is consistently, as 
here, designated by sebein, sebesthai, tima esbeue 
etc. and not by aideistha;, although aidos is the negative 
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inhibition which prevents breaches of the standard. In Homer 
both senses could be covered by aideisthai, and the Euripi- 
ean practice in. this play shows how far sebein etc. have 
taken over from that verb in the sense "respect", "honour". 
Philia, and breaches thereof, also play an important röle in 
Medea. Throughout the play Jason is condemned for his bet- 
rayal of his wife: the Nurse is unwilling to speak ill of 
her master, 
239 
yet is firmly of the opinion that he has been 
revealed as kakos with regard to his philoi (84). The Paida- 
gogos is cynical about this arrid replies (85-6): 
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At 439-40 the chorus draw the moral from Jason's conduct 
towards Medea: 
VC Kwý/ ý( At L3 el At 
r( 
S 
Eka öL -r-it /K ýý"jA 4' ývcýc. ) AAc6 uc 
cav E-rmaf. 
In abandoning Medea, then, Jason has destroyed the obligation 
to treat her properly, an obligation sanctified by oath, 
241 
and suggested that there is no longer any place for aidos, 
the impulse to keep such obligations, in the world. 
242 Medea 
is given the chance to vent her fury on Jason himself at 
465fr.. She equates his betrayal of her with cowardice (465- 
6) and maintains that he is now her enemy (467); further 
insinuating cowardice, she goes on (469-72): 
ou , -OL 
Bros 
-t-ü ý' E s-rL / cue c-vrok 
L. 
c, 
cý c )t uVs Kat. iCwj (? PC fa. vT e va,. rL k 
FrELV, 
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?J 01VO ALS vä (w/ 
-r1a (W xLýEc 
It is, of course, implied that it is discreditable to betray 
one's ilo', but Jason's anaideia, as Medea sees it here, 
consists not in the betrayal itself but in his having the 
nerve to face the one he has betrayed; his consciousness of 
his misdeed, she suggests, should have caused him to be un- 
able to look his victim in the face. At 499 Medea ironically 
pretends to treat him once more as her ilos, yet asks her- 
self the question: 










The enormity of Jason's betrayal, she believes, will become 
apparent when he is unable to answer the question (502), 
where am I now to turn? 
243 That Jason should be shown up in 
this way is clearly Medea's intention, and such is often the 
motivation behind such Eones. 
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Medea, herself, however, has already committed grave crimes 
against philia, and will do so again. At 166-7 she herself 
confesses that the murder of her brother was aischron (ocsaxe 
ws 
... Krc 
ýaýa ºCgc11 sLl), while at 1286-7 the chorus, thinking of 




e6«. At 1328 Jason calls her deed S'V«týcir. cru, 
and at 1346 addresses her as airx u1c&IE : as often, the same 
action may be regarded as dussebes or as aischron. Medea 
herself admits that the murder was dussebes at 1383. 
The closeness of sebas and aidos in the context of philia is 
further demonstrated by Hcld. 6-9, where Iolaos explains his 
participation in the labours of Herakles: 
etw Y 
RQ 
a. i 6 o1. WAA -rt, r yt--V&S rc- WV) 
e JöJ ý'c, vV' ''lýýýas i (V)xW$ veü ýuJ, T1'övwJ 
7C'kci. r-rw/ of 
te 
ývt, E x Eis Of V4 FL) 
r, ,r or 7 V, ý. c, k0 1ýw ' 
Here both ou öot and r, /3w4 express the idea of 
positive respect for one's kin, and the equivalence demonst- 
rates that, while sebein etc. are now more common in this 
application, aidos can still bear this sense. As a result of 
his phi is with Herakles Iolaos now protects his friend's 
children (10-11), and at 26-30 we see how aidos motivates 
him in this, too: 
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and the the reason for Iolaos' concern, what 
People will say, confirms that he is subject to aidos. Other 




failure to help one's philoi in time of trouble. 
In the Hip_pp tus the most important breach of phi] a is 
that supposed to have occurred between Hippolytos and his 
father: we have already noted 
247 how Theseus accused his son 
of honouring himself more than his father. At 1257-60 Theseus 
describes how his in tial pleasure at Hippolytos' destruct- 
ion turned to regret: 
öýot 
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Theseus feels aidos for his son on s_: ccunt of their kinship, 
and the co-operative feeling of concern for a philos, especi- 
ally a blood-relation, overcomes thF, competitive desire for 
vengeance. 
248 Theseus' aidos for the 90-ds must relate to 
this, so it seems-that he regards the . ods as guarantors of 
the proper relationship between pilci. '49 There is, however, 
a slight difference of meaning between . cý 
 and 
#. IC4V j EK&LVi'I : 
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aidos before the goers signifies res- 
pect for the gods as upholders of moral standards and 
implies the sanction of their disapproval, while Theseus' 
aidos for Hippolytos can scarcely encompass any concern for 
the latter's opinions, but is rather a positive regard for a 
member of one's own family qua philos. This standard may 
ultimately be related to popular disapproval, but that aspect 
is not mentioned here, so it seems that Theseus' aidos for 
his son is an example of the concept in its most altruistic 
and other-regarding aspect. 
At 1286-9 Artemis upbraids Theseus for his treatment of his 
son and says that he is, as a result of his conduct towards 
him, disgraced and should hide himself away (1290-1): 
-rr w3 ovX u-ýrö r Sý Ta (rxý oc K( 
vrr-ri- 
LS 
C/4-'%. KS It. I r)<v-10L-(. S ,... 
Theseus' disgrace stems partly from his mistake, but ultima- 
tely from his wrongful destruction of a philos: the idea 
that he should remove himself from sight acknowledges this 




1287 the goddess also says that Theseus killed his son oüx 
or w. and this reasserts the connexion with the divine 
sphere which we noticed at 1258-9. At 1294-5 she goes on to 
claim that Theseus' crime leaves him no share in the life of 
9-. GL KVSee5, and thus suggests that a crime against pi is 
of such enormity entails the destruction of the perpetrator's 
arete: Artemis, however, is far from impartial in all this, 
and perhaps others may be inclined to see Theseus' ignorance 
of what he was doing as a mitigating circumstance. At 1331-4 
it is Artemis herself who is implicated in disgrace, and 
again the grounds for this lie in the betrayal of a philos, 
in this case Artemis' failure to protect her devotee, Hippo- 
lytos: 
E'ft"4l 6-a Lf(-l Z%( 
4 
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Again, there may be an element of irony in this attribution 
of human motivation to the divine. 
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Philia also has an important part to play in the scene bet- 
ween Hekabe and Odysseus in the Hecuba. Hekabe once allowed 
Odysseus, who had entered Troy in disguise, to escape unhar- 
med, and he admits (248) that he owes his life to her. As a 
result of this debt of charis Hekabe asks Odysseus to inter- 
cede on behalf of Polyxena, who is to be offered as a sacri- 
fice to Achilles, and claims that he should be ashamed to 
appear before his benefactress to demand the sacrifice of 
her daughter (251-3): 253 
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Odysseus, she goes on to say, manifests no charis (254) 
because he is a politician, and therefore a slave to the 
whims of his constituency, GL -r'oýkot (257) : in the course of 
this argument (256) she implies that she is his phile, whom 
it is not right for him to betray. 
To Hekabe's argument from charis Odysseus opposes another: 
358 
Achilles himself requested the sacrifice (304-5) and he, 
because of the energy he devoted to the capture of Troy, 
deserves to be honoured in the way in which he would wish 
(309-10): if the brave are denied time cities will decline 
(306-7), and no one will be willing to fight if the dead are 
not honoured (313-6); Achilles is also the p1ilos of the 
Greeks, and it is aischron to treat a person as a philos 
while he lives only to abandon him in death (310-1). Odys- 
seus thus resists Hekabe's argument, in essence, by agreeing 
with it: he agrees that it is aischron to betray a philos, 
but represents the obligation to show gratitude as more cogent 
in the case of the dead Achilles than in that of Hekabe. 
Adkins 254 believes that, in terms of traditional values, 
Odysseus is right. Yet while the arguments he employs may be 
compelling in any ordinary situation they do not adequately 
meet the purpose to which Odysseus uses them: it is true 
that Achilles has a much more powerful claim to philia with 
Odysseus than does Hekabe, and all that Odysseus says about 
the need to reward bravery and prowess is perfectly commend- 
able: in the present circumstance, however, his arguments 
are being used to justify human sacrifice, which, as Pearson 
points out, 
255 "is no different from murder", and which is 
one of the very few practices to meet with outright and un- 
ambiguous condemnation in the Iliad. 
256 Odysseus, then, is 
using justifiable arguments to unjustified ends, 
257 
and it 
would be very easy for the request of Achilles to be condem- 
ned as excessive or unseemly in line with traditional, if 
vague, standards of appropriateness. 
258 Nor should the obli- 
gation which is placed on him by the fact that Hekabe once 
accepted his supplication be minimized: supplication does 
create a bond between the two parties259 and the successful 
suppliant is under a debt of gratitude to his protector. 
260 
It is doubtful whether Odysseus' granting of a favour which 
Hekabe does not want (301-2) satisfies this obligation. 
At Sup . 293 Aithra asks Theseus whether she should say some- 
thing kalon for both the city and himself, but at 295 refers 
to her reluctance to speak her mind, a reluctance which she 
359 
goes on to paraphrase (299-300) as a fear that it is useless 
for women to speak well. Aithra, then, seems to experience a 
form of aidos, or fear of criticism, which arises from her 
consciousness of her place as a woman (and we should notice 
that this fear of criticism almost prevents her revealing 
that which she believes to be ka o- 293,300). Theseus, 
however, suggests, in effect, that it is not with regard to 
speaking that she should feel aidos, but at remaining silent, 
and relates this opinion to the demands of loyalty between 
iloi (296): 
i 
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We saw in connexion with SophoklesI Elektra261 how, in the 
context of the crime within the family, the conduct demanded 
by dike might conflict with that demanded by aid s: we find 
the same opposition in Euripides, expressed in strikingly 
similar terms. At x, 1.1051-3 the chorus-leader comments on 
Klytaimestra's argument that it was dike which drove her to 
kill Agamemnon: 
The chorus-leader's point, then, is the same as that made by 
Elektra in Sophokles' play: 
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regardless of the legitimacy 
of retaliation, Klytaimestra's murder of her husband involved 
fundamental offences against both women's Grete, for women 
must be loyal to their husbands, and philia, since it is 
clearly a crime against philia to murder one's husband. The 
argument is similar at O r. 194, although here it is the murder 
of Klytaimestra by Orestes and Elektra which is at issue: 
the chorus sing that this deed was performed with Wie, but 
Elektra goes on, Kokws 
S'oüý.. These statements, however, must 
be seen against a background in which it is traditionally 
aischron either to be disloyal to one's husband or to promote 
263 
strife within the family: this is not a new aspect given the 
situation by Sophokles and Euripides, and certainly not an 
attempt at a solution "to the problem set by the crime with- 
in the family. "264 It would, however, be true to say that to 
designate an action aischron is to present a sound argument 
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against its performance, but this, as we saw very clearly in 
our discussion of Sophokles' play, does not necessarily mean 
that one who accepts that a given course of action is aisc - 
ron will be deterred from carrying it out; it is also true 
that in the Orestes especially the claims of justice are, in 
the early part of the play, frequently subordinated to the 
demands of family loyalty, 
265 but if this is a sign that 
Euripides believed that the latter always outweighed the 
former, then it will be a sign that he is placing more em- 
phasis on one of two traditional aspects of the situation, 
rather than suggesting a solution to the problem based on 
supposedly new, "quiet moral"266 uses of aischron etc.: 
Homer's Klytaimestra, brought up to subscribe to the same 
standards as Penelope, will have known as well as her Sophok- 
lean or Euripidean counterpart that it is aischron to be 
disloyal to one's husband, and the "problem set by the crime 
within the family" is scarcely one which required a solution 
in fifth century Athens. 
At one point in the Orestes and Pylades are on the verge 
of separation, and this prospect arouses feelings of aidos 
in both. At 605-8 Orestes explains why he feels unable to 
abandon his friend: 
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On this account, he gives up the opportunity of a safe return 
to Greece. Pylades, however, feels no less strongly (674-86): 
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Orestes immediately points out that he is affected by simi- 
lar considerations (689-91): 
C" I% 
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Both, then, are subject to aidos, in that both believe that 
it is aischron to abandon a friend and both are afraid that 
they would incur the censure of others should they do so. 
Pylades, in particular, conceives an elaborate image of the 
unjustified charges of those who see base motives in every- 
thing: it is clear that these charges would cause him great 
distress, in spite of his own knowledge of the facts, but 
this is an entirely understandable human reaction in the 
circumstances. Nor should it be inferred that Pylades' pre- 
occupation with the judgement of others reveals that the 
Greek's loyalty to his friends rests only on fear of opprob- 
rium: Pylades' very fears show that he is acutely concerned 
about his own reputation for loyalty as suchi(by subsuming t 
disloyalty to the head of cowardice he relates/to that area 
of male values about which a young nobleman in his position 
might be most concerned), 
267 
and this reveals that his own 
personal belief that it is wrong to betray a friend is a 
strong one. In line 686, moreover, he gives two reasons for 
his desire to be sacrificed along with Orestes, friendship 
tout court and fear of reproach, and neither motive should 
be minimized; and if Pylades does show a strong prudential 
regard for his own position, we may contrast this with the 
initial pronouncement of Orestes (605-8), that it is aischron 
to abandon a friend and that he himself is as concerned for 
the life of his friend as he is for his own. 
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Once again, 
Greek. ' values are shown to embrace prudential and altruistic 
aspects. 
In the Ion Kreousa is urged by her faithful slave to kill 
Xouthos. This, however, she refuses to do (977): 
ftl J'rvý. ý. tra, C-UVx -rw. s Tod 
'y 
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Kreousa's aidos here is not related to any fear of disap- 
proval on the grounds of disloyalty, but to a positive regard 
for the philia she and Xouthos have enjoyed: the fact that 
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Xouthos was once a good husband sets up, in Kreousa's view, 
an obligation which must be returned. 
This idea of obligation, of charis, also occurs in a passage 
to which we have already referred in another context, 
269 or. 
459-69. At the approach of his grandfather, Orestes is seized 
by aidos, which causes him to be reluctant to face the old 
man (460-1). As the causal dative, -roLriv e ýý ýýýýº1äroýs , 
shows, the grounds for Orestes' aidos lie in his murder of 
Klytaimestra, but they do so in a particular sense, as he 
goes on to explain (462-7): 
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Orestes' murder of his mother, then, occasions his aidos in 
that he regards it-as a crime of ingratitude against his 
grandfather, who brought him up: thus he cannot face a Phi los 
he has wronged. Again, the unpleasant implications of the 
crime within the family are stressed, and this fits in with 
the general importance of the theme of philia in the whole 
play. 
270 Later in the play this theme is also prominent in 
the prelude to the execution of the plot to kill Helen and 
kidnap Hermione, when, just as in IT, Orestes and Pylades 
pledge their friendship and vow never to abandon each other 
(801-2,1075-81). 271 
In one of its longest continuous fragments (fr. 22 and 60 
Bond) the Hypsipyle contains several passages which are 
relevant in this connexion: at 15-7 Hypsipyle begs Amphiaraos 
not to be put to death under an atrtX xiixeK, and this seems 
to refer to her breach of trust and dereliction of duty in 
neglecting the infant, who was subsequently killed. At 20-1 
she tells the seer, 
i AYETE, 4'-e o- cSc-v C-t r opw -rl-t XX 
Here it seems that aidos is the trust one Places in one's 
363 
philoi, or the hope that they will stand by in time of need: 
thus the sense of epaideomai here seems very close to that 
which might be borne by sebo or even timao. At 25ff. Hypsi- 
pyle supplicates Amphiaraos, 
272 but his reply at 39-42 is 
expressed in terms of the debt of charis which he owes her 
as a result of her earlier kindness towards him (to which 
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That the seer feels it aischron not to return Hypsipyle's 
favour indicates that he would feel aidos at the prospect of 
not doing so: this is the attitude which he describes as Tö 
&vrtflsin line 40, and again we see the closeness of ads and 
273 
, rö ctf&t4, aischron and dussebeia. 
Mention of supplication in the Hypsipyle brings us to discus- 
sion of the topic in its own right: aidos as we have seen 
before, is felt particularly appropriate in the context of 
supplication, and seems to be a reaction to the situation 
and the ritual gestures in themselves, but in Euripides, in 
particular, aidos is often present ., or appealed to, 
in the 
supplicated in other, less obvious ways. 
At line 324 of the play which bears her name Medea seems to 
begin supplication (-rr vS rE yovätwJ (sc. LKFrfrvý&. rti 1), but 
Kreon dismisses her pleas (325) and in answer to her quest- 
ion (326), confirms that he feels no ads for them (327). 
At this point, as Gould shows, 
274 Medea's supplication is 
purely figurative - she has not made ritual contact. By 339, 
however, she has made contact, and (340-7) begs to be allowed 
to stay in Corinth one day longer. At this point Kreon does 
feel aidos, and gives in, although he is aware that he is 
making a mistake (348-51): 
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Ritual contact, then, does make a difference, and in this 
case it brings Kreon, not initially susceptible to aidos, to 
a point where he must either accept Medea's supplication, or 
carry out his threat (335) to use force against her; this, 
however, he cannot bring himself to do, because, as he seems 
to suggest, it is not in his nature to act in such ways. His 
aidos, then, leads him to reject a course of action which he 
feels instinctively to be wrong: this aidos is close to, but 
distinct from, that which one might feel as a spontaneous 
response to another's appeal for mercy or aid. 
275 
Medea's supplication was personal, conducted on a one-to-one 
basis with Kreon, the echthros whom she was attempting to 
turn into a soter. 
276 
The Heracleidae, on the other hand, is 
a full-scale suppliant drama, in which supplication takes 
place before the altar of a city in which the suppliants are 
seeking protection. Since protection implies protection from 
an enemy, the appearance of the suppliants' echthros is a 
constant feature of plays of this type. In this play, the 
echthros, Eurystheus' herald, enters even before the suppli- 
ants have encountered their prospective soter, 
277 
and this 
means that when the latter, Demophon (with his brother, who 
remains silent throughout the play), enters, he must decide 
quickly on whether or not to support the suppliants. In view 
of the violence threatened by the enemy herald, 
278 
there is 
really only one decision Demophon can make, but although he 
decides quickly and with scarcely any hesitation, his decis- 
ion does not arise from one simple consideration, but rather 
reveals the complexity of the motives of the supplicated and 
something of the variety of appeal which the suppliant might 
employ. 
Faced with the appearance of the enemy herald, Iolaos appeals 
to the citizens of Athens in general (69-72), referring both 
to the herald's threat of violence as violence against the 
city's gods and to the danger that failure to protect those 
who take refuge at its altars will damage the city's reputa- 
tion (will be an oneidos, 72). This oneidos may cover a num- 
ber of different ideas: Iolaos may imagine that Athens is 
365 
concerned for her reputation as protectress of the weak, or 
as a city of pious citizens, or he may be suggesting that it 
will be a sign of weakness on the Athenians' part if they 
allow those who take refuge in their territory to be maltre- 
ated. 
In their rebuke to the herald at 101-4, however, it is to 
religious aspect alone that the chorus refer (cf. 107-8), and 
it appears from this that the very act of supplication en- 
titles the suppliants, in that they have invoked the protec- 
tion of the gods, to aidos: 
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The divine sanction, however, merits only the barest of al- 
lusions in the speech in which Iolaos seeks to persuade Demo- 
phon to accord protection, but rather the old man employs 
three common suppliant appeals which are intended to supple- 
ment the basic argument that it is pious to protect those 
who already enjoy the protection of the gods. These Bitt- 
topoi are in this case the argument from reputation, the 
argument from kinship, and the argument from charis, grati- 
tude for past favours. 
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The first of these arguments is subtly worked into Iolaos' 
speech, for rather than simply suggesting that the reputation 
of Athens will suffer if he and his fellow-suppliants fall 
into the hands of the Argives, he prefers to indulge in 
extensive praise of the Athenian spirit, while introducing 
a number of hints to the effect that this spirit, and the 
consequent good reputation, must be maintained. Thus he in- 
sinuates (191) that any decision to expel the suppliants 
would be regarded as motivated by fear of the Argives, and 
suggests (197-8) that in such an eventuality he would have 
his doubts about the city's independence. At 200-1 he links 
protection of the suppliants more explicitly to the values 
of the battlefield: the Athenians, he says, will be willing 
to die to protect their suppliants, 
366 
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This is still praise of Athens, but it also suggests that 
the Athenians' reputation for bravery is now at stake. 
Iolaos' next point is re, rLYYkv&l, something upon which he 
himself sets a high value. 
280 Theseus and Herakles were 
related, and so Demophon is related to the suppliants (207- 
13); this places an additional obligation on Demophon him- 
self (205-6). There was more to the philia of Theseus and 
Herakles, however, than simple kinship, for Herakles freed 
Theseus from Hades (214-9), and Iolaos, using the third of 
his arguments, now claims that charis back (220). His 
final words are essentially an appeal to pity, but he does 
allude to several of the topoi he has already mentioned, and 
begins by stressing the danger to the reputations of Athens 
as a whole and of Demophon in particular should the suppli- 
ants be dragged off by force (223-5): in pointing out that 
this would be aischron for the city and its king Iolaos 
essentially recapitulates, for all that he has said before 
has been based on the idea that it is aischron firstly to be 
shown up as weak or cowardly, secondly to betray one's kin, 
and thirdly to fail to return a favour; this being so, it 
should be clear that he is appealing to aidos on three dif- 
ferent grounds, none of which answers to the simple argument 
that suppliants deserve aidos qua suppliants. 
In his reply Demophon enumerates three considerations which 
compel him to accept the supplication: the divine sanction 
(238-9), -rö rvYytrvFJ and charis (240-1) and -ri aljxecd (242), 
on which he adds (243-6): 
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He has, therefore, recognized and accepted Iolaos' arguments, 
and his aidos has been successfully aroused on all counts. 
It will be seen that he accedes to the request both out of 
concern for principle and out of concern for his own and his 
367 
city's reputation, and aidos is relevant in both areas, as 
the instinct which responds to the wrong action of disregard- 
ing those who are under the protection of the gods, to that 
of the abandonment of one's kin and to that of failing to 
return a favour, and also as the reaction to the knowledge 
that all these things, in much the same way as is cowardice 
or weakness, are subject to the disapproval of other people. 
Demophon expresses the idea that it is aischron for him to 
allow the suppliants to be dragged off again at 256, and his 
insistence that this is so will be based on a belief that it 
is discreditable to allow suppliants to be maltreated, but 
this belief itself may rest either on the idea that to fail 
to protect is a sign of lack of regard for others or on the 
thought that failure to protect indicates one's own weakness. 
Demophon's reply to the herald's suggestion that he should 
simply expel the suppliants from Attica in order that the 
Argives may take them once they have crossed the borders 
(257) at least shows that he is not solely concerned about 
the charge of weakness should they be seized by force. Demo- 
phon's statement, incidentally, that it is aischron for him 
to allow the suppliants to be taken by force (256) is promp- 
ted by a question from the herald which reveals that it is 
also aischron to seize suppliants by force (255): 
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The same action, then, may be disgraceful for both the ech- 
thros and the soter, and the former's lack of aidos in this 
case is a clear sign of his anaideia. At 284-7 Demophon ends 
the scene with the herald by referring once more to the röle 
of r Kir 
s in securing his support for the Herakleidai, and 
this time he is certainly motivated by a concern for his own 
and his city's reputation for strength and independence: 
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The supplication over, Iolaos urges his charges to express 
their gratitude towards the Athenians, who are K 
/JLuL 6tf tI 
368 
(315). This use of sebein, which is virtually interchange- 
able with aideisthai in this context, suggests that aidos is 
also the reponse of the successful suppliant to his protector. 
The situation changes, however, with the prophecy that the 
blood of a noble maiden must be shed if the Athenians are to 
defeat the Argives in battle. Demophon cannot command any of 
his citizens to make such a sacrifice, and the suppliants 
fear they will be abandoned. At 450 Iolaos expresses the 
that it would be aischron for himself and his fellow-suppli- 
ants if they should be put to death at the hands of their 
enemy: it seems, then, that the taking of the suppliants by 
force would be aischron for all parties, for Demophon (242-6, 
256,284-7), for the herald (255) and for the suppliants them- 
selves. As a result of Iolaos' fears, the Athenians of the 
chorus become worried about the reputation of their city 
(461-3): 
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The chorus-leader fears a reproach which he knows would be 
false: results are thus more important for him than intent- 
ions, but this is an entirely understandable reaction, and 
one which we should have no difficulty recognizing both at 
individual and at community level in our own society. 
In the play of the same name, Andromache is driven, in fear 
of her life, to take refuge at the Kv 
kTo('1 
of Thetis 
(42-6). Until the entrance of - 
Peleus, however, much later 
in the play, she does not address her supplication to any 
human being. Her appeal to Peleus comes at 572-6: 
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As well as the divine sanction, then, she also appeals to 
the old man's aidos for the reputation of his family: both 
he and Neoptolemos will appear weak if she, the suppliant of 
the one and the concubine of the other, is seized by an out- 
369 
sider. Later in the play (647-67) Menelaos claims that the 
opposite is the case, that Peleus' protection of Andromache 
is aischron, both for Peleus and for himself (648-50), on 
the grounds that she is a barbarian and an enemy, who is 
partly responsible for the death of Achilles. Menelaos thus 
ignores the power of the ritual of supplication entirely, 
281 
but his argument fails because Peleus holds him responsible 
for the war and considers him his enemy (706-7), and because 
he is from his first appearance on stage prepared to take 
Andromache's side. 
Hekabe's supplication of Agamemnon at iec. 786ff. deserves 
careful consideration, for there is more to the scene than 
first meets the eye. Hekabe throws herself at Agamemnon's 
knees at 787 and proceeds to supplicate him on the basis of 
the justice of her case: Polymestor has killed a xenos and 
deserves punishment. At 806-7 she sums up this part of her 
appeal: 
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Aideisthai seems to be used here as the verb which describes 
the reaction to supplication, and probably refers to the 
status which the suppliant enjoys as a protege of the gods, 
although there may also be an element of pity for one who 
has abandoned all claim to tim e in the usage. rwvr... 
e/ 
Dci IICºý 91/kVVS refers to Hekabe's argument on the justice of 
her case: she is asking Agamemnon to consider the crimes of 
Polymestor aischron (thus the term will have a similar app- 
lication to the adjective anos os, used of Polymestor at 790 
and 792 (cf. 788), referring to the breach of gnia); she 
says nothing about Polymestor's conduct, or Agamemnon's 
failure to punish him, being aischron for Agamemnon; 
282 thus 
she is not appealing to Agamemnon's own sense of aidos, but 
to his sense of outrage at a breach of aidos committed by 
someone else. This argument, however, fails to persuade him, 
for he withdraws and thus avoids the ritual contact of supp- 
lication (812); 283 Hekabe then interprets this action as a 
refusal. At 850-3, however, Agamemnon accepts the supplicat- 
ion, and on the grounds of the justice of Hekabe's case at 
that: 
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What, then, has happened: has Agamemnon changed his mind, or 
was Hekabe wrong to imagine that he was not persuaded by her 
argument at 812? Only one argument has been tried in the 
meantime which could possibly have influenced his decision: 
at 824-40 Hekabe turns to the fact that her daughter, Kas- 
sandra, is now Agamemnon's concubine, and claims that a form 
of charis exists between herself (and her dead son, Poly- 
doros) and Agamemnon on account of the philia he enjoys with 
Kassandra. This is not a compelling argument, 
284 but Agamem- 
non does not simply ignore it, 
285 for he qualifies his 
statement of his willingness to act in accordance with To 
SWM#4 as follows (854-6) :, 
#/ ^ 
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Now, it may be, as Adkins claims, 
286 that Agamemnon's decis- 
ion to recognize the claims of justice and the institution 
of xenia is to be taken at face value, but, if so, why does 
he withdraw at 812, the very point at which Hekabe has said 
all that she is going to say about the justice of her case? 
And why is he so concerned to avoid the charge that he is 
acting for Kassandra's sake? Dalfen287 is in no doubt but 
that sex, the charis of his relationship with Kassandra, is 
Agamemnon's real motive, and concludes, "Als Bemäntelung fair 
sein wahres Motiv ist ihm die Hikesie gut, als Appell war 
sie wirkungslos. " Part of the point of the scene, then, will 
be that people often have personal, self-interested reasons 
for following the moral course, and this seems to me to be 
the best way to explain both the king's change of mind and 
the fear that he will be seen as acting out of regard for 
his concubine. It may seem slightly strange that Agamemnon 
should be subject to such a motive, but the very fact that he 
suggests that others will assume that this is his motive 
suggests that it would be regarded as natural, if discredit- 
371 
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able, for him to act on that basis. 
The Supplices, like the Heracleidae, is a suppliant drama, 
and naturally aidos is important. The main modification of 
the canonical pattern of suppliant drama in the play is the 
presentation of two parallel appeals and two replies, one 
negative and one positive. 
289 Each of these is very different 
from the others, and as the appeals are based on different 
means of persuasion, so the replies are formulated as they 
are for different reasons. 
The climate initially seems favourable to the suppliants, 
when, at 34-41, Aithra expresses her pity for these mothers 
who have lost their sons, reveals her respect for the insti- 
tution of supplication UEý3vvtsk, 36) and announces that she 
has summoned her son in order that he may resolve the situ- 
ation. Theseus duly arrives, and at 113-4 Adrastos begins 
his appeal, initially answering Theseus' questions in sticho- 
mythia, then resorting to a formal suppliant appeal (163-92). 
At 164-5 he prefaces his plea with a reference to the ritual 
humiliation which the suppliant must undergo: 
% 
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t: V &t rxvvtt$ tXw seems to paraphrase aischunomai: 
290 Adras- 
tos is reluctant to abandon his claim to honour, yet (167) 
recognizes that he must do so. 
291 The stichomythia had been 
concerned mainly with the advisability of the expedition 
against Thebes (answering to the topos of the justice of the 
suppliants case), but the rhesis which follows it is largely 
an appeal to pity and a general argument that it is right 
that Theseus and Athens should protect the weak: Adrastos 
adduces no other reason for acceptance, not even the divine 
sanction. By this point, however, Theseus is more interested 
in the justice of the initial expedition, which he condemns 
as imprudent (161), unjust (224,228,233) and impious (231), 
and on this basis he rejects the appeal. 
He will, however, change his mind, but only after Aithra has 
interceded on the suppliants' behalf, employing many of the 
372 
topol Adrastos failed to mention. After the rejection of the 
initial appeal the chorus renew supplication and beg for 
pity (263-85). At 284 they urge Theseus to look upon them in 
their pitiful condition, but it is Aithra who looks and, 
having looked, immediately covers her eyes (286-7). She is 
plainly moved, and her reaction, given that she hides her 
eyes, might be classifiable as aidos. Theseus, in turn, is 
moved by his mother's distress, and attempts to divert her 
sympathy (286-90,291-2). Aithra, however, obtains leave to 
speak, and at 296 begins her appeal on the suppliants' be- 
half. 
Her first point is based on the religious imperative (301-2): 
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To urge someone not to dishonour the gods amounts to a re- 
quest to pcºTýýýýtic fýEL' 
S. Next, with a passing reference to 
the time Theseus will win if he helps the Argives (306), she 
refers to the dangerous precedent which will be set if the 
Thebans are allowed to maltreat the dead with impunity (306- 
13). Following her remarks on the importance of pan-Hellenic 
nomos, however, she proceeds to her third point, which is an 
argument based on the reputation of the supplicated (314-27), 
and although she concludes this section with an implication 
that it is discreditable per se not to help those in need, 
most of her appeal here is based on the point that others 
will regard Theseus as a coward if he avoids conflict with 
the Thebans: people will say that he shirked a fight out of 
fear and anandria (314-6), and they will belittle his previ- 
ous exploits if he is found to be a coward in this case (316 
-9); Aithra even goes so far as to suggest that she would 
disown him if he were to act in the way she describes (320). 
This is clearly a much more audacious form of appeal than 
could be employed by any suppliant, but Aithra has already 
obtained leave to speak on the grounds of her philia with 
Theseus, and their kinship gives her greater scope for plain 
speaking. In essence, however, though not in degree, this 
appeal to self-regarding aidos based on one's status as a 
warrior is of the same kind as that employed by Iolaos in 
373 
ld.. 292 
Aithra appeals, then, to three sanctions, the gods, pan- 
Hellenic law and popular disapproval, but it it to the latter 
alone that Theseus' reply addresses itself (337-46): 
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It is the appeal to self-regarding aidos which has found its 
mark: in particular, the hint that Theseus must live up to 
his reputation as an Attic Herakles-figure (316-7) and the 
reference to Aithra's own disapproval are both taken up (340 
-1,343-5): the mother clearly knows her son well. 
It is important to see that Theseus' expressed motives for 
accepting the supplication are based entirely on considerat- 
ion of his own status and reputation, for this is sometimes 
ignored by those who interpret the play. Kopperschmidt, for 
example, 
293 
thinks that the reference in 301 to rx tw4 t EL! V/ 
is the main point of Aithra's argument and sees Theseus' 
negative and positive responses as manifestations of a regard 
for Polis-Recht and Götterrecht respectively. He recognizes 
that Theseus gives in out of aidos but does not explain what 
this aidos is. 
294 Zuntz295 emphasizes Aithra's appeal to 
nomos and describes her argument as a successful attempt to 
subject oiktos to the test of reason: his paraphrase, 
"You cannot avoid the risks involved in succouring the 
injured; such cowardice would destroy your honour and, 
at the same time, would be your proper ruin, " 
blurs the distinction between Aithra's arguments and ignores 
Theseus' response. Others stress the elements of divine and 
pan-Hellenic law in Aithra's appeal, but fail to notice that 
374 
Theseus himself does not refer to these points. 
296 
On the other hand, there are those who positively emphasize 
the appeal to Theseus' fear of being called a coward and its 
obvious acceptance. 
about the religious 
Theseus' "vanity". 
appeal to her son's 
by public opinion. 
Greenwood297 calls Aithra's remarks 
obligation "perfunctory" and writes of 
Similarly, Fitton298 mentions Aithra's 
ego and recognizes that he is troubled 
Burian299 attempts to find a middle way, and claims that 
"the question of Theseus' reputation is ... inseparable from 
the ethical and political considerations inherent in ... the 
appeal. " This is true, to the extent that Aithra believes 
that her son will incur disapproval by failing to do that 
which she regards as pious and proper, but she does not say 
that it is on these grounds that he will be reproached, but 
for cowardice, and it is to this argument that he responds. 
Again, Burian is right to point out300 that the force of 
Aithra's religious and legal arguments remains, despite 
Theseus' lack of response to them and that Theseus actually 
uses the same arguments against the Theban herald (531-41, 
558-9), and it is certainly true that Theseus' earlier dis- 
missal of Adrastos' appeal failed to take account of this, 
the central aspect of the mothers' supplication. The argument 
from Pan-Hellenic law is valid, and it can hardly be that it 
is wrong of Theseus to act in support of this law, but it 
still remains a problem that he agrees to do so for entirely 
self-interested reasons. 
In the end, we are probably left to rely on a subjective 
appreciation of the "tone" of Theseus' reply, but an impor- 
tant factor in any judgement of this tone should be the 
observation that it is in no way inherently discreditable 
for a hero like Theseus to be concerned for his reputation 
for valour. 
301 It is also worth mentioning that the reputat- 
ion of which he is proud, based on exploits as chastiser of 
the kakoi, is likely to have struck the Athenians as an 
aspect of their national hero with which they had been fami- 
375 
liar since childhood. It is unlikely, 
any irony in the presentation of Thes, 
if the poet has any purpose in making 
mother's appeal so self-regarding, it 
that self-interest and the demands of 
can combine to the same ends. 
302 
then, that there is 
sus at this point, and 
his response to his 
will presumably be 
morality and religion 
The early scenes of HF form a suppliant tableau of a super- 
ficially familiar kind, Amphitryon, Megara and the children 
taking refuge from Lykos at the altar, yet there is no sign 
of Herakles, their soter, 
303 
and they themselves, although 
Amphitryon, at least, retains some hope, seem to have little 
expectation that he will ever return. Eventually they decide 
to abandon their supplication. Their position is also unusu- 
al in that their supplication has no object: they take 
refuge at an altar, but deliver no appeal, firstly because 
their saviour is absent and would, in any case, scarcely 
require to be persuaded to save his own family, and secondly 
because Lykos is a committed enemy from whom they expect 
nothing. No appeal, no plea for aidos: there is nothing in 
the play which refers directly to aidos for the gods or for 
their suppliants; instead we hear a great deal about Lykos' 
lack of aidos. 
The futility of any appeal to Lykos' aidos is shown by his 
own remarks at 165-9: he claims that he is not anaides, but 
reveals that he is the sort of person who does not see his 
conduct in these terms at all: 
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These words, commentators point out, 
3641 
reveal Lykos as an 
immoralist, a sophistic upholder of the right of the stron- 
ser. 
305 
He is not subject to the claims of morality at all, 
but only to the demands of self-interest. In terms of tradi- 
tional values, however, he manifestly la anaid, in that he 
has no regard for the sanctity of supplication and because 
376 
he is able to face his victims and still deny his anaideia. 
Megara refers obliquely to his lack of aidos at 299-301: 
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There ism nothing to be gained from submitting oneself to 
Lykos' aidos because he is stupid and badly brought up. The 
association of aidos with intelligence is a traditional one, 
going back to Homer, 
306 
while its development in the process 
of education is a recurrent idea in Euripides in particular. 
307 
308 
With this passage we might compare Hcld. 458-60, again in the 
context of supplication: here Eurystheus is the s a'os: 
1r/i 
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Here the reference to education is missing, but otherwise 
the passages are remarkably similar. From both it emerges 
that the capacity for aidos is dependent-on the character 
(or intelligence) and upbringing of the individual; the car- 
rect way to conduct oneself is an object of knowledge and in 
the process of learning one may acquire aidos, the instinct 
which distinguishes commendable from discreditable conduct. 
Since aidos in both passages is seen as something one recei- 
ves from someone else, it clearly answers to that a" os 
which acknowldeges the status and rights of. other people, 
aidos for the direct recipients of one's actions. The 
fundamentally social nature of the concept is thus stressed, 
and it may be assumed that the education which produces 
a' s consists in the apprehension of the values of society: 
at the same time, it is clear that aidos has been instilled 
in those who are sophoi and properly brought up, and so it 
may also be seen as an integral part of an individual's 
character, rather than a simple awareness that action x is 
liable to have the unpleasant consequence of arousing popular 
disapproval. 
The last word on Lykos' anaideia comes at 554-7: 
ý/ 
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To use force on others may in itself be anaideia, 
309 but 
Lykos' anaideia is compounded by his lack of regard for a 
venerable old man. 
310 
There is a supplication scene in Helen in which Helen and 
Menelaos (reluctantly) 311 beg Theonoe to help them in their 
plan to escape. Their appeal is based on two main arguments, 
each closely linked to the other, for not only do they 
appeal to her sense of justice and piety, but they also 
remind her that the reputation for justice and piety of both 
herself and her father will be in danger if she ignores 
their pleas. Helen begins supplication at 894 and begs Theo- 
nod not to tell her brother of the planned escape (-900). 
She then proceeds to an argument based on the prophetess' 
reputation - not, however, since she is a woman, and since 
there is, in any case, no question of her having to enter a 
situation of conflict in order to protect the suppliants, 
her reputation for strength, but her reputation for eusebeia 
(900-2): 
vý 
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Helen, then, is urging Theonoe to place moral principle, and 
her reputation for it, before loyalty to a member of her 
family. From 903-18 she is concerned with the justice of her 
case, and contrasts this with Theoklymenos' bia (903,908); 
at 910 she introduces the subject of Theonoe's father, Pro- 
teus, mainly in order to convince her that he would have 
accepted her suit, but also to suggest that the justice of 
her father sets a standard to which the daughter must aspire. She 
sums up this part of her argument at 919-23: 
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'i%cT aJ 
% &LA 1E-, o 6L5) 
LK-r-(w 6'v°VW '"" s 
fLWJV 
C 
A ýxecf ýr aJ (ý I -L. ( TA VT t tC-CA VXL ) 
7 p` TGv rK IýGA/ 
X CV1IC 1( S6 
JY 
"C K /'V j. 
378 
As the use of aischron in 922 shows, Helen is attempting to 
arouse Theonoe's aidos, but her argument, both here and at 
900-2, is of a more subtle nature than a simple appeal to 
concern for one's reputation. There is, however, plainly an 
element of the latter, in particular in the references to 
Proteus, which recall the traditional imperative that one 
should not tarnish the reputation of one's parents, while 
even in the argument from Theonoe's own special status there 
may be some idea that to fail to live up to the demands im- 
posed by such status will involve the disapproval of others. 
Yet there is also, in the appeal to the prophetess' inheri- 
ted principles, her special relationship with the divine and 
her own past eusebeia, an unmistakable hint of "self-respect", 
the idea that, regardless of what others say, Theonoe will 
be letting herself down if she ignores the claims of justice 
in favour of those of family loyalty. The family, however, 
still excercises powerful claims, and it may be as much for 
the benefit of the audience as for that of Theonoe that 
Helen goes into such detail on the need to ignore family 
loyalty in the present instance. 
The next section of Helen's speech is an appeal to pity (924 
-38) and to consideration for her efforts to remain virtuous 
(note -T/rw¢eo in 932), but she concludes her speech with a 
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Here the element of the appeal to justice for justice's sake 
is still present, but the appeal to reputation emerges much 
more clearly with the reference to leos, and she thus re- 
minds Theonoe directly of the need to live up to the reputa- 
tion of one's father. Nonetheless, this is not the sole as- 
pect of her remarks on justice and piety, and it is clear 
that she is also urging Theonoe to remain true to her own 
principles. 
379 
Menelaos' appeal, which is essentially a suppliant appeal 
even though he does eschew the performance of the ritual 
self-abasement, 
312 takes its cue from that of his wife, but 
is much less subtle, and where Helen had suggested that The- 
onoe had standards, both her own and of her father, to which 
she should aspire in order to enhance her reputation, Mene- 
laos simply threatens opprobrium: if she thinks it right to 
save him and heed his just request, let her do so; otherwise 
she will be revealed as a yvvl KAKI (954-8). He then turns 
away from Theonoe and speaks directly to Proteus' tomb 
(959ff. ), developing his remarks on the latter's reputation 
and its relation to that of Theonoe. He is confident (966-8) 
that she will not allow her father, previously EüKaEýlfaTas . 
to be badly spoken of (KAKwj ^)Kovi L, 968) . He returns to the 
idea of reputation at 973-4, this time urging Hades to "com- 
pel" Theonoe to "appear better than her pious father. " As in 
958, the use of the verb phainomai reveals that Menelaos' 
concern is exclusively for the outward appearance of moral- 
ity, although it must be granted that he also believes that 
his appeal is just (955). Thereafter, he simply resorts to 
threats, firstly to fight Theoklymenos (975-9), secondly to 
pollute the tomb of Proteus by killing first Helen, then 
himself over it (980-7): this would be not only a miasma but 
a source of reproach to the honour of the tomb's inhabitant 
(987). 313 
Theonoe's reply shows that she has taken the arguments of 
both husband and wife to heart (998-1004): 
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Here the ideas that it is part of the prophetess' nature to 
do what is right and that her reputation and that of her 
father will suffer if she does not are given equal weight. 
The sense of line 998 is clearly that Theonoe has a positive 
330 
desire to act in accordance with principles which have become 
deeply internalized in her nature: von Erffa314 is therefore 
right to compare Il. 6.442-4,315 where Hektor explains that 
it is not simply the desire to conform which drives him to 
the-field of battle, but an active desire rooted in his 
essential nature and developed by a process of education. 
Theonoe, however, has the terminology of the late fifth cen- 
tury at her disposal, and thus identifies her motives in a 
more analytical fashion than does Hektor: in essential de- 
tails, however, the responses of the two characters do not 
differ widely. 
Line 998 is one syntactical unit, the two finite verbs co- 
ordinated by -re and Kxi: the same structure is used in 999- 
1000, J0 1"i ... /%L*(vi. 





vr4d is to be 
taken 
in sense with the reaction based on 
internalized principles, as expressed in 998, or with the 
response to the possibility of loss of reputation in 999- 
-1001,316 On the face of it, it seems equally possible that 
the phrase could refer either to self-respect in the sense 
of living up to one's own principles or to the wish to pro- 
tect oneself against the taunts of others: one wonders, how- 
ever, whether the two are really separable in this case; 
Theonoä is clearly concerned both to be true to herself and 
to avoid reproach, and it may be that her philautia does not 
refer exclusively to one or the. other, but contains elements 
1 
of both and is therefore transitional between erw ... 
/ýGJkab% 
and KAl )(¬o ... v 
ro 
&. t. . That said, the self-regarding 
impulse to love oneself is clearly a positive thing here, 
317 
and thus Kannicht is manifestly right to relate it to Aris- EN 
totle's discussion of proper philautia at/1168b. 25ff., 
whether it does encompass concern for reputation or not. In 
that the expression 
}t ýw t») ýacvT. J probably does contain a 
reference to the desire to be true to one's own principles, 
and thus to the justification of one's conduct in terms of 
one's own personal conscience, von Erffa318 may be right to 
relate the passage to Demokritos B264 etc., but if philautia 
in this passage does contain an element of self-protection 
against the criticisms of others, and given that philein and 
381 
aideisthai differ in meaning, the possibility remains that 
JLi &N t Xvr 




It must, however, still be the case that Theonoe is subject 
to aidos in this passage: her concern for her own kleos and 
for that of her father alone shows that, and since this con- 
cern for reputation is virtually inseparable from her wish 
to be true to her phygi, 5 and to the temple of dike which is 
there sited, 
320 
we should be prepared to find a role for 
aidos in this part of her reaction, too. The reference to 
the temple of dike in her Physis is, in fact, of the greatest 
importance, for, as Stebler says, 
321 
the expression is noth- 
ing less than an acknowledgemnent of the location of the 
individual's standard of justice in his own personal moral 
conscience. In rejecting the course which conflicts with the 
dictates of her conscience, then, it is likely that Theonoe 
is subject to ads, since aidos is the instinct which 
rejects wrong conduct, whatever the arbiter of right and 
wrong may be. 
In the Orestes, Orestes and Elektra imagine that the coming 
of Menelaos will be their salvation. When the former and 
Menelaos meet face to face supplication takes place (begin- 
ning 382-4), and Orestes refers in particular . to the 
charis Menelaos owed his father, and now owes him (453,646- 
64), and to the philia which exists between them (665-9,674). 
Failure to respond to either of these arguments might be 
regarded as lack of aidos. Menelaos, in turn, indicates that 
he is moved by the supplication (682-3): 
'Oeart' E'Yw 1b1 Y4 KoCTOCLSoýý, Kt ko ( 
k, c, L (v 1rOvh (wt, re. 1L. s Ka. kö1. f(. / &V) 0 
The verb Katý. ýJývrýý here seems simply to refer to the 
proper response to the suppliant, the granting of the respect 
he deserves. Menelaos goes on, however, to qualify his sup- 
port for his nephew, and Orestes, unconvinced of his sincer- 
ity, reacts angrily (717-24). As a result, there comes to be 
a state of enmity between the two (1102), and Menelaos' role 
changes from that of so e to that of echthros. 322 
382 
We saw already323 how in the IA Achilles, as a properly 
brought up young nobleman, was particularly susceptible to 
aidos. 
324 Klytaimestra, who praises his aidos as so rosyne 
at 824, also recognizes this aspect of his character, and in 
the supplication scene between the two she attempts to exp- 
loit his sense of aidos in order to elicit his support for 
Iphigeneia against Agamemnon and the rest of the Greeks. At 
897-9 Achilles is disturbed by the Old Man's report, feeling 
he has been abused by Agamemnon, and Klytaimestra encourages 
him in his sense of grievance: 
fEx. ýK)(výV Gü rxJ äcFýýl' / (FI 'r 
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Achilles, then, is already worried about his position,. while 
Klytaimestra encourages the identification of his troubles 
with those of Iphigeneia. At 900-2 she declares that she 
feels no aidos at supplicating Achilles (subtly reminding 
him of his superiority on the basis of his divine descent at 
901), 325 and begins her appeal at 903, combining a plea for 
pity with an argument that, on account of the bogus marriage 
which was mooted between Achilles and Iphigeneia, there now 
exists a kind of philia between them which means that it 
would be discreditable for him to abandon her (906-8): 
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Klytaimestra, however, probably recognizes that this appli- 
cation of the os of philia is somewhat tenuous, and so 
she tries other arguments. She mentions Achilles' onoma at 
910, and claims that because his name has ruined her, he 
must now come to her aid. Again she claims that Achilles is 
under an obligation to her, and again her claim is tenuous. 
Thus the body of her appeal is a request for pity (903,911-6). 
Achilles is not oblivious to the appeal for pity (932,942-3), 
but he says much more about his good name and its misuse by 
Agamemnon. He is,. in fact, convinced by Klytaimestra's point 
that his onoma is partly to blame for Iphigeneia's plight 
(938-9,941,947), and he is deeply resentful that he has been 
383 
used: from 954 it seems that he believes the honour of his 
homeland is at stake if he does not resist such treatment at 
the hands of Agamemnon. At many points, however, he does 
show an appreciation of the issues involved: we have already 
noted his sympathy for Klytaimestra and her daughter, and at 
928-9, where he says that he will obey the Atreidai if they 
"thinkº'skws " but will not if they do not, it seems to be 
implied that the plan to sacrifice Iphigeneia is not kalo n. 
Again, at 940-3 his statement that he would consider himself 
defiled should he be the unwilling agent of Iphigeneia's 
ruin seems to indicate a certain revulsion for the plan. At 
959-69, however, he gives himself away: he has no desire for 
marriage with the girl, but resents the hybris Agamemnon has 
perpetrated against him (959-61); Agamemnon should have 
asked for permission to use his onoma (962), in which case 
he would gladly have participated in the deception of Klyt- 
aimestra and the sacrifice of Iphigeneia (963-7); as it is, 
however, his permission was not asked and so he feels that 
he has been treated as a nobody by his commanders (968-9). 
There are elements in Achilles' speech, like his discursive 
prooimion (919-31) and his aside that "myriad girls"seek him 
as their husband (959-60), which, though they seem to us to 
indicate pomposity and narcissism, we might play down out of 
deference to the rhetorical nature of Euripides' speeches 
and the millenia of cultural change which separate. Euripi- 
des' world from ours, but surely in lines 959-69 Achilles 
reveals that he is totally absorbed in himself and his fame, 
to the exclusion of any other external moral consideration? 
326 
This picture of Achilles, with his proclivity to resent any 
and every insult to his time is clearly based on the Homeric 
model, although the Achilles of the Iliad, unlike his coun- 
terpart here (964), would never resort to deceit (11.9.312 
-3). Nevertheless, Achilles' resentment here is a recogniz- 
ably traditional response, perhaps aidos, but more probably 
resentment (nemesis) at another's breach of aidos in failing 
to accord him the time he deserves. The heroic response, 
however, does emerge in a rather shabby light at this parti- 
cular point of the play. 
384 
In his treatment of supplication in different plays Euripides 
explores a whole range of motivation: some characters are 
convinced by the moral and religious arguments, but more 
often an appeal to some other sanction is more effective; 
these appeals may take the form of a reference to some tie 
of kinship, friendship or charis which it is aisc oar for 
the supplicated to ignore, or they may be more directly 
addressed to, the supplicated's concern for his or her repu- 
tation, whether it is the reputation for strength or the 
reputation for altruism. 
327 The question of the character of 
the self-regarding response is further complicated by the 
fact that some who respond to the reminder of others' disap- 
proval seem to be presented favourably while others do not: 
as often in Euripides, there is little room for absolutes. 
Like hiketeia, e is is an institution by means of which 
outsiders are brought within the group and thus within the 
range of privileges to which philoi are normally entitled: 
accordingly, strangers and guests are felt particularly to 
deserve aidos. Since the Cyclops is based on the encounter 
of Odysseus with Polyphemos in Od. 9, it is no surprise that 
the prominence of xenia in the latter is reflected in the 
former. In both places Polyphemos' maltreatment of strangers 
is seen as an extreme of anaideia: the Cyclops' throat is 
anaides at c. 592, and his cannibalism anaischuntos at 416. 
Contempt for the laws of xenia, however, is also contempt 
for the gods, and so Polyphemos and his activities are also 
described as dussebes or anosios (30-1,289,310-1). 
In Alcestis, too, much of the action is motivated in terms 
of the relationship of xenia which exists between Admetos 
and Herakles (itself a doublet of the similar relationship 
between Admetos and Apollo which is the source of the pecul- 
iar situation from which the play proceeds). At line 542 
Herakles seems to express his unwillingness to intrude on 
his host's grief in terms of aidos: 
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Aischron here refers to Herakles' feeling that it would be 
inappropriate for him to be entertained in a house which is 
385 
in mourning. For hospitality to take its proper form, it 
seems, both parties must be committed to its enjoyment, 
328 
while Herakles' a'dos at putting one who has troubles of his 
own to further trouble seems to be the converse of that 
desire not to involve others in one's own problems which we 
noted at IýF. 1162 and 1200,0 r. 280-2 and 1.981-2.329 Aidos, 
it seems, can lead to respect for another's privacy, whether 
by leaving him to cope with his own grief or by refusing to 
implicate him in one's own problems. For the reference to 
inappropriateness in Herakles' use of as ron, we might 
compare the Theognidean passage (627-8) in which it is said 
to be aischron for the company of the sober to be infiltrated 
by a drunk (and vice-versa)33there, as here, the reference 
is to the inequality of mood of the two parties and to the 
general idea that such inequality is offensive to good taste. 
Admetos, however, refuses to let Herakles depart, and in 
this he, too, is influenced by ideas of appropriateness and 
good manners. Where, however, Herakles, from the position of 
one wishing to avoid hospitality, stressed the inappropriate- 
ness of the presence of a guest at a time of mourning, Ad- 
metos, wishing to fulfil the obligations of xenia, stresses. 
the impropriety of troubling a guest with one's own grief 
(549-50): 
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Both Herakles and Admetos, then, react in accordance with a 
system of politeness which prompts them to consider both the 
awkwardness of the situation and the position of the other 
person. 
The chorus-leader, after Herakles has been led inside, 
agrees with his judgement that it is inappropriate for Ad- 
metos to think of entertaining a guest in his present condi- 
tion (551-2): 
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Admetos' reply makes clear what his use of 0V IT. ' Eirat in 549 
suggested, that in insisting that Herakles remain he is 
386 
motivated by aidos. His grief would not have lessened had he 
turned his guest away, but he would have lost a friend (553- 
6), and to add to his other troubles he would have to suffer 
the ignominy of being considered inhospitable (557-8): 
Ka. i ir''os KaKoi, <cV '>)co Tc. ir' äý 5v KAk-*J 
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He believes, then, that the kleos of his house would suffer 
if he turned away a guest: a network of guest-friends, more- 
over, is a useful thing, while Herakles himself is aristos, 
and thus a tie of xeni a with him reflects well upon Admetos 
(559-60). Admetos is thus clearly concerned with his reputa- 
tion, but his response is not a simple calculation of the 
consequences of his actions for himself in terms of the 
judgement of others. Herakles, in fact, showed no sign that 
he would be offended if he were not accorded hospitality, 
the 
but rather gave evidence of his sympathy for - position 
of his friend, and even said that he would be grateful if he 
were allowed to depart (544). Admetos, of course, could not 
be certain of what Herakles might say in the future, or of 
how other people, especially those with malicious intent, 
might react to his report, yet it nevertheless seems true 
that Admetos' concern for his reputation also embraces a 
commitment to do what he believes to be right, and is not a 
simple fear of criticism. 
This emerges more clearly as the episode draws to a close: 
the chorus-leader accepts that Admetos is motivated by con- 
Cern for Herakles as a Philos, yet implies that since he iss 
a Philos, Admetos should not have deceived him (561-2). 
Admetos, however, sees the situation entirely differently: 
Herakles is a philos, and so he must deceive him to ensure 
that he does not leave (563-4). Herakles would not approve 
of his conduct, and would therefore not accept his hospita- 












For Admetos, then, the requirement to accord hospitality is 
one which must be obeyed rio matter what the circumstances. 
'S 
387 
It is certainly clear that in doing that which he believes 
to be right he is also doing that which is generally thought 
commendable, but the two ideas are scarcely separable at all, 
and it would be wrong to claim that Admetos is simply trying 
to maximize his reputation. 
Despite the initial criticisms of their spokesman, the 
chorus recognize that Admetos' attitude is essentially a 
noble one. They immediately sing a song on the theme of 
philoxenia, of which the final stanza is a direct appreciat- 
ion/Admetos' conduct in the present situation (597-601): 
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Admetos' aidos, which motivated his reception of his guest, 
is thus a product of his euaeneia, whether this be moral or 
social: aidos is also, they go on, a mark of the agathos, 
who is commended for his so a. These associations of aidos 
1 
with good birth, Grete and good sense are traditional33but 
in this case we have no way of knowing how far they might be 
influenced by sophistic consideration of the interaction 
between arete, knowledge and aidos. 
At 821 Herakles discovers the truth about the death of 
Alkestis and is astonished that Admetos should have ventured 
to entertain him in spite of his grief. The Servant, however, 
explains Admetos' action in terms of aidos - 
( 
co d'E -rwvI' 
ä-rrwr(A(Voc. 
C14µw\l (823) - 
and, since aidos for a guest is generally a commendable 
response, Herakles sympathizes. More importantly, however, 
he is so impressed by the strength of Admetos' philoxenia 
that he feels himself under an obligation to return the 
favour (c a s, 842). At 855 he explains his determination 
to return Alkestis to the man, 
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Admetos has honoured Herakles, and Herakles wishes to honour 
Admetos, and just as Admetos saw it as a matter of his own 
honour not to dishonour his guest, 
332 
so Herakles is deter- 
mined, as a matter of honour, to prove himself a worthy 
recipient of his host's aidos. Clearly, then, in a reciprocal 
relationship of this kind concern for one's own honour and 
regard for that of the recipient of one's actions go hand in 
hand. 
One of the messages of Alcestis seems to be that x ni, and 
so aidos for one's xenoi, is a boon which brings rewards: 
thus Herakles' advice to his friend on departure (1147-8): 
k' g(. 110 i 
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Admetos' a'dos, then, also makes him dikaios and eusebes. 
Ultimately, his aidos for guests has been his salvation, but 
even here there is a note of ambivalence, for, just as Adme- 
tos' philoxenia towards Herakles led the latter to perform a 
act of cas which was most welcome, so his earlier enter- 
tainment of Apollo brought him a charis which proved to be 
no charis at all. Nonetheless, it remains true that his 
aidos for xenoi is positively valued, and this surely means 
that it is so in both its self-regarding aspect and in that 
element which is based on principle. 
Xenia is also prominent in Hecuba, where Polymestor has 
killed a xenos, Hekabe's son, Polydoros, by deceit and for 
motives of greed. Thus in her supplication of Agamemnon333 
Hekabe lays emphasis on the fact that Polymestor's crime is 
aischron (806). This judgement is shared by the chorus-leader 
at 1086, and by Agamemnon himself at 1247-8, where he tells 
Polymestor, 
As in the case of 
rº oý( vwý ýý eae va KToV I L 
Herodotos, 
334 Agamemnon's acquaintance with 
comparative ethnography makes him aware that nomoi may be 
389 
relative to the peoples who profess them, ' 
335 
and thus that 
standards of aischron may not be absolute, yet he still 
believes that each people's nomoi are valid for themselves. 
336 
As an indication of the range of terms which might be emp- 
loyed to denote the proper attitude to cenia we might notice 
Hekabe's denunciation of Polymestor at 1234-5as being neither 
eusebes, pistos, hosios337or dikaios. All these terms, then, 
may describe an attitude to which aidos is central. 
At IT. 947-54 Orestes tells his sister how, when he first 
went to Athens to Athens for purification, no xenos would 
accept him on account of his pollution. 
338 He goes on, how- 
ever, to explain how OL" ?Of a(cýw (949) did eventually 
accord him hospitality, but although they admitted him to 
their houses, they would not allow him into their company. 
The aidos of these people, then, must have a strong altruis- 
tic aspect, since they presumably have no need to fear the 
disapproval of their fellows who refused to have anything to 
do with the matricide. Their aidos must, then, spring from 
their own beliefs of what is right and from the sympathy 
they feel for the unfortunate, if they endanger themselves 
by taking a polluted person under their roof: 
339 the idea of 
aidos thus seems close to that of pity here. Orestes himself 
seems subject to the aidos proper among xenoi when, at 955-6, 
he explains how, because he did not think it right (ov(( 
ºf 
tavV) to show up (IltX&r jjt'- ) his hosts, he endured his 
pain in silence and pretended not to notice that he was 
being kept away from everyone else. 
At $x. 441-2 Pentheus' servant, detailed to recapture the 
Stranger, describes his aidos at being forced to bind a man 
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The servant clearly does not want the stranger to think bad- 
ly of him, and thus there will be an element of embarrass- 
ment to his aidos, but he would not feel such aidos at all 
if he did not feel that what he was doing was wrong. 
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At Rhesus 841-2 two breaches of guest-friendship are compa- 
red. The Charioteer, believing that Hektor has treacherously 
killed Rhesos, claims, 
Cv/aý/ KaT1 rxoV 
lr(v 
rvýý.. 
änovs KToCvr. . 
It may be true that the murder of an ally is More serious 
than the abduction of a host's wife, but the Charioteer is 
essentially the aggrieved party here, and we should not take 
his remarks as a literal indication of any real hierarchy of 
offences. 
We have seen (for example in the passage from IT just cited) 
that in some cases the altruistic aspect of aidos, as simple 
concern for another human being, can come quite obviously to 
the fore, 340 while in many other passages it may well co- 
exist with more self-regarding concerns. At this point I 
should like to consider a number of other passages in which, 
it seems to me, the altruistic aspect dominates. At Hec. 515 
Hekabe asks Talthybios whether the Greeks sacrificed Poly- 
xena a'SVU1%EYVL, or whether she had to endure the indignity 
of being treated as an enemy in death (516-7). This question 
may contain a veiled reference to Polyxena's status as a 
virgin, 
341 
and thus the aidos about which Hekabe enquires 
may contain an element of inhibition with regard to sex and 
famale nakedness, but even so it must also refer fundament- 
ally to respect for Polyxena's person, whether that respect 
is based on her virginity or simply on her pitiable condit- 
ion. 342 
The reaction envisaged in the last passage is more clearly 
evident in the Talthybios of Troades. At 717 he speaks of 
his uncertainty as to how he might best break the news of 
the decision to kill Polyxena to Hekabe, and she interprets 
his apprehension as aidos (718): 
i 




This aidos can hardly be anything but the desire to spare 
another's feelings, and it is to this kind of aidos that 
the herald himself refers at 786-9, where he laments his own 
unsuitability to be the bearer of such tidings: 
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To deliver news which will cause suffering to another person 
takes not only a lack of pity but a lack of aidos. There may 
be a number of reasons as to why aidos should be used in 
this context: firstly, it is a traditional use of the term 
to apply it to a positive regard for the recipient of one's 
actions; secondly, this kind of aidos may be related to the 
desire to avoid the disapproval of the recipient of one's 
actions (although this concern is scarcely evident here); 
thirdly, individuals may simply feel that it is not right 
to inflict suffering on others, and so experience ads when 
forced to do so; and fourthly, popular usage may have given 
aidos overtones of "pity" or "compassion". 
343 In this con- 
nexion Hcld. 1027 may be relevant: Eurystheus says that 
Athens experienced aidos at the prospect of putting him to 
death (Kwry4 01 Wr6evfW), and while this may simply mean 
that the Athenians felt it inappropriate to kill him, the 
usage may also foreshadow the use of aidesis as a technical 
term in Athenian law for clemency. 
344 
It will readily be seen that aidos is an important concept 
in Euripides, and on occasion, indeed, this importance is 
acknowledged by certain of his characters: Medea calls 
anaideia "the greatest of all ills among men" at f. 471-2,345 
while in fr. 436N2, from the first Hippolytus, 
346 Hippolytos 
apostrophizes ads and expresses a wish that its power were 
universal. Similarly, a lamentable lack of regard for con- 
ventional morality can, as it was in Hesiod and Theognis, 
347 
be seen in terms of the departure of aidos: this, as we not- 
iced already, 
348 is the case in Med. 439-40, and the same 
idea recurs at 1.1089-97: 
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The chorus are commenting directly on Agamemnon's desire 
to sacrifice his daughter, and thus the context is one of a 
breach of phi ia: aidos, as is common, is the impulse which 
leads one to observe one's duty to one's philoi, while so to 
do is seen as aret e; from Homer on we have seen that the 
obligation to show loyalty to one's ilo' is a powerful one, 
but whereas this imperative is often linked to competitive 
virtue, 
349 
such an explicit association of are e with aidos 
for one's h' o' is rare; 
350 
arete in this passage, moreover, 
is quite clearly not competitive, but co-operative, since 
its absence leads to disregard for nomoi; this is not, then, 
a case of the promotion of co-operation with reference to 
competitive standards. Arete, then, consists of respect for 
one's philoi and for law and custom, and is promoted by 
aidos, which is the instinct which makes one susceptible to 
the claims of law and custom. Both aret and aidos, moreover, - 
are contrasted with -r& 
xjt-jrrA/, and this suggests that 
aideisthai and sebein may still overlap to a large extent, 
particularly in cases in which asebeia etc. denote general 
wrongdoing. Here, however, while -rz , crEiCred obviously does, 
by virtue of its association with anomia, have a general 
application, mention of divine phthonos in 1097 also suggests 
the more particular sense of respect for the gods as guaran- 
tors of human standards. Mention of the gods, in turn, con- 
tributes to the traditional and conventional tone of the 
passage, and this suggests that the sentiments expressed 
would not be considered novel or unusual by the original 
audience. 
Aidos is also associated with arete in an earlier ode in the 
same play: at 558-72 the chorus sing: 
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The similarity of this stanza to the argument of Protagoras 
in Plato's dialogue is striking, 
352 
and it is very likely 
that both this passage and the parts of the dialogue in 
which Protagoras propounds his own views are based on the 
opinions of the historical Protagoras. Allowance is made for 
innate capacity (558-9, cf. Prot. 327b-c), but education is 
said to be the chief factor in the production of arete. The 
connexion in thought between lines 562-3 is rather elliptical, 
but the va( clearly implies that aidos is instilled through 
education and that it contributes to arete: aidos here has 
its traditional association with both intelligence and repu- 
tation, and the point is clearly made that the course dicta- 
ted by duty is also that which brings good reputation; dos 
which is felt at the prospect of the commission of an act 
which one's education has taught one to regard as wrong is, 
therefore, to be seen as complementary to that which fears 
loss of reputation; concern for what people say, then, is 
not incompatible with conscience. 
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This association of aidos with education is not new: it is 
apparent, for example, injýgn. 409 10 (where 3týere is also 
an association with arete) and in . 
1.6.441-6, where Hektor 
explains that he is unable to remain within the walls of 
Troy both because he feels aidos at the prospect of reproach 
and because he has learned to be brave and so cannot bring 
himself to behave otherwise. Passages like these seem to 
recognize the truth that any sense of shame (or guilt) will 
be acquired in the process of socialization, as one learns 
what is expected of one by society, and naturally, as 
thinkers come to speculate on the origins of moral values 
and the nature of the impulse to be moral, we find that the 
394 
link between aidos, education and knowledge, a link which 
has a long history, begins to be explored in a 'more systema- 
tic manner. Thus there are several passages in Euripides in 
which the explicit association of aidos with education 
reveals the influence of sophistic, and perhaps particularly 
Protagorean, thought. 
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We have already looked at F. 299-301, where aidos is seen as 
a quality of those who are wise and well-brought up. There, 
as in the IA passage, aidos is seen as the impulse which 
promotes co-operative behaviour: at Supp. 909-17, the conclu- 
sion to Adrastos' Funeral Speech, aidos, treated as synony- 
mous with aisc un, is related to competitive arete, and 
thus the education mentioned in this passage bears comparison 
with that of Hektor in the passage from Iliad 6: 
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Tees ý7eOCs aVrj -trxL'r. -5 j -r-*. JCVeT( Again, there are similarities with the "Great Speech" of the 
Protasoras (cf., for example, 914-5 with Pro . 327e), and, 
while the passage deals only with euandria, a synonym for 
357 
arete in its narrow, competitive sense, it is surely also 
implied that other aretai, or aee in general, are teach- 
able, and this is Protagoras' essential position in Plato's 
dialogue. Similar ideas are expressed in similar language in 
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An interesting aspect of this passage is the statement that 
395 
habits learned in youth can become part of the adult's 
Physis, which implies that upbringing can develop, or even 
create one's physis. 
358 The question of nomos or Physis, 
heredity or environment/upbringing is also raised at Hec. 599 
-602,359 where the statement that one who has been (fie EýOJ Jar-l 
i 
1coýkws is able to discern T4 K%'#McV by means of the standard 
i 
of Te. K-. koV implies that aidos, the instinct in one which 
responds to the prospect of ?i c'/, is instilled in the 
process of education. All the passages cited, then, suggest 
that aidos is developed in the course of one's upbringing or 
education, and this indicates a belief that aidos, the fully- 
developed ability to discriminate between right and wrong, 
aischron and ao, is not present in the individual JvrtL 
but exists Vu : thus Hippolytos, who rejects education yet 
values aidos, 
360 is an isolated figure in Euripides in 
his belief that aidos and sophrosyne can be innate. 
It seems fitting to conclude this chapter with a selection 
of passages which stress the importance of aidos, for in 
Euripides aidos has a degree of prominence it has not enjoyed 
since Homer. Aidos is still active in most of the areas in 
which we observed its function in Homer, although aischunomai 
is, now more common than aideisthai, while in the sense of 
"respect for the recipient of one's actions" es beire etc. 
retain most of the ground they captured from aideisthai some- 
where between Homer and Aeschylus. In most, if not all, con- 
texts, however, aischunomai and aideisthai are synonymous, 
while there does still exist a degree of overlap between 
aideisthai and sebein. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE. 
1. Since -r"ýS kavrvfo43 ai&-tV(K5 is so clearly parallel to 
the Homeric reaction, I do not see why von Erffa (p. 142) 
finds it necessary to claim that in this passage "the posi- 
tive force of aidos is lost. " Aidos is inhibitory, and so 
"negative" in Homer: see p. 95n. 2 above. 
2. Cf. von Erffa, ibid.. 
3. Cf. pp. 30 and 89 above. 
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4. Cf. D. B. Lombard, Acta Classica 1985, p. 10n. 14. 
5. The aidos which is lacking in Eurystheus' failure to 
ai , t-cliýýc crEcXk, based as it is on one's own awareness of 
the duty inherent in one's status, is thus similar to that 
experienced by Sophokles' Neoptolemos (above, pp. 257-62), 
behind which there may also be a Demokritean influence. 
6. Cf. below, pp. 308-15, and see von Erffa, 157-60. 
7. Cf. P. 262 above. 
7a. It is, however, accepted by Kannicht on Helen '415-7, 
Solmsen, Hermes 1973, p. 423 and Harder in her commentary on 
Cres. f r. 457N2 (p. 149). 
8. Od. 21.323, pp. 93-4 above (cf. Od. 16.75 and 19.527 for 
aideomai in the same sense). 
9. Noted by Barrett, ibid.. 
10. Cf. P. 211 above, and von Erffa, p. 158. 
11. On its dating, see Lesky, Greek Tragic Poetry, p. 256. 
12. See pp. 25-9,38 etc. above. 
13. For von Erffa, however, "Der Zuruf AtAOeJ$ ist positiv, 
die Mahnung ovK oeIj&r #11'tXvv7 negativ" (P-142). See n. 1. 
14. For the idea that it is discreditable for women to take 
the initiative over men, cf. X1.932-3, where Elektra claims 
that it is aischron that a woman should be in charge of a 
house rather than a man: for the idea that it is aischron 
for men physically to be worsted by women, cf. $x. 798-9. 
15. Cf. pp. 33 and 97-8 (n. 40) above. 
16. Cf. pp. 170-1,222 above. 
17. At 531-2 Iokaste asks Eteokles why he worships Philotimia, 
the "worst of divinities", while at 506 Eteokles himself 
claims that he holds Tvrannis the greatest of gods. To these 
two "deities" Iokaste opposes Isotes at 536 and 542: it is 
tkis 41 
tempting to see , an echo ofAthe opposition of Ads 
and Dike in OC (pp. 220-1 above). 
18. P. 158. 
18a. P. 316 below. 
19. On this question, see M. Nill, Morality and Self-Interest, 
passim. 
20. This is "non-sceptical relativism": see Nill, p. 29 and 
cf. Dissoi Logoi 2.2-8 (below, pp. 568-70). 
21. For a summary, see Lesky, Greek Tragic Poetry, 397-9. 
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22. Cf. fr. 829N2. 
23. On aidophron, cf. P. 215 (with n. 25) above: in the present 
passage it is notable that Admetos associates ddos with the 
response to another's time; to be aidophron is not to 
atimazein the object of one's aidos; cf. above, pp. 48-55, on 
the association of aidos and time. 
24. Above, pp. 236-45, cf. P. 233 on the exchange between 
Teukros and Agamemnon in Ajax. 
25. On the theme of the philia of Admetos and Alkestis, cf. 
below, pp. 352-4. Lombard, Acta Classics 1985, p. 11n. 34, 
correctly points out that, in 694-6, Admetos' anaideia prop- 
erly consists in his attempt to avoid death, rather than in 
his "murder" of his wife (against von Erffa, p. 133): since, 
however, his attempt to avoid death culminated in his allow- 
ing his wife to die, it seems pedantic to deny that his 
anaideia might also cover lack of respect for a Phil a. The 
wider aspects of Lombard's discussion of this passage also 
merit some discussion. On p. 9 of his article he writes: 
"Thus , vit6ij implies that the pleasure Admetos derived 
from life should have instilled in him .. u`Awj , i. e. an 
'inhibition' preventing him from expecting others to 
die in his stead. Here at last we have a negative form 
of otIýows censuring the absence of the inner restraint 
demanded by Democritus (in B264DK etc. ) as the measure 
defining and limiting the action of man. ... the inner 
force of 
av'u. (j is enhanced by* the technique of juxta- 
position and contrast ... (which) ... emphasizes the 
contrast between Admetos' pre-eminent observance of ai'w3 
in the context of social conventions and his 
xV&L1'4K 
on 
the existential level. " 
While I agree that the aidos whose absence is criticized in 
694-6 should have prevented Admetos' expecting others to die 
in his stead, I cannot see why Lombard should relate this 
.. particular instance to Demokritos' E wvTGJ a1 ökißr-l or why 
he seems to imagine that negative ads is rare. In using 
anaidbs of Admetos' determination to avoid death Pheres is 
referring to his son's concern for himself to the exclusion 
of all others, and such disregard for the claims of other 
people is a recognizably traditional form of anaideia (cf., 
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for example, pp. 52-4 above, and 349-51 below). I should not 
deny that this form of anaideia involves an "absence of 
inner restraint", but would point out that inner restraint 
is also necessary in the "observance of in the context 
of social conventions". Lombard's attempt to relate this 
passage specifically to Demokritos is rather strained. 
26. Cf. esp. Sophokles' Elektra and Antigone. 
27. See Bond, ad loc., and Adkins, CQ 1966, p. 211. 
28. See Bond, ad loc.. 
29. Megara's argument here is, however, somewhat illogical: 
she says that Herakles would be unwilling to save his child- 
ren once they had acquired a 
(ü' fr 
Ka vi . On her own reasoning, 
however, such a doxa is to result from the children's death, 
and it is difficult to see how H. could save them then. One 
wonders whether the audience is expected to notice this: is 
it, perhaps, a hint of an irrational aspect to her pessimism? 
30. This maxim is obviously based on traditional ideas of 
the community of honour within the family: for instances of 
the disgrace of one member of the family affecting the 
others, cf. Hel. 134-6,200-2,686-7,720-1, E1.47-9,1154. 
Related is the idea that children should live up to the rep- 
utation of their parents, , 
x. 336-8, Ion 735-7, Ox. 1169-71, 
Ba. 265, Iß. 505. 
31. In fr. 460N2 it is seen as inevitable that one's enemies 
will mock one's misfortunes. 
32. On -ri Jtc& f in the context of the obligation to show 
gratitude, cf. Pearson, Popular Ethics, 136-60. 
33. Cf. P. 17 above (and p. 256 on S. Phil. 842). 
34. Collard (ad loc. ) compares Bf. 1233-4; see also Stebler, 
p. 75. 
35. Fr. 32W (pp. 132-4 above). 
36. Cf. Adkins,, p. 184. 
37. See Murray, Euripides and his Age, p. 97. 
38. Adkins, loc. cit.. 
39.6.418-9,24.571-90. So, too, the Odysseus of S. Ajax, 
whose humanity is his chief characteristic, wishes to take 
part in the burial of his erstwhile enemy (above, p. 236). 
40. On all these passages, see above, pp. 176-82,244,246-8. 
41. Tyrwhitt's ¢Oovos for JVOvu in 902 would make the corres- 
V 
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pondence closer (cf. also P. O. 8.55) and may well be right, 
although the MS text can certainly stand. 
42. As, indeed, is suggested by her choice of the pejorative 
term hubrizein in itself. For the idea that one should not 
insult the dead, cf. Od. 22.412-3, A. Aa. 1612, S. j. Passim 
(pp. 224-36 above) etc.. Elektra's scruple in this respect is 
evidently not shared by her brother, who in 896-9 contem- 
plates with equanimity the mutilation of Aigisthos' body. 
43. Cf. Telemachos in the Odyss y (pp. 55-6 above) and Achil- 
les in IA (pp. 326-9,382-3 below). Hippolytos is also compa- 
rable, although his aidos is of a rather more individual 
kind (cf. PP. 334-5 below). 
44.636-7 also deserves a mention: Ion says that it is 
"unbearable" to have to give way to one's inferiors in the 
street; to do this willingly would probably be a mark of 
respect (as is giving up one's seat to another at Tyrt. 12.41 
-2W and Ar. Clouds 993 (p. 130 above)) and a recognition of 
the other person's time. Ion's concern for his own time, 
however, is so intense that he is unwilling to allow himself 
to appear to be on a par with those he considers his inferi- 
ors. Devereux, The Character of the Euripidean Hippolytos, 
p. 14, compares Ion's "narcissism" with that of other Euripi- 
dean characters. 
i i 
45.1074-5, ' X1r; Kvvv, r. t rvV -rc'ýýUVvrV 
{ýE'VV 
... is explained 
by Wilamowitz (ad loc. ) as the chorus' reaction to the 
thought of a non-Athenian taking part in the Eleusinian pro- 
cession; they assume that the god (Iakchos, see Owen's n. ad 
loc. ) shares their hostility. 
46. With these passages cf. S. OT. 1078-9, p. 211 above. 
47. For esthlos in 856 does not mean "good at being a slave". 
48. Cf. above, 139-40. 
49. Cf. 
. 
Ih. 858 and Eumaios' concern for his honour at x. 14. 
38 (pp. 23 and 60 above). 
50. Cf. Eß. 367-90 and Adkins, R, p. 177; with the present 
passage Adkins (p. 207) compares730-1, frr. 511,831N2. 
51. She also refers (974-5) to the nomos that women should 
not look directly at men. Diggle would delete these lines, 
presumably because the commonplace seems somewhat extraneous 
here, but it could be that Hekabe simply adds one further 
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excuse to explain her inability to look her victim in the 
face. 
52. See Grube, Drama, p. 303. 
53. Page's emendation, asix 
v. 
t-mt. for äv4iv"`. i( , is quoted 
with approval by Denniston (ad loc. ) and accepted by Diggle. 
54. Sheppard, CR 1918,137-41, shows how the motifs of euse- 
beia and sophrosyne, applied in Cho. and S. I. Ewith reference 
to Elektra (cf. pp. 246-8 above, with nn. ), have been trans- 
ferred in this play to the Farmer. 
55. On this passage, see Adkins, NR, p. 177; on the tradition- 
al equation of moral virtue and social standing, cf. Dennis- 
ton on E1.253. 
56. There may even be a further twist, in that anyone in the 
audience who wishes to has the opportunity to regard the 
Farmer's moral eugeneia as a product of his atavistic social 
eugeneia. E. may well be teasing his audience, or a section 
of it, here. 
57. Since''IS rvXlj in 417 is presumably an objective geni- 
tive, the phrase will correspond to a retrospective usage of 
aideomai with an impersonal object, although not to an 
instance of aidos as shame over one's own conduct, since 
Menelaos is manifestly not ashamed at what he has done, but 
embarrassed at his sufferings; cf. von Erffa, p. 159 and 
below, p. 311); for aischune in a similar sense (although 
encompassing shame at one's own actions), cf. 5.1.616 
(p. 244 above). Kannicht's note on He1.415-7 accepts Barrett's 
explanation of the history of aideomai and aischunomai, and 
this leads him to claim that tAvve in this passage has 
"taken over" the "original" sense of aideomai, while wifaüs 
represents the use of aideomai in the sense which originally 
belonged to aischunomai. This is mistaken: cf. P. 285 above. 
58. Cf. P. 65 above. 
59. On the role of the suppliant's aidos, cf. pp. 165-6 above. 
60. Cf. P. 187 above. 
61. Cf. Grube, am a, p. 193 (on semnos etc. in Hipp. ). 
62. P. 288 above. 
63. For this competitive aspect of what is essentially a co- 
operative relationship, cf. S. Phil. 524-5 (p. 255 above). 
64.511-4: this idea of "death before dishonour" is common 
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in E. (as, indeed, it is in S. ): cf. Hec. 373-4 (and Adkins, 
MR, p. 161), 497-8, Hel. 134-6,200-2,686-7, as well as the 
passages from Pho. on pp. 288-9 above and BE. on pp. 292-3 
above, 304 below. 
65. e. g. 11.22.105-6. 
66. This wish for death as a means of escaping disgrace is 
close, but not identical to the choice of death rather than 
future dishonour: for parallels, cf. Dover, GPM, P. 237 (Dei- 
aneira in S. ac . etc. ), Lesky, Greek Tragic Poetry, P. 279 
(S. A1. ). 
67. Cf. Adkins, CQ 1966, p. 214. 
68. On which see Parker, Miasma, p. 227. 
69. ibid., p. 318. 
70. See Bond, ad loc., on the transmission of pollution 
through sight, and for parallels to this passage. 
71. See Bond on 1160-2 (comparing S. Ai. 245 etc. ), Class, 
96-7 (with parallels). 
72. Pheres' accusation of anaideia against Admetos at Mc. 
694 (p. 291 above) may also censure an absence of this regard 
for others. 
73. asma, 316-7 (also 94 and 205); cf. P. 212 above on 
Oedipus in OT. 
74. Parker, p. 317. 
75. See Parker, 313-4, on this phenomenon in Hipp.. 
76. On this passage, cf. below, pp. 313,337. 
77. Similarly, Theseus reacts to the story of his son's- 
adultery with Phaidra by terming it a miasma at 946 (cf. 
Parker, p. 313, on both these passages). 
78. Cf. von Erffa, P. 160; Webster, Tragedies, p. 68, suggests 
another location for the fragment. 
79. On the importance of philia in this passage, cf. P. 362; 
the breach of Philia is the major reason for Orestes' aidos 
here, but he is nonetheless a polluted person, and Tyndareus 
treats him as such at 479-81. 
80. See esp. 1231-4: Herakles, Theseus claims, cannot pollute 
the gods (thus he seeks to remove Herakles' concern that he 
may pollute the Sun), and he himself, as Herakles' philos, 
fears no alastor (thus he combats the fear both of polluting 
a friend and of incurring reproach); cf. Chalk, S 1962, 
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p. 13: 
The grounds for suicide were d VtKýFIa and-'i ; but 
oý 




wX &t. ( is determined by moral judgement 
... and it is the continued regard of an obviously noble 
Theseus which convinces Herakles that these grounds are 
illusory. " 
81. Even if he is purified, as Theseus (1323-5) promises he 
will be, he will still risk revulsion as one who has commit- 
ted crimes which are felt to involve pollution, 'and presum- 
ably this revulsion will take little account of formal puri- 
fication. 
82. Cf. pp. 227-30 above, and, on the contrast, Lesky, Greek 
Tragic Poetry, p. 280. 
83. See Chalk, JHS 1962, P. 13 on this passage. Adkins, CQ 
1966, p. 218, is right to say, in modification of Chalk's 
argument, that Herakles is still motivated by the need to 
avoid disgrace, and that this, although a demand of traditi- 
onal arete, is not a "new" arete. Yet Herakles has changed 
his mind as to the nature of disgrace, and has, in effect, 
decided to live with that which would be disgraceful in 
terms of traditional values. Thus, while he does base his 
decision to live on an aspect of traditional aee, he also 
rejects one traditional "heroic" response, and while he may 
not make endurance (C- <q-rtelýrw) a "new" aee, he does sub- 
sume it to the head of arete. 
84. See Zürcher, Darstellung des Menschen, 93-4,96, Stebler, 
p. 98. 
85. Cf. Bond, ad loc.. y 
86. Wilamowitz refers 
JAk ßV öý! ¢ýýºýý to the chorus, but 
Theseus, son of Poseidon, is a kinsman of Herakles, son of 
Zeus (cf. 1154 and Bond's n. on 1200), and referred to Thes- 
eus, the line picks up Herakles' reluctance to the 
innocent, a reluctance which is probably to be seen as ads 
(cf. p. 305 above) at 1161-2. 
87. On the causal dative with asu om , see Goodwin's K»; s G., err. ' 
Grammar, §1181 (citing Ar. l8uds 1355 ; Bond (ad loc. ) calls 
the dative "instrumental", and one can see what he means, 
but this seems to require a quasi-passive sense of the verb 
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(although the distinction between causal and instrumental 
dative will not be very precise). 
88. Also comparable in this respect is Herakles' statement 
at 1423 that he has spent the house in aisc unai: obviously 
this entails self-reproach, remorse and recognition that he 
has done wrong, but he will also be aware that other people 
tend to criticize those whose actions, on their own admissi- 
on, have been disgraceful. 
89. Cf. Bond on 1287: "Such mockery or scorn was a natural 
concomitant of the guilt which the fifth-century Greek felt. " 
This seems to imply that guilt and fear of mockery can co- 
exist as manifestations of the one general reaction, and, if 
so, one should approve it. Bond goes on, however, "The Stoic- 
Christian notion of the mens sibi conscia recti wich disre- 
garded public opinion was still far away. " Certainly Stoic- 
Christian notions are far away from fifth century Athens, 
and it is true that in Greek literature recognition of the 
reprehensible nature of one's own actions is very often 
accompanied by fear of mockery, but 1) the mens sibs conscia 
recti is an ideal to which few adhere on every occasion and 
2) there are examples enough in Greek literature of those 
who disregard public opinion in clinging to their own idea 
of what is right (Archilochos and Solon, pp. 132-5 above, 
Aeschylus' Achilles and Klytaimestra, 182-7 above, Sophokles' 
Antigone, pp. 223-4 above, Demokritos, pp. 560-4 below). 
90. See pp. 87-90 above. 
91. Thus von Erffa's list of retrospective uses at pp. 156-60 
seems to me rather too uncritical in this respect; in parti- 
cular, he goes too far in claiming that the awareness that 
one has'done something discreditable is new (pp. 157,160). 
92. GPM, p. 225. 
93. Cf. P. 286 above. 
94. As Willink points out (ad loc. ), 461 recalls the famous 
line 396 (below, pp. 313-4). 
95. pp. 36-8,90 above; Solon 32W, which von Erffa sees as an 
example of retrospective aidos, is comparable (cf. pp. 132-3 
above). 
96. Cf. Ion 1557-8 and 1e.. 884-6, where Apollo and Aphrodite 
(respectively) fear disapproval arising from the presence of 
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a mortal whom they have treated shabbily. 
97. Cf. P. 300 above. 
98. P. 159. 
99. On the opposition of TL 
I, 
rwJ&V and aha dgia in this 
passage in the context of women's modesty, cf. North, Soph- 
rosyne, p. 69. 
100. p. 158. 
101. So Lombard, Acta Classics 1985,7-8. In line 106 Helen 
goes on to express another, more trivial kind of aidos, to 
the effect that it is aischron that she should neglect her 
duty to her dead sister by allowing slaves to bear her offer- 
ing. 
102. See Barrett, ad loc. (but cf. above, p. 285, on the 
deficiencies of his distinction between aidos and aischune). 
103. See Zucker; Syneidesis-Conscientia, 7-8, Seel, "Zur 
Vorgeschichte... ", 298-9, Class, 102-7, Stebler, 118-9. 
104. On ruV'LSe04 elsewhere in E. see Zucker, p. 8n. 12, Class, 
loc. cit., Stebler, p. 120; on rvv(-4rLs , see Class, P. 106, 
Willink, ad loc.; on syneidesis etc. in other authors, cf. 
below, pp. 509-10,542-8, 
105. See Class, 106-7, Willink, ad loc.. 
106. Cf. Class, p. 104. 
107. This concern for the feelings of another person might 
well be the same as the aischune which Orestes expresses 
with regard to Elektra at line 280; cf. also pp. 305 and 308 
above. 
108. At this point Orestes has been representing himself to 
Tyndareus as troubled by what he has done (see 546 of r&ruJ &-i 
T1 A W1_*LvwC and so this aidos may be based on horror of 
the crime of matricide. On the other hand, it is possible, 
since Orestes has moved on to the subject of Klytaimestra's 
adultery, that his aidos is to be seen as reluctance to 
associate himself with a mother whose conduct he despises 
(for a similar reaction, see C. Q. 917). 
109. So von Erffa, p. 160, Grube, p. 208. 
110. On (vvvi see [P1. ) Def. 415e (quoted by Willink on Q. 
396). 
111. See Class, 99-102, Stebler, p. 83. 
112. Stebler, p. 84. 
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113. See 833-5, which, to me, indicates only distress that 
Neoptolemos will inevitably discover what Hermione has done 
(contrast Class, p. 101). Certainly at 919-20 Hermione openly 
acknowledges that she is motivated by fear of punishment, 
and no other motive is. mentioned. Notice also the absence of 
any recognition of her own violation of Andromache's suppli- 
ant status in Hermione's "TW&s oCýrL/ºµK 
0E-WV (k L. s aýerwßl t 
859, which is surely an ironic touch. Hermione has no respect 
for the institution of supplication as such, but considers 
using it for her own protection. (The way in which some 
characters exloit such conventions for their own ends is one 
of the themes of J. Dalfen's article on ads in Festschrift 
Ji, 67-75. ) 
114. I do not mean to suggest here that these standards must 
be personal to oneself. 
115. Cf. Dalfen, Festschrift Fink, p. 73. 
116. These last passages are those in which references to 
conscience etc. most directly concern us: on conscience in E. 
in general, see Class, 91-107, Stebler, 47-9,83-4,88-9,91-2, 
98-102,117-9. 
117. Cf. von Erffa, p. 133. 
118. pp. 311-2 above. 
119. For the noun clause, cf. p. 288 above. 
120. See North, Sophrosvne, 69,71 and 74. 
121. For similar reflections on the sexual appetite of women 
(the orthodox view), cf. frr. 401,410,493,662N2,882a (in 
Snell's supp. ). 
122. Cf. pp. 301-2 above. 
123. In this line the argument, drawn from the ethnographical 
studies of the likes of Herodotos, that different peoples 
may vary in their conceptions of what is aischron is alluded 
to, but the point is made that, although conceptions of -rö . ros? 
v 
differ, each people's conception is valid for itself, and 
this is very much the Herodotean position; cf. pp. 388-9 with 
n. 334 below. 
124. Diggle, following Page, prints a lacuna between these 
two verses. 
125. pp. 314-5 above. 
126. Cf. n. 51 above. 
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127. pp. 299-300 above. 
12la. C( pp. 2q6-1 0. beve . 1231. Cf. especially Orestes at Cho. 917. 
129. WOLC & presumably denotes awareness rather than cons- 
cience here, but there may be a slight ambiguity nonetheless; 
it turns out that Kreousa's memory of the rape does prey on 
her conscience, and since the audience is aware of the nat- 
ure of the aischune, its members might mentally supply a 
re flexive pronoun in this line. 
130. P. 313 above. 
131. Cf. P. 311 above. 
132. Cf. also HF. 1341-6, with Bond's n. ad loc.. Von Erffa 
(p. 163) uses fr. 292.7 to distinguish E. 's theology from that 
of Sophokles, as exemplified in fr. 276R (nothing that the 
gods do is aischron); there is, indeed, a contrast, but 
since both fragments will have formed part of speeches by 
characters in a play they represent at best only the kind of 
arguments which were "in the air" in the Athens of the late 
fifth century, rather than the considered opinions of the 
two poets. (The Sophoklean fragment, moreover, is flatly 
contradicted by the statement of Hyllos at Trach. 1271-2 (cf. 
p. 265n. 15 above); Hyllos may be wrong, but we do not know 
that the speaker of the fragment was proved right. ) 
133. Euripidean Drama, p. 282. 
134. Cf. von Erffa, p. 154. 
135. Adkins, MR, p. 184; Dover's explanation (GPM, 240-1), 
that Antigone invites others to see her as a moral subject 
rather than a moral object, is similar. 
136. As is claimed by Adkins, ibid.. 
137. Cf. P. 167 above. 
138. Cf. below, pp. 392-3. 
139. Fr. 436N2, p. 306 above. 
140. Cf. North, Sophrosyne, p. 78. 
141. Cf. P. 319 above. 
142. This is the familiar association of ads with the eyes; 
for a simple restatement of the proverb, see fr. 457N2 
-1 1- 
L. 
For parallels and discussion, see Harder's commentary, 
pp. 118-20. 
143. Acta Classics 1985,6-7. 
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144. p. 6. 
145. Lombard, p. 7. 
146. Lombard's assertion, then, that E. consistently applies 
a technique of contrast between conventional and advanced 
uses of aidos must be considered not proven: he considers 
three passages in his article, the present one, lA. c. 600ff. 
(on which see pp. 290-1, with n. 25) and Ox. 97-105 (pp. 312-3 
and n. 101 above), and only in the last is there any real 
contrast between superficial or conventional aidos and "inner 
shame". 
147. Below, pp. 382-3. 
148. See Snell, Aischylos, 151-2, Grube, am , p. 428. 
149. Cf. above, p. 301 (etc. ). 
150. Cf. von Erffa, p. 153. 
151. ibid.. 
152. ibid.. 
153. Cf. above, pp. 301-2. 
153a. Iphigeneia, does, however, supplicate her father at 
1245-8, using the infant Orestes as a lever and appealing to 
aidos and pity. 
154. Her feelings of embarrassment at being made to look a 
fool here will thus be comparable to those of her mother at 
847-8. 
155. Cf. P. 289 above. 
156. Cf. below, pp. 339-43. For habrotes as a synonym of 
aidos, cf. A. Ag. 1203-5 (p. 167 above), E. IA. 858 (where a 
character informs us that he does not 
;e vvFr 0 *c-t. on account 
of his servile status). 
J 
157. Cf. pp. 283-4 above and x. 1199-1201 (pp. 308-9 above). 
158. pp. 74-5 above. 
159. On his purity and his exclusivism, see Segal, Hermes 
1970,278-83, Devereux, Character, 89-94. 
160. See Segal, Hermes 1970, p. 282, G. Berns, Hermes 1973, 
165-87. 
161. Cf. 667,949 (Theseus, ironically), 995,1007,1013,1034-5, 
1365,1402, North, P. 70, Berns, passim. 
162. Cf. 656,996,1061,13Ö9,1364,1368,1419,1454. 
163. Cf. pp. 55-6 above. 
164. Cf. p. 326 above. 
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165. Cf. pp. 311-2,316-8 above. 
166. On Hippolytos' unusualness, cf. Barrett on 79-81, and 
on his quasi-feminine concern for sexual purity, see Segal, 
Hermes 1970, p. 293, Devereux, Character, 19-32 (and cf. 1006, 
Toi-ýBFdýý 4VA vý/ tXwJ). 
167. Cf. above, pp. 325-6, and below, pp. 392-5. 
168. Cf. Berns, Hermes 1973,169-75, and below, pp. 551-6. 
168a. Hippolytos' insistence on Physis is recognizably aris- 
tocratic (see Barrett, p. 173, on 79-81), and thus this pas- 
sage may be compared to those in which dos is seen as an 
aristocratic virtue (h. iiom. Cer. 213-5, p. 126 above, Thgn. 289- 
92,399,409-10, pp. 139-40 above). }- 169. Cf. 1007. 
170. See Barrett, ad loc.; it appears that Hippolytos regards 
Phaidra's behaviour towards him as a breach of philia; simi- 
larly, both the Nurse and Phaidra regard his implied threat 
to ignore his oath and denounce his stepmother as a betrayal 
of his phi of (613,682). 
171. Cf. pp. 123,166,210-1 above. 
172. p. 325 above. On Phaidra's attempt to overcome gros with 
a dos, cf. also Zürcher, Darstellung, 85-7. 
173. Cf. Tro. 1041 and f r. 662N2. 
174. This line is, however, deleted in Diggle's text. 
175. At 408 and 420 the idea that she would also shame Thes- 
eus is also present. 
176. Cf. frr. 19,840 and 920N2 (on which see Dodds, x, 187-8). 
177. Cf. above, pp. 20-1. 
178. Cf above, pp. 14-6,54-5,85-6. 
179. GPM, p. 210 (on adultery, cf. also 209,218). 
180. See Class, 97-8. 
181. On miasma here, see Class, P. 99, Segal, Hermes 1970, 
p. 281. 
182. That she calls the suppliant's gesture a sebas (that 
which one rejkL ), but describes her reaction to it as aidös 
reveals once more the closeness of aideomai and sebo (etc. ) 
in the context of supplication (see above, p. 187 etc. ). 
183. See Barrett on 333-5, Winnington-Ingram, mod. Hardt 6, 
179,193. 
184. Cf. Dodds, C$ 1925, p. 103, Gould, JHS 1973,86-7. 
185. Conacher, for example, Euripidean Drama, 35,54-5, 
409 
believes "that 'the bad alOus ' here regarded as apleasure 
refers to the distracting enjoyment of 'taboo' subjects - 
which, when not treated with reverence, lead to shame. " This, 
however, answers to 
sense 
of aidos which I can identify. 
186. The commentaries of Wecklein and Barthold, for example, 
speak of Phaidra's "weakness". 
187. See the judgement of Lesky, Greek Tragic Poetry, P. 237. 
Helpful discussions include Dodds, c$ 1925,102-4, Winnington- 
Ingram, Fond. Hardt 6,176-85, Barrett on 385-6, Segal, 
Hermes 1970,283-8, Solmsen, Hermes 1973,420-5. 
188. Cf. above, pp. 117-9 and A. B. Cook, CR 1901, p. 341. 
489. C 10.7110 a brvc. 190. pp. 301-2,329-31 above. 
191. On the fragment and the lost play in general see Webs- 
ter, Tragedies, 127-30. 
192. Thus, it seems to me, Barrett (on 385-6) explains trad- 
itionally ambivalent aidos, but not, or not entirely, the 
passage under discussion. 
193. Solmsen, Hermes 1973,420-1. 
194. Without wishing to go into any detail, I should perhaps 
declare that I am convinced by those who claim that there is 
an objection to the Sokratic doctrine that no one willingly 
does wrong in these lines: see Barthold on 380, Snell, Phil- 
ou 1948,125-34, Scenes from Greek Drama, 59-67, Dodds, 
GI, 186-7; contrast Barrett, p. 229 on 377-81. 
195. Dodds, 
_ 
1925, p. 103, followed by von Erffa, P. 167, 
Segal, Hermes 1970, p. 284. 
196. See previous note. 
197. What follows is similar, but not identical, to the views 
of Dodds, loc. cit., and Segal, 284-8. 
198. Thus there is no need to deny, with von Erffa, P. 166, 
and Barrett on 381-5, that aidos .a seen as a pleasure 
in 
385; cf. Segal, 285-6n. 4. 
199. Cf. Dodds, P. 103, Segal, 286-7; on the kairos, see also 
Barrett on 396-7. 
200. This idea, that the character of an action or attitude 
varies according to situation, occurs time and again in E.: 
see pp. 289 and 331 above. Dalfen, Festschrift Fink, 70-2, 
shows how the Nurse's misuse of the ritual of supplication 
and Phaidra's misplaced respect for the ritual gesture ulti- 
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mately prove harmful, and relates this to Hippolytos' respect 
for the oath which the Nurse, again exploiting the religious 
sanction for her own ends, extracts from him; this, too, 
might be related to the idea that context determines the 
usefulness or otherwise of such conventions (non-sceptical 
relativism again, cf. n. 20 above); cf. Ion 1275-81,1313-9, 
with the comments of Segal, Hermes 1970, p. 284. 
201. As do Winnington-Ingram, Fond. Hardt, 177-8,193, Solmsen, 
kermes 1973, p. 422. 
202. Winnington-Ingram, Fond. Hardt, 193-4, believes that 
Phaidra's aidos with regard to her illicit passion proves 
harmful because it leads to repression. 
203. Fond. Hardt, p. 193. 
204. Hermes 1970,281-8. 
205. Cf. Deianeira at S. Traci. 596-7 (p. 215 above). 
206. Cf. Barrett, ad loc.. 
207. Cf. Herakles' doubts as to whether he will be able to 
endure the silent reproaches of his own weapons at H E. 1379- 
85 (pp. 307-8 above). 
208. Suilct,, 6 in 425 refers to awareness of a discreditable 
element in one's family history which causes inhibition, 
regardless of the fact that those who experience the inhib- 
ition bear no responsibility for the past action: it has, 
therefore, no connexion with syneidesis as "conscience", but 
does, interestingly enough, describe the awareness which 
leads to aidos. 
209. On the closeness of Yst #-fto-I here to aidos, see North, 
p. 74. 
210. In 489 &vKXEjj still refers to Phaidra's determination 
to preserve her reputation by committing suicide. 
211. On pidos seen negatively as semnotes, cf. pp. 301-2,330 
above. 
212. See Grube, Drama, P. 183, Parker, Miasm , p. 313. 
213. Cf. Hec. 251. 
214. See Barthold, Barrett, ad loc.. 
215. Cf. 239-49. 
216. Cf. 1310-2, where Artemis explains Phaidra's denuncia- 
tion of Hippoloytos in terms of her fear of exposure (elen- 
chos). 
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217. Another use of the verb + acc. in the sense "be ashamed 
of ... ". 
218. Cf. Segal, Hermes 1970, p. 288. 
219. See 656. 
220. Cf. Zuntz' comment on Winnington-Ingram's paper in Fond. 
Hardt, p. 194. 
221. At 667 Hippolytos hopes that women, especially Phaidra, 
may learn sophrosyne, at 731 Phaidra expresses the wish that 
he may learn the same lesson, and at 1034 Hippolytos again 
passes judgement on Phaidra's sophrosyne and contrasts it 
with his own. 
222. Menelaos showed no signs of aidos in the actual exchange 
with Peleus, and there can be little doubt but that we are 
supposed to see the cowardice with which the latter charges 
him (590-1,616-8,765) as the real reason for his departure; 
cf. Dalfen, Festschrift Fink, p. 73 (p. 315 and n. 115 above). 
223. This instance of &F-vvj is rare: it does not 
imply that aidos has a particular religious aspect, simply 
that the time of the gods should be recognized. 
224. Cf. pp. 305 and 308 above. 
225. Cf. pp. 75,106n. 127 and 112n. 202 above (etc. ). 
226. dos is explicitly used of the avoidance of excess in 
f r. 209N2: on aidos, sophrosyne and moderation, see North, 
p. 78n. 116 and the passages there cited. 
227. Cf. S. M. 319-20, Trach. 1071-2 and (with reference to 
the display of emotion in general) Qr. 1047-8; the position 
of Odysseus' aidos at Od. 8.86 is complicated by the fact 
that Homeric heroes frequently experience no aidos at shed- 
ding tears; cf. p. 62 above. 
227a. Cf. the braggart Menelaos at x. 947-53: he feels it 
unmanly to weep, yet he has heard that it is kalon to do so 
ev ktr( 
228. On aidos as a mark of noble birth, cf. n. 168a above. 
229. Cf. 858,900-1,997,1343-4 and above, pp. 301-2,330-1. 
230. Cf. below, 382-3. 
231. Cf. pp. 185,248-62 above. 
232. Cf. Amphiaraos at Hyps. fr. 22 and 60 (Bond), 58-9. Lying 
is also anaideia in the sense that it denies the truth to 
one who feels he deserves it, and so fails to recognize his 
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claim to honour. 
233. On her arete, see 152,323-5,1000-1. 
234. Cf. Pearson, Popular Ethics, 148-51. 
235. The same sense is conveyed by -jj-eo-r w roc at 155 (cf. 
Dale, ad loc. ). 
236. Cf. P. 290 above. 
237. Cf. P. 291 above. 
238. The syntax of these lines, as printed by Diggle, is odd. 
One would expect Kec. 
1 in 1060 to be co-ordinate with rF in 
1057, and j'9 rt,. ý"ýýn. ýrwýl and vw. 
A TES () aavrlsto be dependent 
on /LpH o/, explaining its twofold nature, but this leaves 
1061, 'rr o? ýýý J 'r(1Vat. j/ kr) " unconnnected; one might assume ana- 
colouthon (beginning with a KM to co-ordinate with rt in 
1057, Admetos then changes the syntax of his sentence), or 
punctuate with a colon after Ga. VCVyjs and a comma afters-rI'E-%v, 
taking the following clause as asyndetic, or delete 1061-3, 
following Wheeler (Diggle's app. crit. ). 
239. This, too, might be aidos - cf. Qd. 17.188-9. 
240. Cf. fr. 452N2 (from Cresphontes): 
r 'ol I 
Klsl v/ Uyx- n- il e 
TE 
-if'ýG vr&r- ou 
F- e tAt L- 4Aäc. XLf t' C /It. IT o 01" r! a' nc vWV/-- *, l. 
On this fragment Harder (p. 102) writes: 
"By saying that he is not ashamed of loving himself, 
because everybody does it, Polyphontes implicitly admits 
that his fk ovrt. c is a bad thing, thus conforming him- 
self to the common view about 4L) wYn 
A.. Only occasion- 
ally we find it positively valued; cf. S. QC 309 ... and 
E. He1.998f. " 
On the latter passage, cf. below, pp. 379-81. Cf. also Hipp. 
1080-1, where sebein seems to work in much the same way: 
-, rý)c ?ýw re ý)c)c aJ o'a. vroV 
r 
, ý, ý rý, är(3 c ýJ 
Ti vj rf- Ic'vras o rr L .L 
S-Lo .cL ACA Loj w. 
Too much respect for oneself, then, appears to be discredit- 
able. 
241. On ads in connexion with oaths, cf. pp. 123,166,210-1, 
335 above. 
242. For the decline in contemporary morality seen as the 
departure of aidos, cf. Hes. WD. 197-201 (p. 120 above), Thgn. 
289-92,647-8 (p. 138 above), S. E. 1.245-50 (p. 246 above); also 
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IA. 1089-94 (pp. 391-2 below). 
243. For aischros in the non-physical sense when applied to 
a person, cf. S. Phil. 906 (p. 257 above). 
244. Medea's opinion that the conduct of Jason has been 
aischron is shared by Aigeus at 695 (cf. 699, where he calls 
him kakos). 
245. Cf. S. Phil. 93-4, p. 251 above. 
246. Cf., for example, Hektor at 11.22.104-7 (p. 37 above: 
cf. also 38-42,46-56). 
247. n. 240 above. 
248. This might be interpreted as showing that he puts aidos 
for his iloi before retaliatory Justice, and thus might be 
referred to the antithesis between aischron and dikaion in 
the context of the crime within the family (pp. 240-8 above, 
359-60 below). 
249. So Barrett, ad loc.. 
250. Euripides is fond of the zeugma of different senses of 
ade st ai : cf. Hcld. 813-6 (pp. 283-4 above), fi_F. 1 199-1201 
(p. 308 above). 
251. Cf. pp. 305-6 above. 
252. Cf. P. 321 above. 
253. On ºlicww ,, A, cf. Hipp. 686, p. 347 above. 
254. CQ 1966,196-9, where he criticizes the interpretation 
of Pearson, Popular Ethics, 144-6. 
255. P. 146. 
256.11.23.176. 
257. Pearson, P. 146, Blaiklock, Male Characters, 105-7, 
Lesky, Greek Tragic Poetry, p. 243. 
258. Hekabe appeals to such a standard at 282: 
. cº ), xe "ý e . ur'6-cv jt 6-LV VV "VS Ke evravvr, c3 w 
259. Cf. Gould, JHS 1973,90-4, Parker, asma, p. 181. 
260. Cf. (e. g. ) Hcld. 503-6, p. 302 above. 
261. pp. 239-48 above. 
262. pp. 239-40 above. 
263. Strife between members of the same family is aischron 
also at io. 1219-20 and 1369. 
264. Adkins, 7R, p. 185. 
265. See 288-93,416-7,505-6,507-11. 
266. Adkins, MR, p. 186. 
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267. For disloyalty as cowardice, see ýled. 465-6, p. 354 above. 
268. Since both Orestes and Pylades are prepared to die for 
each other, I do not see why Roisman (Loyalty, p. 173) says 
that in this play "only the chorus :.. fulfills the require- 
ments of loyalty. " 
269. pp. 306,311. 
270. Cf. P. 360 and n. 265 above, and see also 499, where 
Tyndareus calls the murder of Agamemnon an or, 
'intsTo-/ ecrov 
(though, significantly, he denies that this justifies Ores- 
tes' retaliation). 
i 
271. Note Etate 
t 
xV rlr(3wd in 1079 and cf. Alc. 279 (pp. 352-3 
above) and Hcld. 6 (p. 355 above). 
272. Cf. below, n. 327. 
273. On aidos for one's philoi, cf. also fr. 109N2 - co%o YU 
1 
p1 'I 
x 01 IS'/ n's Tý ýýºTýs ýj ! '^ý - and j. 1187, where Klytaimestra 
says that Agamemnon would return home oý'ýXOwt having sacri- 
ficed his daughter. Fr. 593N2 speaks of the "fetters of aidos", 
probably in the context of the friendship of Theseus and 
Peirithoos (von Erffa, p. 133, says Herakles and Peirithoos, 
but see Nauck's testimonia). On the attribution of the play 
from which this fragment comes to Kritias, see below, p. 549. 
274. JHS 1973, p. 85. 
275. On Medea's supplication, see Dalfen, 67-70. Medea is 
another of those characters who misuses ritual for her own 
ends (see n. 200 above). In the second part of his study 
(72-5) Dalfen collects passages in which ritual is used 
legitimately (the subject thus being entitled to aidos) only 
to be ignored by those who see it as in their own interests 
to do so; these people, however, he points out, emerge with 
no credit in failing to respond to appeals for aidos. It 
seems, then, that E. is exploring both the way in which 
people view their self-interest and the extent to which the 
legitimacy of conventional and ritualized behaviour may vary 
according to context. 
276. For the terminology and the two types of supplication, 
see Kopperschmidt, Die Hikesie, 46-53, and cf. Burian, 
Suppliant Drama, 1,4-5, and Gould, 75-8. Medea also under- 
takes supplication of Aigeus at 709ff., and the latter gives 
in 1) out of pity and 2) because he wants to, on the grounds 
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that Medea has already been of service to him. Aidos is not 
mentioned, but may, at least, lie behind the impulse to re- 
turn a favour. 
277. This is an atypical feature (Burian, p. 96). 
278. See 65,67-8,105-6,159-60 and Burian, 97-8. 
279. See Kopperschmidt, p. 150. 
280. Cf. P. 355 above. 
281. See Dalfen, p. 72-3. 
?- 282. As claimed by Adkins, Cg 
283. Cf. Gould, p. 85. 
1966, p. 201. 
284. Cf. Adkins, C4 1966, p. 202. 
285. Pace Adkins, ibid.. 
286. ibid.. 
287. P. 74. 
288. Earlier in the play, Hekabe tells Polyxena to supplicate 
Odysseus, but he hides his right hand, avoiding ritual con- 
tact (339-45, see Gould, 84-5), and, in any case, the girl 
declines to follow her mother's advice. Hekabe's own suppli- 
cation of Odysseus (IKFf6CW , 276) concerns us only as an 
appeal to dos on the grounds of phi, lia (pp. 357-8 above). 
289. See Kopperschmidt, 133-5, Burian, 137-8. 
290. See Collard. ad loc.. 
291. On the reluctance to undertake supplication, see pp. 300 
-2 above. 
292. Cf. pp. 365-6 above. 
293. Die Hikesie, 135-6. 
294. See P. 138. 
295. Political Plays, 7-8,10; cf. Lesky, p. 266. 
296. See, for example, Grube, Drama, p. 233, Conacher, Euri- 
pidean Drama, p. 102. 
297. Aspects of Euripidean Tragedy, 108-9. 
298. Hermes 1961,431-2. 
299. Suppliant Drama, p. 159. 
300. p. 163n. 34. 
301. Cf. Burian, p. 164, Walcot, Greek Drama in its Theatrical 
and Social Context, 98-9. 
302. Cf. Burian, P. 164. If there is no irony in the presen- 
tation of Theseus here, there may, nonetheless, be irony in 
the presentation of the subsequent events of the play, and 
it should be noted that the recovery of the bodies is the 
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first step in the rehabilitation of the Argives, whose expe- 
dition Theseus originally criticized. The rehabilitation 
continues with Adrastos' Funeral Speech, which praises for 
private virtue men, like Kapaneus, who were notorious as 
types of impiety, and ultimately results in the renewal of 
the conflict through the Epigonoi. For this "ironical" inter- 
pretation of the second part of the play, see Fitton, Hermes 
1961,438-41 (followed by Burian, 191-5); against, see Lesky, 
269 and 272, Collard, BICS 1972,39,43-9. 
303. See Kopperschmidt, 193,179-92,204 (on the late entry of 
the soter: he compares And. in this respect). 
304. See Bond on 165-6, Grube, p. 247. 
305. See Guthrie, 1IGP 3,101-16, Adkins, MR, 238,249 etc.. 
306. Cf. above, pp. 76-81. 
307. Cf. above, pp. 325-6, below, 392-5. 
308. Cf. also Hyps. fr. 60.116 (Bond). 
309. Cf. OC. 863, p. 218 above, and note the depreciation of 
the herald's is at Hcld. 64,79,97,102,112,127,225. 
310. Cf. above, p. 349. On the personification in 557, cf. 
In 337 (p. 320 above). 
311. Cf. 300-1 above: despite his protestations, Menelaos 
does address an appeal to Theonod. 
312. See previous n.. 
313. Cf. the threat in A. Supp. (p. 174 above). 
314. P. 149. 
315. P. 36 above. 
316. See Kannicht on 998-1001. 
317. Contrast le . 85-6 and fr. 452N2 
(p. 354 and n. 240 above). 
318. P. 149. 
319. See below, p. 578n. 109. 
320. On the temple of dike, Kannicht (on 1002-4) compares 
(D. )25.35, where all men are said to possess altars of dike, 
gunomia and aidos in their hearts. 
321. Entstehung und Entwicklung, p. 74. 
322. See Kopperschmidt, 197-9. 
323. pp. 326-9 above. 
324. Cf. von Erffa, p. 154. 
325. Cf. pp. 301-2. 
326. Cf. Blaiklock, Male Characters, 117-21. 
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327. To the examples already cited add Hyps. 22 and 60,30-1 
(Bond). 
328. This much emerges from passages like Q d. 8.85-6,15.69-71, 
19.118-21; see pp. 61-2 above. 
329. Cf. pp. 305,308,350 above. 
330. Cf. P. 137 above. 
331. Good sense: cf. pp. 76-81 above (etc. ); noble birth: cf. 
n. 168a above. 
332. Cf. 1037-41 in this connexion. 
333. Cf. pp. 369-71 above. 
334. Cf. below, PP. 422-3. 
335. Cf. And. 243-4 (p. 318 and n. 123 above), also von Erffa, 
p. 165. 
336. The view that moral standards, and the gods who under- 
write them, exist only by convention is expressed by Hekabe 
at 799-805; she, too, believes that nomoi should nonetheless 
be upheld. This corresponds with the Protagorean position, 
as_far as we can tell: cf. Pl. Prot. 323c and see Heinimann, 
Nomos und Physis, 121-2. 
337. He is also anosios at 790, and his crime anosion at 792. 
338. This is the reaction he fears at j. 1195. 
339. Cf. at äe c-rj1 -t ý. nýfa7fýluviwvct at Thuc. 2.51.5 
(below, 
pp. 485-6). 
340. This altruistic concern for another's feelings is not a 
new element in the reaction of ads- cf. Qd. 3.96 (= 4.326), 
pp. 8-9,56 above. 
341. Concern for which leads her to take pains to conceal 
her body from the eyes of men, as reported by Talthybios at 
568-70. 
342. Cf. von Erffa, p. 139. 
343. Talthybios shows a similar sympathy for Hekabe and 
Polyxena at Hec. 518-20. On the universality of pity, see And. 
421-2. 
344. See below, p. 572n. 21. 
345. See above, p. 354. 
346. See above, p. 306. 
347. Cf. n. 242 above. 348. P. 354 above. X349. 
Cf., for example, those Passages in which failure to 
meet one's obligations to one's Philoi is seen as cowardice 
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(pp. 354,361 above). 
350. Aidos and arete are, however, associated in several 
passages of Theognis (pp. 136-9,144 above), although this may 
conceal an attempt to reconcile moral and social arete. It 
may well be, however, that aidos for one's Philoi would be 
seen quite generally as an aspect of arete: the two are 
certainly equated in an unambiguous and unselfconscious 
manner at Thuc. 2.51.5 (n. 339 above). 
351. Cf. pp. 325-6 above. 
352. See below, PP. 550-6. 
353. In lines 363-6 I take r' as the subject of 
E 
rý 
- "For rý .rlfZ9 ýr. ý is wisdom, and has the excellent grace 
(of being able) to discern duty with the aid of intelligence. " 
Von Erffa (161-2, following Weil) takes i rve wJ 14 
d4- 
as the 
subject of c 
XK 
, and seems to imagine that t -Ah wrrwr. 
t 
("surpassing") must have a comparAtive sense. Thus he sees a 
r% 01 
contrast between instinct (aidos) and intelligence ('1rv rvv«s 
a, Etat KJ but 1) aidos is already identified with sophi 
2) r& ... re does not indicate any kind of a contrast 
(quite 
the opposite) and 3) IS ý)t 0-1Ttv(ec need not be comparative. 
354. P. 139 above. 
356. P. 36 above. 
356. P. 376 above. 
357. Euandria, however, denotes virtue in a wider sense at 
F, 1.367-70, a passage which also suggests that environment 
and upbringing, rather than heredity, are the important fac- 
tors in the development of character. 
358. Cf. Demokritos B33DK. 
359. This passage is deleted by Sakorraphos, but even if it 
is not by E. it clearly reflects contemporary ideas. 
360. Cf. pp. 332-3 above. 
361. Various examples of this may be found above, particu- 
larly in contexts of Philip, supplication and xenia. In 
addition, see r. 37-8, where Elektra experiences aidos at 
naming her brother's tormentors, the Furies, and 410, where 
Orestes finds a similar reserve on the part of Menelaos 
understandable, in that the goddesses are semnai: that which 
causes one to sebei , then, may also cause one to aideisthai. 
Ion's aidos at harming the birds which live in the sacred 
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precinct at Ion 179-81 is another example of the use of 
aideisthaiin a context in which sebein might also be approp- 
riate (for aideisthai in the context of sacrilege, see A. 
ers. 809-10, p. 161 above). Sehei is much more common as the 
response to the divine, although the simple aif 
itýwt ýc-oýs 
does occur at Hipp. 1258, Bä. 263. 
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S. HERODOTOS. 
Instances of aidos etc. are comparatively few in Herodotos, 
certainly in comparison with those of aischune and ais ufQ- 
mai. This undoubtedly reflects the growing obsolescence of 
the former group of terms, and perhaps a feeling that aidos 
is a more "poetic" word than its synonym. Nevertheless, 
there is still a great deal which is of relevance to us, 
provided we include under the heading of aidos both passages 
in which the ideas with which we are concerned seem present, 
although the words themselves' are not used, and instances of 
obvious synonyms. 
Still one of the most natural contexts in which our group of 
terms may be found is the martial one. The verb aideisthai 
occurs in connexion with cowardice and flight at 1.55.2, 
where the oracle advising Kroisos to f lee and not to "ci 
rcL r9 .t 
KýKos Et vrt when a -mule 
becomes king of the Medes is quoted. 
The ideas are familiar, and we shall note further examples 
in the historian's work, but this passage is not in itself 
evidence for his usage, being a piece of hexameter verse 
which presumably dates from the previous century. 
When Herodotos does speak of the shame of cowardice in his 
own voice the term he uses is aischunesthai, and the context 
is one of the attitude to cowardice of the Spartans, who are, 
in the Histories, the people who adhere most rigidly to 
traditional martial values. The Spartans, we are told at 
1.82.8, have grown their hair ever since their conquest of 
Thyrea: the sole Spartan survivor of that campaign, one 
Othryades, 
ýi. ývv ýý 
V1tSVQ(fi 
-t l 
ES ýý ýTyý Tw aý rukkaxýr w 
(tcI YXp, M, 
V*W) 
ic. rüJ E it vtt-1 (L WOCTotý(ý (4A( 4 uur 
j 
Used prospectively with the infinitive, xi r vvvl 4v / is 
clearly indistinguishable from vet 
(Eä, Mt, J here. 
The reception O thryades could have expected from his fellow- 
citizens is suggested in 7.231-2, where the story of two 
Spartan survivors of Thermopylae, Aristodemos and Pantites, 
is related. The former chose to take no part in the battle, 
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having been excused from service as a result of an eye comp- 
laint. Unfortunately for him, Herodotos explains, a comrade, 
Eurytos, also excused because of illness, chose to fight, 
thus throwing into relief his colleague's lack of commitment. 
Aristodemos' return to Sparta is then described (231): 
ä- ov. r-rjrK5 f1t 








ne- L C-r 7 "(rrxwV tr EToL, 
ý& 





d Ks l vocvE L'n'a(1 L, -j'rE-w oJr& c. EX c-io, 
DV Cl OOS TE 4I it O T/ Fo-4S #. 6roa ipS KE VGS 
His fellows, then, demonstrate(. their disapproval by shunning 
him and calling him names, and he suffers a diminution of 
time. 1 The reaction of the citizenry to Pantites seems to 
have been similar, but in his case the opprobrium proved 
unendurable - v`rr" rater,. cSE rowrot 
FS ýý"ýCrIJ) wS 1TCc, wro 
oi-ir" off Oe L( 232) . He, then, reacts as does Orthryades, and 
shows that suicide as a means of avoiding or escaping dis- 
grace is not an expedient which is confined to the figures 
of the Athenian stage. 
We hear of Aristodemos again at 9.71.3, where we are told 
that, in spite of his bravery at Plataia, he was denied the 
honour accorded others who performed well, on the grounds 
that his disregard for his own safety in the battle was 
directly attributable to his desire to escape the disgrace 
incurred at Thermopylae through death. The anecdote demonst- 
rates both the intensity of Aristodemos' concern for his 
time and the strength of the Spartans' disaproval of one who 
failed to live up to their standards: it also, interestingly 
enough, illustrates an instance in which intentions, even in 
the context of success and failure in battle, are more impor- 
tant than results; 
2 for the Spartans, in this context at 
least, one's motives for bravery are more important than the 
mere outward appearance of one's actions. 
In contrast to Aristodemos the kind of conduct valued most 
by the Spartans is exemplified by Leonidas, who adheres 
rigidly to the precept that it is not fitting for Spartiates 
to retreat (ov'w cXIc ý-riý E1r 
'i 
$c Kip (., '%-" V -r4J 'rXjL /, 7.220.1 , 
ov gev. Xvs e)(atV, ibid. 2); as a result, he left great 
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kleos behind him. Aidos seems central to Spartan attitudes 
in this matter: at 7.104, however, Demaratos names quite 
another concept as the force which chiefly promotes the 
discipline for which the Spartans are renowned: 
kCvO4`Pfit. 
0'. 
c( E ovT%S ov 7ocvrA akFJAEC ei GºrL CýEOlt. 
ETl s va, vwS rsJ vTýuýC-ýýýýVýv(l 'i%ýilw / i4 
fL OC-rTorJ 
Md 
ý^GV al fal öE . 
T'Gt Evrt )r rVf ;d 
äJ' i K4tv&s avwý` 
oe JP 
AVh%u %(. ET wvýc OCt C-C !OjE wf 
' äv ýý wed EK'1 S' ýký irw V rOLs er ry roc c -rr h- oc rr c-i l 
a Zr'Aý 
In the particular sense, this nomos, which makes the Spartans 
the bravest of the Greeks, is that people's belief that any- 
thing other than complete commitment to bravery and overall 
victory is unacceptable; whether or not the Spartans had a 
statutory law which forbade cowardice or prescribed punish- 
ments for it, 
3 the requirement to be brave is one which they 
also enforced by a considerable degree of social pressure, 
and any nomos (law) which the Spartans had formulated 
against cowardice or indiscipline would only be one aspect 
of the nomos (custom or belief) that cowardice is disgrace- 
ful. 4 To this nomos, then, aidos might well be the response, 
and it is certainly clear from the passage quoted that the 
conduct dictated by nomos and that which might be said to be 
promoted by aidos are identical: nomos in this passage is to 
be referred in the first instance to the Spartans' martial 
code, to their system of values, and it is thus not surpri- 
sing that the requirements of this system should be recogni- 
zably those which aidos traditionally helps maintain, given 
that aidos is intimately concerned with the observance of 
prevalent codes of conduct, of the nomoi of one's society. 
Nomos has a wider significance here, however, in that it 
also refers to the general difference in political organiza- 
tion between Greeks, represented by the Spartans, and the 
Persians: the Greeks are free, and obey nomos, their own 
system of values, customs and laws, whereas the Persians 
obey their king (which is, in a somewhat different sense, 
their nomos). 
5 Study of the nom of different cultures is, 
of course, a major element in Herodotos' work: he recognizes 
that mo are relative to their country of origin, yet 
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stresses the pervasive influence of a people's nomoi upon 
its character. 
6 
Thus in the present passage the Spartans' 
fear of a nomos which is a particular belief of their commu- 
nity is related to the nomos of the Greeks as a whole that 
they. live in political communities and are subject only to 
compacts to which they subscribe as a-community, rather than 
6emaratos' 
remarks about the to the commands of the monarch 
% 
Spartans' fear of nomos are proved correct in the sequel, to 
which most of the examples of the Spartan attitude to cowar- 
dice quoted above belong, and thus it seems that the histo- 
rian is using the Spartans, and the basis of their bravery 
in their nomoi, as an illustration of how the bravery of the 
Greeks, rooted in their choice of political organization, 
proved superior to the Persians, whose deficiencies are like- 
wise rooted in their political system, their nomoi. The 
nomoi of a culture thus determine how its people will behave, 
and so in Herodotos' ideas of causality nomos plays an impor- 
tant part. 
7 
All this may seem to take us far from ads, but aidos is 
relevant to nom os in the sense that it is one's aidos which 
makes one susceptible to the values of one's society and to 
the judgement of one's fellows who subscribe to the same 
values. Aidos is also particularly relevant in a situation 
in which the particular standard is not a rule imposed on 
one by someone else but part of the agreed system of beliefs 
with which one grew up; thus aidos is important in the 
question of the extent to which a people nomoi produce 
bravery in battle, since aidos is likely in a warrior who is 
aware that he is fighting on behalf of his community and 
that his community abhors cowardice, but rather less likely 
in one who feels that he is fighting simply to maintain the 
privileges of another. 
Herodotos does, in fact, seem to contrive a contrast of this 
kind, for with the Spartans, who fight in fear of their col- 
lective nomos, he contrasts, in 7.104 and elsewhere, the 
Persians' simple fear of their king. Thus, at 8.86, the 
bravery of the Persians at Salamis is attributed not to fear 
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of disgrace but to a fear of Xerxes based on each individual's 
feeling that the king could see him. Similarly, at 7.107.1 
we learn that when Boges of Eion, a valued subject, was 





cIo f &t c- it t Ftvrl jtG Boges may value his 
own status in the eyes of others, but the opinion he values 
most is that of Xerxes, and while he may experience some 
aidos at the idea of cowardice, it is likely that he is 
chiefly motivated by fear of Xerxes' wrath. 
Thus even if it is only fear of unpleasant consequences 
which promotes bravery, the Greeks, in Herodotos' estimation, 
are likely to prove braver than their Asiatic counterparts, 
in that to the latter the calculation of whether theymay act 
without the king's knowledge will be important, whereas the 
citizen warrior will constantly be under the eyes of his 
fellow-citizens. This argument, however, should not be pres- 
sed to the extent of claiming that the Greeks differ from 
the Persians in that the latter do not subscribe to the nomos 
that cowardice is disgraceful, for at 1.136.1 we are told 
that for the Persians, as for the Greeks, the chief manifes- 
tation of an ragathie is "to be good at fighting. " Presumably, 
then, the Persians consider those who are not good at fight- 
ing not to be agathos, and the latter will feel aidos, or 
its Persian equivalent, at such a judgement. 
Thus while Herodotos obviously believes that the Greeks are 
braver than the Persians as a result of their nomoi, he shows 
an awareness that the latter might share the former's nomos 
with regard to cowardice. This awareness also emerges in 
passages like 8.16.2, where the resistance of the Persian 
fleet at Artemision to the impulse-to yield is explained as 
follows: (. v& / Y'Ce )(el 'º. c 6it'ýI. IV c vIt-o VýwJ o ktýtuJ rs uÖ'ýJJ 
7eot-eir0" . To be routed by a smaller number of ships would, 
it is felt, cast doubt upon the prowess and bravery of the 
fleet. Fear of the king's anger is not mentioned, but rather 
the sailors', own determination not to be shown inferior: 
this determination is articulated by the phrase t((, L\(üV ... 
(-r*L&vYTv , which seems analogous to the use of aischunomai 
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and aideomai with a noun clause at E. io. 509-14 and Hcld. 43- 
4 respectively. 
8 From 8.100.4 it further appears that Per- 
sians are concerned about their reputation for valour: Mar- 
donios attempts to console Xerxes, maintaining that the non- 
Persian contijgents of the army proved themselves kakoi, but 
that no stain of cowardice adhered to the Persians themsel- 
ves. It appears, then, that he imagines the king would be 
disturbed by the imputation of cowardice to his men, and-he 
implies 
that he, too, values the Persian reputation 
for bravery, in that he urges the king not to expose his own 
race to the mockery of the Greeks by abandoning the expedi- 
tion. He thus appeals to ideas of honour and reputation with 
which we have become familiar. According to Herodotos, -how- 
ever, his concern conceals his true motives, which are enti- 
rely related to his own position, rather than 
the honour of 
the Persians: he fears punishment for having recommended the 
expedition and feels it better to persevere in the subjuga- 
tion of the country or to die gloriously in the attempt 
(100.1). He is thus subject to a fear of his master which 
the historian regards as typical of the king's subjects. His 
remarks to Xerxes about the Persians' reputation, however, 
must have some validity in terms of Persian values (at least 
as Herodotos perceives them), or else their efficacy as an 
means-of persuasion would be minimal, while in Mardonios' 
desire to end his life KKk wS there may also be an element 
of concern for his own reputation. Concern for one's reputa- 
tion, then, does not seem to be foreign to the Persians as 
the historian saw them. 
8a 
The attitude that defeat, cowardice and indiscipline are 
disgraceful is, in fact, more or less universal in the his- 
torian's work: it is one he himself shares, as he reveals 
when he uses the adverb aischrös of the collapse of the Med- 
ian forces at 1.128.1 and of the poor showing of the Persians 
in battle at 6.45.2; at 9.17.4 the Phokian general, Harmoky- 
des, reflects the same traditional attitude in urging his 
men not to give themselves up to be killed . cºi 
rTv 
MA/L 
The Skythians, too, do not differ fundamentally from the 
Greeks in their view of cowardice: at 4.66 their nomos that 
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every man who has killed his foe in battle be invited to 
drink with the nomarch is recounted; those who have failed 
to kill their opponent, however, are not allowed to taste 
the wine, 
C )k)(' IjTýw vDL ýTiuKaTFaTa1 ' ýv, i(os J CO 
yrt, 
', tE irrcY icro . Failure in battle, then, entails diminution 
of time and attracts disapproval, just as in the Greek con- 
text. By contrast, the man who is able to provide concrete 
proof of his pre-eminence by attaching the greatest number 
of opponents' scalps to his bridle is considered aristos 
(64.4). The Skythians' practices may differ from the Greek, 
but the basic suppositions are the same. 
Of the Greeks it is, as we have seen, the Spartans who 
adhere most rigidly to traditional ideas of honour and shame 
in battle. At 9.48 Mardonios attempts to exploit this trait 
of-theirs as a means of undermining the cohesion of the Greek 
forces: addressing the Spartans directly, he refers to their 
reputation for bravery and implies that it is now in danger, 
construing the tactical manoeuvres of the Greek force as 
cowardice and pointing out that the Spartans are now statio- 
ned opposite the Persians' subject peoples. It seems, then, 
that he is aware of the intensity of the Spartans' sense of 
aidos, for clearly it is that sense that he attempts to 
arouse here. That this was an expedient which might have had 
some success is demonstrated by a subsequent episode, still 
in the context of the prelude to the battle of Plataia: at 
9.53 Pausanias and the other commanders advocate a strategic 








Eýfý pýcSE E Kº. iý Eiý, ýý 
WCxWEMI V I-1 
21rsce1 \( . Amompharetos' regard for his own 
honour and for that of his city leads him to disobey an 
order: this is clearly a demonstration of the inefficacy of 
aidos in certain circumstances, -and the situation only comes 
about as a result of that sense-of honour, that aidos, for 
which the Spartans are renowned. Amompharetos' aidos, we 
might say, leads him into anaideia, and the commanders' 
reaction to this anaideia is one of anger and indignation, 
conveyed in the phrase fctw: J lto'4 
tToýE'vto 
Tä -rrfL0E, (0, V1- 
Eketvov 6itt(. (53.3). 
9 
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A nomos which we have met before is that which demands that 
one should not tarnish the reputation of one's forefathers. 
In Herodotos it is Xerxes who appeals to this principle, at 
7.11.2: 
1t41 ýýe Eýýv 
Err Q, ýCEiýv Tv `I( 61tß I$ -rý 'fýý r«ý, E. S ... 
fiuýv ýýxtiýº fas rEr&sMJS /441 fiý^ I%J(I« os " ýºý. ý, ý... . And at 7.53.1: 
'O ýECreL 
, -rwv 
Eyre üýxºv x/hiSuJ cvvrX rfý, 
avO 
4$ 
aýac, duvs rýaýi ºýaýfxl t rx wvC-LJ TO -tces Bt 
-. (fit 4l /1l Np fIf C" 10 VT. C 'L YW 
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Something else we have met before is the idea that it is 
shameful for a man to be worsted by, or compared to a woman. 
10 
At 1.207.5 Kroisos tells Kyros that it is aischron for one 
of his (Kyros') status to, yield to a woman (in this case 
Tomyris, queen of the Massagetai), while in two passages of 
book 2 it is the comparison with women as a sign of unmanli- 
ness which is important. AtI. 102.4 (cf. 106.2) we hear of the 
practice of the pharaoh Sesostris, who honoured vanquished 
opponents who fought bravely, but sought to humiliate those 
he considered to be cowards: 
DD OTfAN 
rE 
oýcµic ýit k4 C-VTMTEws 7C &X4 TDCS ^fLoýLI$ TovTýýöl 
OE 
IVAyeE iV 
ýrvýdL ork1X& or k#' (( 'raýT. l KOC 7"«L 
ÄV/IL&L6L 
I'& e OV-6--WV ýbvu, ýt, 
ývu « Kwi S11' Kiü 'cJ 
[. r vvpwrös - r' 
orEv- 
ere, c. }4: -TroL-lv 
'$ 
Eil i äv: AkL. J'-$(102.5) . 
Since these a'do 
i1 
appear to be the result of a misinter- 
pretation of Egyptian hieroglyphs, 
12 it seems that either 
Herodotos himself is the source of the mistake (at 106.2 he 
says he has seen stelai inscribed with these aidoia in Pal- 
estine), having applied a rationalization which seemed pro- 
bable to him to signs which otherwise were puzzling, or else 
he has heard a story about Sesostris' humiliation of his 
enemies from some or other of his sources. 
Similarly, at 7.11.1 Xerxes, angry at Artabanos' opposition 
to the proposed campaign against Greece, threatens to humi- 
liate his uncle by leaving him behind among the women, 
adding, as he says, atimie to his cowardice and lack of 
spirit: 
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KIýý 'fGl Tpc. vTýd Týý/ PcilMýviý/ Ali UYtlV1/ l. OVTL WXKW 
k. 
TE R rvr7(o, -TIV&iVCL 
C1vwLfC- dirt 
TpI 
`t Xk a ýK awrGV t E- vNLV ar. oc i vý -t c. 
At 8.93.2 it is the Athenians who are concerned lest they 
appear inferior to a woman. At Salamis, we are told, they 
were particularly anxious to capture Artemisia alive -c wv*4 
Yat Ti. CIE-ocküvrv Yvvaikoc_c-trc räs 'ýýýIý"S (rr? ATCJ* d"t. once 
more the phrase 6. LV' -rAtZO'' seems to place the occurrence IF4 
designated deinon in the category of the shameful. 
13 At 
9.107.1 it is to Persian values that we return: Masistes up- 
braids the general Artayntes for his conduct in an engagement 
with the Greeks, calling him, among other things, "worse than 
a woman"; this, we are told, is the greatest reproach (1', 5) 
possible among the Persians. Artayntes is far from pleased 
(107.2) :o SE L''r4i -rr-4k)c; ý K&vrt 1 





öc'rrok i jjl 0& He thus clearly resents 
the slur on his honour, and this resentment is expressed as 
(6t. 
' "rºct 6 'i ta, i . This phrase, then, seems 
to refer both to 
the recognition that a given occurrence may damage one's 
honour and to the resentment produced by this recognition; 
thus it appears to express ideas which Homer might have exp- 
ressed through aidos and nemesis. In this passage Herodotos 
mentions only that the Persians consider it the greatest of 
insults to be compared unfavourably to a woman, but from the 
other passages quoted it emerges that several other races, 
including his own, are susceptible to concern for the damage 
such a comparison may do to their time. 
14 
Concern for time, or the desire to save face is also evident 
in two passages in book 9, in which a number of cities are 
represented as shamed into action by the example of others. 
At 9.85.3, on the subject of the burial mounds of those who 
died at Plataia, Herodotos expresses the opinion that many 
of these are not genuine: 
-fwV eft 
ä'ScAwJ o r&ý K. ci 
4 wývovtwc EV 
ýSx-i 
iý.. e'öv s 
i <. 
4 
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Here we have an example of aischunomai with a causal dative 
similar to those found in Euripides, 
15 
and again the refer- 
ence is to fear of criticism in the future based on recogni- 
tion of shortcomngs in the past. 9.19.1 seems similar: there 
the-Spartans advance to the Isthmus, and the other cities of 
the Peloponnese, some out of principle, others because they 
actually witnessed the Spartans' advance, oü wt 
St P<xt (r9V 
ýc irEýf}Rý -rºýS eoýaý Since the historian goes to the trouble 
of mentioning that some cities were only motivated to do 
what he regards as their duty by the sight of the Spartan 
advance, it seems certain that we are to regard these cities 
as concerned to avoid unfavourable comparison with others. 
It is significant, however, that he does not regard this as 
the only possible-reaction. 
Elsewhere the desire to save face is described in terms of 
semnotes, which, as in Euripides, seems to come close to the 
sense of aidos while retaining a pejorative connotation which 
suggests that the desire to keep up appearances is slightly 
misplaced. 
16 At 1.95.1 the historian declares his intention 
to follow the accounts of those Persians who wish to tell 
the truth, rather than Cýv. vövV i -rcqi klV'rv, , while at 3.16. 
7 he rejects Egyptian stories that the body of Amasis escaped 
mutilation at the hands of Kambyses as mere semnotes - 
Ri ý-tv vvI 
ew ri's A oLf«S evrý)ºaý ac, ýTocý oc1 e5 Tr1J 
µrý 
[d 
Kt, Ijr . T oC 1/ TE Käc rd O1v 
E}C &T off/ 
jý 
ýVr ( NO 
i 
oaey 
A good example of how an individual may experience aidos at 
the imputation of cowardice, regardless of his own knowledge 
of the facts, is provided by the complaint of Kroisos' son 
at 1.37.2-3, even though the word aidos does not actually 
occur. Kroisos, following a dream which warned that his son, 
Atys, "would be killed by a spear, sought to protect him by 
removing all weapons from the house and keeping him indoors. 
The speech is informative, and worth quoting in full: 
TO t .1 0' %/ IT( cTEe Ta ; eOLXXt ftoC -rr(--r'-ec' kroT: ' revvots ron< 
ýt tV ý/ es TE 'Trc) ipvs º<oc E-S Y6 "5 '1 
at, rE-OVToýs 
Eti"SOKLV%*4 I. Výl 
ýýýrTtewýl 
, wt TvvfWýi 
ä'iTOKý1ýJLlýS 
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4XEis uv rLVA S tt V Zu. l -rt"aet 
Swv a, ir- of 
VvV re rf-a<<i nn f1 
ý ps3Lrt CS 
rF er'IV IC M 
otTE-Gvroc atVE(LK. t ý k0ý #$ nt, EV TES TU It 
"f1't1iCttlTºýrl 
rd 
w El Vacl KGlvs Cf-f TLS Tº"C VE(Jý(o, µW 
ýýýxr KGt w JE C, KPLVI DVCS L rvv6U(k-&&LJ; 
e/" wv rüg q /K4+0"5 ) E'V t4 7r. -rlr V ºý(Jv, 
a ýaý'1T"EtöGV G Fý ws l eý M. l: lva) 
Ertl 
TeWTaC a0 
Tt, 1 '71 vLFÜMEv 
. 
The youth's first worry is that he is being excluded from 
those activities through which a young nobleman may win es- 
teem, and he claims that, although he is neither deilos nor 
athumos, he is being treated as though he were. Thus he is 
concerned lest others, observing his treatment, assume that 
it is deserved. Several aspects common in contexts in which 
aidos is found reveal that Atys is experiencing that emotion 
here: words of seeming, mention of the eyes of others and 
concern for their opinions all indicate aids. His concern 
for the opinion his wife will have of him, moreover, indi- 
cajes a fear that she, because of the community of honour 
within the family, will come to beh 
AMad 
of her husband, as 
happens in the case of Helen in Iliad 6.17 
It is well known that Herodotos' partiality towards certain 
states and bias against others sometimes influence his judge- 
ment. At 1.143.2-3 he launches into a particularly scathing 
attack on the Ionians, claiming that they are so weak that 
the majority are actually ashamed of the name - 
äkk. 
c Wxt vcv 
OC1_V6VrKL /4141 Ol 1I O)/\of O, V1-r E'ifoCl( V i'&A. T6. J OvvroTt, 
Entire cities, then, may experience aischuu at the associ- 
ation with a name which is a byword for weakness. 
We have already noted something of the relevance of the 
phrase "ýýýý"ý T. 'aý Eý 6Baý to our enquiry., Ttg _ _. 
usage seems 
broadly to fall into two categories: firstly, as in 8.16.2 
and 8.93.2 the words may refer to the prospect of disgrace 
or loss of face as a likely result of the action or situation 
which those involved seek to avoid or prevent. In this sense, 
as we noted, the phrase behaves as do aischunesthai and 
aideisthai when used with a noun clause. 19 Thus to consider 
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a situation deinon may be equivalent to considering it 
a schron. 
20 The other sense is closely related, b%tsomewhat 
different nonetheless. At 9.53.3 and 107.221 the phrase 
describes a feeling of anger and resentment, in the one case 
at disobedience, in the other at insults: there is still a 
reference to the effect of the action considered deinon on 
one's own time, but this is combined with a sense that the 
other party involved should have taken account of that time, 
and thus in this application the phrase seems to cover the 
idea of justified indignation conveyed in Homer by nemesao 
etc.. 
22 Thus it is possible that 
(t-LvGJ 
'TiuL FAfOau may desc- 
ribe the reaction to another's anaideia. 
23 
In the second of these applications in particular eýC-CVu1d 
-TrLcLE-Cö&wt etc. play an important role in a pattern of moti- 
vation which is central to the historian's idea of causation, 
in that he frequently explains the motivation of his subjects 
in terms of their concern for their time, their resentment 
of insults, their desire to humiliate their enemies and their 
thirst for revenge. The idea of revenge, in fact, permeates 
the work24 and, as the greatest single factor of causation, 
has the effect of linking episodes and imposing form. 
I^ 
The connexion between (ß. v9, -1 ToLELedý and time is clearly 
shown at 5.42.2, where the reaction of Dorieus to the acces- 
sion to the Spartan throne of his half-brother, Kleomenes, 
is decribed: 
pQ We lFýs cýýrcvýJ rF Ttýl Evýrýaj Kotet výK or ic-: 
V 'ir 
^XL, -,, e /ýarýý Eý(ýwlý Da/rýjr'xs 
X 
1v LTaJýrýýlres 
ýrF FS äirotº. 
nýV 
Dorieus feels himself wronged and is angry, believing that 
he has been treated in a way which has undermined his status, 
and decides to have no more to do with those who have wronged 
him. In a similar context later in the same book it is Kleo- 
menes who feels himself insulted, and, interpreting the 
insult as hybris, he decides to take revenge (74.1): 
101 ka f aMývºý Cr 
r 
1rt 1o OJ -rCt-e L V/( if O Ck 
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TFL(arLl T OLA- C OL-i1wV.... 
Thus it appears that, as in Homer, 
25 
the aggrieved party, at 
any rate, may regard an insult to his time, which might other- 
432 
wise be seen as anaideia, as hybris. 
At 7.9.2, where Mardonios tells Xerxes that it would be a 
cScývýv -rtýýYýK if the Persians should fail to punish the 
Athenians for the wrongs they have inflicted upon them, 
deinon seems to be used euphemistically for aischron: for 
the king to fail to subdue a people who once attacked his 
kingdom, when he has enslaved nations who have done him no 
harm whatsoever, would, Mardonios suggests, be a sign of 
weakness. He is thus urging on his king both resentment of a 
wrong and fear of future humiliation, attempting, in short, 
to arouse his aidos. Xerxes answers this point at 11.4, and 
reveals that for him, too, it is a matter of honour that the 
Athenians and the rest should be punished (it is ka o to 
take revenge, he says, and he, too, stresses the inferiority 
of the Greeks). 
26 
At 9.33.5 the indignation of the 
is their reaction to the attempt 
Teisamenos) to infringe on their 
the privilege of Spartan citizen 
vices. Again, concern for status 
tion. 
Spartiates (dc-Lvö «'oLc-üvro 
of ari-outsider (the seer, 
prerogatives, by demanding 
ship in return for his ser- 
is prominent in their reac- 
In several other passages in which the motive of revenge is 
paramount so, too, are the terms with which we are concerned. 
A göod example is the story of Kandaules' wife in book I. 
After the episode in the bedchamber, 
27 the wife, aware that 
she has been seen by Gyges 1 is understandably upset: 
tiAIoI(dovfoý 
it 
-r oev e4,3 c -e 
ävr3WCE 
Ki r; K( -'ca( ov fe 
ffOf 
e EV vo ' 
4E 
VvöP, 
'rfýr"oýýIýýct rW Iýa, ýakE"c (1.10.2). 
To put the depth of the woman's shame into perspective, 
Herodotos adds (10.3) : TCa e ". Y sC -r& .A VfoZ(t ... Kcci 0 -14r oý 
ö 0ºýVort Y VýwW 
& arrx VVI V' k 'LXýJ 
{ ýFc. The Lydians' shame 
with regard to nakedness, he suggests, is more intense than 
that of the Greeks, since they consider it disgraceful even- 
for a man to be seen naked (a fortiori a woman's shame in 
such a situation would be even more intense than in the 
433 
Greek context: this does not mean, however, that a Greek 
woman would experience no shame in similar circumstances). 
At this stage, however, it is not shame with regard to naked- 
ness which concerns but the way in which Kandaules' wife, 
having been disgraced, resolves to take revenge, a revenge 
which has a momentous influence on the history of the Lydian 
nation. 
28 
At 1.73.4-5 insult again calls forth retribution. Kyaxares 
casts aspersions on the hunting prowess of the Skythians who 
had arrived as suppliants at his court, and this implicates 
them in disgrace (aeikeie, 73.4). The Skythians, in turn, 




-REývVýurEs. 73.5) and plan a Thyestean banquet for their 
erstwhile protector. 
The story of the discovery of Kyros' royalty in the same 
book is similar. Kyros, brought up as the son of a herdsman, 
beats the son of a nobleman while playing "kings"; the boy's 
father complains to the king, Astyages, who decides to punish 
Kyros. There are several important points here: firstly, the 
resentment of the son of Artembares is described in terms of 
status - Y&- 
ä /D t'c E wvröV -rrtG 
Pn/ (1 .1 14.4) ; next, Artem- 
bares regards Kyros' conduct as hybris (iv(, et*( 
i 
ItiFRx., 
114.5), not only against his son, but also against himself; 
finally, Astyages is moved to grant Artembares' request that 
Kyros be punished out of regard for his subject's time (3c' wV 61 
T IVIIIAWeI ilGt TiýJ 'JCsttÖl TLµt1s Tý1 S 
'ACtEýnýýt/iýetvhKlý 1 15.1) . 
Time is, then, central to the whole episode: Kyros, it is 
believed, has acted without proper regard for a superior's 
time, an affront suffered by the son reflects badly on the 
father, and it is seen as imperative that the aggrieved 
party be restored to his proper position. There is also a 
strong case for regarding Kyros' conduct as anaideia, at 
least from the point of view of Artembares and Astyages, 
given that aidos recognizes the status of another person, 
and that it is with failure to accord another the time he 
deserves that he is charged. In his interrogation of Kyros 
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Astyages continues to see the gravity of the offence as 
rooted in the gulf in status between the boys' fathers 
(1 15.2) :v wJ tr; crteGovr, ov e' ev res -rr T5c -ro kp 1 c. 
T' c, v re vd&-r'at. SaeOv, 03 -r- wrz v -r[. xe C. k4L a4Lk -c y -tiL h dc- -mac-eWT&- v; 
For the son of a herdsman to assault the son of the king's 
most valued counsellor requires tm (and daring is a fre- 
quent concomitant of anaideia) and involves the superior 
party in aeikeie. The situation is thus disgraceful for the 
patient of the affront, but there is also a strong implica- 
tion that the commission of the affront is also disgraceful 
for its agent. 
That it is correct to see anaideia in this last passage is 
suggested by a similar episode in which the term does actu- 
ally occur. At 7.39 Pythios the Lydian, encouraged by Xerxes' 
favourable treatment, ventures to request that his eldest- 
son be excused military service. Xerxes is outraged, and ex- 
claims (39.1): 
Y Koc Kta ee rýI9[ E(ü 
Vc 
Ta k/Mit ! ýS 
1 
Aý4u ör PX -V OýtýlN & 
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Again, the "goingOtoo far" is described as tolma, 
29 
and 
again the status of those involved is the main consideration. 
Xerxes goes on (39.2): 
T& /V V VV ý( / ö'rol -tCo r. K tZ-/oý -Mc oß)1, ( CT - 
'r >'(-0 EvE/Y(. ý-rýyrt Axer c&# au K, cvx1r&-oil 
"'ri'te 
(U 
GE C-S ?i 
ä'(4j, 6n0F&J 
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The king, then, regards a presumptuous request from an infe- 
rior as anaideia and sees punishment for the insult to his 
own honour which such aideia implies as imperative: 
30 just 
as the king returned favours with greater kindnesses, so he 
will now, magnanimously, requite Pythios' anaideia with less 
than it deserves. Behind this explanation of the conduct of 
the oriental despot, then, lie the familiar Greek notions of 
charis and "helping one's friends and harming one's enemies. " 
435 
It is, in fact, a fundamental part of Xerxes' attitude that 
others should be thinking of his status and his power. At 7. 
210.1, for example, he regards it as anaideia that the 
Spartans at Thermopylae do not retreat at the sight of his 
01 
superior forces: c, ý5 ý. º K ä-tr, c. kk x «ovro 
ä kk oc &L 
t PLLV oVTÖ 
avwusýý Tý Kit aýzwýt j 
SLK)CCýwý, tVOL For Xerxes, it 
L is anaideia for the weak to presume to oppose the strong, 
and evidently he expects aidos even from enemies in time of 
war. 
The sequence insult-resentment-revenge is a pervasive one in 
Herodotos. 31 Essentially a story-teller's technique, it 
provides a thread which can link several different narratives. 
The Kyros episode recounted above, for example, leads to the 
discovery of the boy's royal birth, which causes Astyages to 
punish Harpagos for disobedience, which Harpagos in turn sees 
as an insult and which ultimately leads him to avenge himself 
on Astyages by helping Kyros gain the throne. Similar pat- 
terns abound in the work, 
32 
and all rely on the one essential 
notion that insults to one's time will be resented and lead 
to retaliation. This may well have been a feature of all the 
different societies in which Herodotos portrays its occurrence, 
but, more importantly, it articu]ates his history in terms of 
a motivation which the ordinary Greek would readily under- 
stand. 
Several passages present the concern for onels own time in 
straightforward terms. At 3.65.5. Kambyses, son of Kyros, 
explains to the Persian nobles how he has suffered aischra 
at the hands of the two Magoi usurpers. He regards it as 
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Two passages reveals the use 
(of 
an appeal to aidos (based on 
concern for one's own status) as a means of persuasion. At 
3.134 Atossa attempts to persuade Dareios to mount an exped- 
ition against Greece, appealing essentially to his a' s 
with regard to his reputation for manliness J134.2): oL I<oS S-E 
C rri «vSeic Koci y( tcg%. Xeºý 'Jý. teXeýkýn/ If"_rvrIJ s. 
Lvt-r6at rc 
äKº. 
ývv of tVoý. ISM tc r fou df k-" Ow'L 
&rt 
VV 
äVS, 003 . 
ýeýx 
mal, rý e 
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In the thinly veiled threat that Dareios' subjects will con- 
sider him less than a man if he fails to carry out some 
daring exploit his wife is clearly seeking to arouse his 
aidos. The need to impress his subjects, then, might be one 
consideration which could provoke aidos in the oriental 
monarch. 
At 5.49.2 Aristagoras of Miletos requests Spartan support 
for the revolt of the Ionians. His appeal takes the form of 
a figurative supplication (he does not attempt full ritual 
contact until 51.1, after Kleomenes has rejected his plea), 
and several common suppliant motifs occur, including the 
argument from the supplicated's own reputation, here expres- 
sed as follows: 
w 
VW ICM tS 
` 
K3 vVXGvs EtVptl eck C ltEJýL-ýOWV tiv, ý, US i<4 
A 0- " ö'S /''', WLrrz. l &A. w , c,,; rü r1 44 
E. r ý4ý -rwv heir V výLd 
o (w Te oý ýfaýrý Tvý S C\ sG 
Aristagoras states frankly that the situation of the Ionians 
is aischron for themselves, and attempts to extend this idea 
to include the Spartans, on the grounds that they are the 
champions of Greece, and as such must act to defend those 
tinder their protection, both because it is felt to be right 
that Greek should help Greek, and because any failure to act 
might give rise to doubts about the Spartans' claim to pre- 
eminence. 
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The passages discussed so far have dealt mainly with the 
values of males, and with their striving to avoid diminution 
of their status. Herodotos is also, however, particularly 
interested in the conduct of women in different cultures, 
and in the extent to which the sexual mores of other socie- 
ties coincide with or differ from those of the Greeks. 
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The 
concept of aidos is important in this area, too, since aidos 
is a characteristic element in the Greek attitude to sex and 
sexuality on which the historian must inevitably base his 
study of the values of other peoples. 
At 1.5.2 the Phoenician version of the abduction of Io is 
given, an account which denies that she was abducted at all: 
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ETCE-t U4 etV-e h(V03 E cVl^ ) ac1 L( 4) I-V -rVJS 7LKt aS ) 
OüYrJ' C/ 
ý'Eýe>. ovTý pcý+ rýJýrzýrý 
/! 
it v< <Vý/FKir)c&Irýlý 
Io, then, fears exposure and the disapproval of her parents: 
the participle, KiýFO. ý , perhaps combines the idea of con- 
cern for those who witness one's actions and that of respect 
for those who have a right to it, but both these senses are 
Homeric, and there is nothing new or unusual in this passage 
(pace von Erffa, 181-2). 
Following the stories of the abduction of women with which 
the histories begin there comes the story of Kandaules' wife, 
to which we have already referred. 
35 Gyges is horrified by 
Kandaules' suggestion that he should contrive to see the 
queen naked (he calls it "unhealthy", 1.8.3, and "unlawful", 
8.4), and explains his horror by means of a gnome (8.3): 
1c/1"x 
A kLGwVt IKauaýueVw QvV&V 
U&ru. 6-0ý- i4 oc, ýýw Yuv4 . The 
gnome, however, seems scarcely to fit well in this context. 
Taken in its most obvious sense it would refer to the atti- 
tude of the woman herself, namely that the removal of her 
clothes entails the removal of her sense of restraint and 
modesty. That this is the most obvious interpretation of the 
words is shown by the objection of Plutarch (coniua. praec. 
139b) : 
36 oüF! lC6ws `ý'ieoýoTýs V 
ärL I yvvl 
äctu 
-rQ xrTi? VL 
E KdVETOA KIýt Ttiýý oN dW TUVdwKI ýA/ i. fW}eb1iý 
äv7EvcSV! 'ra. ý 
. r& v' rat 
Z- Plutarch, then, objects to the implication about 
the nature of women in the historian's gnome, and replaces 
Herodotos' assumption with a more optimistic one. 
In their most natural sense, however, the words do not seem 
to bear any very precise reference to the particular situ- 
ation: Kandaules' wife is to have no knowledge of Gyges' 
presence, and there is no reason to suppose that she will 
conduct herself immodestly once she has removed her clothes. 
In attempting to reconcile the gnome to its context, von 
Erffa37 holds that aidos is not the subjective sense of shame 
in this passage, but rather the quality in a person which 
commands the ads of others ("die unbekleidete Frau ist 
nicht mehr a do'e"). There are some precedents for the use 
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of aidos in this sense, 
38 but, except when it is used as an 
equivalent of aidoia, aidos as a quality usually presupposes 
that the individual who possesses it is capable of manifest- 
ing aidos as a response to others, while the interpretation 
of the words by Plutarch shows that the sense demanded by 
von Erffa is not one which would occur immediately to a 
native speaker of Greek. The presence of the article, more- 
.i -ryV «., 
9w 
suggests that the a dos in over, in fvvaddv4-r. " K^4% 
question is the woman's own, not her claim to that of others. 
To me, then, it seems most likely that Gyges' words have no 
precise reference to the conduct he expects of Kandaules' 
wife39but simply represent a general reason, based on the 
typical Greek view of the appetite of women for sex, and 
spoken "man to man", for his reluctance to see the woman 
naked: it is right, he implies, that women should manifest 
aidos, but his master's suggestion will force him to place 
himself in a position from which he will see his mistress 
without her customary sense of aidos. 
Herodotos is generally extremely reluctant to pass adverse 
comment on non-Greek custom, even when it contrasts sharply 
with Greek attitudes, yet at 1.199.1 he describes the prac- 
tice of ritual prostitution among the Babylonians as 
aischistos, even though other, and, in Greek eyes, equally 
reprehensible customs of both Babylonians and other peoples 
escape censure entirely. 
40 Aischistos here seems simply to 
express the historian's revulsion for a practice which he 
regards as unseemly and inappropriate. 
No censure accompanies the story of the Pharaoh Mykerinos' 
rape of his own daughter at 2.131.1, but we might imagine 
that some feeling of shame must have provoked the girl's 
subsequent suicide. The extent of a Persian woman's sensiti- 
vity about sexuality is revealed at 3.133.1, where Dareios' 
wife, Atossa, conceals an abcess in her breast out of shame 
(Kývrrrrvr c K. ýi ., . $JVup'v1 i 
ft i(f 66 (VL the reason for 
which would seem to lie simply in the fact that the part of 
the body affected is one normally concealed from others in 
accordance with proper behaviour as regards sex. This atti- 
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tude, that perfectly straightforward afflictions of certain 
parts of a woman's body are somehow shameful, persists even 
to this day. 
41 
That a woman acquires time and manifests arete in proportion 
to her devotion to her husband is a proposition which might 
be supported by any number of passages from Greek literature: 
if, however, a man were to have several wives the pursuit of 
feminine arete might take on a rather different form. This 
is the case among the Krestonaians, a Skythian tribe whose 
marital nomoi are described at 5.5. On the death of the hus- 
band his wives vie for the honour of being considered his 
favourite. Their arete, then, is competitive in2way which 
would not be possible for a woman in any monogamous society. 
In the case of this tribe formal competition actually takes 
place, and a winner (j'TLS -e-v&w/ . 
01 Ir dee ýEETO ýnýiýýQfK 
vir TW 
ävi(Cos) is chosen. She is then honoured and praised (-nýM78h 
as is appropriate for one judged ariste of a 
particular group, and killed over her husband's grave. The 
rest take their defeat badly - wt ire' 
ä mat 6v +týV /-U(salý 
11'aL Fvvtac .ö 
v"Cos 
Yne ti L -rvvre rt-rr' ys-r. K . Within the 
reduced scope of their existence, then, these women compete 
to win praise and avoid disgrace just as men do: the arbiter 
of success and failure is public opinion, manifested in the 
praise of the successful wife and in the oneidos which awaits 
those who fail. 
The terms with which we are concerned frequently occur in 
contexts of philia, or where a debt of charis is owed bet- 
ween two parties. This is also the case in Herodotos, 
although instances are relatively scarce. Behind Kroisos' 
indignant questioning of the Delphic oracle lies the assump- 
tion that it is aischron to betray a benefactor. Kroisos in- 
structs his messenger to ask the god EL VI IL C'Trx%fAvVtf*A_ 1'061L 
ý: eeircJ crýwrartBeý, ý 
e-ir ýT'rýý, ý 
C 
ýnwvTýýýýr 





ýývýººý... (1-90-4). There may also 
be an implication here that it is discreditable to deceive 
Per se, but deceit is more discreditable when it denies the 
truth to someone who deserves it on account of the oblig- 
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ation to show gratitude (Kroisos' sense 
related to his dedications at Delphi at 
reply (91) denies deceit and points out 
factions were, in fact, returned, which 
firm that deceit and betrayal of a phil 
grounds for aischune. 
of grievance is 
90.3). -The god's 
that Kroisos' bene- 
only serves to con- 
Ds would constitute 
The idea that a benefactor deserves aidos is given clear ex- 
pression at 3.140.2, where Syloson, a Greek who once lent 
Dareios his cloak, comes, on hearing of the latter's acces- 
sion to the throne, -" to Susa to claim his reward. 
Dareios subscribes to the belief that benefactors deserve 
aidos, but is astonished that one should present himself so 
early in his reign -K r'S 
e (rt- ` EkkýjvwJ (0,4C 
%%IV, 
r1S Tw c-ýw 
-Tre 0 ac t 
ý4ýýwý V*WI TL 1 -rp J Acl; ( eXwi; We have not met the com- 
pound proaideisthai before, and, indeed, it is only found 
here and in one other Herodotean passage. The significance 
of the prefix might lie in the use of the verb, here and at 
1.61.3 (Peisistratos and his sons 
l 
y-cyoJ 




(fL WC OsL6 
&OCIb 
k c) rL ) to denote the repayment 
of aidos for aidos shown in the past: in both these passages 
the verb might be translated, "owe a debt of gratitude", but 
its precise sense is difficult to pin down. 
In Homer, not only those Who were philoi, but also those who 
could be described as deinoi were felt to aidos, and 
aideisthai could be used of the response to those of greater 
power and status than oneself. We have seen that in tragedy 
sebein etc. have become the more common verbs in this con- 
-text, but in Herodotos the Homeric usage reasserts itself. 
At 3.72.3 the Persian conspirators against (as Herodotos 
presents it) the Magus who has seized the throne discuss the 
manner in which they should gain entry to the palace. Dareios 
claims that they will have no difficulty in marching straight 
in, explaining that the guards will not stand in their way, 
partly out of aidos and partly out of 
fear (&Lýºý, c, 
C'v'wJ) 
. Dareios, then, expects aidos and deos from 
the guards on the grounds of the status (t övTwj Tut, wv('E ) of 
himself and his fellows. As in Homer, then, the association 
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of aidos with fear of one's superiors is made, and deinotes 
is re-established as a ground for aidos. Dareios, moreover, 
is proved correct, for at 77.1 the guards let the conspir-01 
ators pass, kcr. r. ý SEÜýsýcL ... 
Jvý6, cs -rv %/3 Tl'te6-ý. wJ 'tTwruvs. 
Gaining access to the Persian king was, even in normal circ- 
umstances, no easy matter. That this should be the case was, 
according to Herodotos, the work of Deiokes, king of the 
Medes, who was the first to stipulate that no one should 
enter the king's presence, but that all business should ins- 
tead be carried out by means of messengers, that the king 
should be seen by no one, and also that it should be aischron 
for anyone to laugh or spit in the king's presence (1.99.1). 
This obviously has the effect of increasing the mystery of 
the monarch, and, in increasing the gulf between the king 
and his subjects, may also make it more likely that the lat- 
ter will regard the former with aidos. Given that one does 
feel aidos for one of such superior and awe-inspiring status, 
it is entirely likely that one will consider it aischron to 
laugh or spit in his presence, since to do so would incur 
the disapproval of the king and all those who held him in 
reverence and require a considerable degree of boldness in 
ignoring propriety. This is probably what Herodotos means 
here: no doubt by his own time it was considered aischron to 
behave indecorously in the king's presence, but no one man, 
regardless of his power, could make it so by his own fiat. 
Deiokes may have forbidden these acts, and they may gradual- 
ly, or even quite quickly, have come to be considered 
aischron, but even Deiokes could not have said "x and y are 
aischron" with any hope of convincing anyone if a majority 
of those concerned did not already believe so. 
Given that ads is the response to the powerful in these 
passages, it seems important to notice that sebein etc. are 
not generally used of powerful mortals in the 
histories. We are told at 1.66.1 that the Spartans ýFýevfýrt 
a temple of Lykourgos built after his death, but this in it- 
self suggests only that they regard him as a god (the oracle 
quoted immediately before left the question of his divinity 
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open). Elsewhere sebein, eusebes etc. are used exclusively 
of mortal attitudes to the divine, 
42 
although at 7.115.3 we 
do find that the Thracians r*f vr. c4. YK)ws the road built 
by Xerxes on his march to Greece; even here, however, there 
is a religious connotation, and it seems that the people 
concerned believe that Xerxes' prodigious feat of engineering 
is somehow divine. 
Aidos is also present in its traditional guise as that which 
inhibits conduct which is generally felt excessive or inap- 
propriate, and Hippokleides' unorthodox gesticulations during 
the banquet at the court of Kleisthenes of Sikyon are const- 
rued by the latter as anaideia at 6.129.4. The notion of 
aischrokerdeia also appeals fundamentally to the same regard 
for moderation and propriety, and at 1.187.5 the adjective 
aischrokerdes is used of one who would desecrate a grave in 
the pursuit of wealth. 
There are also several instances of aischros in its root 
meaning, "ugly": 1.196.2,4.144.2,6.61.2. The outward appear- 
ance of actions felt to be distasteful is also the main point 
of the adjective at 2.35.3 (Tý alryv of practices which 
should not be performed in public), 2.162.6 ( ocn'r)(ewS of the 
terrible mutilation of Patarbemis), 3.155.3 (Zopyros' self- 
mutilation an eCýav #ii. rrod ) and 4.184.2 ("T. 
rx ra of-J W4e 
iýýýýUýtovToc, ý - probably of obscene language). Appearances 
and appropriateness are also important at 7.13.2, where Xer- 
xes apologizes for his earlier outburst against his uncle, 
Artabanos: ºý vecr15 
fire 
Er t-, he explains, 
wort ä4tºýErfL '( 
f Sr ocTýaDeýt, ýwý 
llr&*K Ej KveK 'RIElý3"rrt/ýJ ºeegfireK here 
refers to a standard of appropriateness in the treatment of 
the old, a category of people commonly felt to deserve aidos. 
As represented by the historian, Xerxes reveals his awareness 
that this standard obtains in his society, and repents of 
his past conduct. This, too, may be aidos, and we should 
notice that Xerxes' repentance is based on his own sense of 
what is right (pý EýºtE6rýý K ... 
i Xe ýýJ) . Herodotos is thus 
able to use traditional language to express the ideas of the 
desire to do what is right, regardless of'other people; and of 
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regret over one's own conduct in an unselfconscious manner 
which suggests that such ideas are commonplaces of everyday 
idiom. 
The tragedians furnish ample evidence of the belief that it 
is aischron to tell lies, 
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and Herodotos provides further 
examples, but in his case the data refer to barbarian, rather 
than Greek society. At 1.138.1 he informs us that lying is 
onsidered aischiston among the Persians, while owing money 
is almost as bad, especially in that it usually compels the 
debtor to tell a lie. At 1.117.2 Harpagos, on being questio- 
ned by Astvages, av TC F'cr o-Toct cTd 4 EvcýEýC a öoýý c vý E: IFYx "S 
öc &s. 
(v4r. u.. Lying always risks elenchos, exposure, which is 
embarrassing and which reveals the agent's anaideia in saying 
something he knows to be untrue. 
Herodotos' assertion that telling lies is aischiston among 
the Persians does, however, appear a little strange when one 
compares his statement at 136.1 that andragathie for that 
race consists firstly in being good at fighting and secondly 
in having a lot of sons. Either we are to believe that 
andragathie is not the most desired goal of the Persians, or, 
if it is, that that which is aischiston for them is not the 
opposite of that which is kalliston: perhaps Herodotos has 
got it wrong, or perhaps the values of a real society defy 
such systematic classification, but possibly the most impor- 
tant aspect of this section of the work for our purposes is 
the obvious fact that Herodotos does not automatically 
equate the kalon/aischron standard with the agathos/kakos 
standard: according to him the Persians'most desired goal is 
competitive success, but their greatest disgrace is a co- 
operative failure. If this answers at all closely to what 
the Persians actually believed or what they told Herodotos 
they believed, then it is a sign that real societies do not 
classify their own values in any systematic or exclusive way. 
Supplication does occur in Herodotos (1.159,5.51), but only 
once is aideisthai used in that context: at 7.141.2 the 
Athenians, urged to approach the god as suppliants in order 
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to obtain a more favourable prophecy, beg Apollo, 0 voc, l 
xe <<J º, ýiýKt -v 
Vn 
-tt ECL r' TT46 eý 90S , a. 
ý ýE f Eis 
ºtE-T jC L. cs Txr6E Ir-«A -roe IK u/ýý + E(&vrts . 
There is, however, one further area in which aidos is of 
considerable importance. For the Greek states who take part 
in the resistance to the Persian invasion it is kalon to 
resist, aischron to Medize, and aidos has its röle to play 
in promoting the first and preventing the second. At 7.152.3, 
for example, where the question of Argive medism is raised, 
co-operation with the Persians is described unequivocally by 
the historian himself as aischista 
Tr_MOi1r"). The fullest statement of this commitment to 
united Hellenic resistance in terms of honour, however, 
comes at 9.7a. 2, where the Athenians explain why, in spite 
of betrayal by other Hellenes and the advantages of an agree- 
ment with the enemy, they remain determined to play a leading 
part in the defence of Greece: 
+ý ýs öE ALA, TE `EkkjvLo. , c, ýýErdFv4$ kt T1d '6kXsedrK 
ýi ý vö J -r[ oý EVýý rWeL -rrC o l'vuv "wK. urýc ýVt1. c '/K iti1' a''IT -LR- 
KrtkdK 
Koc t1re KS IK WTr nxl v" k .t Kwrk-rec - 
LL vWC ar-rx VI LTt. rLK C-e 0- WT LVIV 
t 
(T Co , vW 
1. v - 
w ýEC rh pt) Xc i -r't 
The Athenians, then, are committed to a specific Hellenic 
ideal, and their commitment is expressed in terms of aidos 
and their belief that it would be deinon (once again cýatvi 
-Wo LLI-`0o, expresses the sense of aischunomai or aideisthai) 
to betray Greece. As Solmsen points out, 
44 Xerxes is also 
influenced by 1r% K x>ed in deciding to attack the Greeks, but 
his concern in this direction is limited to the traditional 
regard for one's own status and the idea that one should 
live up to the reputation of one's forefathers. 
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Behind the 
Greek commitment to civic glory and freedom as represented 
by the Athenians, however, there lies a deeper commitment to 
a more abstract and altruistic ideal, an ideal represented 
by -r6 `EXXjvLKGJ (racial and cultural unity, 8.144.2) and by 
the-gods of Greece, who personify the abstract ideal and who 
are imagined as having an interest in its maintenance (see 
8.144.2, K4 6&-w 1 V/41011 f "L Tr ýcc W. K K#c, t OVfL #G L '" dtK -rt e, IU4r "-äK 
44S 
-rw-4 -r'e ulý&r«. S _-E%IIC(t & 
ke1v"OV3 




and 9.7a. 2, 
QLK re `EXctjvloV 414ýe6BrvrS5 ). Zeus Hel lenios, then, is not 
simply a powerful god whose disapproval the Athenians fear, 
although there may be a literal element in the phrase, too, 
but rather he is also an embodiment of a principle which is 
held in force by aidos at the thought of its breach: in 
referring to their aidos for the god the Athenians also 
refer to the aidos which prevents them betraying their prin- 
ciples. 
We have seen that ideas which can be expressed in terms of 
a dos are more often conveyed in other ways and that the 
word aidos itself is not of frequent occurrence. This is first 
of all an aspect of Herodotos' style, but if it also ref- 
lects change, then the change will be linguistic rather than 
cultural, since traditional ideas are clearly still present 
even where terms like aidos are not applied. Two passages, 
however, offer clear examples of the trend towards subjective 
evaluation of one's own actions without reference to the 
opinions of other people. The novelty of this trend, however, 
should not be over-emphasized, since it is as old as Solon 
at least. At 5.75.1 we find that the Corinthians, having 
already set off to join an expedition against the Athenians, 
changed their minds and withdrew, eji (L oýtjroýVL , 
9&v1tS >& p\/ 
NS oü -rotft i TK (((c oc Whatever the grounds for the opinion 
that the expedition was not just, we are left in no doubt 
but that it is the Corinthians' own interpretation of their 
action which was important, and that justice, in an abstract 
sense, was an important consideration with them. Had they, 
in fact, considered what other participants in the enterprise 
might say, they might have seen that commonplaces such as 
the need to avoid imputation of cowardice, the importance of 
being successful in completing what one has begun etc. would 
suggest quite the opposite course in anyone who had not their 
concern to do what is right. The Corinthians here act as 
their consciences dictate. 
The remarks of Artabanos at 7.10d. 2 might be compared: 
ra , L( Ev &vkEVtr6. wc uc-t (os /A. et%rr`d e i'k. k) e 0V " Et pat 
44 6 
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Taýýý/as , r. ý rMV) 6-t 0L h 1- c1 E-rr«re', Tc, Nve11, %c EjeIKt-) 
r d-(, V 
fe 
uü cc'/ of KxK, % F1Sýv)ýcvr. r-ý . 
This argument, attributed to an aged Persian nobleman, more 
plausibly reflects contemporary developments in Greece. 
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Its novelty lies in its explicit and complete disregard of 
results, of success or failure, in favour of stress on the 
quality of the original plan, or intention. 
47 Popular opinion 
as the arbiter of success and failure, of kalon and aischron, 
is thus ignored, and the possibility of aidos at criticism 
of one's failure ruled out: what matters here is the know- 
ledge that one has done one's best, one's own awareness that 
chance, not one's own shortcomings, led to failure. 
The word nemesis occurs at 1.34.1, but referring exclusively 
now to divine anger, it has virtually no relevance to our 
theme: von Erffa (p. 184) compares S. Phil. 601-2, E. Qr. 1361-2.48 
NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX. 
1. In that Herodotos goes on to describe Aristodemos' atimie 
as social ostracism, it seems most likely that this is all 
that the historian has in mind here. Atimi a, however, might 
also denote legal disfranchisement, and the social sanctions 
could be prescribed by law. On the possibility that Spartan 
cowards were punished by legal as well as social atimia, see 
MacDowell, Spartan Law, 42-6. For our purposes, however, the 
precise sense of the word in this passage is scarcely rele- 
vant, for even if the Spartans did take legal action against 
those considered to be cowards, this will only have been one 
aspect of their disapproval, and thus only one manifestation 
of a reaction which might occasion aidos in one who had 
fallen, or was in danger of falling, short of his fellows' 
requirements. 
2. On this question, cf. pp. 31-5 above. 
3. See again MacDowell, loc. cit.. 
4. On the senses of nomos in Hdt., see J. A. S. Evans, Athenraum 
1965,142-53, Ostwald, Nom os, 20-54 passim, and Giraudeau, 
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Notions Juridigues, 120-33. 
5. For this interpretation of the passage, see Heinimann, 
gmos und Physis, 29-35, Gigante, Nomos Basileus, p. 115; n. b. 
102.1 - nomos makes all the inhabitants of Greece brave. On 
obedience to the king as the Persians' nomos, see Heinimann, 
p. 34n. 42, Gigante, P. 116, Evans, p. 149. 
6. See Gigante, 111-2, Dihle in Kerferd (ed. ), Sophists and 
their Legacy, 59-60, and Giraudeau, 164-5,167-8. One clear 
indication of this attitude is the passage at 3.38.1, where 
the historian rebukes Kambyses for ridiculing another nation's 
nomoi, and points out that each people considers its own 
nomoi to be best. 
6a. See 104.4, .c XFE S 
0e 
a, «rcL corQ J 
oc Ws VrwJ . On the social 
aspect of the Spartans' aret e and the nomos which promotes 
it (and the relationship of these ideas to sophistic thought), 
see Dihle, Philologus 1962,209-10. 
7. Cf. Heinimann, 35-6, Dihle, p. 59, and cf. Evans, 149-50. 
8. PP. 288 and 316 above. 
8a. There is no essential contradiction between the ideas 
that the Persians, like the Spartans, do have a code of 
honour in battle, and that the king's subjects fight only 
out of fear, provided we make a proper distinction between 
Persians proper and their subject races (as made by Mardonios 
at 9.48): Persians may fight out of regard for Persian 
honour, but subject peoples fight out of fear. 
9. On cfWvJ cf. above, p. 424, below, PP-428,430-2. 
10. In Homer, cf. , 
1.2.235,7.96,8.163, and see also pp. 268n. 
46 and 286 above. 
11. For aidofa in the meaning "genitals", cf. (besides these 
two passages) 1.108.1,2.30.4,36.3,37.2,48.2-3,104.2-4,3.103, 
149. Most of the references are in book 2, and most of these 
deal with circumcision or other Egyptian ritual practices. 
On these, see Lloyd's commentary, ad locc.. 
12. See How and Wells, ad locc.. 
13. Cf. P. 424 above. 
14. See Waters, Herodotus the Historian, 129-30. 
15. Cf. PP. 310-1 above. 
16. Cf. pp. 301-2,330-1 above. 
17. Cf. pp. 28 and 34 above. 
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18. Above, pp. 424 and 428. 
19. See n. 8 above. 
20. Cf. 3.155.2, Jc cv&J -rc '1L-ý/14J af 'A V( uvs ry rt Koc, ýoýýýr , 
21. pp. 426 and 428 above. 
22. On the meaning of which, see pp. 10-3 above. 
23. The phrase dcLvK -rr"t c--v also occurs, but appears to mean 
i "make a fuss" (so Powell, Lexicon, s. v. lTcttW A. I. 6). One 
may, however, make a fuss about an insult to one's honour, 
as at 2.121e. 1 and 7.1.1, but the phrase does not seem to 
have any fundamental reference to standards of honour. 
24. See de Romilly, REG 1971,314-37, Giraudeau, 80-6, 
Waters, 105-6. 
25. See above, p. 106n. 127. 
26. On honour as Xerxes' motive for attacking Greece, see 
also p. 427 above. 
27. On aidos in this passage, see below, pp. 437-8. 
28. Not only does the woman's desire for revenge install a 
new ruler, but Hdt. also reports an oracle which attributes 
Kroisos' downfall to his ancestor's usurpation of his master's 
prerogatives (1.91.1). 
29. Cf. 7.158.1, Gelon's reply to the ambassadors from Greece. 
30. The kind of anaideia manifested by Pythios is rejected 
by Artabanos at 7.16.1, where he considers himself unworthy 
to sit on the royal throne (oJýC Fv va$ }; Artabanos pays 
due respect to the divergence in status between himself and 
the king. 
31. Cf. Giraudeau, p. 91. 
32. E. g. 3.48, the Corinthians' resentment of a hvbrisma; 
3.120.3-4, where Oroites, insulted by Mitrobates, decides, 
in his fury, to avenge himself on Polykrates (! ); 6.67.2 - 
Demaratos and Leotychides, humiliation of a personal enemy 
as vengeance; 6.73.1, Kleomenes' resentment of a orrI. VI3 1 O'fi'º -' 
A*4WLIM. o}; and 7.238 and 9.79.2, on the desire to humiliate 
a dead opponent by maltreating his body (on which see de 
Romilly, REG 1971, p. 333; on the body as a prize in war, see 
7.225,9.22 and 24). 
33. Arguments of this kind are particularly common in Euri- 
pides (above, pp. 363-84). 
34. Cf. Waters, p. 7. 
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35. pp. 432-3 above. 
36. Cf. von Erffa, P. 181. 
37. ibid.. 
38. See above, pp. 97n. 35 and 126 
39. The woman, in fact, reacts as Plutarch's (w 
iC 
w/ yvv( 
would (see pp. 432-3 above) - she is shamed and, out of con- 
cern for her honour, seeks revenge. In 10.2 a i. xv%10'" lc is 
probably passive ("disgraced"), but to be disgraced implies 
that one will feel aidos, and in this instance the woman's 
consciousness of her disgrace inhibits her impulse to cry 
out. It seems certain, then, that aidos is part of her reac- 
tion. 
40. Cf. Waters, 110-1. 
41. There is an identical concealment of an identical condi- 
tion in George Douglas Brown's, The House with the Green 
Shutters (London, 1901). Brown, a protege of Gilbert Murray 
at Glasgow, would have known his Hdt., and may have taken 
the idea for Mrs. Gourlay's abcess from this passage. 
42. See 1.86: 2,138.2,2.141.6,172.4,5.7. 
43. See pp. 185,248 (and 249-62 passim), 352 above. 
44. Two Crucial Decisions in Herodotus, 28-31. 
45. See above, p. 427. 
46. On the relationship of this passage to contemporary 
thought, see Dihle, Philologus 1962, p. 217. 
47 . n. 
i r)ct wj seems simply to be variatio for e , &wws here: cf. 
8.144.1 and von Erffa, p. 183. 
48. See also Giraudeau, p. 70 (and 71-2 on phthonos in Hdt. ). 
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7. THUCYDIDES. 
Thucydides uses the substantive aidos only once, at 1.84.3, 
and the verb aideisthai does not occur. The only other deri- 
vative of aidos to find its way into the work is the adjec- 
tive aidoios, twice (1.6.5,2.49.8) used in the neuter plural 
in the sense pudenda. In the passage in which aidos does oc- 
cur, however, it is quite clear that it is regarded as a 
synonym of aischune: (&6l 1r> E ftoY ý. ýt re! xý týa J'ýXývy s 
ýý cv y vxýoc claims Archidamos. Aischune etc., on 
the other hand, are found quite often, as is 7(ý, wi ýx eJ as a 
synonym of aischune in both its subjective and objective 
senses. Given that aidos and aischune are interchangeable at 
1.84.3, and since this only reflects the intimate relation- 
ship between aidos and those terms derived from aischros/ 
aischos, it seems legitimate to continue to treat instances 
of the terms mentioned above as relevant to the study of 
aidos. At the same time, as in previous chapters various 
periphrases which seem to present ideas which deserve to be 
included in our enquiry and several passages in which none 
of our terms occurs will be considered, where it seems pos- 
sible that the ideas with which we are concerned are present. 
We have seen that the shift from aidos to aischune is a 
gradual one, effected over a long period in the works of 
several different authors. This development probably reflects 
a change in everyday usage. On the other hand, aidos does 
not die out after Thucydides, and other, later authors use 
it with greater frequency than he does. For this reason, 
some have sought to explain the virtual exclusion of the term 
with reference to the historian's method and outlook. Shorey, 
for example, 
1 believes that he prefers aischune and r6l . cis .: 
to ads because the latter is "more distinctly ethical", 
and thinks that the historian saw aidos as an obfuscation in 
the search for a rational explanation of events: if this 
were the case, it would be strange that the practically 
synonymous aischune is of such frequent occurrence as a 
motive for action, rational or not. Nor is there any real 
case for considering aidos to be "more ethical" than aischune. 
No substantial difference of either meaning or connotation 
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is unambiguously apparent in any passage 
so far, and while we may well agree that 
gerated a linguistic trend out of person. 
real reasons for his preferring aischunee 
scarcely discoverable. 
we have considered 
Thucydides has exag- 
al preference, the 
and rö aigCoV seem 
The sole instance of aidos in the work occurs in the middle 
of a debate in which aidos/aischune, aischron and kalon, as 
well as other terms, notably sophrosyne, are of the greatest 
importance. Sophrosyne is a key word in the work as a whole, 
2 
but its importance is probably greatest in book one, where 
its centrality to the Spartan character is the major point, 
and where the efficacy of the Spartan approach, and the ap- 
plicability of the term sophrosyne thereto, are disputed. 
3 
Reference to Spartan sophrosvne is first made by the Corin- 
thians at 1.68.1, where Spartan possession of the virtue 
with regard to their internal affairs is admitted, but cont- 
rasted with amathia in their dealings with outsiders. Here, 
as elsewhere, sophrosvne may denote little more than "good 
sense". 
4 In 1.69 the Corinthians go on to criticize their 
allies for their quietism and lack of initiative, and they 
end their speech (71.7) with a conventional appeal to the 
Spartan sense of honour, urging them to live up to the repu- 
tations of their forefathers. 
It is to this view of the Spartan character that Archidamos, 
ävl( kcal Swti (oci Ei\/i9, L 'c cwwý (79.2), addresses 
himself. He immediately stresses the importance of delibera- 
tion and good counsel (80.1-2), and, in summing up this part 
of his speech, points to the danger of the more precipitate 
approach urged by the Corinthians (82.5): " 
t -k (. 
4c Pr-R'^eO9dK&V6i -r&L -r'" 
1 10/,. Y4% 
0tvr& TFýnwý. t' ow11V(sc. r1J 
ý/ý-rrý J ), eo 
/44 1 
Ott rX l &, q Kaut 
et1i'v/ºýTtPoý/ T (l ExG'rGvv1 rW Tp oC j ()µ, ýV. 
It is clear that aý'ix t .J here refers to the disgrace of de- 
feat. The Spartans' concern for careful 'preparation, else- 
where seen as sophrosyne, thus also contains a desire to 
avoid disgrace, a desire which might be construed as aidos. 
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Archidamos' next point develops the idea of disgrace: just 
as the Spartans should beware of defeat as a possible outcome 
of over-hasty action, so should they avoid being stung into 
action by-their own aischune at others' charges of cowardice: 
ýý 
acl 
ä VolvSe t .c Mºý (6C-vL 'TCIq\X&V5 ýL d 'rro 
>K 
/v 
j TKxV t rfXV -tV 
csoýccrw 6Zv. ct(1 . 83.11 
). 
Kota tL Pe . c. 
ýý KM »k , q, C' of "a t ý. ý kLr ir cvA, wJ, %' 
s6rxvvo(Ef (1.84.1). 
Whereas at 82.2 Archidamos had attempted to arouse the 
aischune of his audience at the prospect of defeat, in these 
passages he moves to forestall the same feeling, lest the 
Spartans should be persuaded that their present inactivity 
is generally regarded as cowardice. This idea is implicit in 
the speech of the Corinthians, and it is one to which they 
return at 120.3: otvcýC 
-4 rote (f CovwI 
ErrW, Ei p 
ýýtK«vruý 
ºý rv, xý j&4d1 st VKIýwý Jr aýL Kw ýývS E is /wrý/ c-ýeýv7S 
-1( . ..... They then go on to enlarge upon the duty of 
the agathos to avoid disgrace (122.2-3). 
5 The importance of 
their argument at this point lies in its appeal to the essen- 
tially heroic ideal that the agathos should resent insults 
and take steps to wipe them out, and the implication is that 
the Spartans, unless they act as the Corinthians wish them 
to, risk not being considered to be agathoi. This is the 
assumption which Archidamos attempts to counteract at 83.1 
and 84.1. There is, then, something of a tension between the 
arete-based values of the Corinthians and sophrosyne: 
6 
although Spartan sophrosyne, as represented by Archidamos, 
takes account of the fear of disgrace, it is seen as possible 
that others may regard the same attitude as indicative of 
anandria. Aid os (or aischune) can thus lead to both caution 
and haste, and Archidamos is driven both to-excite aidos and 
to deny its applicability in certain circumstances, and thus 
the traditional ambivalence of the concept is apparent once 
more. 
The idea of good counsel which Archidamos consistently 
recommends also exhibits a certain ambivalence, in that at 
84.1 the conduct suggested by aischune is opposed to good 
sense, while at 82.5 aischune and good sense converge to the 
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same end. There is a very close echo of the former attitude 
at 8.27.2-3, where Phrynichos also speaks out against the 
danger of being forced into ill-considered action as a result 
of fear of disgrace: 
-L7 t-'I'`ý 
K% "pN S t'Lot (E' 1) c, J 1 irrE- -rw Kº, ý(w övt-. 
1 
KlVfvvcvýEýý ^ sv. act( eu4 E-I V4I 
'hl'ýýJýctovs VeGt" '' 
K 4t(ýJ v'TC'tX wP r. c. l 
ö! ýýl 
of K. C. t A--- Tae 
& 
T&V OVV` 
r vac uv a, 1 ' 1ý c "V r e-t F} Kk rtIU vv K. C4 -TIALV 
"`c r<--f c -rw 1. %, YLr-f w ºct vOw ý &U 
' 
/vt, \/W Tw oc l ý, c 
a' et XX 
'1[ l ToL is y EV k ttV VIU4 
eVýfr 
E-lOýc. l 
/&ýOýCv TT a(«. rV't'vys k660 'f i<cvttL%VV) t 1tVv 





-ff' vs K6ý. c ßrcVt ktVtlvýrvS 
LCV cA . 
This pasýsacýe v 
'concýentr'ates 
on facts and deprec ates over- 
sensitivity to popular opinion. 
8 It also hints at subjecti- 
vity in the evaluation of that which is aischron, in that 
the attitude which recognizes that others may criticize one 
for retreating, and that this is aischron regardless of the 
circumstances, is explicitly rejected as unhelpful: Phry- 
nichos is able to decide for himself that it is not aischron 
to retreat/wtTK Woe-t(ev . This need not, however, be seen as 
novel, or necessarily dependent on the opinions of the 
sophists, first of all because Agamemnon finds it just as 
easy to deny that retreat, even by night, is ., aischron at 
fl. 14.80-1,9 and secondly because Phrynichos immediately 
goes on to refer to the traditional idea that defeat is dis- 
graceful in pointing to a greater and more concrete aischron 
which might come about as a result of a misplaced fear of 
criticism. Thus he is not simply urging the Athenians to 
ignore popular opinion, but rather attempting to channel 
their sense of shame to a more important object, just as 
Archidamos attempts to convince his Spartans that the dis- 
grace of defeat caused by haste is a more pressing considera- 
tion than the prospect of criticism of their caution. 
In the speeches of both men good sense and prudence are of 
the utmost importance. The Corinthians, however, seeking to 
overcome Spartan slowness, attempt to argue against this im- 
portance (1.120.5): 
'(AGM < yo { Ka-' s CVW(b'&VT. ( Cý&X-e&/ 1V tVO'VT"VV 
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rvýýVT#C KacrW (3w(aý / Jc &t ETl ý1t-; -L ) K. eýý 
13 dc/Kwvrot 
ýs&vk E-V01Voct CJ TOOV. Gvr(. 
1 1 le 
V/ t- I i1YW3 -r&6t FI77 . 
This passage is virtually the converse of that at Herodotos 
7.10d. 2,10 in that it uses similar vocabulary to limit the 
importance of good counsel, whereas Artabanos in Herodotos 
stresses its importance. Here, however, there is nothing 
remarkable either in the language or the content, 
" for where 
Artabanos denied that success or failure have any effect on 
the essential worth or excellence of a plan (thus denying 
that success or failure determine what is aischron or kalon), 
the Corinthians use AlIxK6? S traditionally to refer to the 
plan's eventual issue. 
At 1.84.2-3 Archidamos goes on to explain how the Spartans' 
caution, described as rk rvrJ , 
12 
maintains stability 
and equilibrium in their state, preventing excess in both 
the enjoyment of good fortune and the extent to which they 
yield to misfortunes: this caution, he goes on, means that 
the Spartans are not easily forced into action against their 
better judgement either by the praise or the censure of 
others. The king then proceeds to give this approach a the- 
oretical basis in the organization of the state and in its 
system of education (84.3): 
-rVXf- tlkO. It- k CA 9-1 GýJ>td( 
ýýýC 





tJ ört ociýwý äý¢ aYWýS'ii'xFI(T&f e L/ý peiýxwºý1 
t-vý ýxt"c Eýýwýct otýý6E'rrrýoý/ -/rwV VaMwJ 1S 
41'tCt( vý o(, 5 '1['ar t 
ýCft1 
o/µ iYoL kD 
JW ý(oc is F rorIrt e' . "! 
ý 
/o JE-ä'rt'ý a1/ 
W: 
Tt o T& N o( %/ J ICOV rrW( )/ 
Wx "fi °' KK 
J 
CJV&TVL 
a. Ia VrZ: -r Twýl "ýi uh t aýJ -r[ 
/ 
wt'1lýV `w Ksch wý 
7/ 11 f L% 








ý va l 
ýýrlJ 
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rý- J acvct KS -rwi 'TrAx- Txe. r'lt'iýºý rL Vrt_ 1<14 % . 11 '7i' G ('(C1. T1 Tp'ý sjT5$e so nOrW c1 L *CA eeC. T 
This is a complex and difficult Passage, 
13 but the general 
line of thought is fairly clear. Archidamos has just exp- 
lained that his people's caution leads to moderation, and he 
attributes that moderation to the discipline of the Spartan 
education (T1 tv &ti OVV ). This education, however, has two 
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parallel results: it renders the Spartans both warlike and 
prudent. The origin of both these qualities is then explained 
in the clauses, -rv /AA -V ... 
de and while aidos 
only occurs in the first of these, sophrosyne is found in 
both, and since'aidos is associated with sopjosvne in the 
first clause, it must be that it is also relevant to the 
second. Indeed, the whole passage is an explanation of Spar- 
tan sophrosyne, a concept with which aidos has long been as- 
sociated, and this association is expressed in a particularly 
direct manner here. 
14 Aidos, then, is closely relevant to 
Spartan sophrosyne. 
The Spartans' overall characteristic, then, is sophrosyne, 
and aidos (here equated with aischune) is part of that soph- 
rosyne. Sophrosyne thus seems to be the wider term, in that 
it covers the entire effect of Spartan discipline and educa- 
tion, whereas aidos only occurs in relation to martial, 
rather than civic virtue. This perhaps reflects an associ- 
ation of aidos with the poetic and the archaic, perhaps 
specifically with its importance in the martial context in 
Homer, while the use of sophrosyne to cover wider aspects of 
civic virtue probably reflects the more fashionable nature 
of the term and its greater suitability to political and 
theoretical contexts. 
15 Both the traditional links between 
aidos and sophrosyne, however, and their particular closeness 
here mean that it is not only with Archidamos' remarks on 
his city's warlike qualities that we are concerned. 
The promotion of bravery through. dos, of course, is an 
idea which is as old as Greek literature itself. Here, how- 
ever, martial virtue is placed in a civic and social context. 
Bravery, Archidamos says, has a share of aidos/aischune: 
this, however, does not appear simply to refer to fear of 
others' disapproval, or, at least, if it does, it refers not 
to the disapproval of outsiders but to that of one's fellow 
Spartiates, since the sophron attitude, of which aidos and 
bravery are constituents, specifically excludes excessive 
concern with the praise or blame of non-Spartans. The Spar- 
tans' martial aidos presumably does contain an element of 
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fear of the disgrace of defeat or cowardice, but the modera- 
tion which their king commends means that it is not so in- 
tense as to be influenced by the taunts of others. 
Much more importantly, aidos is related to the more general 
attitude of moderation which is developed by education and 
which promotes obedience to the laws. 
16 Education is thus 




aidos, as part of sophrosyne, is seen as of that educa- 
tion. 
18 Spartan sophrosyne, then, is produced by an education 
in the values and statutes of Spartan society: it does not 
take an excessive account of the opinions of odbiders, but 
is based on obedience to the internal constraints of Spartan 
society; it involves rational deliberation, but not to the 
point of excess, and the nomoi are always superior to indi- 
vidual cleverness. In all this, aidos, as a part of sophro- 
syne, is important, and thus emerges as a product of one's 
upbringing in a social and political environment. Hussey's 
relation of this to Demokritos is very plausible, 
19 but per- 
haps it is not possible to be quite so specific: the passage 
certainly shows sophistic influence, but other thinkers, 
such as Protagoras and even Antiphon, 
20 
may also have pro- 
pounded similar ideas, and it is also possible that the 
sophistic influence on the passage is too general to be 
related to anything more concrete than the general climate 
of late fifth century thought. 
At 2.11.4-5 Archidamos again urges caution, this time on an 
army in the field immediately prior to the first invasion of 
Attika, and certain of his remarks on this occasion recall 
those already quoted. 
21 This time, however, it is fear, 
rather than ads, which is stresfed as an important factor 
in ensuring success in battle: 
'kO'CrAJ -a-x^H61ý3 c1e1J tv`J 
-rv vý -rrkE&Vic, S ccL: c Tt, Kxrc C6vvvvrocs PPToc? aIrKEvovs 
/ 






-t'Co1 tt ,r T-L, 14-H 
, 
VW/ºý 
d aý ýý, ac-ývs 6re tvýc, ý rw CSýe ýw eft frr LC& c valýK`ýýi . 
The association of aidos with fear is traditional in the 
martial context, 
22 
as is the opposition of aidos and "daring": 
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thus it seems quite possible that the fear which Archidamos 
urges on his men is akin to aidos. In particular, aidos, as 
well as being related to the fear of disgrace, may denote a 
reluctance or hesitancy when action is called for, based 
either on the simple fear of going toofar (or "daring") or 
on a more precise fear of criticism, and it is in this aspect 
that aidos is often considered inefficacious in certain 
circumstances. Archidamos clearlytbelieves that the fear he 
recommends will be salutory, but, together with his earlier 
remarks about caution, aidos and sophrosyne in book 1, this 
passage does indicate a considerable Spartan tendency towards 
hesitancy in the name of discipline and prudence, and, it 
has been plausibly suggested, 
23 in these qualities may reside 
something of the Spartans' weaknesses, as the historian saw 
them, as well as their strengths. 
These speeches of Archidamos, taken collectively, recall the 
remarks of another Spartan king in a different context: at 
S. A1.1071-86 Menelaos, like Archidamos in 1.84.3, also asso- 
ciates discipline in the city and discipline in the army, 
and the coincidence in the use of terms like aidos, fear and 
sophrosyne in the speeches of the literary and the historical 
kings is striking. 
24 Both Menelaos and Archidamos seem to 
reflect contemporary debate on the nature of political com- 
munities and on the forces which promote social cohesion, 
25 
but it is also significant that both are Spartans, and the 
remarks on the fostering of obedience to authority, and so 
on fear, aidos and sophrosyne, seem to have a special rele- 
vance to conditions in Sparta, at least as Athenians percei- 
ved them. 
26 
We have already seen that the Corinthians take issue with 
Archidamos on the correct way to check the Athenians. At 
1.86.2 one of the ephors, Sthenelaidas, taking up the Corin- 
thian position expresses this difference of opinion as a 
difference regarding that course which is truly sophron - 
IV 
ttu&4W """ oüfý AA, 0Xjr &p. -l 1yt&s V. Thus he denies 
that -rv XXoV , which Archidamos called rt 
icoe 
vl /is 
sophrosyne at all. Just as Archidamos, then, had to distin- 
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guish (at 84.1 and 84.3) between two kinds of aidos/aischun, 
so Sthenelaidas suggests that a course of action designated 
so hron by his king is really not sophron at all. The whole 
debate, it seems, reflects sophistic interest in accurate 
definitions of words, 
27 
as well as a sense of the relativity 
of those terms both to the particular situation and to those 
who use them. 
Throughout the debate in book 1, while it is sophrosvne which 
is given greatest prominence as the quality which the Pelo- 
ponnnesians would most like to appropriate to themselves, 
the desire to maintain time and avoid disgrace is also impor- 
tant. Archidamos and those who support him seek to avoid the 
aischron which may be occasioned by ill-prepared action on 
their part, while the Corinthians and Sthenelaidas regard it 
as aischron that they should not punish the Athenians forth- 
with. It is thus important to both sides to maintain honour, 
although they disagree as to how this should be achieved. 
The motivation of the Corinthians receives further expression 
at 1.122.2-3, where they explain: 
1j+/7 r- 1/ 7 
j Et Kr("4 
1. vor/ -r J oc 1<dVYotL c rl) of K KOVt Tvlý f(Ký/ 
Ole A 0. ", #1 or A) IL 
tot 1ý 0 r1 
dEp 
Dvrief º'ý bluff F! V$ Gil /ýflo /'V wX4 
x 
o)rw 
0V tOLa, (Ovtý/ou. a"1 C$p i-i E%o1VOvvý /w k'X I -rCoý+ýc j -ro ý-S 
v'ýý }CorrtGToefýtýý/ 4V W 
ýc 
rloel(, w ( (&L, ý V A'V1 
{ 
-r oc r)(ELJ 
ýc. 




-rºv d 'floor 
ý 
s(° w 
ý ýC COvS t wývt-äbýct oý -r J Eýýoicý"c X Fv46 wloý r 
ov (+ AC j Pb Artet. oVJIt I; 
v 
TV 0cW14 
cJ c w, r/ cy Idýý^týýýc it cý 1 -rzvj Fdýt« VV , 
ws 
C. OL1,4. ý/k at. t1 / For the 
'torinthians, 
then, defeat will mean slavery for the 
defeated, and even to be in a position from which it is pos- 
sible that one's fortunes could tend in this direction is 
aischron, since the cities of the Peloponnese are many and 
Athens only one. Concern for the opinion of other states is 
revealed in S: people will say either that, since the 
Peloponnesians acquiesce in their humiliation and thus admit 
their inferiority, the Athenians must be justified in treat- 
ing them badly, or that the Peloponnesians fail to retaliate 
out of cowardice. The Corinthians, then, experience aidos 
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with regard to both their present condition and the deteri- 
oration which they see as inevitable if they do not take ac- 
tion at once. They then go on to refer to the familiar precept 
that one should not disgrace one's forefathers, and ads is 
also relevant here. 
28 
The Corinthians thus express themselves in thoroughly tradi- 
tional terms, and, indeed, they make this clear in their 
references to the past. Attempting to win the Spartans to 
their point of view, they profess to see the dilemma facing 
them as identical to that which faced their fathers29- free- 
dom or slavery, the liberty of the cities of Hellas, the 
dissolution of tyrannies, 
30 
all these points are intended to 
arouse Spartan aidos that they should appear worse than 
their fathers. 
Resentment of wrongs or insults, as we saw in Herodotos, may 
be expressed as b4cvOl -ff cLt <b a-t. , 
31 
and this phrase occurs 
with the same meaning at 1.102.4, where the Athenians are 
described as resentful at being sent away from Ithome, 
although their help in crushing the helot revolt had been 
requested - K, c; t Cýtcv&4 -rt ccý r `ý ºlor: ov ºc 
äc wYowrEj 
vT ü ýI x1cf 
Cý o , cv1 wNj -rtivrt, -TI -w- 
Sic-tV... Again, oiýrä (w6cvTfs makes clear 
the connexion between 
(&-i'j14 and treatment felt to 
bj unworthy of one's status. 
Later in book 1 Perikles delivers a speech which is the 
Athenian couterpart of that of the Corinthians at 1.120-4, 
and 'it soon becomes apparent that he is motivated by many of 
the concerns which affected them. At 141.1, for example, he 
too sees the issue of peace or war in terms of freedom or 
slavery: 
-rý4 Yale ocýTIJ 
ýwVrý gvvkw«J výj' Ti- 
ý(Tý 
ºC cXl 
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ö t>i 3 
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For Athens to give in to Peloponnesian demands without 
recourse to arbitration would, he claims, imply her inferi- 
ority. Like the Corinthians, ' therefore, Perikles urges his 
audience to go to war at least partly to preserve their 
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honour in the face of enemy insults. Later in the same speech 
he refers to a positive inducement to war based on the same 
premiss, that defeat is aischron and victory kalon, and that 
one must defend one's time against the former and seek to 
increase it by means of the latter -K -rý wJrttý-irrwJ 
kvf vv wV 01-C. Kart 'Ti c, X(-C K opt 
lUL wT1 /tF Lr1 -t -T -L oc. 
c -Tt Eel 
.1 0- TL'v(vrM(144.3). As was the case with the Corinthians, ref- 
conventi. onal lections like these lead him. to one of the induce- 
ments to valour, the importance of maintaining one's father's 
reputation.: 144.4). 
At 2.11.2 and 9 it is the turn of Archidamos to express pre- 
cisely these two points, the need to live up to the reputa- 
tion of one's father and the glory to be won in victory: 
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Unlike Perikles, however, Archidamos combines the reminder 
of the duty to the glory of previous generations, itself an 
appeal to aidos on the basis of one's own reputation, with a 
more explicit reference to the requirement that the present 
generation should strive to preserve its own reputation. The 
Spartans' doxa, he suggests, is at stake, once and for all, 
for good or for bad, and this constitutes a very powerful 
appeal to aidos indeed. With Archidamos' linking of past and 
present we might perhaps compare 4.92.7, where the Theban, 
Pagondas, urges his countrymen not to 
/, le .1 
ocýrrn s where the ae rraA are -r( rj KovreX in that they have 
been handed down from previous generations (who are mentioned 
immediately before) to the present. 
32 
Also in book 2, Perikles' Funeral Speech has a great deal to 
say about honour and disgrace. At 42.4 we are told that those 
in whose honour the oration is delivered, by concentrating 
on warding off the enemy rather than on their own safety, To. 
'10.0' ý 
a. jx6&4 Tov koCjv t. The dead, by the very fact of 
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their death, escape the charge of cowardice. BY doing so 
they bring glory to the city, and in the next chapter Perik- 
les urges his audience to remember that this glory is the 
result of the aischune, the desire to avoid disgrace, of men 
like those who have died (43.1): 
KaAv Tx/ ýýiý, / ýzhý ýý ºý &1Vwc (sc. r Xt S )ý 
Cv ývýn. tý vý+ý. ývavs Gtl tvýt WvrES º(o&1 YtYvWYKGYTL-s 'T'K 
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Glory, then, is won by men who know their duty and who expe- 
rience aischune (=aidos) when in action. These two points 
are probably to be taken closely together, since awareness 
of-rä ýEcvr. c in battle will presumably occasion a'dos/ 
aischune at the prospect of dereliction of that duty, while 
ad s/aischune itself, and the discipline and cohesion 
thereby promoted, must also be considered part of a soldier's 
duty. Mention of the arete which belongs to the city brings 
us back to the familiar idea of the community of honour 
within the group, and it is clear that, for Perikles, the 
polis has a powerful claim to the loyalty of its members, 
and he expects that the honour of the city as a whole will 
be as major a consideration as the honour of oneself and 
one's family. 
At 44.4 it is to the collective honour of the family that he 
refers in urging the older members of the community who have 
lost sons to be consoled by the eukleia the dead have won. 
In chapter 46, which forms the conclusion to the speech, the 
civic inducements to bravery in battle, namely glory, a pub- 
lic burial and education at the state's expense for the sons 
of the fallen, are described as the is Eýýx : erTJS , and these, 
it is said, produce the best citizens -ä UýK 
ý 
&L S 1<i- yr I 
Ti ýS rt. 
y1. 
el, I( ) TZ, L 
KOet 0 vO(C -S NCI CT-LL "jro trjFv&V6 LV 
To be a good citizen is thus a competitive activity, but it 
is the good of the polis as a whole which Perikles stresses, 
not simply the glory to be won by individuals. At the same 
time, however, it seems that he does believe that competition 
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among the citizens for these athla can only be good for the 
community. The expression 0ha o'cet-Tj S recurs at 2.87.9, 
where it is the Spartan way of rewarding bravery and punish- 
ing cowardice which is under discussion: 
Kit C. UK 
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The Peloponnesian commanders are characteristically more e 
&T7S- 
reticent than the Athenian statesman, but, for all the dif- 
ferences between the two cities and their ideologies, both 
reward the brave and punish the cowardly. As in Athens, the 
Spartan or Peloponnesian athla may include material benefits, 
but the wider value of these is honorific, and the athla 
presumably also encompass other, less tangible rewards. As 
regards the punishments for cowardice mentioned here, the 
language used strongly suggests specific legal penalities, 
rather than simple disapproval, and we shall encounter an 
example of the statutory punishment of cowards below. 
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At 2.62.3 Perikles combines two appeals to a os: one is the 
prospect of unfavourable comparison with previous genera- 
tions, and the other is based on the idea that it is aischron 
to admit weakness by giving in to others. His actual words 
are: 
... t 
wY 11- -Tro"T4 NX E-te tß'3 K" V Vi V AA' 
% wd ýtJOL Kord uJ OL oß ýrC ovwJ <0-4 (/V -rCol ' ýCý\ ýfk 
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It is aischron to be deprived of what one has, and even more 
so when one owes what one has to the efforts of one's fore- 
fathers, since to give up one's possessions in that case en- 
tails a betrayal of the reputation of one's predecessors. It 
is more aischron, Perikles claims, to lose what one has than 
to fail to acquire more, because the former shows weakness and 
lack of initiative while the latter at least reveals a proper 
degree of ambition. Having made this point, Perikles then 
goes on to urge his fellow citizens to strive to win glory 
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States, then, act very much as do individuals, at least in 
the view of people like Perikles and the Corinthians spokes- 
men in book 1. The last two passages quoted, in particular, 
make it clear that a major motive for the maintg,,, nance of 
the Athenian empire, and thus for the Athenians' readiness 
to go to war, was the time that the city enjoyed as a result 
of her pre-eminence. This is a major theme of the history, 
and a point'to which Athenian spokesmen refer often and ex- 
plicitly. 
34 
Athenian success at Pylos in 425 B. C., their fortification 
of the place and blockade of the Spartiates on the island of 
Sphakteria, poses considerable problems for the Spartans, 
faced as they are with both the ignominy of defeat and the 
loss of a number of important citizens to the enemy, for 
whom they would constitute valuable proof of success 
and an important source of propaganda. Accordingly, their 
ambassadors sent to Athens to sue for peace make it clear 
that avoidance of disgrace is one of their chief objectives, 
and they point to the renown which the Athenians' success 
has brought them as an incentive for them to come to terms 
immediately (4.20.2): 
C TL vt vrwv e'k eL fw' k výwýJ ý. ý t, / tsu ýS FCwt ý ý( «-S 
lill, Cs 'rt'>ýrýlýVýjýLEVýs, 1, fr"''1 tfd 1t O psi ýS OQ YLViý3 VM" 
oe ýS 'l. t 
lwj, 
Koc, ýocrt fa hS tf1 oýXXýýI ý t4V 
The Athenians, however, are not persuaded. They go on to 
capture the island, and allow their prisoners to seek advice 
from their fellows on the mainland as to what they should do: 
they are told to make their own decision, provided they do 
nothing aischron (4.38.3). At 5.34.2 we learn that the cap- 
tured Spartiates, having decided to to surrender themselves 
and their arms to the Athenians, were later disfranchised, 
suffering legal at . Although the Spartans are credited 
with other motives for taking this action, there can hardly 
be any doubt but that these measures would have been justi- 
fied to the Spartan people with reference to the fact that 
the prisoners had done something aischron in giving up their 
weapons. The prisoners' conduct, then, would have been con- 
strued as cowardice and punished by the appropriate penalty. 35 
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It is significant, however, that the very disfranchisement 
of these people is explained by a fear that, if they were 
allowed to retain their citizens' rights, they might attempt 
some kind of revolution out of a feeling that they were some- 
how disadvantaged by what had happened on the island, and it 
is probable that this explanation alludes to the social 
atimia which the former prisoners would suffer, and to the 
fear that their resentment of this might take an extreme 
form. 
36 
At 4.126.5 Brasidas is attempting to encourage his troops, 
who are about to face the barbarous Illyrians. He points out 
that their outlandish appearance and constant shouting con- 
ceal serious deficiencies in their way of fighting, and imp- 
licitly contrasts Spartan discipline, maintained by aischune, 
with their haphazard approach, maintained by their lack of 
aischune" 
OvrE rw LV EvrE A, IIxt, V0CA Ir V aV L-C&L\/ rLva 
We Kai t, K C)/4tVVL 
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Brasidas' point is that the Illyrians will not prove resolute 
opponents because, unlike the Spartans and other Hellenes, 
they do not fight under the constraint of aischune (=aidos), 
that is, they have no regard for the opinion of their fellow- 
combatants and have not been taught that it is disgraceful 
to retreat: thus they are not afraid to save themselves 
rather than stand their ground. Brasidas represents this as 
inherent in their tactics: they do not fight in battle for- 
mation and thus have no way of determining each other's 
bravery, while their strategy of "every man for himself" 
affords the individual the opportunity to justify tactics 
for which he alone is responsible. 
We need not take this too literally, however, since it is 
clear that Brasidas is saying exactly that which will most 
hearten his men: it suits him very well to represent the 
Illyrians'guerilla tactics as indiscipline and lack of 
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aischune and to contrast this with the superiority of hoplite 
warfare. We should not, therefore, simply accept that the 
tactics he describes necessarily mean that those who employ 
them have no sense of aischune: the Illyrians may feel no 
aischune at following the battle plan they feel to be most 
efficacious, but that is a different matter. Homeric battle, 
for example, is more or less ocv rtwea rwe , and yet aidos is of 
the greatest importance to its participants, while references 
in Herodotos to various barbarian peoples, like the Skythi- 
ans, who also exhibit reluctance to engage the enemy in 
straight combat, suggest that their aischune could be just 
as intense as that of the Spartans. 
37 Even the Spartans 
themselves, moreover, will have known as well as anyone else 
that sometimes a well-disciplined army has to swallow its 
pride and withdraw, 
38 
and so the fact that the Illyrians 
withdraw readily as part of their strategy proves very little 
about their sense of aischune. Brasidas' remarks, then, are 
more valuable for what they tell us about the Spartans than 
for what they tell us about the Illyrians. While it 
should probably not be implied that every Spartan experiences 
aischune at any withdrawal in any circumstance, it is clear 
that Brasidas believes that Spartan battle-formation ensures 
bravery and discipline, in that it renders each man a witness 
of his comrades' behaviour and allows no excuse for saving 
oneself at the expense of the group. 
39 
Brasidas' belief in the importance of -rä .H rývv* 3*x-t in battle 
is expressed again at 5.9.9, where he addresses first the 
Spartiates, then their allies: 
%s 
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This clearly echoes Archidamos' remark at 1.84.3 that cvý, vXtýoc 
partook of aischune, 
40 but whereas Archidamos was addressing 
his fellow-Spartiates, here Brasidas seems to think that a 
simple reminder of the duty inherent in their status will 
suffice to motivate that section of his force. 
41 Archidamos 
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also assumed that aischune would promote discipline, while 
Brasidas treats that quality separately. f lo se.; rvvrd i itself 
is unexplained, but it must refer to the traditional function 
of aidos/aischune of promoting bravery through the fear of 
disgrace or the reluctance to become a coward. As von Erffa 
points out, 
42 
one might expect -r, edi I-0 to be a consequence 
of -i w% YVVt- o-t , but aischune is a negative check, and by 
-rä cBEhFLV Brasidas probably envisages a positive desire to 
fight well. 
43 As if to reinforce his point about aischune 
Brasidas goes on to employ a classic appeal to aid os: if the 
allies fight bravely, they will enjoy the title "allies of 
the Spartans" (note KEk)( , ibid. ), but if they do not, 
they will risk universal condemnation as traitors to the 
cause of Greek freedom. The analogy with the situation of 
480-79, then, continues to prove useful to the Pelopon- 
nesians. 
44 
The issue of freedom or slavery is also central to the Melian 
Dialogue, where Melian aidos/aischune at the prospect of be- 
ing considered inferior is seen as a possible reason for 
their resistance, and thus its appropriateness is deprecated 
by the Athenians. At 5.100 the Melians clearly express the 
idea that their aidos prevents them giving in to Athenian 
demands: 
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This is a traditional attitude, and one of which we have al- 
ready seen evidence in Thucydides. To the Athenians, however, 
it is not a prudent attitude (101): 
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The Athenians, then, claim there is no room for andragathia 
45 
or the concern to avoid disgrace when the weak are faced 
with the demands of the strong, and urge the Melians to act 
out of prudence (Cwjý EWS ) and in their own interests 
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(fWTvj S ), 46 Sophrosyne is thus opposed to aidos here, 
47 
although Archidamos could combine the two at 1.84.3, but the 
Athenians' argument does not differ fundamentally from that 
offered by that speaker at 1.83.1 and 84.1 or that of Phry- 
---nichos at 8.27.2-3,48 since all these urge the dismissal of 
at least one kind of aischune in favour of a more realistic 
appraisal of the particular situation. As the catchword, 
oei, suggests, there is obvious sophistic influence on 
the Athenian argument, and a fragment of Demokritos49 sup- 
ports their position, inasmuch as it claims that it is not 
by giving in to the strong that the weak incur disgrace, but 
in attempting to oppose them: this, however, is an attitude 
which is much older than the sophistic movement, for it is 
expressed in strikingly similar terms at Hesiod, WD. 210-1 - 
he who opposes the stronger inevitably loses and adds aischea 
to his algea. The Athenians' position in 101, then, is based 
on traditional discretion, rather than the extreme immoral- 
ist's "might is right". 
50 
At the same time, however, their 
argument is one the Melians are unlikely to accept: 
51 the 
attitude that it is aischron to be ruled by others is well- 
nigh universal among the Greek states as represented by 
Thucydides and Herodotos, 
52 
and never is the determination 
to avoid the imputation of. inferiority, or slavery, tempered 
by the realism of admitting the prospective ruler's superi- 
ority. Thus the Melians do not accept that their aidos is 
irrelevant simply because they are not the equals of the 
Athen<=ians, because they do not accept that the contest of 
andracathia can only take place among equals. 
The Athenians develop the points made in this passage in 
more detail at 111. Still urging the Melians to consult the 
interests of self-preservation and good sense, they go on to 
deliver a denunciation of aischune/ Idos which draws heavily 
on traditional ideas of that quality's ambivalence (111.3-4): 
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The passage recalls those in which the ambivalence of aidos 
is first encountered (I1.24.45 = Hes. WD. 318), as well as 
the passage we have already considered in which Phrynichos 
points to the possibility of a greater disgrace resulting 
from a misplaced sense of aischune. 
53 The argument here is, 
then, that aischune at giving in to the Athenians without a 
fight could lead to utter defeat in a struggle with superior 
forces: thus, although the Athenians depreciate aidos, they 
also seek to arouse it. They then go on to appeal, in essence, 
to a kind of ideal hierarchy of honour (4), in which those 
of equal status compete, while the weaker give in to the 
stronger and the stronger behave moderately towards the weak. 
Again, this has a traditional basis, since any society 
structured upon honour will be hierarchical and will expect 
its members to "know their place": it is for this reason 
that the status of a person delivering an insult will be im- 
portant - insults from those who compete on a basis of equa- 
lity or near equality must be taken seriously, while the 
strong can afford to ignore a challenge from the weak and 
the weak must simply endure the slights of their betters. 
54 
A system of this kind probably works well where differences 
of status are well acknowledged, but even then the applica- 
e 
tion of/theory will not be hard and fast: in Herodotos, for 
example, Harpagos will have been only too conscious that he 
was the inferior of his master, Astyages, yet the resentment 
he feels at being insulted by him still leads him to take 
action which ultimately removes 
him/ romshis position of 
pre-eminence. 
55 In practice, then, no hierarchy of honour 
will be absolutely rigid, and inferiors may be intensely 
determined to protect their honour against even their acknow- 
ledged superiors. To these considerations we might add that 
oyt 
the Melians might well point! that there is no acnowledged 
hierarchy of Greek e's, that all are free and call no man 
their master. Thus the Athenians' argument, though based on 
traditional notions, will fail unless the Melians abandon 
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their commitment to other, equally traditional notions. 
In urging their partners in the dialogue, moreover, to aban- 
don their aischune with regard to becoming the subjects of 
Athens, while counselling them to bear the disgrace of defeat 
in mind, the Athenians also seem to be attempting to have 
their cake and eat it, since it is unlikely that the Melians, 
having accepted that defeat is aischron, even when one is 
defeated by superior opponents, will then accept that giving 
up one's independence is not aischro, precisely because 
one's opponents are superior. 
It should be clear from this discussion that the Melian Dia- 
logue is not simply an abstract treatise on the nature of 
power: the Athenians recognize that the Melians' aischune, 
together with other, more or less moral notions, will be a 
hindrance to them, and so they attempt to eliminate it. 
56 
Similarly, those who see the Dialogue as the illustration of 
the Athenians' drop to the very depths of immoralism are 
unlikely to be right, firstly because it is clear that they 
are simply using the arguments they feel to be necessary, 
some of which are traditional, some "sophistic", in order to 
bring about a convenient, and bloodless, resolution of the 
matter, 
57 
and secondly because their arguments are strikingly 
similar to those of the Athenian spokesmen at 1.76.2-3, who 
also mention that it is natural that the strong should rule 
the weak: the spokesmen in book 1, it is often pointed out, 
58 
claim that they themselves act with justice, though they 
need not, but so, too, in effect, do the ambassadors to 
Melos, who promise that the Melians will be treated moderately 
if they give in, and go so far as to claim that moderation 
towards one's inferiors is the best policy (111.4). The 
arguments of the Athenians at Melos, then, do not represent a 
decline in the moral standpoint of the city's spokesmen from 
the position at the beginning of the war. 
59 
It is not only the thought of these passages which is impor- 
tant for our purposes, however: in 111 in particular, the 
terms aischune and aischros are used with a remarkable degree 
470 
of fluidity. Aischune, for example, occurs in both its sub- 
jective and objective senses, as the sense of shame (= a dos) 
which does men most harm in the midst of "ugly dangers" (i. e. 
when there is a danger of utter, and disgraceful, ruin), and 
as the disgrace which is more disgraceful when caused by 
one's own stupidity. 
60 From the next sentence it appears 
that, in the usage of Thucydides, r& ociºx 
V is undergoing 
a similar development to that which is manifest in the two 
usages of aischune: for just as aischune, which first 
appeared as "disgrace", came to signify also "sense of shame", 
so in this passage TO a, 4X( 
J, 
with its "attractive name", is 
not "the disgraceful", but "thought (or fear) of the disgrace- 
ful", i. e. the sense of honour, or aidos. There is also an 
interesting periphrasis for misplaced ad s/aischun in 111. 
4, where the obstructive preoccupation with honour is desc- 
ribed as rot )(t"(" 
JkX'vtkyi(st, 
which suggests that the desire 
to avoid disgrace can be seen in terms of its converse, the 
appetite for success. 
In two passages the idea that military defeat is aischron 
occurs in connexion with the position of the Peloponnesians 
at the time of the Peace of Nikias. At 6.10.2 Nikias himself 
expresses the belief that the truce was made at a time when 
the situation of the enemy was more aischrcj than that of 
the Athenians, i. e. the Peloponnesians had come off worse in 
the Archidamian war, while at 6.11.6 he urges the Athenians 
to be cautious, and to imagine that the Spartans are doing 
nothing but 
iL. c TV 4 rW cJ 6 K4vrfrLV c1rw -r/ C'w d rt k' 4 vv' I I 0 6, %/wiac( 
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I 
seems to cover the ideas ofýboth "dis- 
grace" and "reaction to disgrace", while, as in 5.111.4, 
aprepes is used as variatio for aischron. Nikias clearly 
believes that the Spartans' renowned sense of honour will 
prove stronger than any obligation they might feel to honour 
the treaty which he himself negotiated, and thus his appeal 
to realism rather than justice does recall something of the 
61 
atmosphere of the Melian Dialogue, but Nikias' realism, 
471 
while it does recognize that the Spartans are more likely to 
act in their own interest than out of a concern for justice, 
also encompasses a recognition that considerations of nati- 
onal prestige are often as important as the evaluation of 
one's immediate material advantage, and this is a thought 
which his compatriots in the Melian Dialogue would rather 
play down. 
In the same context (that of the debate over the expedition 
to Sicily) Nikias also finds it necessary to deny the approp- 
riateness of aischune in certain circumstances, when he 
imagines that the older citizens may fear the charge of 
cowardice from the young and so be reluctant to vote against 
the enterprise (6.13.1): 
62 
Ko ti VZ' me rfývrrC i-3 äVT-L-r eOCK(0, C-VrXL /VtJ Koý%cc6ý(ýv8"ýac 
Et Tw ft$ -Trot( o(Blo, 1gfac. -rwvcIE 
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ý 
räV 
A {l d t51Ta The irrational impulse of aischune, Nikias recognizes, may 
overcome one's better judgement and lead one to conform as a 
result of the social pressure exerted by the more vociferous. 
The aischune which he attempts to forestall is thus based on 
appearance rather than facts, and on the judgement of others 
rather than one's own opinion of oneself. As it turns out, 
his attempt is unsuccessful, and the vote for the expedition 
is carried without conspicuous opposition because of the 
aischun of many in the assembly (6.24.4): 
W rt"& 
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Thucydides ascribes the conformity of these people to fear, 
but since the fear in question is directed towards the 
adverse judgement of others, towards "how it will look if 
... 
", it seems legitimate to conclude that the historian is 
describing the operation of the aischune which Nikias tried 
to forestall: but although the citizens opposed to the expe- 
dition are represented as keeping silent out of gLischune, 
their embarrassment does not take exactly the form which 
Nikias feared it would: for whereas Nikias envisaged the 
fear of being called a coward, the fear of being considered 
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weak, the citizens in 6.24.4 keep silent out of a fear that 
they will be considered unpatriotic; Nikias thus imagines 
aischune at individual failure, while the historian hiicelf 
presents a reluctance to be considered lacking in one's 
commitment to others, one's fellow citizens. 
After the arrival of the expedition in Sicily, we find Alki- 
biades giving voice to the commonplace that it is aischron 
to return from an enterprise with nothing to show for it 
(6.48.1) : 
63 
Kt/3 L CI S ýE u Lf ýl 
1i ?cv, c, t 1ýýu. TL1 c(v s(/A, (. F EV - 
rgVr cS at f,?, C w3 k-O(A 
Xlre 
of <TZNý ä'r (K Among the Sici- 
lians themselves the threat from the Athenians is frequently 
expressed in terms 'offreedom against slavery, kalon against 
aischron. At 6.80.5 Hermokrates urges the Syracusans /441 PeAlews 
tfta, TcTX, 3 and at 7.56.2 that community is represented 
as considering the kalon to be achieved in the conflict with 
the Athenians. 64 This point is echoed by their ally, Gylippos, 
at 7.66.1, and it is he who goes on to remind them of the 
consequences of defeat - slavery, "unseemly" treatment of 
women and children and an a4'r; 4Lrrj tTi'i K, 4 r(3 for the whole 
city (7.68.2). 
So far we have seen whole states or armies being urged col- 
lectively to pursue rö , 1akä4 and avoid 1-0 mir 
V: in this 
way the concern for honour appears to work collectively on 
groups very much as it does on individuals, and, indeed, we 
do find that the prominent individuals of the history are 
also motivated by similar concerns, often to the extent that 
they promote certain policies or take certain decisions, the 
results of which will affect the entire state, out of concern 
for their own personal prestige. This is particularly true 
of Nikias and Alkibiades: at 5.16.1 Nikias is represented as 
contemplating his reputation in the eyes of posterity as he 
attempts to secure the peace which bears his name, 
65 
while 
Alkibiades, we are told, proceeds to wreck the peace at least 
partly because he regarded it as a slight to his honour that 
the Spartans had negotiated with Nikias and Laches rather 
than himself (5.43.2). 66 At 6.15.2 doxa forms part of his 
motivation in supporting the Sicilian expedition, while in 
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his speech in the following chapter he reminds the Athenians 
of his own time. 
67 His famous speech to the Spartans also 
reveals that his regard for his own status is paramount 
(6.89), 68 and at 8.82.3 he is portrayed as wishing to appear 
i 
-fLLW n (tS to Tissaphernes. 
69 
Nikias' concern for his repu- 
tations revealed at 7.48.4, where part of his reluctance to 
return to Athens from Sicily stems from fear of punishment 
for his failure, part from the fear that such punishment 
would, because of the discreditable nature of the charge (e-rl 
aI ä Tr air ), ruin the good name which he was so keen to 
preserve at 5.16.1.7 
ý 
It is not only in the sphere of competitive values, however, 
that states and individuals are subject to the same, more or 
less personal motives: we also find that aischune, kalon and 
aischron are as relevant to the co-operative ties between 
states as they are to the obligations of personal phi. lia, 
and, in particular, the requirement to return favours is 
mentioned just as often in the area of international diplo- 
macy as it might be among personal i oi. 
71 
At book 1.32ff. Kerkyraian and Corinthian ambassadors address 
the Athenians, speaking for and against an alliance between 
Kerkyra and Athens. 
72 The former point out that they have no 
claim on Athenian services, since neither have they supported 
them in the past nor are they members of their alliance, and 
so they confine themselves to the advantages which an alli- 
ance between the two cities would bring (1.32.1). The Corin- 
thians, on the other hand, employ an argument based on justice 
and honour, referring initially only to the supposed rights 
and wrongs of their dispute with Kerkyra: 
73 
an important 
part of their attempt to convince the Athenians of their 
opponents' injustice is their portrayal of their anaischuntia, 
which, although the Corinthians' language is extremely vague, 
seems to consist in failure to observe proper standards in 
relations with other states. 
The Corinthians' remarks on their opponents' anaischuntia 
occur in chapter 37. At 32.4 the Kerkyraians had referred to 
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their previous opinion, now abandoned, that their policy of 
neutrality represented 5ophrosyn, in that it freed them 
from the danger of being implicated in an ally's mistakes. 
At 37.2 the Corinthians, since theirs is the moral argument, 
interpret this statement with an exclusively moral emphasis, 
and take the Kerkyraians`sophrosyne not as a claim to pru- 
dence, but as a claim to quiet moral virtue: the Kerkyraians, 
they say, avoided alliances not out of arete, the desire to 
be morally right, but with a view to kakourgia, 
74 in order 
that they might proceed with their adikemata without the 
need to experience aischune at the opinion any witnesses to 
their misdeeds might have of them. In their view, then, one 
feels aischune when one's misdeeds are witnessed, and would 
prefer that they remain undetected. 
75 This is one possible 
view of the operation of shame as a check against wrongdoing, 
the idea that shame requires witnesses to be effective, and, 
as we have seen, it is a view shared by many, both in our 
ancient sources76 and in the discussions of modern commenta- 
tors: 
77 it is, however, for reasons outlined above, unlikely 
to be absolutely right. 
78 
The speeches of both sides at this point in the work are 
clearly influenced by sophistic rhetorical theory: the Ker- 
kyraians represent the argument from -rö while the 
argument of the Corinthians is based on, 4 the Corin- 
thians, moreover, since their opponents expend no great 
energy on putting forward the justice of their case, are 
driven both to propose the kind of positive moral construc- 
tion which might be placed upon the Kerkyraians' previous 
conduct, and to demolish this impression by interpreting the 
same conduct in a negative moral light. Since it is the 
Corinthians' main aim to blacken their opponents by means of 
rhetoric, they are led into a slight inconsis tency: they 
claim that the Kerkyraians possess sufficient regard for 
their reputation for quiet moral arete to attempt to conceal 
their misdeeds from others, and, at 37.4, they develop this 
point by alleging that their opponents devised rl EvireET 5 
Pirroyöov as a cover for their immorality, rather than as a 
way of avoiding being drawn into the immorality of others. 
79 
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At the same time, however, they go on to accuse them of 
anaischuntia, in that they persist in acting unjustly and 
have no concern for decency or justice provided they may 
make some gain (ibid. ): 
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Thus the Corinthians seek thoroughly to blacken their oppo- 
nents, yet they do so by claiming both that they devise fair- 
seeming arguments, themselves largely a product of the Corin- 
thians' imagination, to conceal their misdeeds, and that 
they have no regard at all for propriety in pursuing their 
own advantage. 
The Corinthians refer indirectly to the Kerkyraians' anais- 
chuntia (anaideia) once more at 38.5: <o 
&J vlJ 
C Kü 
aoä J Io V 0ýº^ Eý/ 7L 6 ýE ýtýJ Eit Oct 7-11 
4 (of C, /' yº ß'1r L V, 4fE 041 
cx(6L0. & -id7 1N 
, 
t. 1lLoT1-'ra . The Corinthians claim that 
they-have a right to respect from their colonies (cf. 38.2, 
Doc wscýr4ýat 
, 38.3, -rV 
vtcV), 
as superior does from inferior 
or parent from child, and, in implying that the Kerkyraians 
have been deficient in this respect, indirectly accuse them 
of lacking the aidos which one owes one's superiors. As did 
those of the Athenians at 5.111.4,80 their arguments rest on 
the idea of a hierarchy of honour, in which the inferior 
must give in to the superior, but which also requires that 
the superior behave with moderation towards the inferior. It 
is perhaps possible that the Corinthians envisage a situation 
in which the Kerkyraians might be satisfied with their own 
knowledge that they had acted KNh"'S by giving in, while the 
Corinthians had acted ateýeuj by using force, but more pro- 
bably they regard international opinion as a powerful sanc- 
tion against excessive behaviour on the part of individual 
states, and imagine that the Kerkyraians might draw some 
satisfaction from both the praise they would enjoy on account 
of their moderation and the censure incurred by the Corin- 
thians' excessive violence. The view, however, that the 
community of Greek states is concerned with the injustice of 
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its members is an idealistic one: it clearly suits the Corin- 
thians to propound it here, but the Athenians, although in 
other circumstances they might put forward similar views, 
are not susceptible to it in the present instance, and decide 
to support the Kerkyraians out of regard for their own inte- 
rests (1.44.1-3). 
81 It is, in fact, fairly clear that the 
Corinthians' pursuit of the moral argument rests entirely on 
their image of themselves as the wronged party, and thus, 
since the Athenians, who have no real interest in the quarrel 
over Epidamnos, decide on the basis of self-interest and the 
Corinthians only resort to the argument from principle 
because it suits them to do so, it appears from this episode 
that it is out of a desire to maximise their self-interest 
that states conduct themselves, regardless of ideas of prop- 
riety in international relations which undoubtedly exist. 
Between states which are allies, as we have said, the stand- 
ards which are felt to obtain are largely identical to those 
which apply to personal philia. This much emerges from Perik- 
-les' words at 2.40.4: 
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The idealistic remarks on the relative merits of different 
kinds of obligation do not immediately concern us, but it is 
important that proper behaviour towards one's philoi is seen 
as part of arete, 
82 
and that this is felt to hold good for 
cities-as well as for individuals. Given that it is part of 
arete to behave properly towards one's philoi, the aidos/ 
aischune one might experience at betraying a friend, and 
thus proving oneself kakos, should, in theory, be intense. 
Like the Corinthians in 1.38.5, the Mytilenean ambassadors 
at Olympia in book 3 assume that breaches of obligation bet- 
ween states are frowned upon by the community of city-states, 
but, at the same time, and unlike the Corinthians, they also 
recognize that disapproval of the betrayal of one state by 
Ianother 
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is not allowed to interfere with considerations of national 
self-interest - it is an established custom, they claim (3.9. 
1), that states welcome the defection of their enemies' 
allies, yet remain suspicious of those who have broken faith: 
VGýt. t[ vvtLS cN Et v., t -T (D[; rs3 -rz v 1r &-t, 
¢ LU4 x H' WS YGVVrX-C . 
The Mytileneans are thus realistic enough to recognize that 
no state is going to reject a potential ally who could prove 
useful, but at the same time their desire to convince the 
Peloponnesians that they did not, in fact, betray the Athen- 
ians reveals that a community might, nonetheless, be acutely 
concerned for its reputation for loyalty to its allies. 
83 
it 
seems, then, that aidos over a breach of philia may affect 
an entire city. 
84 
In conclusion to their speech at 14.1 the Mytileneans appeal 
to a moral principle of a rather different kind as a means 
of eliciting Peloponnesian support, representing themselves, 
figuratively, as suppliants, and asking the Peloponnesians 
to grant their requests ý'rvv& 6vrs-S """ -rots -r-F- -r-. v 
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This appeal recalls the Athenian statement of 
their commitment to the cause of Hellenic freedom at Herodo- 
tos 9.7a. 2,85 and rests on similar assumptions regarding the 
specifically Hellenic ideal that the independence of indivi- 
dual city-states should be protected. The hopes of the Greeks, 
the Mytileneans claim, are invested in the Peloponnesians as 
liberators, and it is aischron to betray either these hopes 
or the god who underwrites the principle on which they are 
based. 86 
The concept of hp ilia is also of the greatest importance in 
the speeches delivered by the Plataians and the Thebans 
later in book 3. That friendship or enmity is a central issue 
of the debate on the fate of the Plataians is stated in sim- 
ple terms by the Plataians themselves at 3.54.2, where they 
ask whether the Spartans consider them philoi or pglemioi: 
if the former, then it is the Spartans who are in the wrong 
in attacking them without provocation. This, in turn, raises 
the question of justice, for if the Spartans consider the 
Plataians their enemies, then they cannot claim that they 
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have been-wronged (Kif the Plataians have not 
treated them as friends. 
The justice of the Plataians' own position is the issue at 
55.3 -Ei' 
AU1v wv ýý It vý d F%ý Q. c 
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14ikw V This statement they explain with reference 
to Athenian help against the Thebans, and to the demands of 
honour in an alliance in which a bond of chars exists bet- 
ween two willing parties - Kok" -rCefJi&výýcc DtJ1- 
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It is thus both dikaion and ccalon to maintain one's obliga- 
tions to one's philoi. At 56.4-5 the Plataians adduce the 
argument from ilia and charis in yet another way, claiming 
that the Spartans are obliged to show gratitude for the 
Plataian contribution to the repulse of the Persians in 
480-79. 
The Plataians, then, are urging the Spartans to take the 
proper moral course, the course which might be dictated by 
ads, and the appeal to aidos becomes more explicit in 57.1: 
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The Spartans are reminded, then, of their reputation for 
andraaathia87 and of the fact that the eyes of the rest of 
the Greeks are fixed upon them, particularly since the pre- 
sent conflict involves parties of such renown. The community 
of city states, they claim, takes a dim view of injustice 
and ingratitude, and their disapproval can affect one's 
Grete. 
Having once introduced it, the Plataians proceed to develop 
the argument from the Spartans' reputation: they remind them 
of their former alliance and of the arete shown by their 
fathers in the cause of Hellas, and ask, as a favour which 
ought to be returned, that they should not kill acs ... i 
'Te&-rk, but rather Gw¢pava Tc- prvr. al'd'KS ýcw, 4o, 4e (O" cx rI'll ci 
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kýcti ý1M1 ýýGýýý c c/ ricS pýý' &t5 KvtKlwV aV-roS ocvIrL)% &tV . 
To 
kill former friends, then, would be aischron, the Plataians 
claim, 
88 
and would expose the Spartans to a charge of $akia. 
The threat of loss of reputation is then put even more 
bluntly (58.2) : SpaXu yse ti rä A 6w:. tea JLOCý6"Le, cc 
elcklrGGJ Se 
7jV urKX(-A, eV xürcv 
ä¢ 
6tvL`IL1 . The Plataians then 
continue in this vein until the end of their speech, remind- 
ing the Spartans particularly of the need to preserve their 
own reputation, of the Plataians' past services, of the in 
Spartan dead who lie/Plataian soil, the danger both of fal- 
ling short of their standards and of dishonouring their 
graves, and adding, as a further consideration, the fact 
that the Plataians laid down their arms and came forward as 
suppliants (3.58-9). 
89 All these arguments are based on 
standards which aidos traditionally helps enforce, and so 
the conclusion that the Plataians' main purpose is to arouse 
the Spartans' sense of aidos is inescapable. 
The Thebans (3.60) are worried lest the Spartans succumb to 
this kind of argumentation, and so request leave to argue 
against the Plataians. In opposing them, however, they never- 
theless rely on similar standards of justice and propriety, 
and seek to prove that the present generation of Plataians 
deservesno special consideration. Thus, while much of their 
speech consists of self-defence against Plataian attacks on 
the conduct of the previous generation of Thebans, they also 
answer their opponents directly at several points. At 63.3-4, 
in particular, they attempt to refute the Plataian claim 
that it would have been aischron for them to betray their 
allies, the Athenians: 
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The Thebans, then, agree that it is aischron to betray one's 
allies, yet, turning the Plataians' references to the situ- 
ation of 480-79 to their own advantage, regard the betrayal 
of the Plataians' former allies as more ischrp_D than that 
of their alliance with the Athenians would have been. For 
the Thebans, as indeed for the Plataians (cf. 58.1), the 
manner in which ties of friendship are maintained is also 
important: by following the Athenians in their enslavement 
of Greece the Plataians have "given back unequal charis", 
turning a debt owed on a just basis into one repaid on a 
basis of injustice. The Thebans maintain, then, that an ally 
should consider justice rather than the obligations of alli- 
ance when these seem to demand co-operation in injustice, 
and this is the opposite of the implication of the words of 
the Corinthians at 1.37.4,90 which seem to assume that a 
state may be drawn into injustice out of loyalty to its 
allies. Clearly, however, this is a moral dilemma which each 
state would have to work out for itself, and probably neither 
of these two statements on the subject is a definitive 
solution to the problem, although it must be said that the 
position of the Thebans is in no way untenable. 
At 66.2 the Thebans point out that the Plataians also killed 
men who stretched out their hands in supplication (namely 
the Thebans taken prisoner after the initial attack on 
Plataia), and thus dismiss their opponents' observations on 
the nomos that such people should not be killed (58.3), 
implying that the Plataians' initial adiki calls forth ret- 
ribution and that they, too, have committed aischra. They 
attempt to shame the Plataians in a more direct manner at 
67.2, turning their own arguments on their past arete against 
them: if the Plataians ever did show any arete, their present 
conduct is doubly aischron and deserves twice the punishment, 
since it represents a betrayal of their inherited excellence 
41 .1 ( OTL avK 114 -rcCcýhº. ýovrwJ 
äýý{-r ), and thus a betrayal 
of their forefathers. 
91 'The Thebans do not necessarily want 
the Plataians to experience aidos here, but they are trying 
to annoy them by implicating them in disgrace. 
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All these speeches, those of the Plataians and Thebans, of 
the Mytileneans at Olympia, of the Corinthians at Athens, 
refer to justice, Phil ia, -fö K«. ked and iri. cGiNAeov with great 
regularity, and are thus strikingly unlike the most celeb- 
rated of Thucydidean speeches, such as the Melian Dialogue 
or the debate over Mytilene, in which Athenian speakers, 
particularly, avoid references to these concepts and depre- 
ciate their worth. It seems most likely, to this reader at 
least, that it is the hi is/justice" speeches which rep- 
resent the kind of argument actually employed in the course 
of international diplomacy, rather than the austerely prac- 
tical arguments in speeches of the other kind, and so we 
should be prepared to recognize that references to standards 
which are normally upheld by aidos were probably crucial to 
the language of the fifth century diplomatic,. exchange, but 
neither should we be in any doubt as to the historian's low 
opinion of the efficacy of such arguments. In the Plataian 
debate, in particular, nothing is more striking than the ir- 
relevance of the arguments of both the Plataians and the 
Thebans on justice and -rä Koc)c 
öd to the Spartans' eventual 
decision, for, while the Spartans justify their decision to 
put the Plataians to death in terms of justice (claiming 
that the Plataians broke the treaty they had made with Pau- 
sanias and were first to harm the Spartans, 68.1), the his- 
torian makes it clear that he himself believed that they 
acted as they did to gratify the Thebans, whom they regarded 
as useful to them at that time (68.4). This, in fact, is the 
general pattern in such episodes. It seems probable, then, 
that the speeches in which self-interest alone is stressed 
represent the historian's own appreciation of the issues in- 
volved, while those in which Justice and -ro Kvk are promi- 
nent reflect more closely the type of arguments which might 
actually be employed. 
This is not to say, however, that Thucydides necessarily ap- 
proved of the concentration on expediency over justice in 
international affairs. His own ideas on the role of morality 
in international politicsare hard to pin down, but it is 
perhaps significant that in the context of personal philia, 
482 
at least, he subscribes to the belief that it is part of 
aee to help one's friends. 
92 He might, then, agree with 
the Plataians that it is a sign of kakis for a city to fail 
to honour its obligations of charis (3.58.1), while appreci- 
ating that such considerations will not normally outweigh a 
state's calculation of its own advantage. 
93 
From 4.19.2-4 it appears that a cessation of hostilities can, 
but need not, create a state of philia between erstwhile 
enemies. The Spartans, at this point., are seeking to come to 
terms as a result of the setback they have suffered at Sphak- 
teria, and claim that it is better to dissolve enmity by 
coming to a moderate and fair settlement than to attempt to 
force one's opponents to agree to one's own terms. When one 
makes an agreement -rr vj ro ä1 k(_U($ Kor i äCrrh , as they claim 
they wish to do, 
iL&& 
/t(W &IC JViI rý vý. ý, ý. cxýocý/ Koci 
ckL'ocV -r[-ukh KoA vircK rIr1rO( CS ähhajhais V 7ret(y, e-i Va debt of 
charis is created between the two signatories, with the 
result that o ý&t ww/ yoý( WS 
s (oc ýe H. Sý öc »k' äVT-, ýo IOU [w ETr1v/, ETD CS 8'T iV ou r, \vVJ 
Irw6v/ 01, vvs-e6To . Again, the reciprocal relationship 
between philoi is described as arete, and aischune (in its 
subjective sense here, as a synonym of aidos) ensures that 
the agreement is observed. The Spartans thus represent the 
course commended by honour and moderation as that which is 
also most advantageous (making for fewer problems in the 
future), and it seems that the historian, to judge from his 
disapproval of his fellow-citizens' rejection of terms, 
94 
agrees with their assessment, but it is also clear that the 
Spartans' desire for fairness and moderation stems largely 
from their position of inferiority at the present stage of 
the conflict, and we should not forget that Nikias' observa- 
tions95 that the Spartans are more concerned with the pre- 
servation and enhancement of their doxa appear to be justi- 
fied by events. While, then, it appears from the present 
passage that a moderate and honourable settlement involving 
an alliance for the future may have been the most advantage- 
ous course for both sides, the Athenians' rejection of the 
offer and the idea that the Spartans would not be constrained 
483 
by the obligations inherent in a peace treaty both suggest 
that in reality ambition and concern for national pres- 
tige tend to preclude the recognition that the course which, 
is reasonable and honourable may also be the most expedient. 
At 4.64.3 the Syracusan, Hermokrates, employs an argument 
based on phi is in an attempt to unite the other Sicilians, 
at present split by differences among themselves, against 
the Athenians. With this in mind he claims that, by virtue 
of their sharing the same island and being called by a com- 
mon name, the Sicilians are as much kin to each other as are 
Dorians to Dorians or Chalkidians to Chalkidians: as a result, 
the competitive standards which obtain among those bound by 
no tie of phi l is do not apply- oý cSEý ýa( X? rýC j' 
i 0LKEiaIli 
of ýý - wJ v) rira! 
O, k . The gnome is conventional enough, 
but the 
application of the term oikeioi to the disparate ethnic 
communities of Sicily is questionable. 
In the Melian Dialogue, as we have seen, the Athenians at- 
tempt to exclude moral considerations from the discussion, 
while for the Melians questions of aischune etc. arise. 
96 
As 
well as raising the subject of their own aischune, however, 
the Melians also refer to the possibility of Spartan aischune 
should they fail to help their allies. The Spartans will 
intervene to help their allies, the Melians claim, if for no 
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(5.104). The Athenians, however, are contemptuous of what 
they regard as the Melians' naivete here (105.3), -res cý; 
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and go on to claim that the Spartans consider 
only their own interests in their dealings with other states: 
although they act in accordance with ae 
98 in respect of 
their own customs and institutions, towards others they con- 
sider only their own advantage, and -röc /4J 
oc 
KkkK V ov4Lý ovrrL ) 
. roc cS 
ý 
uun4 tt&vr.. cýc (ý . 
99 The truth of this has already been 
amply demonstrated in the Plataian episode. The Melians, 
however, have a good answer for the Athenians on this point, 
and remark (106) that it ems in the Spartans' interest not to 
484 
acquire a reputation for betraying their allies, lest they 
alienate those well disposed to them and provide the enemy 
with valuable propaganda to use against them. 
100 In this en- 
lightened view, then, justice and self-interest can coincide, 
101 
and this is exactly the position which might be taken by 
Demokritos, Sokrates or Antiphon. The Melians, in essence, 
appeal to the idea of ultimate self-interest, which may dif- 
fer from immediate self-interest, but this is a point which 
is lost on the Athenians of the dialogue, who, in 107, per- 
sist in regarding Tö teoJ as that which is most con- 
venient for the Spartans in the short term. The lessons 
imparted by the secession of Athens' allies on a large scale 
later in the war, however, perhaps suggest that the city's 
concentration on its immediate advantage had blinded it to 
the nature of its ultimate self-interest, and thus might go 
some way towards proving that the kind of argument employed 
by the Melians in 106 is a cogent one. 
102 
In the case of the Melians there is no evidence that the 
Spartans were influenced to intervene, whether for reasons 
of justice or for those of self-interest. Significantly, 
however, the Spartans' most articulate spokesman, Brasidas, 
is represented as referring to exactly those concerns raised 
by the Melians in 5.106, in that, in attempting to win the 
propaganda battle among the allies of the Athenians, he 
claims both that the Spartans are genuinely concerned to 
treat any states which might secede with justice, and that 
it is in the Spartans' interests to do so. Such is his 
argument in his speech to the people of Akanthos at 4.86.5-6: 
ºýýa t x. c K Eift rEý. c Y oe eav -r1$ akkv vk W oae X IS 1-11 
'r6 n . at, u. vt. oLJ VVK oc v-r . '1COVwV x mC LS 
KadL Roc, tTa avrt 
öt -r S its of 
OS 
`1 S aria /.. Ckk od "s -ý -rtivs ) /ý Aºý ýaü ws 
CýýK%lývýoýrl KovrrTre, ýja, wreL AV AAWO K EXBLNvK 
ºý o v'rtocýEýýocý ae c-rºýJ ocra K`fwttv0L . oc-R'ory ö°LC 
EU-r Mf"L #I, % 1c TLI5 "'E 
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Once again arete is identified with justice, equity and the 
honourable motive of freeing states from subjection to Athens, 
485 
and time and doxa, are seen as the rewards which such Grete 
brings. That which would be worse than rule by another state 
is Spartan intervention in the internal affairs of cities 
which secede from the Athenian alliance, and Brasidas claims 
that this would be the case because such Spartan intervention 
would be a betrayal of their previous claim to aee, and 
so aischron, even more aischron than the pursuit of profit 
by force. Brasidas' reassurance of his audience is thus very 
subtle, in that he suggests that the Spartans will remain 
true to their promises to act with justice simply because it 
is in their own interests to do so: for whoever would choose 
an aitia and the implication of a jvw x'&K&s rather than 
time and doxa? It seems fairly certain, then, that Brasidas 
is convinced of the value of justice in dealing with other 
states, not least because he is aware that the argument from 
justice and-rL KtcI can prove efficacious and offer the 
Athenians' allies an honourable motive for giving in to 
Spartan pressure. The pressure, however, is still there: 
Brasidas threatens to lay waste the Akanthians' land (87.3), 
and while the latter are impressed by his attractive argu- 
ments, their decision to give in is also motivated by fear 
for their crops (88.1). 
There is a minor example of the operation of the Salon/ 
aischron standard in the context of proper behaviour among 
states at 8.45.4, where Alkibiades describes the Chians as 
anaischuntoi in requesting aid from Tissaphernes in order to 
revolt from Athens, and their anaischuntia seems to lie in 
their attempt to induce others to take trouble on their be- 
half when they have the resorces to help themselves (lt)covrL 
i 
titaivTo vvrt-S -rwv `EN\j11ºJ1 ), although it may also have involved 
their pleading poverty when their wealth was well known. 
103 
We have seen that philia between states operates in very 
much the same way as does personal philia. It is, as one 
might expect, in the sphere of international politics that 
il' is most prominent in the work, but references to per- 
sonal philia do occur, and one in particular shows how iden- 
tical standards obtain in both kinds. At 2.51.5 the identi- 
486 
fication of proper behaviour towards philoi with ae is 
made by the historian himself: of ere erIS -TL , u-rOrTrVLVVýAkVoL 
he informs us, were most likely to die of plague as a result 
of contact with others, oc, 4' i (I Vy 
ä{ 
Eivavd r4 ' XU_rwd 
ed tcv i-S 
Ttaeä -r w3 
ýLx0vs 
. This aischune, the impulse to act in 
accordance with arete, might perhaps be identified with a 
feeling that society expected one to care for one's philoi, 
but in anyone who would expose himself to a fatal disease as 
a result of such aischune the feeling must have become deeply 
internalized. This passage, in fact, is a good example of 
the way in which terms which often describe the self-regard- 
ing concern for one's own position may also be used of beha- 
viour which benefits others much more than it benefits one- 
self. 
Personal hp ilia is also relevant in a much less significant 
way at 2.97.4, where we learn that the Odrysian Thracians, 
unlike the kings of Persia, believed that one should receive 
gifts rather than give them, and that it was aischion not to 
give a gift when asked than to ask for one and fail to 
receive it. Only the use of aischron in the context of the 
reciprocal process of philia need concern us here. 
It only remains to comment on some passage which do not fit 
readily into any of the categories outlined above. At 1.5.1 
we are told that, in days gone by, piracy did not involve 
its practitioners in disgrace (aischune), but rather brought 
them renown (doxa). It is the attitude of those who were not 
pirates which is important here, since presumably anyone who 
chose to be a pirate would be unlikely to spend his life 
feeling ashamed of his profession, and this is why Thucydides 
goes on refer to the question, found in "the older poets", 
104 
as to whether those who put in to land were pirates: this 
question, he writes, assumes both that those questioned 
would find nothing reprehensible in the practice of piracy 
(O '-""" OC-n-4t &vvrwq ) and that those asking were unlikely 
to reproach them for it (O'( 0vKftfovrwv/ ). Presumably, in 
the absence of any coercive state only those who were the 
victims of piracy would find anything wrong with it. 
487 
One passage in Perikles' Funeral Speech touches on the rela- 









ýtnä floc Ov it CKVU TWq Tk- acs E-C tv ä(A(1 ° VTwV 
A We 0 of S&L K4A -T-WV Vu 
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wY66LL 
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q E/ ovseV 
The problem of the precise eäning of "unwritten law", and 
whether the expression can always be related to an identifi- 
able corpus of unwritten laws, is a vexed one, 
105 
and this 
particular passage does not make a particularly decisive 
contribution to any possible resolution, but a few general 
points might still be made. First of all, since Perikles 
claims at 37.1 that Athens differs from other states in her 
nomoi, it would appear that the nom of 37.3 have a more or 
less Athenian character, and thus that the unwritten nomoi 
are not to be related to laws which are common to all men. 
106 
This does not mean, however, that Perikles has a specific 
Athenian collection of unwritten laws in mind, 
107 
since the 
reference to the "recognized disgrace" which results from 
breaches of these standards suggests not specific imperatives 
but Athenian belief in general; agraphos nomos in this pas- 
sage most probably indicates the general body of moral atti- 
tudes which one could declare with some confidence to be 
held by most Athenians; anything which the Athenians con- 
sidered aischron might be proscribed by an agraphos nomos. 
It is, however, with the use of aischune rather than the 
meaning of nomos that we are chiefly concerned, and so the 
main points to note are the association of fear of aischune 
and fear per se as the forces which ensure obedience to law 
and custom, 
108 
and the application of the adjective o)"CkIvu- 
ýn, vv)ý to ac, 4rývvi4 , which suggesta9both the possibility of 
disagreement over what is aischron and, more importantly, 
the idea that the members of a political community are (must 
be? ) in general agreement over moral values. Both the iden- 
tification of fear and fear of disgrace as the factors which 
ensure justice in the state and the mention of agreement 
suggest the influence of Protagorean political theory in this 
passage, and in our final chapter we shall return to this 
488 
theory and the opposition to it. 
110 
Perikles returns to the topic of aischune in a subsequent 
passage of his speech (2.40.1 ), where he claims -IT"Aovrw Tt- 
E jv eck(o1/ Ka1, l(W I 
i( C, ý GV Kuµ-r[ wXOwt4 oý Koe I rr -T(-; EVf6- 
eaý Gtj XC il"AC J'J-n. vL P"d c(Olj ýckkýc ýý"c¢cvyKý taw xt co\4 Here 
Perikles distances his city from the tendency to regard 
poverty as something of which one should be ashamed. 
III In 
Athens, he suggests, it is not poverty itself which is the 
disgrace, but failure to take active steps to escape it. 
Thus it is a person's intentions which he values, rather 
than the outward impression created by his circumstances, and 
the absence of initiative is more disgraceful than poverty 
itself. It is notable that, while Perikles claims that it is 
not aischron to admit poverty, he nevertheless assumes that 
poverty is aischron, since, for it to be true that not to 
strive to escape poverty is aischron, it must also follow 
that the condition of poverty is discreditable in itself. 
112 
At 2.52.4 a connexion is to be found between nomoi, in the 
sense of social and religious imperatives, and anaischuntia 
in the description of the effects of the plague on traditi- 
onal burial customs: 
1/ Ul 'f !- 'Tier VrEf VVK oýý ocx vý öoý OSL xe W VT O -Ire 
GT Eýev "1L t' 
*1 It 7'0. ToL4 e'&. :Q wS E 
Kotä'fOS Vo,, r& . Icwt -TC'e, 
XX LS 
of voa4r v;. ravs &' ºCoc. S ýTy ocoýevra a-t-aý. vfc -rwg 
E-trvrjIE-CwJ SLoc 
-r f vý(v&vs Lj (1 -r[e &. r-& `fit vou/oe-t T¢L 
it VE "Ta -tn. 1[ 'S yae Of 
i0 
-re Ias4 Et o« owr&$ -t - V1 row/rk 0,4- 
t-rrc. Er F VT 
C oW'fW\( vL Kp 
cý 
u4 I-'i`rI'V) Cc J-E Kle-t ilIN or 
hh ej Otrt vttý 
Dc VW YC4 0Vjy GL EV o'-wj ro v. 
The sentence Iii -Rv(KS ýlf "". 
Uexplains 
the sense in which 
the methods of burial here referred to are anaischuntoi: 
113 
cremating the body of one's own relative on a pyre made for 
someone else or throwing it on a pyre which is already aflame 
indicates a lack of regard for established norms of behaviour 
and for the opirý ions or feelings of other people, especially 
SOW- iGýAäive" of +4 
those of the4deceased person for whom the pyre was built. 
i 114 
Erffa14 does not explain 
äWtitr)(vvrovs 
, but his compari- 
son of S. Aj. 1306-7,1356 and j. 245ff., where aidos, in a 
489 
general way, promotes proper burial, is apposite. 
Immediately following 
cribes other, wider m; 
effects of the plague 
failure to sebein the 
and the deterrence of 
the passage quoted, the historian des- 
anifestations of anomia caused by the 
on public morals. Central to these are 
gods115 and disregard for human nomoi 
legal sanctions (53.4). 
The verb aischunomai occurs in the context of a similar 
breakdown of conventional morality at 3.82.7, where Thucydi- 
des comments sardonically on the type of reputation'most 
sought after in times of stasis, when traditional senses of 
words become twisted. 
116 
Speaking of a 
ývvEitws 
äýwvtdj o( he 
goes on: a Gv U, aL -Tfox t KXKGVWL ýF3 c) tL% FlEKi`týYToc . 
º'ý DýýxiýEts aýoGýoý KoU -r O rAL, VGVtoK , Eift 0f TW aýocM6Viiýi. 
This passage has caused some difficulty, 
117 but its sense is 
fairly easily appreciated, provided we translate 
eKýV KCKkJVTW, ( 
not as "are more readily called" (Gomme), but as "would 
rather be called. "118 If we then supply 
ovrfs with Kyoc0cL 
we have the perfectly acceptable notion that "the majority 
would rather be called clever rogues (lit. * clever though 
rogues) than stupid but honest (stupid though honest): in 
the case of the latter they are ashamed, but in the former 
they exult. " Cleverness, not arete, is now the most desired 
quality, and even a reputation for arete is of no consolation 
to one who would rather be called clever. 
Several incidental passages may be dealt with briefly: at 3. 
42.2 aischron is used in a general sense of proper behaviour, 
at 3.59.3 the Plataians say they would rather perish by 
starvation, which is the most aischron method of death, than 
be handed over to the Thebans, and aischistos here seems 
both to describe the fundamentally unpleasant nature of such 
a death and to contrast it with a more fitting way of dying, 
perhaps specifically death in battle; at 8.73.3 we are told 
that Hyperbolos was ostracized S1 -rrvv1C 
t" Woci vii )ýv"VJ / -rq S 
-rr&ws . It seems more likely that . ischune should be objec- 
tive here (Hyperbolos was a disgrace to, brought disgrace 
upon the city) but the subjective sense ("ostracized because 
490 
is also possible 
of the city's shame" at Hyperbolos' presence)/. In either 
case the point will be that the disgraceful conduct of one 
member of the community can affect his fellows. Two passages 
in book 7 suggest remorse or guilt: in both (7.75.5 and 7.77. 
1) the Athenians in Sicily are portrayed as blaming themsel- 
ves for the failure of the expedition; perhaps this also 
suggests retrospective shame based on one's own interpreta- 
tion of one's actions. The idea of remorse occasioned by the 
recognition that one has acted in contravention of one's own 
principles is also implicit in the misgivings experienced by 
the Athenians following their decision to put all adult male 
Mytileneans to death. 119 
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47. See North, ibid.. 
48. See pp. 452-3 above. 
49. B238DK. 
50. Cf. Hussey, Crux, p. 126. 
51. See Adkins, MR, 224 and 241n. 8, and Andrewes in Gomme, 
Andrewes, Dover, ad loc.. 
52. It motivates Perikles, for example, at 1.141.1 (p. 459 
above). 
53. Many words, in fact - KLvdvvt , v"ývý ýýýýýý a-ý ýXý °ý, 
ºtdj H Vs-i - are common to both these passages: see above, pp. 
452-3. 
54. See Pitt-Rivers in Peristiany (ed. ), Honour and Shame, 
p. 31. 
55. See above, pp. 433-5. 
56. Cf. Pearson, Popular Ethics, p. 24. 
57. The eventual slaughter of the Melians is not an issue in 
the dialogue: see Cogan, The Human Thing, p. 89. 
58. E. g. de Romilly, Thucydides, 254-6. 
59. The stress on expediency rather than morality, moreover, 
may be attributable to the historian's expressed concern for 
diagnosis and prognosis (1.22-3,2.48.3), since the laying 
bare of true motives makes for clarity and the exposition of 
"natural law" in action suggests how its operation may be 
recognized in future: see E. Topitsch, W5 1943-7, p. 66. 
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60. Cf. Antiphon 6.1 for a similar idea. Such disgrace, it 
might be said, exhibits more clearly the subject's own short- 
comings than does a setback which comes upon him by chance: 
see Andrewes' modification of Gomme's n. in Commentary on 
111.3. 
61. See Pearson, Popular Ethics, p. 176. 
62. Cf. Pearson, CP 1957, p. 238. 
63. The prototype is 11.2.298, p. 17 above. 
64. See Pearson, CP 1957, p. 240, de Romilly, Thucydides, p. 80. 
65. See Westlake, Individuals in Thucydides, 94-5, and on 
personal motivation in general, cf. Cogan, p. 190. 
66. Cf. Westlake, p. 213. 
67. See Westlake, 171-2,219-20. 
68. Cf. Pearson, CAP 1957,, p. 239, Westlake, p. 226. 
69. Cf. Westlake, p. 251. Cf. also 8.12.2, where Alkibiades 
uses the inducement of Tä x-xxof to persuade the ephor, Endios, 
to support his plans. 
70. Cf. Pearson, Popular Ethics, p. 191, on the "tragedy" of 
Nikias, whose philotimia ruined his country. 
71. Cf., in general, Pearson, Popular Ethics, 152-60. 
72. On this episode, cf. Pearson, Popular Ethics, 29-31. 
73. They do, however, relate this to Kerkyraian anticipation 
of just such an argument at 1.34, where the latter claim, 
though in far less detail than their opponents, that right 
was on their side in the original dispute. 
74. For kakourgia (rather than kakis) as antonym of arete in 
a non-martial context, cf. 3.82.7, p. 489 below. 
75. Cf. von Erffa, p. 186. 
76. Cf. S. Trach. 596-7, E. ipp. 403-4 (pp. 215,344 above) and 
Antiphon B44ADK (below, pp. 556-8). 
77. See above, p. 4, p. 6n. 15. 
78. Above, pP. 3-4 etc.. 
79. It is a notable point that the Corinthians assume that 
obligation to its allies may cause a state to act unjustly. 
80. P. 468 above. 
81. Cf. Pearson, SE 1957, p. 233, Popular Ethics, p. 31. 
82. As, in fact, was suggested by 1.37.2 (p. 474): cf. below, 
pp. 482-6 and Pearson, Popular Ethics, p. 235n. 17 (on arete 
and personal phi i at 2.51.5). 
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83. Cf. Gomme, ad loc., Pearson, CP 1957, p. 234, P_gPuIAxr 
Ethics, p. 17 
84. At 3.10.1 the Mytileneans continue their self-justifica- 
tion by setting forth their views on the fundamental condi- 
tions for philia, both personal and international: philoi 
must be alike in character and the relationship must be con- 
ducted with "conspicuous arete"; again, arete is seen as 
essential to philia. 
85. pp. 444-5 above. 
86. Aischunesthai thus bears the Homeric sense of aideisthai 
as "respect" here, and, as in that usage, the idea of respect 
is combined with the notion that it is discreditable to fail 
to respect those who deserve it. On freedom versus slavery 
and the Peloponnesians as the liberators of Greece, cf. pp. 
458-9,466,479-80,484-5. 
87. Andragathia here is thus equivalent to arete in 2.40.4 
or 3.10.1 (p. 476 and n. 84 above), where the reference is to 
justice and equity, but not to arete in 3.56.7,57.2 or 58.1, 
where it denotes bravery in battle (and possibly also commit- 
ment to the Hellenic ideal). On aret e in Thuc., cf. Topitsch, 
WS 1943-7, p. 65. 
88. Since the opposite charis is described as sophron, it 
appears that, once more, the course recommended by sophrosyne 
and that promoted by aidos are the same. 
89. We saw in Homer, however, that the supplication of those 
who, having surrendered in battle, plead for their lives was 
often disregarded. Cf. pp. 66-9 above (with nn. ). 
90. Cf. P. 474 and n. 79 above. 
91. On this motif (a classic means of arousing aidos), cf. 
pp. 459 (with n. 28), 460,462,478 above. 
92.2.51.5, below, pp. 485-6. 
93. Consider, for example, 3.82.7, where he laments the fact 
that a reputation for ar , among those engaged 
in stasis, 
is less highly prized than one for cleverness (below, p. 489). 
94. See 4.21-2, especially 21.2, -Tcü 4 1CXEc. vas w'et-pvro 
95.6.11'. 6, pp. 470-1 above. 
96. Cf. pp. 466-9 above. 
97. Note that Stogy -ro X44, X(QI is used in the same sense as 
K1 177 I in 104: cf. p. 470 above. 
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98. This, again, shows a natural assumption that honouring 
one's obligations to one's h' o is part of arete. 
99. The Athenians here seem to subscribe to a political 
theory which acknowledges justice and moral values within 
individual communities, but not in the international arena, 
since there is no constraint on the independent members of 
the community of states equivalent to that exerted on the 
individual citizen by the laws, customs and institutions of 
his city: cf. Hussey, Crux, p. 126. 
100. Cf. 90, where the Melians point out that it is in Athens' 
interests to act with the appearance of justice and modera- 
tion, for the sake of the impression this will make on others. 
101. On this coincidence, cf. Pearson, Popular Ethics, p. 164. 
102. Cf., generally, Hussey, 127-8. H., however, fails to 
mention the Melians' point in 106, even though it would add 
to his argument. 
103. For the idea that it is discreditable (bad manners) to 
involve outiders in troubles, see pp. 305,308,349-50 above. 
104. E. g. Od. 3.69-74. 
105. See Hirzel, Agraphos Nomos, Cerri, Legislazione orale 
(both passim), and cf. the remarks of Ostwald, Nomos, vii. 
106. See Hirzel, p. 21. 
107. Such as the body of unwritten law whose interpretation 
was entrusted to the Eumolpidai ((Lys. ) 6.10): see Cerri, 
67-8, against Hirzel, p. 21. 
108. Cf. Archidamos' stress on the same qualities, pp. 454-7 
above. Archidamos, however, emphasizes obedience and self- 
control to a greater extent than does Perikles. Von Erffa, 
p. 190, points out that aischune helps define deos in the 
present passage, and explains the latter as not simply fear, 
but rather fear (presumably of legal sanctions) and fear of 
disgrace, comparing 1.49.4. 
109. Cf. von Erffa, p. 189. 
110. See below, pp. 549-65. 
111. On the disgrace of poverty, see pp. 142-3 above (on 
Thgn. ). The idea, implicit in Perikles' remarks, that 
the poor should not be reproached simply for their poverty 
is not new - cf. Hes. J1 . 717-8. 
112. This much is suggested, in fact, by the comparative, 
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aischion, which implies the sequence, "poverty may be 
aischron, but not to strive to escape it is aischion. " 
113. A mild instance of enallage. 
114.191-2. 
115. The only instance of , gebe-in 
in Thuc., though we do find 
-riv, -E- vWV O&wJ at 1.126.1 1, asebein of denial of burial at 
4.98.7, asebein and asebema in connexion with sacrilege and 
the mutilation of the Herms at 6.53.1 and 27.2, and eusebeia 
in a general sense at 3.82.8. 
116. In the passage which concerns us it is the prescriptive, 
rather than the descriptive force of the terms which is 
changed. 
117. See Gomme, ad loc., referring to the criticisms of 
Dionysios of Halikarnassos. 
118. So Shorey, TAPA 1893, p. 75, who explains the phrase 
under the analogy of e; ov 
e 
E-,. at 8.89. 
119. See Woodhead, 36 and 160, Andrewes, Phoenix 1962, p. 72. 
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8. ARISTOPHANES. 
Aidos and its direct derivatives (with the exception of 
anaideia) are not common in Aristophanes, and Aischung etc. 
are much more frequently used. 
1 Instances of the relevant 
terms are, for the most part, heterogeneous, many being 
merely incidental references, but these are nonetheless 
valuable as indications of everyday usage. On the other hand, 
there are special considerations peculiar to comedy which 
the student of ethics must bear in mind, 
2 
and caution is 
thus required when using evidence obtained from that source 
to hypothesize about trends in society in society in general. 
It seems best to begin with a survey of the miscellaneous 
instances of aidos, aischune etc. before proceeding to in- 
vestigate the more particular characteristics of their func- 
tion in comedy. Comic characters, like their tragic counter- 
parts, are often represented as concerned at the prospect of 
mockery or damage to their reputations. One such is Lamachos 
atc . 1195-7, exaggerating his wound and expressing 
his fear 
of mockery in mock-heroic terms: 
T 41 
E KKVd GV V/ ocý oýKr 'd ytVAvrfo 
4 LI. --e LOiroi, L$ 4lß M t"UGL TE*rpwM. EIVý1/ 
-tC/ TE 'XOG' ToetJ y& tf TU)(oeu'tV. 
L 
The readiness of others to mock one's misfortunes (specifi- 
cally one's demotai), 
3 is mentioned by Demosthenes at Knights 
319-20, where he describes how he was cheated by the Paphla- 
gonian tanner and thus provided his demesmen with a great 
source of amusement (K-WqLAWJ "nýý"R¬>w. I) . In contrast, Strepsi- 
ades, at Clouds 1206-11, imagines the admiration and envy 
his proposed victory over his creditors will arouse in his 
demotai. At Lys. 271-2 the Old Men are vehement in their con- 
viction that they will not be mocked by their female oppo- 
nents: 
aU rae I 
Qrli Swvros eYXowoivt. e( , 
It is, of course, a matter of honour that men should not ap- 
pear ridiculous to women. 
4 Later in the same play the hemi- 
chorus of women, wishing to effect a reconciliation, refer 
twice to to the ridiculousness of their opponents' appearance: 
at 1020 their intention in doing so is to undermine the men's 
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continued bellicosity, while at 1024 they attempt to restore 
their self-esteem by claiming that, fully dressed, they are 
real men and no longer L,,, av«ytkxrrc( . At Wasps 150-1 Bdely- 
kleon expresses his concern for his own reputation, when he 
claims that he is athlios because people will call him "son 
of Smoky", a reference, prompted by his father's attempt to 
escape through the chimney, to the comic poet Ekphantides, 
nicknamed Kapnios because of the obscurity of his writing. 
Bdelykleon has no wish to associated with an inferior poet 
like him. 5 The desire to avoid mockery is also apparent in 
Thes. 939-42, where Mnesilochos, about to be handed over to 
the Prytanis, asks that he might at least be allowed to be 
bound naked, without his women's clothing, to the plank, 
.. %% 
[VA rw1 V FleOKwTO15 K. ct /oIYoc%3 
(Ö"&ýv 
av 
cJe ý-rc wý 
Public humiliation, however, is to be part of his punishment: 
the Prytanis wishes him to be ý Iaos to the passers-by (944). 
At Knights 1274ff. the chorus proceed to the abuse of one 
Ariphrades, abuse which they justify as follows (1274-7): 
OL6G(1 (o&l -r-GVS -TFov1 (IV GV 
ýE\l 
C" (1"' e TI-C E wtv, 
äýK TI/MM -r i1 Y(V1r-r äd711 FV ýGYI zEfoýl" 
iývl, 
c-/'XäFCo&-. Kai kk1 VVaPl >rfra o V, cý C T" o 
oýýra3 vjv ýýrýºýýos ý oviý aJ avccýoas Eýý1'6' '1 
4Jh&v" 
In 1274 E-rr(4)()hv v contains the idea of public disapproval, 
and it is thus implied that unjustified abuse might be c. TLt 
Givsv 
(or a'sc ro). To abuse one who deserves it, however, brings 
tim , if done well. The 
desirability, in turn, that the 
poneros should be exposed excuses the reference to his 
brother, who might be expected also to be affected if a mem- 
ber of his family were to be subjected to public humiliation. 
Thus the poet, in effect, apologizes for any embarrassment 
he may cause the innocent brother. The idea that one should 
feel no scruple at ridiculing one who deserves it is also to 
be found in fr. 200K (= 207KA), a quotation from the poet's 
Bangueters" 
UaA). rYwov, wc, l t-'\/ -räetxav 7ti'-rbvi 
JVº, n! ä IV016tJ O r, < 6'vv1, L J' aj-rw Koeº« . 
Abuse of this kind, directed at specific living individuals, 
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appears from the Knights passage to be regarded as part of 
the comedian's duty, and indeed may have been a part of the 
rituals from which comedy developed. 
6 The aim, presumably, 
is to shame the victim. 
Ariphrades in particular is ridiculed because he takes 
delight in xi ((O at v1 
6 
ov aN (1284), in which expression 
aischros seems to bear the sense of "disgusting" or "obscene": 
this fits with the term's intrinsic reference to "how things 
look" as well as with its secondary connotation of "liable 
to excite disapproval". The adjective, in fact, most commonly 
has a general reference to appearances in Aristophanes. It 
has its basic, physical sense, for example, at Knights 1321, 
Clouds 920, E Thes. 168 (the ugly poet, Philokles, writes ugly 
plays) and Eccl. 618,619,625,629. Semnos appears to be used 
of physical attractiveness at Eccl. 617, while Kratinos 208.3K 
(=223.3KA) provides another example of aischros meaning 
"ugly". Fr. 322 (364KA) of the same poet - -rWv cri r)LA: J 
I t>'t, -l 
% xa(k jtGM4W Tr(, V, (ON/ ecvt-cv Ft val - printed thus, should translate, 
"It is the mark of ugly men to be poneros while rendering a 
favour to their friends". i- 5' Deljyk, %, , however, seems awkward 
' t- Vof, % , and Kassel and Austin with the singular-irov1(iv xv rö 
i 
believe these words to belong to the author making the cita- 
tion. Meineke reconstructs Kratinos' verse beginning aiº14 
de) 
and this general, moral sense of aischron, rather than the 
physical one of Twy a iajewJ , is what is required. 
8 
At Lys. 923 (Myrrhine's assertion that it is aischron to make 
love on the bare bed-boards) pischron may mean as little as 
"not nice" or as much as "unseemly", while at Frogs 693-4, 
Kti1 y. c{ 00 r)((14 t ITL -rbv3 ýA-uý Vxvýnýxlýt, cvrýs 
1(0-1 . cT X 6c) C -VI ýv S E- 
TN (Pt ºe av TL 
SCv" I4 f-ir oTa S. 
the sense is not simply that it is aischron that slaves 
should be made citizens after one sea-battle (the poet ap- 
proves of this at 696), but that it is aischron that those 
who benefitted the city on one occasion should be so treated 
while others who have served her on numerous occasions remain 
atimoi as a result of their "mistakes" (689) in 411. Again, 
the meaning of aischron is general, but its application can 
be explained with reference to the traditional idea that one 
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should treat one's benefactors or friends according to both 
their deserts and their time: it is inconsistent of the city, 
the poet claims, to accord one group great honour in return 
for one service while others are without honour, and dis- 
franchised (692), in spite of their many services; this in- 
consistency, in turn, is discreditable and unfitting. 
Fr. 600K (616KA) refers equally to "how things look" - it is 
aischron for a young woman to have an old husband, both 
because such a match simply does not look right, and because 
it brings the woman herself, who might have found a better 
husband, no credit. The use of aischron in fr. adesp. 518K- 
ai rXýýJ ºýakV. -r-11-II/ -rrokkwv ho w- is also general, 
but the implication, that society in general is not a fit 
arbiter of -roe Ka)tx, is important. 
At Eccl. 560,565-7 the'aischra enumerated are all offences of 
general dishonesty, and the use oft)/ N(1V in P60 indicates 
the tendency to link words of daring with conduct which is 
aischron, which requires anaideia. Fr. dub. 1203K, 5-6 shows 
that aischros can be used of ugliness of sound as well as of 
appearance: 
ýI AnV E-l C) OG I, xP 
ws KX WVo( 'TI-o oS KOLA 
%6 
C of VI 5 
1. 
ö aýý3ot CI,, ) -rr e Dew c(oe 
Kock suggests v¢ ae, 3c, 5 for o I. ' &S , presumably because it 
does seem unlikely that Apollo should sing out of tune, but 
"Phoibos" here may be used ironically of some other character, 
or may be a slave's name used literally for comic effect. 
The phrase a,; q(ä e (2 f -rL V( occurs in the passage of Eccl. 
just discussed (560), and is paralleled in the sense, "do 
41 9 by oti vyLrToc yäe iV (Ya(oero at Wasps harm or wrong to; ' 
787 and by the passive formation, +7cý 
K 
E-rrä6ý, ýeV , at Lys. 
1096.10 No doubt aischra in these phrases implies the humi- 
liation of the sufferer, but criticism of the agent may also 
be implied. Aristomenes 3K - ýýrÜ ýý 
"1. I ýEý`ýS AU- TIYr, YO - 
seems similar, but the article in -fäf. is difficult and 
t 
the verse may be corrupt. 
The concept of aischrokerdeia'occurs at Peace 623-5, where 
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Hermes finds the origin of the war in the desire for gain: 
0ta pc f v, - o" rpeKFPý4l Kost dl Fl( wV0JJJ ! FVOL 
Tb)Vd XIT00eLý#F Vr&3 
lOe4 
o) ptvJ t7, \/ 'fi0ý4 Jo v7(1raloeV 
[<c -rac -Tä 
Lk 
\(Wv Yf ke(a &0'1, tz"3 ýF wCoyct$ IVK 
l0CKoi 
. 
As usual, aischrokerdeia consists in the pursuit of gain 
regardless of the rights of other people. In -rývv'(sc. E%'ev1v ) 
ä -Tdýýeýý octir&S a+'ýcek05 the point of or, ý'ýAwS seems to lie in 
, 
the failure to accord the goddess her proper time, and it 
seems clear that the action is aischron both for her and for 
its perpetrators, as, it was suggested, might be the case in 
the examples of 440C OL ä,  etc.. Also in Peac e (695-9) 
aischrokerdeia, pursuit of wealth to the exclusion of all 
else, is attributed to the poets, Sophokles and Simonides: 
perhaps the acquisitiveness of poets was a standing joke. 
11 
Kerdos also bears its frequent, pejorative connotation at 
Wea 363 and Frogs 360, and the idea of aischrokerdeia 
recurs at fr. adesp. 337K. In ea , indeed, it is a basic 
assumption that all profit is dishonest, 
12 
and the wealthy, 
particularly the new rich, 
13 
are condemned. In particular, 
lines 563-4, although the term used is sophrosyne, recall 
Hesiod's remark that aidos belongs to the poor, tharsos to 
the rich (1jp. 319) : 
14 
'Ti&e' rr W 001V13 
II 
TGLVVV -rr1- O xvw (V t, 'oev. cit 
SA w 
r 0, 
Gtl KO tOT43 o1 c Fl / 4r &v(SC. 11#v(. eJ 1(X&VTOk E67tV V11 
) 
v 3ý iýEtV 
At 590-1 Poverty seems to regard the avarice of Zeus as 
aischrokerdeia, when she says, 
Iron -rºýs ft"cvocs -rioIW &A 1)ClrV Imes ccv-rw -rcECiöcý 
OC, CI -'kve las 
wv ävt-X6"výý-das e r(1 oVrwäý'< t ýýamKýPJys , It is considered discreditable, then, to concentrate on the 
acquisition of wealth to the extent that one cannot enn oy it, 
an idea which becomes a commonplace in New Comedy. 
Several passages refer to the fundamental belief that cowar- 
dice is aischron, and to the related idea that one should 
not bring disgrace on one's ancestors. At Peace 1298 the son 
of the (according to Aristophanes) notorious coward, Kleony- 
mos, begins to sing Archilochos' song about the loss of his 
N 
shield, and at 1301 Trygaios interrupts the third line, 
4v)cId 
N6Kw(K with Kovrq fxvvsc5 
St. 




the coward's son is still invited to the feast, but at Eccl. 
678-80 it is Praxagora's hope that cowards will be shamed 
into departing from the feast she proposes to hold: 
11 .1 )JI 
e«ýwýt-ýý t otcc -rcýc't elb, x(cctecv 
011 TUL, S xIO, L LOVJ Ev TIv 7IG>EMw ){(-1 Tls 
ý(-LX FýEVºýTet(ý 
lVA /Vwý VEl'TTVw( 0ýý 1ýýýýºtEvtt 
Any coward s present, it is, jokingly, assumed, will, on Ni 
simply hearing of the bravery of others, be so conscious of 
their own cowardice and of the knowledge others have of it 
that they will leave the feast in shame. 
Cowardice is also the issues at Birds 768. In the topsy-turvy 
world of the birds cowardice is not aischron: 
16 
ws 'irae' ºýýýl  Ov't c( oý+ý! )(e aý E(TLV EK`TrFCJLI.! ldL. 
17 
This clearly implies that in the real world cowardice is 
aischron, and in fact line 768 is prefaced by two lines 
whose intention is to humiliate a real Athenian as a coward. 
At Clouds 1220-1 Strepsiades' first creditor declares, 
0ý Ta vü tsC-Ort art 'r Ir -rºý Tt atpL 
to< Ka. ''x ! z(LVW 
W/ 
ýa 
iýýlo( Kec%o l r' L ec tS1 
 
The comic exaggeration that the creditor's failure to recover 
his money would shame his fatherland may be based on the 
general thought that the whole of Attika would be implicated 
if he were to manifest such weakness, or on satire of Athen- 
ian litigiousness, the idea being that he is reluctant to be 
the one to cause a break with national tradition. 
18 A similar 
sort of joke occurs at Birds 1451-2, where, in an inversion 
of normal attitudes, the Sycophant declares that it would 
shame his forefathers if he were to take up a more reputable 
profession: 
r. T ýýýS a. d Kacýactýý(vvi, l , ir 
l 'TTKT'j Tý'6ý/ Ot G fi 
With regard to the general attitude towards cowardice ex- 
pressed in the plays, Ehrenberg19 writes of "a decline of 
the soldierly spirit", evident especially in passages which 




mentions the references to astrateutoi who are set up for 
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public humiliation, and claims that these indicate a move 
away from traditional ideas of a citizen army. There must, 
indeed, be some, basis to these opinions, but comedy may 
exaggerate, and, in particular, the comic hero's proclivity 
towards cowardice should not be taken too seriously, since 
his antics are more likely to be indicative of the way most 
Athenians did not behave. It is, however, significant that 
cowards are ridiculed, and even that cowardice is a trait of 
those characters who enjoy freedom from the restraints of 
social pressure, for this indicates a general climate in 
which cowardice is deplored and in which aidos with regard 
to cowardice will, for that reason, be common: comic ridicule 
of cowards, moreover, is an important manifestation of soci- 
ety's disapproval, and it may well be that such ridicule is 
a recognized social and traditional function of the genre. 
22 
One individual who is abused for his cowardice is Amynias 
(or Ameinias), who-is, in effect, compared to a woman at 
Clouds 691-2: 23 
ºýr .0ý . 
c5 
1 VAAVc -rj / 
'/ýtu 
vi eý knee &-71. 
Zi-. ov kt, v ý( k-xt $ -1rtj tv v 4-r O vrc-ti"ict 
Related to the comparison of cowards with women is the idea 
that men should never be worsted by women, which is, 
naturally enough, given the centrality of the battle of the 
sexes to the plot, prominent in Lysistrata. The dictum is 
stated as such at 450-1 - 
of Toee by Yvvactw&W Gý OCý'r C' (& V1 Ti fto' 
U 
and implied at 485, 
ws 
oýº'ýýCiý äºtwýwvýýTýV t xV ¶Oco%IT64 -Tr(; V se /t, t, FW-VTxs 
where the idea that it is aischron for men to be defeated by 
women is combined with the fundamental notion that it is 
aischron to abondon what one has begun. 
24 
Honour is also at 
stake for the women in this conflict: it is not, it need 
hardly be said, traditional that women should not give in to 
men, 
25 but the women of Lysistrata deny the woman's role and 
present a claim to parity, and, thus subscribe to male, com- 
petitive values. Thus, at 713, Lysistrata's parody of Euri- 
pides, 26 äßk I , Ci a 
ü, 
4 -rrCý-iV Kati a- refers to the 
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fact that the women are weakening in their resolve, while at 
779-80 she claims that it would be a'sc ron for her comrades 
to betray the oracle which, it is believed, promised them 
victory. 
In the later plays women enjoy considerable freedom to do 
and say what they please, and thus they are given the oppor- 
tunity to share the licence allowed other comic characters 
to transcend the restrictions imposed upon them by society. 
As a consequence, the familiar ads which so constrains 
women in other genres is scarcely in evidence. The chorus of 
Thesmophoriazusae, however, although a pretty unrestrained 
lot themselves, do refer to the normal feminine attitude in 
the parabasis of that play. Their first point is that the 
male opinion, that women are aao, is absurd. The very 
care men take in keeping their women in seclusion, they 
claim (789-94), reveals the inconsistency of this assumption, 
for why should they take such trouble to look after that 
which they find akon? At 797-9 they go on: 
K ocJ 
Ew6 vl SoS -rr oý nC trrý-rw - Ti CoýK º'i Tý rrt 
b ý0ý6 ac t 
K äv oe i, vE)K( 
ävdXW(JrI 
; -rAV '/K; 
kkcv -rtäs 
E-7rc4i 
Ocý ýýS -rÜ º. ýýGýCýd 'try x ýývý rte/ 
i acv. 
Here, where the real values of contemporary Athens are the 
object of the humour, the normal position of women obtains: 
they are kept indoors and experience aischune27 if seen by 
strangers. 
At Fro as 1049 Euripides asks Aeschylus to explain in what wqy 
his plays dealing with adulterous women have been harmful, 
and the latter replies (1050-1): 
u, rl y Nvvoct .L Keel (-vVdUv\ 
ävS w ýX G)(av3 
ävF'l 
&t! 5 
K rJ VC- v( -rt t t-c vat tr> 0 W& c-i roe dt 
ct 
rw j CoIS 
6 0VX eo Jed view . 
These women, it seems, are to be imagined as feeling them- 
selves implicated in the disgrace of Euripides' characters 
and ashamed of what are presented in comedy as slurs on the 
honour of womankind. Exaggerations of this type are not new: 
similar is Agamemnon's claim (at 0.11.433-4) that his wife 
has poured aischos upon herselfý'and all women yet to be born, 
even the good ones. ' Dover28 points out that Aeschylus also 
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presented wicked women, like Klytaimestra, and that it seems 
illogical that the shame of stage adulteresses should corrupt 
contemporary females while that of stage murderesses should 
not. It is, however, a peculiarity even of our own culture 
that sexual matters, treated realistically, are more shameful 
and dangerous than "ordinary" crimes. An actor who played a 
homosexual in a recent West-end production was asked on 
television if he had no misgivings about such a role: he 
pointed out that the question would not have been asked had 
he been playing the most heinous of murderers. 
At ccl. 484-5 the chorus of women express their concern lest 
their plan to cause the assembly to vote for a gynaecocracy 
should be discovered by the men: 
.. I%, TýOf. ifd. lo(, 1t ceK -rVI-S O(VraeofrtV " 7rDoc/hA( 1Z. 'Vr e E6XbEV. 
Aischune is objective disgrace here, and the reasons for it 
in this case seem to lie in the women's disloyalty, although 
it might also be the case that simply to be caught in the 
act of something one wishes to conceal may bring aischune. 
Again we see the connexion between shame and elench, 
"showing up". 
The sensitivity of women and their susceptibility to aidos 
may lie behind ý? ealth 701-2, where Karion's female companion, 
Iaso, is embarrassed at his breaking wind in the temple of 
Asklepios: she blushes (üTr. 1evbeicrr), and blushing is a common 
concomitant of aidos. The Just Argument in Clouds represents 
himself as a staunch champion of aidos, 
29 
and one of his 
recommendations is (992): 
Kacý ruts oc1. xeot3 oe ()(IV ýbwt, , K. eV Q 
Kt. mt rt eC- ýEýý6EJal . 
In the context, then, of aischune and aidos (in 995) the Just 
Argument recommends blushing when one is mocked. In contrast 
to these passages we may set the following, in which failure 
to blush seems to indicate a lack of aidos. At Clouds 1215-6 
Strepsiades' first creditor declares it better to äntev(ýet Z(a, k 
when first asked for a loan than to have trouble recovering 
one's money later. Thus it seems that one would normally be 
expected to blush at the prospect of refusing an acquaintance 
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credit, presumably because to do so implies distrust of the 
other person and a lack of concern that this should be com- 
municated to him, although general ideas of the conduct 
proper among philoi may also be relevant. At Knights 397-9 
the chorus, commenting on Paphlagon's anaideia, 
30 
associate 
it with the ability to avoid blushing: 
WSE 'TC oS -rT VV o1 L CcQ K. r, ý k3 ýt E6 l' 
0TIil TýV ý(ýWM fUS 'TZÜ naC"-rº rr S. 
Paphlagon (or Kleon, since this is one of the passages in 
which the literal characterization is subordinated to the 
allegorical) has just admitted that he relies on the gullibi- 
lity of the demos in order to sustain his power. Such a dis- 
creditable admission indicates anaideia, and the chorus point 
to his failure to blush as further evidence for this. 
We saw in Homer that aideisthaj could govern a direct, 
personal object in the sense usually translated as "respect". 
In Aristophanes, however, it is aischunesthai which conveys 
this sense, 
31 
and it does so on several occasions. At Wealth 
981 the Old Woman explains that her young lover did not ask 
1/ i 
her for many favours - tlaý r-ýx< 
<KV yws ßt4 4xvvt-1-o . The young 
man's requests, however, turn out to have been extensive, 
and Chremylos is being sarcastic when he says (988), akXc< 
S1ko 0Irt 6' ºIrcvvero . The aischune involved here is clearly 
identical to the aidos which one traditionally owes one's 
Philoi. The precise context, however, is one of reluctance 
to ask openly for money, and this is an idea which occurs 
earlier in the play, at 158-9: Chremylos claims (155-6) that 
"good" boys do not ask their lovers for money, but for a 
horse or dogs (157); Karion then replies: 
Xi V%( -IbL rk PC(yVrL; 4 04ýLr t, ws J-tl 
The idea that one should be ashamed to ask openly for money 
seems to be related to the notions of aischrokerdeia expres- 
sed elsewhere in the play, 
32 
and the idea seems to be that 
it is discreditable to be more concerned for material things 
than about true friendship (cf. 153-4): this may also explain 
the idea that one might blush when refusing another a loan, 
above, but there also seems,, -especially in Wealth, to be a 
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growing feeling that there is something inherently distaste- 
ful about money and profit. 
Aischunesthai is used of respect for the direct recipient of 
one's actions in one other passage in Wea , where the Old 
Woman's young lover claims that it is out of respect for 
Chremylos' years (ýý ýxw rýtý'S -rhv &'J 
kt kLKV rk f 6-j V, 1077) 
that he is willing to give up his aged mistress to him with- 
out a fight. Respect for the old as a requirement of traditi- 
onal values is alluded to at Clouds 993-4, where, in a pas- 
sage which has aidos and the avoidance of -ri ski sxt as its 
theme, the Just Argument urges the young to give up their 
seats to the old33 and to refrain from insulting their 
parents. 
34 He ends his speech (998-9) with an injunction not 
to talk back to one's father or to tease him about his age. 
Aidos for one's father seems also to be implied at 1468, 
K. c-r, eI G JA--rL -W tT(w oV ALA: Dover suggests (ad loc. ) that this 
phrase, probably paratragic, could be interpreted to mean, 
"Show aidos for Zeus, whose province is the relationship 
between fathers and their children. " The point would then be 
that Strepsiades wishes his son to accord him aidos, in the 
manner recosnended by the Just Argument. 
At Wasps 446-7 the chorus-leader. comments on the treatment 
Philokleon receives at the hands of the slaves who were 
formerly his: 
,rý/ o( -t &VTIA 5OU t( PV( 
UJcý' Ev b"t öýv oNc1s 3 -r. V lr. t/oelhV 
Jwv. 35 
This seems to combine three forms of aidos, that which one 
owes those who have benefitted one in the past (Philokleon's 
benefactions are recounted at 443-6), that which one owes 
one's superiors (-r v 'troc)tmýiv, 
6Ea`troTkjl 
, 442)36 and that which 
one owes the old (see 441). 
In the three passages of Wealth just discussed we noted that 
aischunesthai was used of respect for the direct recipient 
of one's actions. In other passages the same verb bears the 
related sense of shame before those who will'witness one's 
actions. At Ec . 381-2ý7 Chremes explains that he arrived too 
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late to get his payment of three obols for attending the 
assembly: as a conscientious citizen, 
38 he is ashamed of this 
(aischunomai, 381), and is presumably about to elaborate on 
% the object of his aischune when Blepyros interjects, ý%K-rcv 
Alt vv#c fv or kkvý 
iý 
-rye ýýk<ý: cv. The meaning now is that, according 
to Blepyros, Chremes is worried lest his shopping bag will 
reproach him for failing to obtain his dinner money. 
Similar is fr. 588K (604KA), 
v 1, v 
a)f'Y Vv0 Oek .r)i CV 1vvvvrr -rroei 7lw. 
although, in our ignorance of( the context, we cannot be cer- 
tain of its exact significance. At es. 903 Mnesilochos exp- 
resses his embarrassment at being seen by Euripides while 
his beard, following its shaving earlier in the play, looks 
39 11 
ridiculous. Again, the collocation asI)ývvtywi r(- indicates 
inhibition in the presence of the other person and concern 
for his opinion. Mnesilochos' line (otA'. ýcvvo" or Krý, ") is an 
explanation as to why he does not obey Euripides' command, 
"look at me! " (902), and this implies the familiar notion 
that aidos/aischune prevents one looking directly at others. 
The inability to look others in the face is also in evidence 
at Knights 1354-7, where it is an outward sign of Demos' 
retrospective aischune. The passage reads as follows: 
k" 
OUT-MS -rt- Kq, iiTEl oüxt K46rcC xwVKV vF 
d1" CV-1 dyUVO , ýL -cL -re-r'(vrtfcV a/'`°`ý. ri x(S. 
oc) kkI0v 6TovTU on rl as //I 
v'4 
ývf Lä1S 
' oc kk otI i- -ripe vT- E ý-rro-rrv 
Demos' shame evidently causes him to bow his head40 and some- 
how to change his stance or position, and it seems that 
consciousness of his past mistakes leads to present inhibi- 
tion in the presence of others. 
41 
The suggestion of remorse, 
however, is clearly present, 
42 
and it is notable that Demos 
accepts full responsibility for his actions until his concern 
in this direction is assuaged by the Sausage Seller. The 
notion of self-reproach is also present in Wasps 743-9, 
where the chorus imagine Philokleon's recognition of his 
past mistakes and consider it possible that he is reproaching 
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himself (V4vcLE PTIh1. cCV Xvlty ,S -r-, -n o x)1t%, c 743). The chorus 
themselves seem to acquit Philokleon of responsibility, in 
that they claim that his errors were committed when he was 
"mad" (744) and hope that he will now "come to his senses" 
(ßwebvK , 748), but the possibility remains that his self- 
reproach encompasses a subjective sense of guilt. Similar 
ideas recur at 999-1002, where Philokleon is horrified that 
he has acquitted a defendant: 
il &vS 'vv E 0? W mr C-) w Vv .l Oj' O[(1 
L 
&v>ovr a-T-L&X. -rec5 oývdr, c -rL -rrc-r& -R"ELro, Kmot, 
6v 'MUTE i't1Vbl b -'t t V\ VH/Tt' 11LiL "ý /' .fJ ýI I^I. 
Or W tv ý pc e oc vrt Uý cd KUV . 111 V M&U U i' 1T V 
Philokleon does, admittedly, say that he "didn't mean it", 
and that he does not know "what got into him", but his e_ý11, tvr% 
... (VWEý"CýPeL , 
43 
must nevertheless refer to his own conscience 
as an internal source of reproach for what he has done: he 
thus retains a feeling of responsibility while aware that he 
acted akon, and while this may be philosophically inconsist- 
ent, it is a perfectly plausible reaction in terms of every- 
day language. Philokleon reveals an acquaintance with both 
the phenomenon and language of conscience such as any ordi- 
nary member of our society might possess, and it would be 
idle to expect a discourse on moral responsibility from one 
such as him. 
At Frogs 1474 it is implied that consciousness of a wrong 
one has committed should lead to aidos, which is to be mani- 
fested by the inability to look the wronged party in the 
face. Euripides asks Dionysos, o, i ' trrcv 
F' 4v 4, n& >T Rtf 
Et? eYOCýyt 
" 
ss ; He thus suggests that Dionysos is being anaidei 
in failing to avert his gaze. The deed which Euripides 
regards as aischiston is so because he sees it as a breach 
of promise and, more specifically, a breach of oath (469-70). 
Comically, Euripides' insistence that Dionysos should act in 
accordance with traditional morality allows the latter, to 
retort with examples of moral relativism drawn from the 
tragedian's own plays, namely the notorious line, Hipp. 612 
at 1471, and a fragment of the Aeolus (fr. 19N2) at 1475. 
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Very similar to the repentance of Demos in Knights is that 
of Ploutos at Wealth 774-81. The god experiences retrospec- 
tive shame, but expresses it not as shame at what he has 
done but as shame at what he has suffered (774-5): 
V%/ ""L 
SE 
TaS c'MavVa' (V, ý. t 
a 
o/x3ý 
OLU 5 oee' äv6ew vý, s IVVW/ E)cocv&evOv. 
At the same time, however, he realizes that he has done 
wrong, and does not try to evade responsibility (778): 
WC't1' gip' O11 'T oeOW3 Se WV. 
Once more, we see a highly plausible reaction, which seems 
to combine elements of remorse with elements of concern for 
other people. Ploutos does stress that he acted akon, without 
knowledge of what he was doing (775,777), but in his case 
this is an accurate assessment of the true position: he has 
been blind. It is therefore quite natural that it should be 
the thought of how other people will judge him which is 
uppermost in the mind of one whose eyes have just been opened 
to his past mistakes (Ploutos' concern for his reputation is 
especially evident in 780-1, where he speaks of showing 
people that-he acted ako), but this, we should note, is not 
based on simple dislike of any criticism, regardless of its 
object, but on a personal moral sense which finds it unaccep- 
table that others should consider one to be morally bad. 
We have already had occasion to comment on several passages 
in which it is a sign of aidos/aischune to avert one's gaze 
(Knights 1354-7, Thes. 902, Frogs 1474), and this is the sense 
in which aidos is traditionally said to reside in the eyes 
(Wasps 447). 44 Corre vndingly, it is a sign of anaideia (or 
anaischunti-3) to fail to avert one's gaze in circumstances 
in which aidos/aischune should be felt (Ach. 289-91): 
ä 
, (a 
%rxvvrus Ni u< j'i- XVt us 







6Ti'E«, cuS c TK 
výoc 
r. ct -rrp 
öS ä- 
rrdý%E-1CE ýV. 
Dikaiopolis' knowledge, the chorus suggest, that he has 
acted in a way which will arouse others' disapproval should 
cause him to feel inhibited when confronted by their opposi- 
tion. The opposite reaction is found at Wealth 367-8, where 
Blepsidemos, noting that Chremylos' gaze does not remain 
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fixed, concludes that he has something to hide: 
.11 
ý", oc 
pro Ka. Teýi x10iXEI, 
44a ä hid ý0v cýF T G' iº 
A kk Ef TCv' E1fl 
SI kol rL 'Trf- TrO(V s 1cry KoTI . 
To avert one's eyes, then, is to indicate shame and inhibi- 
tion, while to look another person in the face, though it 
might indicate a clear conscience, can be interpreted as 
anaideia. 
45 
Several incidental passages might merit a brief comment: at 
Ac . 855 the description of Lysistratos as 
Xo). 
ccytwV CGYFL4f4S 
reminds us that the disgrace of one member of a community 
may affect the rest; at Clouds 1374 aischra means "insults", 
which are presumably so called because of their ugliness of 
sound and because they seek to spread this ugliness to their 
recipient; at Wasps 1048 the chorus tell the audience that 
it was aischron of them not to recognize the brilliance of 
Clouds straightaway, and it seems that the poet imagines 
that it is possible to be ashamed of a lack of aesthetic 
sophistication. At Peace 1215 Trygaios uses aischunomai of 
his reluctance to make an offer for the Plumemaker's plume, 
but it is difficult to see exactly why he does so: perhaps 
he is (or pretends to be) embarrassed to name a price which 
the seller might consider too low. 
46 At Thes. 848 Mnesilochos 
explains Euripides' failure to rescue him in terms of the 
poet's reluctance to appear in public following his relative's 
parody of a scene from the "frigid" Palamedes: Tä 
ýpchpcývj ýýý/ 
vx pif 
6 yr I 
PC III vvk-roe4 
The grounds for Euripides' aischune lie in the past, but it 
is clear that its main object is the present and future 
47 
mockery of others. 
Special Characteristics of Comedy: Comic anaideia. 
On p. 175 of his work von Erffa reflects that the frequency 
of words like anaideia and anaischuntia is relatively high 
in Aristophanes, and attributes this, without further elabo- 
ration, to the nature of comedy. The reasons for the promi- 
nence of these terms, and the relationship of this to the 
fundamental character of Old Comedy, are well explained in 
several modern studies. The remarks of McLeish48 express the 
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matter succinctly: 
"Part of our 
the comedian 




delight in watching comedy is in seeing 
overstepping the normal bounds and conven- 
own everyday world. He is a kind of licen- 
a scapegoat who confronts and overcomes 
He is free from the complexity of everyday 
This passage summarizes many of the conclusions of Whitman's 
chapter on "Comic Heroism", 
49 
perhaps the fullest account of 
the licence accorded the comic genre in general and the comic 
hero in particular. Whitman stresses the "self-centred indi- 
vidualism" of the heroes, 
50 
and points out that their un- 
scrupulousness and disregard for convention exist as part of 
a by-tradition in Greek literature (evidenced by examples 
from epic, h. Hom. Merc. and Archilochos) 
51 in which the vic- 
tory of one character's clever knavery is celebrated. D. F. 
Sutton52 gives the presentation of comic licence and the 
audience's enjoyment thereof a psychological basis, and 
relates it to the festivals of which comic performances 
formed part. In this context, both Whitman and Henderson 
refer several times53 to the championing of Physis over 
nomos which is important in many of the plays, and, broadly 
speaking, it is in the disregard shown by the characters for 
nomos that the röle of comic anaideia becomes apparent, for 
aidos is primarily a susceptibility to the values and norms 
of the society in which one grows up, and these values and 
norms, whether rules to be obeyed or general attitudes of 
society, are nomoi. Aidos thus respects nomos, and if the 
comic hero defies convention, it follows that he is, at 
least in some respects, anaides. It is, of course, not always 
only the hero who is anaides, but it is generally only with 
, the 
hero's anaideia that the audience is intended to sym- 
pathize. 
54 
One particular aspect of comedy's victory over convention is 
the use of obscene language. 
55 Aidos should prevent open 
reference to sexual and bodily functions in normal society, 
but in comedy such references occur frequently and with gusto. 
Aristophanes, for example, much prefers explicit and obscene 
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words for the sexual organs to the normal euphemism, T' 
AisoiK. 
56 The latter expression, in fact, occurs only twice, 
at Clouds 978, where it contibutes to the characterization 
of the Just Argument and corresponds to his other remarks on 
the importance of aidos, 
57 
and at Wasps 578, where Philokleon 
refers to the joy of looking at the aidoia of young boys 
undergoing their dokimasia. 
There are several minor instances of anaideia etc. in Achar- 
nians. We have already seen58 that the chorus accuse Dikaio- 
polis of anaischuntia at 289-91, and the grounds for this 
charge seem to lie in his blatant disregard for the opinions 
of all the other citizens of Athens in concluding a peace 
treaty by himself. 490-3 is similar, where the chorus call 
Dikaiopolis anaischuntos and r"(yeo%)s because he is about to 
argue against the rest of the city. 
59 
In this passage, how- 
ever, there is a note of admiration (Dikaiopolis has put his 
head on the block if he fails to convince his opponents, and 
yet he shows no fear), and this may be analogous to the re- 
action of the audience. The question of anaideia also arises 
in the parody of Euripides' Telephus, where the chorus 
repeatedly refer to the presumption of the beggar, Telephos/ 
Dikaiopolis, in addressing them as tolma (558,563,577-9). 
Words of daring, as we have seen, frequently paraphrase lack 
of aidos. 
Comic anaideia has perhaps its greatest r6le in Knig . The 
Sausage Seller is anaides par excellence, and the contest 
between himself and Paphlagon is one in which the aim is to 
be superior in anaideia. 
60 The qualities which mark the 
Sausage Seller out for leadership are first indicated at 
180-1, where the slave, Demosthenes, explains: 
jt awry ßäc .r -rvvso Kor. 
+ of vE-ý YKSý 
C ri -rrwv7eos º! ef oar racP. s flº. 'oýi ýO 9r VS . 
It is 6t scsvS which first suggests the possibility of anaide a, 
of which abundant evidence is provided in the subsequent ac- 
tion of the play: it suggests "going too far", and, in one 
of the Sausage Seller's status, "not knowing one's place". 
Beside his anaideia, , 
it is the Sausage Seller's poneriathat 
515 
is the dominant element in his character, and, in a sense, 
that poneria is defined for us here by t. J &Pis and tr ýcý 
5: 
he is p neros in the moral sense by virtue of his "boldness", 
but equally he is socially poneros as a result of his origin 
in the agora. As Ehrenberg points out, 
61 
poneros is virtually 
a term of rank as well as of moral censure in Aristophanes, 
and it refers in particular to those traders (kapeloi) with 
whom Athenians came most often into contact, namely those 
who ran their own businesses in the agora. The Sausage 
Seller's mean occupation places him squarely in this class, 
a class from which Comedy liked to believe all post-Periklean 
politicians came. 
62 
In spite of Demosthenes' assumption that the Sausage Seller 
is poneros and OCx`v5, however, it seems at first as if he 
is not quite so bold after all, for at 182 he objects that 
he feels himself unworthy for high office ((,, w or J tW VTOl 
t4)(IFld /vkrK ), and this suggests that he is. subject to that 
aidos which is traditionally thought appropriate to the poor 
and of which boldness is the antonym. His objection, however, 
is soon dismissed, 
63 
and in such a way that the complete 
inversion of normal values which will obtain until the 
Sausage Seller has won his victory is made clear. At 183-4 
Demosthenes is dismayed at the unexpected expression of un- 
worthiness, and wonders if the Sausage Seller has something 
good ( alo ) on his conscience: 
64 he asks in horror, IIW1 4K 
KK *iv FI left ro QwV (185); The Sausage Seller vehemently objects, 
proud of the poneria of his ancestors (185-6). He is then 
congratulated on the appropriateness of such a background 
for öne contemplating a life in politics, 
65 
and the point is 
made that the present political situation (the starting point 
in the real world from which the fantasy takes off) demands 
people of low birth and low morals as its leading figures, 
and that the admired qualities which will bring success are 
poneria and anaideia. 
Whitman66 comments on the inversion of the ordinary implica- 
tions of poneros in Knights and"relates this, quite correctly, 
to the frequent celebration of poneria in the character of 
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the comic hero. He then explains the significance of poneria 
in modern Greek (meaning roughly "cleverness" but with con- 
notations of trickery and unscrupulousness), and thereafter 
in his book,. when he refers to the poneros as a character 
type, it is this sense of the word, which he has explained 
quite adequately, that he has in mind. This is important, 
because there is a tendency in other modern discussions67 to 
use poneros as a technical term without reference to Whitman's 
explanation. Poneria was not an admired quality at Athens, 
and although comedy may sometimes celebrate it, it also con- 
demns it. In Knights the poneria and anaideia of the Sausage 
Seller are acceptable because we are made to sympathize with 
him, as comic hero, and with his aims, and because their 
very function is the exposure of the Poneria and anaideia of 
Kleon, a real-life Athenian. This is paradoxical, but it is 
a paradox which exists in several of the plays and one which 
we must simply accept: although the hero may be immoral, or 
amoral, the plays themselves, despite their libertarian 
nature, often criticize or satirize the vices of contemporary 
68 
society. 
The first indication that a contest in anaideia is about to 
take place comes at 276-7: Paphlagon has boasted (275) that 




TlýVF%ý1vs ýý pc ilil f OV 4AVTOI Irf VIKKS -r; 
º'ý/ .d oCý/IGl 
ýC-cK ? ýKýF%ý ýý 6 rL 0 'Tr-V( "c Vs 
It is assumed that shouting and anaideia can be equated, 
presumably because shouting is excessive and takes no account 
of-others' opinions. 
69 As lines 285-7 show, the two partici- 
pants in the quarrel begin shouting at each other almost 
immediately, and this signals the beginning of the contest. 
In the exchanges up to 303, after which the chorus formally 
open the ago n, there are three conspicuous examples of 
anaideia. Firstly, at 292-3, Paphlagon's command, "Look at 
me without blinking, " implies the anaideia of an unflinching 
gaze, while the Sausage Seller's reply, that he is well able 
to do so by virtue of his upbringing in the agora, relates 
anaideia of this kind to a specific class of people. Paph- 
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lagon himself advertises his own anaideia at 296, ""4ks 
K) --uf - rv 1ý oJxý : theft is condemned by society, and freely 
to admit it indicates both contempt for society's opinion 
and one's own lack of moral sense. The Sausage Seller, how- 
ver, goes one better here: he swears by Hermes agoraio (the 
patron of thieves as well as of traders) 
70 that he does 
admit theft, and adds K«-TtaeKw fie- PX,, -rövrNV (298). Just as 
the. presence of other people can frequently induce aidos, so 
here it emphasizes the Sausage Seller's lack of gidos. The 
swearing of an oath always involves witnesses, and aidos is 
often seen as the impulse to remain true to an oath, 
71 but 
the Sausage Seller gives no thought either to anyone in his 
audience who might be aware of the truth or to the sanctity 
their 
of oaths and the opinions of . -witnesses, 
human and divine. 
Also in this exchange (284-303) it is significant that the 
only obscenity (295) is given to the Sausage Seller. As 
Henderson points out, 
72 
most of the obscenity in the play is 
his, and this is a clear sign of his anaideia. 
At 315-8 there is a joke about Paphlagon's selling of sub- 
standard merchandise (Demosthenes weighs in with an illust- 
ration at 319-21), and the chorus make the following comment 
(324-5): 
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By a7rä(AI3 they appear to mean "before you entered politics", 
and so they move from Paphlagon to Kleon, equating the two. 
The anaideia which they find in the Sausage Seller's descrip- 
tion of Paphlagon's double dealing is probably firstly chea- 
ting in itself, and secondly offering for sale shoddy goods 
in the knowledge that they are shoddy, thus manifesting no 
aidos at deceit or the imminent prospect of the disapproval 
of the irate customer. 
73 This anaideia on the part of Kleon/ 
Paphlagon is condemned, which might seem odd, given that he 
is engaged in a contest in which the aim is to prove one's 
anaideia, but this simply shows the way in which the anaideia 
of the play's hero is acceptable (the chorus enthusiastically 
express the hope that their champion will, be victorious in 
Itecvaveeýar TE WXI (ýexrFt Kocht Ko/SocXtKE 
d /at 331-2) where that 
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of its target, corresponding as it does to real-life Anaide ý, 
is not. 
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At 397-9, however, they are critical of the same quality in 
his opponent, in a comment on his words at 395-6. Paphlagon 
has stated defiantly that he will never fear his opponents, 
"as long as the council chamber exists and the face of the 
people in session gapes stupidly. " This admission is in- 
herently discreditable, and this is why the chorus comment 
on his utter anaideia, manifested by his failure to blush. 
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Paphlagon goes further in exalting his own anaideia at 409, 
boasting that he will never be outdone in that quality. 
In lines 417-28 the Sausage Seller relates, entirely without 
aidos, a story of the kind of trick he used to play when he 
was young, and the Slave75 responds enthusiastically. As at 
297-8 he compounds his theft by perjury, and this makes it 
clear that he is giving us an example of his anaideia (as is 
suggested by Paphlagon's iru 6E'Tirvtw 1 Veoccuvs in 429). The 
trick of stealing an item while persuading its owner to look 
the other way will be repeated before the play is over. 
At 637-8 the Sausage Seller describes how, in preparation 
for his speech to the boule, he prayed for rasps, a yý w'rrx 
Evir'o(os and aj wvj c'#zi. 
L 
. Presumably his 
I 
wvºf is to be 
anaides simply in that its very loudness will enable him to 
shout down the opinions of others. Boldness and a ready 
tongue (ready to say anything, 'true or not) also indicate 
anaideia. 
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In the later stages of the conflict the motif of theft and 
taking the credit for another's work is prominent, and this 
is related both to the Sausage Seller's history of petty 
domestic theft (e. g. 417-28) and to the recent success of 
Kleon at Pylos. The topic of Pylos was first introduced at 
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54-7, and there, as later, the point of the reference is to 
belittle Kleon's contribution to Athenian success and to 
represent it as simply the stealing of the credit due Demos- 
thenes. The same point is made at 742-5, where Paphlagon/ 
Kleon presents his success at Pylos as an example of his 
services to the demos, while the Sausage Seller refers to 
the theft of a pot being boiled by someone else. The effect 
of the juxtaposition is to equate the two, and the suggestion 
is that, just as the Sausage Seller's admission of his dis- 
honesty reveals his anaideia, so does Kleon's boasting of 
his achievement at Pylos, since (the poet would have us 
believe) everyone knows that the credit really belongs to 
Demosthenes. Further reference (in language which recalls 
the original joke at 54-7) is made to this at 778, where the 
Sausage Seller, maintaining that he will treat Demos at least 
as well as Paphlagon does, says that he will steal others' 
bread and serve it- to him. 
The contest in anaideia is finally won, in fact, by a com- 
bination of Kleon's stratagem at Pylos and the Sausage 
Seller's own trick as recounted at 417-20, and the cumulative 
effect of the use made of the motif of theft plus anaideia 
is the total demolition of the claim of Kleon's success at 
Pylos to be taken seriously. At 1193-4 the Sausage Seller 
realizes that he will have to devise some plan if Paphla ; on's 
gift of a hare is not to win Demos over: he decides, there- 
fore, to divert his rival's attention by pointing to the 
arrival of some (non-existent) ambassadors. He then steals 
the hare and presents'it to Demos, and the connexion with 
Kleon's exploit at Pylos is made explicit at 1201. Paphlagon 
(or, more importantly, Kleon) has been defeated by his own 
tactics, and this is acknowledged at 1206, Dick Kowa *& #. twvo 
V-rEegvxtS&VO *4r& 
º^oot In this line the stage Paphlagon admits 
the relationship between the anaideia of the Sausage Seller 
and that of the real-life Kleon, and while the former is 
triumphant, the latter is condemned by comparison. 
Before giving up his position of pre-eminence, however, 
Paphlagon is determined to ensure that his rival really is 
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his destined successor, and the effect of the interrogation 
which ensues at 1235ff. is once more to reveal the Sausage 
Seller's complete anaideia and poneria. The former is most 
obvious at 1239, where he says that he learned VXLArrw/ 6rto(KEly 
K'% AXc-ir"4 Fvcvti6J : stealing and perjury involve anaideia 
in themselves, but this is compounded by the ability to look 
the victims in the eye. Anaideia may also be present in the 
Sausage Seller's nonchalance regarding his poor education 
and low origins (1236) and his mean occupation (1242,1247), 
and is almost certainly displayed by his admission that he 
was a catamite (1242): passive homosexuality is frequently 
77 
ridiculed in Aristophanes, and seems to have been frowned 
upon by the Athenians in general. 
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In Clouds it is with the agora between the Just and the Unjust 
Arguments that we are chiefly concerned. This contest, unlike 
that in Knights, is not between anaideia and anaideia but 
between anaideia and aidos, the former being of the regular 
comic type and the latter being exposed as little more than 
prurient hypocrisy. In the play as a whole Strepsiades, to a 
certain extent, conforms to the type of the anai¢ hero: 
his chief desire, for example, is to cheat his creditors, 
and even when he is confronted by their legitimate complaints 
he defies them to attempt to recover their money. Signifi- 
cantly, however, he is not allowed to succeed, and in the 
end repents when he sees the unfortunate results of real 
anaideia. In this he differs from, say, the Sausage Seller 
or Philokleon. The scene in which he disposes of his credi- 
tors, however, shows him at his most anaides, and it is here 
alone that his anaideia is referred to by another character: 
at 1236 the first creditor's ä-Ir #to To"vvd eveºcý ävAL, (Aot$ trt 
is provoked by Strepsiades' levity over the swearing of an 
oath, and the anaideia may lie in his failure to take the 
creditor's demands seriously or in his sarcasm regarding the 
gods. 
The agon tackles, in a comic way, the contemporary contro- 
versy over Physis and nomos and their influence on individual 
development, 79 and these forces are patently represented by 
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(respectively) the Unjust and Just Arguments. The subject, 
however, is treated facetiously, and it is the question of 
sexual behaviour which dominates the debate. 
Just speaks first, and both the chorus' katakeleusmos (VIA' 
1 .1V .1 -f 0)%XOts 10VS -n-e Ec/ývrt 'o '5 
S1 
(rif L xp ýrrvLJ QTE- f acvw! aS , 959) and 
his own opening remarks on I äexiic -r td ä, reveal his sym- 
pathy with traditional values: he flourished, he tells us, 
in the days when öwf eQ(vv1 'Y(vV. º(to . Sophrosyne will be 
important in the ensuing debate and, as often, it will be 
associated with aidos. The theme of sophrosyne is elaborated 
in the lines, that follow, in which its importance in self- 
control and the observance of good manners, together with 
its development through education, is stressed. Already 
Just's obsession with boys as sexual objects is apparent 
(966,973-6), yet he advocates a form of education which 
promotes modesty and chastity in the young. He is thus a 
representative of the double standard which held that while 
it was legitimate for older men to pursue young boys it was 
discreditable for the latter to give in. 
80 
In this connexion, 
it is notable that, at 977-8, he both reveals a considerable 
interest in young boys' genitals and uses the conventional 
euphemisms of polite conversation, the use of which will 
have been inculcated by the sophron education he describes, 
in order to refer to them: 
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ºý hEýý wre ýS aý -rvv gX &V cý (C-ti -mv, -rrCVe EýE -r*aV warF 
Vol. 3 C<- Ö&%* OLrl d'Crij-os KO xvvýf w 9_T&e o«<V E7r1V& K. 
The stress on sophrosyne and modesty in the young, especially 
with regard to sex, suggests aidos, and in the next section 
of his speech (991-90) it is on that quality that he concen- 
trates: 
Kocirºrr1rc-º ýºreý. V . rc(. cd K- % . 4ýKv4- sr äTCFxta L, 
k' T& iSa iýC &ºs a. ýcvve ' (h Ka J (CP/1Cry rºs re ¢k cý-rö9or t 
KK^ 'fwý ßýrwq t-tiºc 'r e (ývrtpoý$ riorv -T U^l &r.. ovrºý 
Krci DWI -WeC º -rrývs ( 'ri, j &v(-ecs rKaL vJýý(-ý. J a ýý0 rb ý. ý 0tß/ ihC / ýI -r0 (c1V 01-c M ä/s /A, Xkt1 j ra ý. «. kr. orvocý'XoýrTr(J' 
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This passage is virtually a list of the proper objects of a 
young man's aidos, concentrating as it does on two main 
areas, respect for one's elders and shyness with regard to 
sex. The physiological manifestation of -aidos, 
blushing, 82 
is referred to at 992, and since the reference is to one's 
reaction to mockery, the passage is thus a good indication 
of the working of aidos as a self-conscious and involuntary 
response to the criticism of others. Aidos is personified in 
995, as often in archaic poetry and tragedy, and perhaps 
Just's poetic language at this point, given that the line 
contains one of the only-two instances of the word in extant 
Aristophanes, suggests that the original audience might have 
regarded aidos, as opposed to a sc un, as a poetic and 
somewhat outmoded term. 
83 
Perhaps most in the original audience, if pressed, would 
find Just's sentiments with regard to respect for the old 
commendable, but they might sense that there is an element 
of the killjoy in his approach which is, at odds with the 
basic spirit of comedy. This is even more possible in the 
case of his strictures about lowlife sexual liaisons (996-7) 
and about the need for discretion and concern for one's 
reputation in sexual matters in general (973-83), because 
his stress on appearances and decency involves such an 
obvious suppression both of his own sexual desires and of 
the normal sexual licence of comedy. The effect of the 
characterization, then, is to portray aidos primarily as a 
superficial regard for convention which involves the inhibi- 
tion of the very licence which the audience is there to enjoy. 
Following this speech the Unjust Argument interjects with a 
suggestion that concern for one's own reputation to the deg- 
ree recommended by his opponent would indicate stupidity and 
inability to think for oneself. Heýclaims that if Pheidippi- 
des follows Just's advice-people will call him a "mummy's 
boy" 
1, 
ftK , 1001), and it should be noted that this in 
itself is an appeal to aidos: whereas Just suggests that 
boys should be concerned for their reputation for chastity, 
Unjust implies that they are now more concerned to possess a 
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reputation for cleverness, sophistication and being up to 
date. 
In the concluding section of his speech (1002-23) Just 
returns to his praise of traditional education, and warns of 
the dangers of following the advice which, he anticipates, 
his opponent will give (1019-23): 
Koci X VOCItFcäEt 
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The Unjust Argument, then, will adopt a relativist approach 
and advocate a complete reversal of traditional values, of 
which the effect will be the abandonment of the aidos which, 
according to Just, should prevent boys becoming catamites. 
This prediction turns out to be fairly accurate. 
The chorus (1024-35) praise Just's conventionality, and place 
the onus firmly on his opponent: Unjust will need 
6'ECVx 
hoA6' to win the argument and risks humiliation if he 
loses (1032-5). In the comic agora, then, as' in any agora, the 
motives of the avoidance of disgrace and the desire to humi- 
liate one's adversary are important, and this explains the 
frequency of words like elenchos etc. in this context: 
84 in 
seeking to ensure that it is one's opponent' rather than one- 
self that suffers humiliation one attempts to "show him up". 
Unjust's exordium comes at 1036-45, and the most important 
element of this part of his speech for our purposes is his 
statement that he always opposes nomoi: Just is an upholder 
of conventional and traditional attitudes, but his opponent 
is to be an advocate of unrestrained Physis. The inhibition 
of the self recommended by Just and identified by him with 
aidos is the subject addressed by Unjust at 1060ff., where 
the same attitude is expressed as Ti rw¢eavFiJ and compared 
unfavourably with the attractions of outright hedonism (see 
especially 1071-2). 85 His words at 1075-82 reveal the common 
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ground between his championing of Physis and normal comic 
anaideia" 
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The "necessities of nature" are, in keeping with the tone of 
Just's speech, exclusively sexual, and it is assumed that 
even those who think in the old way will be unable to resist 
these anankai, and will only differ from their more modern 
counterparts in that their conventional attitudes will render 
them unable to defend themselves when caught. Unjust, then, 
seems to subscribe to the view that aidos does not prevent 
the offence, but is simply arousec(by the prospect of exposure. 
In such circumstances, therefore, where aidos is unhelpful, 
he recommends anaideia. The advice that the adulterer should 
deny all knowledge of his offence and show no sign of shame 
or guilt is, in effect, an injunction to behave as does the 
Sausage Seller in Knights, denying his thefts and committing 
perjury in front of witnesses. Such conduct was anaideia 
there, and so it is here: indeed, the advice Xý wrj v' -l, 
( tcrK y>. ( v jt' pC might be the credo of any 
89 
comic hero, and the Unjust Argument is, in fact, addressed 
as would be a typical anaides at 890 (VC^r%jS ), 909 (ävKir)l- 
87 88 
'fos ) and 915 (OCec(vs ),. 
The Unjust Argument, then, is the true exponent of the spirit 
of comedy in Clouds, and his-, victory, in the axon corresponds 
with that of the hero in other plays. He wins by demonstra- 
ting to his opponent that his conventional inhibitions, 
based on the opinions of the society in which he was raised, 
are out of date and no longer have a basis in popular consen- 
sus. The Just Argument is shown that not only does society 
1 .1 now condone fuev-rewkrCoc , but is actually dominated by -JCi- 
7rewKrot : thus there is no need, in this atmosphere of com- 
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plete sexual freedom, for him to disguise his own tendencies, 
and he joins the c.: e 
nCwKro. (1083-1104). The aidos which he 
recommended thus emerges not as an impulse aroused by the 
prospect, of the violation of any deeply held moral principle, 
but as that which prevents one acting in the way in which 
one dearly longs to act, and when the Just Argument is shown 
that cüev, rewkri. c no longer risks public disapproval because 
the values of society have changed, he immediately gives in 
to the "necessities of nature. " 
The Clouds differs from other plays, however, in that the 
victory of anaideia is followed by scenes in which anaideia, 
in practical application, is condemned. As a result of his 
education in the phrontisterion Pheidippides becomes as 
anaides as the Unjust Argument, and while his anaideia is 
still comic, it is revealed as undesirable in any real con- 
text. 
One of the most fundamental imperatives of traditional values 
is that one should honour one's parents: therefore, when 
Pheidippides emerges (at 1321) as a father-beater, the audi- 
ence, though amused, might feel that anaideia has gone too 
far. Pheidippides is not described as anaides at this point, 
but his anaideia is still apparent, and not only because he 
ignores the belief that it is aischron to beat one's father. 
Witness the following exchange (1325-9): 
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Strepsiades points to his son's admission that he beats his 
father as something to be condemned, and, as we have seen, 
the admission of a discreditable act indicates anaideia. 
Pheidippides, however, is so anaides that he actually enjoys 
being insulted and criticized, in which respect he is exactly 
like his tutor. 
89 
The chorus describe the youth's new character in terms of 
526 
thrasos at 1349, and, following his demonstration that he is 
right to beat his father, Strepsiades addresses him as 
wvr rxvvrf at 1380: his anaischuntia lies, as the context 
shows, in his ingratitude for the upbringing his father gave 
him. 90 Pheidippides' shamelessness in this respect is iden- 
tified with support for Physis against nomos at 1420-2, 
where Strepsiades attempts to argue against his justification 
of father-beating by pointing to universal custom (1420, &MA' 
ov cý xv voýgt-i- r; V ýD 1- o( rüvrc -rrarxýtý) , and he replies: 
by W&VV Cývi e -rc, %/ Val E-ls TLvTfi4 IV I-& 'TioWTýn/ 
wä1ree Cu Kafw I Kavt 
> t8-wJ C-ir6-06 'fLvj -rr#.:. X"&vj; 
Human law, in the absence of any divine law, is thus depre- 
. ciated, and 
Pheidippides goes on to assert his right to make 
contradictory laws. This comic antinomianism, which denies 
all human authority and admits of no distinction between 
hoc de, 9ree and traditional custom, is very close to that 
which enabled Unjust to win the axon, but here, as satire on 
the views of the post-Protagorean generation of sophists, it 
is the target of the poet's condemnation, and given this 
relation to the world outside the play, comic anaideia 
emerges as a real threat. 
At 1444-6 Pheidippides goes too far, offering to prove that 
it is right to beat one's mother, and Strepsiades, deciding 
that enough is enough, burns the phrontisterion down: the 
character who sought to cheat his creditors by having his 
son educated in the anaideia necessary for the job thus 
recognizes the undesirability of anaideia. Clearly, then, 
anaideia is both exploited for its comic possibilities and 
condemned in so far as it relates to the behaviour of the 
targets of the comedian's satire: this isýsometimes seen as 
a weakness in the construction of the Clouds, but, broadly 
speaking, this essential paradox underlies many of the plays, 
and the combination of attack on anaideia and celebration of 
the same quality is just as apparent in the plot of Knights 
as in that of Clouds. 
There is no instance of the terms anaides etc. in Wasps, but 
the play follows a similar pattern to those already discussed. 
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Like Clouds it raises questions of education: Philokleon 
resists all attempts to make him civilized and his physic 
persists in asserting itself: 
91 indeed, his behaviour at the 
symposium, described at 1299-1323, and his attitude towards 
his opponents, 1388-1441, provide excellent illustration of 
the maxim, xw Ty vI K, (Kt(ro. YFh K VO/At92 /pi 
4" 
OCl(MN. 
There is, therefore, much anaideia in Wasps: there is also 
the delight in theft and clever knavery prominent in other 
plays, and the tension between moral licence and moral pur- 
pose: Philokleon is the anaides hero and the ultimate victory 
is his, yet we are opposed to his desire to continue as a 
juror and side with Bdelykleon on the issue of the law courts. 
Similarly in Peace there are few concrete examples of 
anaideia designated as such, but much general shamelessness 
in the demeanour of the characters, choice of vocabulary etc.. 
There is a general accusation of anaideia against the late 
politician, Kleon, at 48, and at 182-7 Trygaios' calm accep- 
tance of and agreement with Hermes' insults (including 182, 
ävß ( vvtF (ü ) is a clear sign of his anaideia. 
93 Again, in 
182 shamelessness and boldness are combined, and the elements, 
7t KavýclI(xvvrPdd occur in a rearranged Pý Kýt -rLXr 
order at Frogs 465 
4 
In Birds a case could be made for the presence of comic 
anaideia at many points, but its real emergence comes in the 
parabasis, where the birds enlarge upon the nature of their 
resurgent kingdom, one which, it turns out, subscribes to 
values diametrically opposed to those of men (755-9): 
! ac -Ca( e rrLJ t fýocd a 7cß Tw vuw KeKTh 44tý/K, % 
f% OP 
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1 0V7 C KE-t K. ckaJ -7rae ýt 1V erne, IV rL5 -rk, 'TirCl 
VC or6tltIJ C-iJty 7rour4'$ aie f 1T'il7Wi &, F-I /-, O'-'x et - 
This passage forms the culmination of the wish-fulfilment 
fantasy that has gone before: Peisetairos and Euelpides 
wished to be free of the restrictions placed upon them in 
Athens, 
95 
and the society. of, the birds allows them to be so. 
This society does not quite, represent Physis against mss, 
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although for all practical purposes it may seem so, but 
rather one set of nomoi against another, exploiting both 
comic antinomianism and popular awareness of compar4tive 
ethnography. In this passage the disruption of standards 
which the Athenians would perceive as normal is once again 
indicated by the example of father-beating, and perhaps the 
frequent references to the breach of this particular taboo 
hint at the feeling of exhilaration the audience might have 
experienced at being momentarily freed of it, relieving the 
tension created by observance of traditional imperatives in 
an atmosphere of conflict between the generations. 
96 Later 
in the same passage we learn that the nomoi of the birds 
countenance another fundamental breach of traditional Greek 
values: they find nothing reprehensible in cowardice (768). 
97 
In Lysistrata anaideia etc. occur mainly as Schimpfwörter, 
but in a general sense the anaideia of the women, their dis- 
regard of the restrictions normally placed on them by con- 
vention, is central to the plot. In a sense, then, although 
the men use . naides as a term of abuse, their criticism is 
justified-in terms of traditional attitudes. At 368-9, making 
precisely this charge, they exploit one of the many miso- 
gynistic lines of Euripides: 
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Their utterance at 1014-5 is similar: 
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Here anaideia is a property of the animal world, appropri- 
ately so, since ad is the civilizing virtue which sepa- 
rates man from beast. -99 Wilamowitz100 is right to see anaides 
here not as "shameless", but as "ruthless, pitiless", but it 
is not certain that he is right to differentiate between 
anaideia and anaischuntia in this sense, particularly since 
-aischune appears 
to mean "mercy" at Ant. 1.27.101 
At line 379, still in the exchange of insults of which 368-9 
form part, the men describe their opponents' anaideia as 
thr os - ºý" icvvirof ocü r*s T&ý 
deo rivs *, The women Justify this 
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with reference to their status - 
eN44ee. 
c 
e c-, ýftL . This 
justification is identical to that offered by Pheidippides 
in mitigation of his father-beating at Clouds 1414 - KKiýaýJ 
cJ vV E xFüet(S YF K äYw . Probably the argument, "I am freeborn 
too, you know, " was in current use as a means of suggesting 
that one's own time was at least equal to that of another, 
and, correspondingly, that one did not require to accord 
that person aidos as an inferior: in comedy this is stretched 
to cover the justification of sheer impudence. We might 
notice that, at 399-400, that which at 368-9 is regarded as 
anaideia and at 379 as thrasos is seen as hybris: all these 
terms convey the idea of carrying self-assertion too far, to 
the extent of ignoring another's claim to honour. If the 
women of Lysistrata are to win, however, they need to over- 
come their respect for convention and their fear of criticism, 
hence Lysistrata's exhortation (460)0JK KV rxvvrurtre . The 
women are, then, like other characters anaischuntoi, but in 
a good cause. 
In Thesmophoriazusae references to women's anaideia are more 
conventionally misogynistic, and their anaideia is brought 
out in a particularly comic way by the antics of the shame- 
less buffoon, Mnesilochos. As in other plays, instances of 
anaideia etc. tend to cluster together in specific episodes: 
in Thes. this means that it is only in the first half of the 
play that the terms occur. 
Mnesilochos is anaides from his first appearance onwards, 
and at 63 Agathon's servant supposes him to have been a 
hybristes in his youth. It is, however, ýin his scene with 
the women that accusations of anaideia really begin to fly. 
Mnesilochos' speech in defence of Euripides (466-519) essen- 
tially admits the validity of the tragic poet's supposed 
calumnies against women, -and, -disguised as a woman, he admits 
a whole catalogue of feminine vices. 
which provokes the chorus', response 
-ruvro. ý. tEVr. ý dKV«ýröý/ý 
O? r0Uty 
ý9 
pFO Ts %(ý 
Tºý vd e rýý # cc . -i ovrw 
It is this outspokenness 
(520-7): 
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roan e ýaP ci rccýv rv -n-ocvav( V 
Our; äv wä 
eV 
0V ýf 
rc/%1.1 ePA' -rrcT' w V. 
The complaint is that Mnesilochos has spoken openly about 
matters which should remain concealed: the chorus assume 
that he is a woman, and he is therefore anaicIgs in that he 
speaks without reservation about things which reflect badly 
on their entire sex. Once again, the idea of anaideia is 
supported by words of boldness and daring (523,527). As a 
woman, Mnesilochos is also anaides in that he is alone in 
his opinion of Euripides, but is not troubled by that fact 
(cf. 544-5, vý'rts1ýº. 
üvj r44XjKt5 ýn-EC xvfeös Jvr efiilv). 
102 The 
chorus of women, however, weaken their position somewhat 
when they admit (ävKJ. ! ), 
OC 
00V 
YID{ E in Two Drt/*CI! ý(Vvr&w v6Et 'YVý/aki KWJ 
OuIeVK. L&' 615 otirOvta -Tr> 
/ ä'' CI rvvX(ICos (531-2). 
The chorus, then, find the only explanation for Mnesilochos' 
anaideia in that of their own gender. 
At 611 it seems to be Mnesilochos' (for a woman) unseemly 
reference to urination which makes him anaischuntos in the 
eyes of Kleisthenes, while at 638 wVoci9xvvrt seems to be 
nothing more than a general term of abuse. At 702 it is 
because they believe that he has stolen a child that the 
103 but chorus describe him as Týk s, rf c KJ( VK«AVVTI c, 
Mnesilochos is unabashed by the theft, and for that reason 
the chorus accuse him of anaischuntia again at 708 and 744. 
Frogs provides only one reference to anaischuntia, at 465 
where Aiakos calls Dionysos anaischuntos because he believes 
him to be Herakles, on whose part it would be a sign of 
anaischuntia to return to the scene of his crimes (the theft 
of Kerberos). Later in the, play Euripides' exclamation (1474), 
KI ql(tGV ; S, 4 GV -wf &irýlF' ILJ fr Eieysc ýc vo$ suggests, as we saw 
already, 
1 disloyalty or perjury. 
In Ecclesiazusa, although there is the usual licence in the 
use of obscenity, in the conduct of women and in the sus- 
531 
tained sexual fantasy that is the plot, the nearest we come 
to 'explicit statements of anaideia are two instances of 
tolman. At 400 it is deina that Neokleides should venture to 
give advice to the assembly when he cannot even see properly, 
while at 560-1 - 
ov Y: c{ 
try -röýf -rohýwrýJ a%1"-rjJ X1 CA c 2KJ 
it seems that it requires olma to insult or humiliate 
another, and this suggests that P, ýrj(ä 
fe. v nYI-c can be seen as 
anaideia, lack of concern for another's status, and so be 
discreditable for the agent. 
105 
In Wealt , while Karion, on his way to becoming the clever 
slave of New Comedy, still retains many characteristics of 
the Old Comic anaides, there is no passage which demands our 
specific attention. 
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9. PRESOCRATICS, SOPHISTS, ANTIPHON AND ANDOKIDE. 
In the fragments of the natural philosophers collected by 
Diels-Kranz aidos etc. occur only sporadically and inciden- 
tally. Herakleitos B15, a typically enigmatic pronouncement, 
declares that the celebrants of Dionysiac rites involving 
the use of aidoia would be acting anaidestat, but for the 
fact that Dionysos, in whose honour the ritual is performed, 
is "the same" as Hades. 
I In fr. B82 of the same philosopher 
we find an example of aischros in its physical sense: -r`'t6 
Kk. v 
i 
o KK), )' c, crvf on ")C 5ä vOe wrrw%1 y'vc-t Q vp)3'»EIV . That this sen- 
tence formed part of an analogy is indicated by the fragment 
which follows it in the source: 
2 
ocVdewrr" a a-o arrxroj 7r &. S 
BF 0V -n-'O jco 
4 
oc E CT*L K fo 
f 
Lot K, c, ý we J -i k, 04 it j 
äJ Aj 
rä6t'I (B83DK). 
The fragments of Empedokles furnish only two passages of 
minor interest. B112, the proem of the Katharmoi, describes 
the citizens of Akragas (line 3) as tivwV ctýýGioý 
X Vts 
Bergk proposed a. +ccc(W for 
SGlGl 
, but this is unnecessary: 
as von Erffa points out, 
3 
aidoios can bear an active as well 
as a passive sense, especially in contexts of quest-friend- 
ship and supplication. At B122.3, in a list of feminine 




qp, ý -E . In Phi lolaos B13 'r r. oc4 
ýci 
GV is given 
as one of the essential parts of the rational being, but it 
seems most likely that the fragments fathered on this genuine 
fifth century figure4 come from forgeries based on Aristotle's 
accounts of Pythagoreanism. 
5 
The sayings of the Seven Sages incorporated in Diels-Kranz' 
collection may or may not go back to those regarded as their 
originators, but they do represent a body of traditional 
gnomai which provide useful corroborative material for every- 
day Greek values. Recurrent in the collection is the injunc- 
tion to respect one's father, parents or elders. 
6 Other say- 
ings recommend loyalty to friends? or warn of the dangers of 
aischrokerdeia. 
8 The idea that failure will lead one's 
enemies to mock, and the correlate that mockery of another 
is liable to create enmity, also occur, 
9 
while Pittakos 5 
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furnishes a rare theological deterrent against mockery of 
the unfortunte: oc-rregvvv-rK ovkSLJF' fire r '-mvirotS v LS 0 
Ye "J woc91TKL. In the saying preceding this one nemesis occurs 
in its Homeric sense of anger at another's conduct - 
VCA 
v& ý5 Tw-rýI«(V, OCAra J 1rrlF(. " In Chalon 12 aischunesthai 
is used of respect for a/pe'rson of authority, and it emerges 
quite clearly that this respect responds to more than simply 
superior power or status: Tppc. ý(v fwVI rv)(oý/ rcrx, 6V . T14PEAe., 
1. .. o-rý'wj iE x r(wuvrorc ýý ov 
7 
o, äwvf In Bias 2a link is 
made between the literal and the figurative sense of kalos 
and aischros, 
10 
but whereas he who is physically kalos should 
do kala, the ugly (aischros) man is urged to mend the defi- 
ciencies of his Physis by means of kalokagathia. 
11 
It is 
assumed, then, that a good physical appearance may be a sign 
of a Physis which is capable of good conduct, but it is also 
stressed that proper education can overcome any lack of 
innate capacity. 
In the fragments of 
we are concerned is 
aischron etc. occur 
B11.7 refers to the 
Helen's infidelity, 
fear can overcome of 
interesting to note 
Gorgias the complex of values with which 
given only incidental expression, and 
only in familiar, conventional usages. 
(unjustified) opprobrium incurred by 
while at §16 of the same piece (on how 
ze's sense of honour in battle) it is 
that the honour (Ti wak 
i) 
which is due 
those who show courage in battle is described as cstow' rä-4 v 
CaI 
12 
KPtYoAA*Vov. As in Hdt. 7.104 nomos plays its part in promo- 
tins cohesion in battle, and, as in that passage, while 
nomos may include positive legislation, it seems unlikely 
that it excludes social control through popular opinion. 
In the Defence of Palamedes (B11aDK) much is made of the 
atimia in which the charge involves the defendant and which 
would be reinforced by his condemnation. While to be accused 
of anything might be disgraceful, Palamedes' disgrace stems 
particularly from the fact that he is accused of treason - 
. rºýS ý'rx 
ýrýs ýcirý a$ §1; cf. §25 - to betray Greece would be 
to perpetrate rK air 
K. In §20 he claims that considera- 
tion of the consequences of _'. 
treasonable action could only 
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have dissuaded him from its undertaking: forced to live 
among barbarians, he would be bereft of the honour he enjoyed, 
living Ei a+r7, t'Ty 
sV6KxeL. l ; 
13 
tiis fate, he claims, would be 
the worse for the knowledge that he himself was its cause - 




ýýKý/fad j olrEC KIr; KLCThV KVOCL, 
ýli6Ttý 
(-w' aL, o t. 
The suggestion is, then, that failure, which entails disgrace, 
is harder to bear when one is aware that one is personally 
responsible for it than when it comes upon one by chance: 
14 
in both cases it is disgraceful to fail, but in the former 
one is likely, presumably, to experience a greater feeling 
of personal inadequacy and to turn more strongly to self- 
reproach; 
15 this need not suggest guilt or remorse, but it 
does indicate that one's own evaluation of one's conduct 
can combine with that of other people in the shame which one 
feels with regard to failure, and this suggests that whereas 
others will consider only results, the fact that one has 
failed, one's own judgement will take account of intentions, 
and of the degree to which one is personally responsible for 
the disgrace. It will be seen that in this passage Gorgias 
is employing an argument from probability based on aidos, 
for if the disgrace resulting from a given action is inevi- 
tably so terrible, then (the audience is invited to assume) 
any normal man's aidos will prevent his pursuing it. 
Palamedes attempts to stress his point that he is unlikely 
to have done that of which he is accused by referring to his 
previous good character (28-32) : hence §30, -rw ai rceN Kai 
TwV kxKwJ 
eC'w4 d-lr Xoý" " In 
§33 he turns to his judges and 
reminds them of their own reputations, and in 35-6 he warns 
them that the eyes of Greece are upon them and that an unjust 
verdict will not go unnoticed: 
v/u 1-J ICU 4 KýcC ýýcf 
ä tv(iW# j, äi 
ºýo 
S¢ owiý c cýö an/ -rýJ 
ývte Ký. TKýKkEw'1 -r1V 
(i Töt, s 
re « 84 OCVC ScA-J 
Frwprt" d Ka-ro 
ýi 1ir"' 
ý 
(jam. (36) t aJ C52 
äýcKws 
% aIt'oK-re-LV1r, t -rYC»acs T-E-1rKxt 4 awtC' v Er` 
j 'rb rx ( 
oý K O'C'YV , uý"wý -r r riJ t. Cvi. I SI 
K xKorºýS Kýü cý KvEC. c , 
This is a blatant appeal to aidos, and clearly such an appeal 
might produce the hesitation necessary to dissuade a jury 
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from a guilty verdict. 
16 
Before the publication of J. S. Morrison's important article 
in 1961,17 it was generally assumed that Antiphon, the oli- 
garch and author of the Tetralogies and homicide speeches, 
was to be distir ished from the sophist, author of works Qp 
Truth and On Concord and perhaps also an interpreter of 
dreams. 18 Morrison showed, however, that the distinction was 
largely based on linguistic and stylistic criteria scarcely 
applicable to works differing so widely in genre, and his 
conclusions make any positive distinction impossible. 
19 In 
spite of this, however, it still seems preferable to separate 
the speeches-and the fragments in DK generically, since the 
philosophical, and particularly the papyrus fragments are of 
immense importance for the understanding of the development 
of important fifth century controversies, while the speeches 
provide excellent evidence for the role of aidos, anaideia 
etc. in rhetorical argument. The speeches, then, will be 
treated here, while the papyrus and other fragments will be 
discussed below. 20 
The passages of Antiphon's speeches which most concern us 
fall broadly into three categories: in the first, the speaker 
claims that his opponents have manifested anaideia or have 
acted aischr6s; in the second, the idea that personal honour 
is at stake in -= a court case 
is predominant; and in the 
third ideas of guilt and conscience are exploited as part of 
the speaker's case. 
In speech 1.26-7 the general thought is that, since the 
defendant, the speaker's stepmother, has acted aischrös, she 
deserves no aidos from the jury. 
21 The passage reads as fol- 
lows: 
7rW f fives Towr7d Cilt Eli K LOd e ti-L' º,. Se %dogs Tvý( X4CV, K 
.. º "' ý. 'fC 1d 7c'. c v/nwd aiýkoj Tdv yTL$ auT1 GuK 
,fYý 
E xfJI(Ocu T1011 e ýýrýls avJ , ýhý aviriws is 
\ a,, ý 27j'"ýihrý[1ý 
,., a ,, 
1,. , I/ ," 
výý w k} Ov ?l K Cirtc C FINo AG. ITý CJV TE 
d fový Gv 0 
i K'1Tw xErEVý out1J k, « 'WTI aV Bp'ovs ý ýýuv(ýblýo( ouýE C'1ýotö ^ 
TW cfl K, ci s0 
ýtc. )so TvxGV roC 1 
ü 
A4 C(LIV 1- 0 -J IAIV 
4 -Tra CI 
ýý ', /, 
01 
C( L K, ct. W TAMS 
<V Tu/Col T/ 11 
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Several traditional elements are employed here, notably the 
association of aidos and pity and that of A cj or aischune 
with fear: in §27 no doubt xiixv-/9tirvt refers to the concern 
for the opinions of those named (gods, heroes and men) and 
ýEitstr^ to fear of punishment at their hands. Also notable is 
the identity of aidos and aischune in this specific applica- 
tion: perhaps äidos, as the older term, might be more readily 
associated with mercy, but this passage shows that the normal 
equivalence of the two terms means that they can be inter- 
changeable in specific, as well as general applications. 
Another point to note is the use of aischrOs together with 
anosiös with reference to the conduct of the alleged murder- 
ess: as Dover points out, 
22 it is clear that the adverb, so 
employed, is intended to condemn the conduct of the agent 
rather than reflect on the patient. At the same time, however, 
there can be no doubt but that it is aischrqn to be murdered 
by one's wife (cf. §23, the speaker's father died KKhtNs), 
and thus it seems obvious that the same action can be dis- 
creditable for both agent and patient. 
As in tragedy and comedy, the accusation that one's opponent 
is anaides is common, and this accusation is frequently 
coupled with one of tolma, of going too far. Speech 3. c. 1 
provides a simple example: 
KLfTK yK( EV (t TW EMTfe0thEf 'C"VW pVý. 
C. 
bº1S KsA TcXpi1Cds 
61/f SIB v vv 
! 
V'ii' Kv r11$ -r'ºj$/r ot cj ý/ýiýKK(Tac 
)c Er W bt. c/ G, 
r 
ý( 
äV ? r'ort 
wý+jV 
Erw -rteyr, ý/ Ei iF. V (c/f. 2, 'ro), mwd ). 
The speaker affects incredulity that his opponent dares to 
contradict what he has presented as the plain facts of the 
case, and implies that such a barefaced denial of the truth 
constitutes anaideia. This is his point again at c. 5, cis 
ON 1 Tuvro ro-C -riý"j KR. i 
ävxýOFýKS 4'cFl 
... ,a phrase which is 
repeated at 4. c. 6: accusations of shameless tolma occur at 
1.28,4. c. 4,5.15,5.57,6.51. 
In 2. c. 3 an argument from aidos is used in conjunction with 
one which seeks to establish that the accused alone possessed 
sufficient motive to commit the crime. Like Gorgias in the 
Palamedes, 23 the speaker asserts that, in any normal circum- 
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stance, people are deterred from crime by fear of both 
punishment and disgrace, but maintains that fear of the con- 
sequences if the crime is not committed and hatred can lead 
the desperate to overcome their inhibitions: 
1ruvs AEJ ya( (sc. v, &//. -wcX o'TF$ , i. e. the I 
defendant) o" tE Yos r6- öc cýt(t 
i Kav1 ºýý -Trocvrck -rj5 
S5 (sc. ai 
4'rrI'J I<LVS'VrEVOYTbS vis-A-visthe 
deceased) o fE Ktýýývos 
vf 




.c "ý KS CI Kare ciC Fvvj 9jra T#; i- 
[Jtit äeKovl#c ' 
6W¢/Gvi tuet Ti 
ý 
O 'T'ES ýwý7S . 
Here aischune is the disgrace which will result from exposure 
as a murderer, but the calculation of kindunos and aischun 
must involve aischune in its other sense, as the equivalent 
24 
of aidos. The prospect of disgrace here performs an inhibi- 
tory function - it checks ((w4p. v (pct) the passions, unless 
the sense of resentment is too strong. 
Accusations of anaideia such as we looked at above are 
clearly designed to "show up" or shame the speaker's opponent. 
A court case is an agora, and, as in any agora, the reputation 
of both parties is at stake: failure in a legal process, in 
a society like the Athenian, where one's actions are highly 
visible, may occasion shame even though the individual in- 
volved is aware (or represents himself as aware) that his 
case is wholly just; other people will not know the facts of 
the case-and will draw their own conclusions from its result. 
25 
Thus the importance of honour in the legal context is 
stressed in several passages in Antiphon: at 2. b. 9 the 
defendant says that if he is condemned to death he will in- 
flict äve: ýK : vt: d7 on his children, and in §12 he appeals, 
Gv 
oe v'rt"/ 
1 TOI, avTOJ f10 Vris /A *V ýt K ý; Y, KnGtKYvWft . 
We have already seen how the prosecutor in the second Tetra- 
logy became indignant at the suggestion that his opponent 
was not responsible for his son's death: honour has its part 
to play in this, too, for at 3. d. 4 the defendant explains 
that it is out of concern for the dead boy's reputation that 
his opponent, the boy's father, refuses to accept that his 
i 




crsWV Thh'7r#LS< ý Fi /Vºv1 
t! ' oCKGVtlöýes 
542. 
'T E-ifi Vol 464> ocv 9E-dTýs &V a1t'o 
ýý-ýE-I KTACý . 
It i's accepted, then, that the charge that one's son had 
caused his own death by negligence might cause some dis- 
_tress, and we can see 
that this is the kind of informa- 
tion of which one's enemies might make use: perhaps the 
same stress on reputation might not be present in, say, 
one present at the incNest into the death of a relative 
in our society, but the same concern to apportion blame 
to others is often apparent in such contexts, and behind 
this may lie motives similar to those mentioned in this 
passage. 
In the Herodes the defendant, Euxitheos, claims that the 
fact that he has been brought to trial by a method which 
he represents as quite unprecedented has brought disgrace 
on himself and his family 018, 
ü vtc &j re pwrw it 
IrEeLeefe- v Kx -r, &Ls Eý. ýS 1rCorºýKw<<ý ... The oneidos 
arises chiefly from his imprisonment). Honour is thus a 
considerable motive in those involved in litigation, and 
in this context it is perhaps relevant to note the 
frequency of terms like elenchos etc. in Antiphon, 
26 for 
while these terms might often refer to the exposure of 
"the truth", there is also a concern to expose one's 
opponent's wickedness, deceit or anaideia, and elenchos 
often has more to do with shaming one's opponent than 
with the presentation of proof or evidence. 
It is in the third of our three categories (that of 
passages in-which the notion of guilt or conscience is 
prominent) that something of Antiphon's individuality is 
apparent: none of his successors exploits the idea of 
conscience to anything like the same extent. 
27 In this 
he reveals his awareness of developments in contemporary 
thought, for the identification and designation of the 
concept of conscience as such is a phenomenon of the 
later fifth century, but clearly the idea of conscience 
can hardly have been completely novel, since a composer 
of speeches to be delivered before a popular jury would 
be unlikely to incorporate ideas which his audience 
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would find unusual or unnecessarily sophisticated. 
28 It seems 
most likely, then, that the identification of the concept of 
science and its designation in terms of -Syneidesis etc. was 
fairly readily accepted by the ordinary citizens of Athens. 
Reflections on guilt and conscience, however, are not intro- 
duced arbitrarily or gratuitously into the speeches: all 
have their point, and in terms of purpose and application 
may be divided into two categories, firstly those passages 
which warn the jurors of the possibility that their consci- 
ences will trouble them should they reach an unjust verdict, 
and secondly those in which the main point is the clear con- 
science of the speaker himself. Those passages in the first 
category are mostly based on the idea of the jury's duty, 
which in a case of homicide is a religious one (a requirement 
of eusebeia) 
29 
analogous to that of the prosecution30 in 
avenging the dead man. 
Summing up his second speech for the defence, the speaker of 
2. d. 12 appeals to the jury for eusebeia and aidos, and con- 
cludes by reminding the jurors that a hasty verdict will 
afford them ample opportunity for repentance: 
Gürte eie äSiKws cc&Kovrf3 ýr , aüro%ýtc. Fý 
ävorcws 
ti tI ö 
"rCoºcTZ-t. K. l tj-r&v vrr5 Kct öge 
öý¢ 
ov er V/Ei ý/aýt 
C 
clr o1 
Eý ct ý. iv i, ýs -rrc(G& , 
ävo'r #. ýý: v heYývr etw 
dr 
Kor, e oceo3  'ITpG VrwV "r 
wV CA Wq `jj. AA&V 
E. 
4+ o6VT of 
e-rCýrýCý-rrrw. i iti« -TºýJ Two 
r t, crhoVvrW1 
-2,41 JE cF4.. rV5 
v-rr &e (E -r#u a-n-ý ýowov O$ aV ýcý, ýºý vºý nt wJ -rjJ -mac vy 
-tra OCLvw -rbV 
ä(avrLrN Koýýiºýcýcvf. cs -rýJ OcArCNN 
4o 411.4/ a4 tLVPA- " a-roVowo, rroc r(10 ou 
öH1. s e n. r& 
rvj! t T. 
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411 Eýrouvý7 fýu/t'tS -r výý/ or aý rütý 
I r% J 01 
'r Vwrr " av-S y# y A4+T-w6t . Twv TLt. OurwV Ea-mV. 
It is significant that in this passage, as often in Aeschylus 
but only infrequently later, aideisthai and sebesthai overlap 
to a considerable extent, and both seem to bear the sense of 
"honouring" which is their closest point of contact. One can 
and this same idea is picked up by 
TK, ýrK ... e'4 -ýo44 L. 3. b. 12 uses similar language: rjd Tr 0 
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1/i/ 
eu re- f3"rý TvvtWýl TwJ T'ýwx (ýC-ýrrwJ K -r ýte cýu 09. 
0 ýCws iCcý Lkw<ws aýa)w --rr výýtxs ... 
As to the metanoia mentioned at the end of the first Tetra- 
logy, it does seem at first sight as if the speaker is war- 
ning the jurors that their own (subsequent) recognition that 
they have reached an unjust verdict will cause them to feel 
remorse, but the picture is complicated by the obvious stress 
on the religious aspect. The remainder of the passage is 
concerned with pollution and ritual purity (for example, if 
the speaker is condemned the real murderer, a source of pol- 
lution, will go free), 
31 
and thus the metanoia may equally 
be occasioned by the recognition that the jurors have been 
responsible for bringing pollution on themselves and the 
city. In other passages, both the condemnation of an innocent 
man32 and failure to condemn the true killer33 may bring the 
wrath of the victim down upon the jury. If, then, the jury's 
metanoia is to be caused by the sense that they are being 
pursued by some avenging spirit, then we are not, strictly 
speaking, dealing with remorse as such, but at the same time 
we should notice that in both 2. d. 12 and 3. b. 12 the jurors 
are asked to behave not only piously but also with regard 
for justice, and it is thus clearly possible that any repen- 
tance they might experience after the trial might also be 
occasioned by a feeling that they have failed to act in. 
accordance with justice, and this might well indicate 
remorse. It is important to remember, moreover, that, unless 
we believe that fifth century Athenians were literally pur- 
sued by the avenging spirits of the dead or subject to the 
pollution caused by the shedding of blood, we are bound to 
see the phenomena which they describe in those terms as 
indications of normal human responses, and it is perfectly 
possible that the fear of pollution or of the vengeance of 
the dead man conceals an anxiety which we should describe in 
terms of conscience. Naturally, however, this does not mean 
that the phenomenon of conscience is referred to in these 
passages as such. 
The jury is warned in similar terms at 5.89 and 91-2, and 
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although reservations based on the theological aspect of 
homicide still obtain, they do so to a far lesser extent in 
this, a genuine court speech, than in the Tetralogies. 34 The 
last sentence of §88 informs the jury that it is a hamartia 
and an asebeia to convict an innocent man of murder, and the 
next sentence (§89) explains that it is more serious for a 
jury wrongfully to convict than for a prosecutor wrongfully 
to accuse. Section 89 closes with a warning that the conse- 
quences of a wrong verdict (whatever they may be) are ines- 
capable: o rc 6 aV owri T"ý c ýv 1O wS ?v vrr ý" i e, ruv ra 0. V º, / e7"6 rLJ o -mac aV tts vtV q Kw3 -rI4 Ot., 6tiKV er-iroAV(LTb . 
In 91 Euxitheos proceeds to make a distinction within the 
category of hamartia, saying that to acquit ä 
ýt ICº-S is c (LI'T sJ 
than to convict/. 
49 cC (ttwy: the former is a mistake fKýT 
the latter an impiety (äsfjv%^) . In the case of a mistake 
which can be remedied (i. e. if the jury acquit a guilty man) 
a change of mind is always possible, but: 
CV' (cE Tol S Dý vºýKEQý'ots 'fýiý FGA! /ý 
ý Kýj05 -re ýVt. t'rDýn/O 6tý1 KR-t irvwv 
Ek 








(cf. the example in 69-71). 
K 
Tut ö rro&v Tots 
t ß w'n-aT1 BtrtX4 4-rc4, A v) r'-/ Lc w04' -Tr 06 vu rz Lx 
rvv_ yef a-rx-r JV1 a-r-O >% w. X Evat . 
Similarly in 92 he goes on to emphasize the gravity of a 
decision to condemn: a conscious decision which turns out to 
have been wrong admits of no excuse. 
Certainly there are religious elements in this passage 
(n ýF/ýýýoc. 88,; rLwTaecý 6E, 61ý" 91) but the threat of pollu- 
tion is not explicitly brought out. 
35 Parker, however, 36 
believes that the warning that the jurors cannot escape the 
resonsibility for any hamartia37 means that "it would be 
pollution or spirits which the jurors could not evade. " On 
the other hand, the sentence, evG -M'LS äv7 k-l"of'rio'. 5 'rk X6`94 
haýýos "ý+pý Vtl&tV i -z --VaV. &t c ºý Kera$, does suggest 
that the very recognition that one has made a mistake (or 
done wrong) will prove painful: as Dover points out, 
38 it is 
impossible to decide whether the recognition is painful be- 
cause it leads to fear of consequences or because the indivi- 
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dual blames himself for being wrong. Possibly the matter is 
deliberately left open, those on the jury who believe in 
pollution thus being allowed to consider the dangers of mis- 
take in the light of that belief, while those for whom indi- 
vidual conscience is a real consideration are encouraged to 
take that into account. 
That Antiphon is thinking of conscience in this passage might 
be suggested by the sequel (§93), in which relatively new 
uses of the vocabulary of conscience are exploited to suggest 
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The repetition of parts of SvvýLdoc here is most striking, 
and it is clear that we are dealing with an internal consci- 
ence which has important psychological effects: the psyche 
of one with a clear conscience is strong, while that of one 
with a bad conscience is weak, and it seems that it is one's 
own awareness that one has done no wrong which is the most 
important consideration. As Dover points out, 
39 
the repre- 
sentation of conscience in this passage strongly resembles 
similar descriptions in the fragments of Demokritos, to 
which, as we shall see, 
40 
aidos is closely relevant. On the 
other hand, Antiphon does seem rather to step back from a 
wholly Demokritean or psychological explanation of conscience: 
the Psvche of the man with a bad conscience is said to weaken 
because he feels that what is happening to him is a punish- 
ment for his asebemata. It is possible that a fear of super- 
natural punishment enters the picture here, but it also 
remains true that the psychological disturbance is directly 
547 
caused by the recognition of a transgression. The passage 
thus clearly reveals fairly advanced notions of the nature 
of conscience, and this is particularly true in the awareness 
of the positive benefits of a good conscience rather than 
simply of the ills caused by guilt. 
41 In the fifth century 
context it is definitely comparable with the interest 
in describing and defining conscience shown by Demokritos 
and Euripides. 
42 
The passage, however, is not included in the speech for its 
own sake, but is an example of how the moral outlook of at 
least part of the jury may be exploited as an argument from 
probability: the speaker claims that a good conscience allows 
confidence, through the strength of the psyche, while a bad 
conscience leads to weakness of the psyche and despair. 
43 In 
effect (as indeed the last sentence of 93 shows), he is 
inviting the jury to conclude from his demeanour that he is 
innocent, because this is the impression created by his con- 
fidence. The converse of this argument, open to his opponents, 
would be that his confident exterior, in the face of compel- 
ling proof of his guilt, is a sure sign of anaideia. 
The speech On the Chorister opens with a similar argument 
from conscience. If one must face danger, the speaker claims, 
the greatest of blessings is a clear conscience (6.1): 
Oc VT -rvvEt dE ý/ýl ývº+ý 
ýN/ 
Eý KGTI K 
ý' E( 
Tý 
kac1 #- U/v+C oc '1 vcv ro , IC VE U 
tCoc *Tjr&j Kc^4 act 
ýiývrffýwl ý Kai -rvX ` ýº. `ý 
kýýý öý K L or 
Again the true determinant of the character of the situation 
is the individual's conscience, and it is claimed, in effect, 
that provided one's conscience is clear, no aischune can 
accrue, even though the situation is one normally considered 
disgraceful. This is not the traditional view, and contrary 
opinions are expressed in Antiphon himself, 
44 but, as we 
have seen, since its first occurence in Solon, 
45 the explicit 
statement that one's own estimation of the character of one's 
actions is more important than that of other people has 
become increasingly common. In the passages so far discussed 
it is implied that the awareness that one has done no wrong 
548 
frees one from fear and inhibition: in other passages it is 
the awareness that one has done wrong which leads one to 
submit oneself to justice, even in the absence of compulsion. 
One such is 6.4-5, where it is said that one who kills 
another who is under his control46 and who thus has no one 
to avenge him by prosecuting his killer nevertheless volun- 
tarily seeks purification, out of respect for convention and 
for the divine sanction (-ro va" 1 o, icI Kbu T) d 6-L&V re t. 
The reference to -rä 9-Ii clearly indicates fear of divine 
punishment, but fear of TG v0/*%43olwoV suggests not fear, 
but aidos: nor does it seem that this aidos is directed 
primarily at others' reproaches, but rather it takes the 
form of respect for the code of conduct prevalent in the 
city; it appears to be assumed that the individual in ques- 
tion agrees with conventional standards and is keen to behave 
in accordance with them. In §5 this readiness to 
submit to the prescriptions of law or custom is described in % 
terms of conscience: ov-r pt-v dvvEtýws K, ros kurve ýCrcJ 
EýýýKd, ý, ý, 
Eyos 
-rvuvT?, V oü y, (^u6xk rwV. It seems, then, 
that there is in this passage a realistic awareness that 
fear of punishment, conscience and a conscientious desire to 
do what is considered right can combine to promote the same 
course of action. Other similar passages include 5.33,41,49 
and 6.23,47 in all of which a subjective evaluation of right 
and wrong is more important than external compulsion. 
Of the speeches of Andokides only the second falls within 
the period of our enquiry, but it contains little that is 
relevant. In §4 we are told that Andokides' real opponents 
2 10 
send others to accuse him, the sort of men P LS Ei 
gct, ýttV`ýs 
IICJ ötVPLIýxVýTbly OVdEv GlKýtýEC El'Tr v Tt R4 OrKGVfýBýt 'IOt 
Mgt rc TwV Kook V. The identification of anaischuntia with 
the ability to say anything, true or not, and with disregard 
for the opinions of other people is fundamental. Here these 
anaischuntoi are contrasted with Andokides' enemies, who eV 






ýcJ'GJocI : these people obviously do possess an element of 
aischune, at least with regard to exposure. 
48 
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In the ethics of Protagoras, Antiphon (in the fragments of 
ut and Concord) and Demokritos, as far as we can tell 
from the available evidence, the nature and efficacy of aido* 
played a major part. Before discussing these figures, however, 
space must be created for a brief examination of relevant 
passages in the fragments attributed to Kritias. Most of the 
instances of the relevant terms are of a commonplace nature, 
49 
and only the celebrated Sisyphus fragment has any bearing on 
the mainstream of our discussion. The question of whether 
the satyr-play and the three tragedies (Tannes, Rhadamanthys 
and Peirithous) are to be attributed to Kritias or to Euri- 
pides is of no great importance here, since the passages 
with which we are concerned will be equally good evidence 
for fifth century ideas as long as it is merely assumed that 
they are of that period. 
50 
The Sisyphus fragment (B25) contains no instance of aidog, 
but is nonetheless important in that it provides important 
evidence that a problem we shall meet again in Antiphon and 
Demokritos was a prominent one in the age of the Sophists. 
The fragment is firmly in the tradition of sophistic 
: Kulturentstehungslehren in its assumption of an original 
bestial state from which mankind emerged with the help of 
laws and other institutions of civilization. 
51 
Laws, however, 
can only prevent open transgressions of which society will 
be aware (B25.9-10), and so men began to do wrong in secret 
(1 1) . In order to deter them from this, TrvKvPS lr%S K. c i Ca¢ aS 
S(v1((12) invented fear of the gods. The speaker is 
probably the irreligious Sisyphos himself, and the atheist 
sentiment may be the passage's main dramatic point: it would 
certainly not be legitimate to take it as the view of either 
Kritias or Euripides, even if we could discover which of the 
two was the author. For our purposes, however, it is the 
idea that human beings felt it necessary to devise a means 
of preventing wrongdoing in situations in which the sanctions 
of statutory punishment and popular disapproval, by reason 
wk ich is important 
of the deed's private status, were felt to be ineffective( 
Clearly aidos has a part to play in the prevention of mis- 
deeds about which others may find out (and here it is not 
550 
necessary that they should find out in every case, merely 
that the prospective agent should be concerned at the possi- 
bility), 52 but the speaker in the fragment is obviously of 
the opinion that aidos is inactive when the likelihood of 
detection appears slight. It is also clear that anyone who 
can say that the gods were invented will have no belief in 
divine authority, and so the opinion represented in the 
fragment is one which holds out little hope of deterring men 
from attempting , to do wrong in secret. This opinion, widely 
accepted, would clearly be a dangerous one, and it is there- 
fore not surpising that various arguments were employed in 
the attempt to refute it, and it is to some of these that we 
shall now turn in our discussion of Protagoras, Antiphon and 
Demokritos. 
53 
The ipsissima verbs of Protagoras are scant, and any attempt 
to reconstruct the broad outline of his teaching will inevi- 
tably be driven to consider the accounts given of him by 
Plato, both in the eponymous dialogue and in the Theaetetus, 
and this raises the question of the reliability of Plato's 
testimony. The Theaetetus, however, does not immediately 
concern us, while in the Protagoras only those arguments used 
in the so-called Great Speech (320c-328d) will be considered, 
and there is a strong presumption that, where Protagoras is 
portrayed as freely offering his own views, these are likely 
to be consonant with opinions actually held by the historical 
Protagoras: if Plato did wish to examine or refute Protagoras' 
doctrines he must have intended to state them somewhere, and 
it is more likely that he did so in the Great Speech, which 
is a voluntary statement of the sophist's opinions, than in 
the rest of the dialogue, where he is pressed by Sokrates 
and led into areas he may not have wished to explore. 
54 Cer- 
tainly the advantages of attempting to discover the views of 
the historical Protagoras distinctly outweigh the disadvan- 
tages of the uncertainty of attribution, since the views ex- 
pressed in the Great Speech are firmly in the older sophistic 
mainstream, and since other writers, like Antiphon and Demo- 
kritos, do seem to be aware of the strengths and inadequacies 
of the doctrines there presented. That the Speech does treat 
551 
major topics which engaged other fifth century figures is a 
strong argument in favour of its reliability as evidence. 
In the myth (320c-322d) which Protagoras relates in order to 
prove his contention that political grete can be taught, a 
two stage account of the origins of culture and human pro- 
gress is given, the first stage being bestial and uncivilized, 
the second bringing civilization and -tfAcrLK4 TExvl through 
the intervention of Zeus and his gift of ga and dike. 
There are two implications of this account which are impor- 
tant for our purposes: firstly, that men lived on earth for 
some time before acquiring the ability to live together 
amicably; and secondly, that aidos and dike, and -ff&aLTlKj' TE)c 1, 
are prerequisites for the second, civilized stage of human 
existence. Thus aidos appears once again as a civilizing 
force, as it does at 11.24.41-455 and in those passages in 
which its withdrawal is seen as a sign of the breakdown of 
moral order. 
56 
At 1Ip. 276-80 it is dike which separates man 
from beast, but as in the present passage, aidos and dike 
are linked elsewhere in the context. 
57 
The precise nature and role of aidos and dike, however, -are 
problematic: all men are to possess them (322d), and any 
unable to do so, in the myth, are to be put to death, but in 
the logos which follows the myth and which gives an account 
of how virtue actually is taught in contemporary Athens it 
is stated that the Athenians do not consider -rr& LrLK7 ör(ft-rj 
to exist vrt. -t, but to be developed by teaching and practice 
(323c). The problem is, how can everyone possessaidos and 
dike and yet not possesS-rr"LtLK-j w t-rý (or rixvºj ) by nature, 
since -rf4Lnr. -1 rfjvj is said to have been brought about by 
the acquisition of aidos and fie? The problem is largely a 
product of the allegorical divine apparatus of the myth, yet 
it is of great importance, in that its investigation will 
bring'us closer to the ideas of one or more classical 
thinkers as to how aidos actually worked. 
Most commentators have assumed that the combination of myth 
and logos shows that both innate capacity and teaching are 
.. s7 
required to bring out 1rc) Lrc. "1 
o 
r"ý and indeed there are 
indications enough of this in the text. In addition, one of 
the fragments of Protagoras' own works (B3DK) affirms exactly 
that position: 
J 
v(e '3 w x) 
xrKl(k-ws ecf. 
ýrKe. XC. c a4.7r (. Our 
problem, then, 
really 
is, do aidos and dike belong to Physis 
or are they instilled by askesis. Some have said that aidos 
and dike exist 
Jü (rl, on the grounds that, if all those who 
were unable to possess these qualities were , put 
to death 
early in the history of mankind, surely all those now alive 
possess them by nature. 
58 
This position is, however, open to 
two objections, the first that the execution of those 
unable to share-in aidos and dike shows that Zeus is unable 
to alter man's essential nature5but both this, and the 
position it attacks, may entail a too literal interpretation 
of the logic of the myth. A more serious objection is thatif 
aidos and dike exist by nature, they cannot be equivalent to 
-fromL-rLw1 7rcx'ºJ or äCErj . 
60 
That aidos and dike are equivalent 
to -r-Ac, rLK trtym /c -Ti is suggested by the fact that dikai- 
osyne and sophrosyne, which paraphrase aidos and dike at 
01 
323a (and thereafter), 
61 
are equated with -WALTLWJ TExvl at 
% 
323a-b and with 
ävJ 
3 or'eeri at 324e-325a. 
62 At the same 
time, however, we should note that, at 329c, Sokrates is not 
clear on whether aidos, dikaiosyne, zsophrosyne and hosiotes, 
despite Protagoras' assertion that these "are" arete, are 
parts of a unity called grete or names given to the unity, 
arete. Protagoras replies that they are parts of a whole as 
are the parts of the face to the face itself (329d-e). Thus 
anabsolute equivalence of aidos etc. and grete, in the manner 
suggested by Sokrates' second alternative, is denied, and 
the statement that aidos etc. (and perhaps any number of 
other qualities) are parts of arete may mean no more than 
that they contribute to it, 
63 
and so the question of whether 
aidos and dike, unlike arete, exist 
4 vrsc. is left open. 
A better route towards the solution of the problem is affor- 
ded by an examination of the logos with a view to determining 
how aidos and dike, or sophrosyne and dikaiosyne, work in 
relation to arete: are they themselves taught or do they 
enable one to learn? In general in the logos it is argued 
553 
that society's attempts to correct the moral faults of its 
members by punishment (323d-324c, 325a, 325d, 326d) show that 
these faults are regarded as remediable, and thus that arete 
can be taught. Experience of punishment, then, and fear of 
its recurrence are thought to produce arete. These, however, 
are only the sanctions employed when the subject has failed 
to absorb the precepts imparted to him in the process of 
education: examination of Protagoras' conception of this 
process shows clearly that he regarded it as the instruction 
of each member of society from the earliest age in the stan- 
dards and values of the community. At 325c-d we are told 
that a. child's nurse, mother, paidagogos and father all 
strive to improve its arete, pointing out Td 1M. 
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The child thus learns to subscribe to the same values as its 
teachers: 
64 
dikaion/adikon etc. correspond to the three parts 
of arete at 324e-325a, oýLKctiýudwý ºýa. + fw 
jCs, 1uvj k-&4 -rv 
crcd 
- Vxt, and, inasmuch as the child does not know instinctively 
what is dikaion or adikon, it seems that the efforts of its 
teachers at this stage are designed to instil exactly these 
qualities, which are those which enable the child to recog- 
nize what is dikaion, what -adjj= etc.. 
It seems likely that 
Protagoras saw education, or "social control", 
65 
as producing 
the qualities dikaiosvne, sophrosyne and hosiotes, not as 
exploiting them. 
66 The sophist himself avoids the word jd 
outside the myth, but the learning of what is aischron and 
kalon, while it corresponds only to ; ophrosyne of the three 
parts of arete, strongly suggests the learning of aidos. 
The other stages of education confirm this general impression. 
As well as instructing their charges in lyre-playing, the 
didaskalos also teaches eukosmia (325e): having learned this, 
the boys also learn to emulate the heroes of epic (325e-326a). 
When they continue their studies of music with the hitharis- 
tes they also practise sophrosyne (326a); in physical train- 
ing (326b-c) they learn how to avoid oýrc1ýýKý LfL", t .r 
jv 
-rcv1(iw 
TNd rwJ WTI kx4 lv' Tö f ýoiýtwGýý Ksi CV Toes 
K/`^OL tS 
-ý-/, ffrdCV, and they are presumably reminded at this Point that 
554 
it is aischron to be a coward. Finally (326c-d) the city's 
laws become teachers, and the young men learn by example: 
the nomoi clearly provide moral, as well as legal, impera- 
tives, and to obey them can hardly be anything other than 
the exercise of aidos and dike. Protagorean theory thus co- 
incides*with that of modern psychologists, to the extent 
that both see the social virtues which promote conformity to 
the standards of society as imparted in the process of 
socialization. 
67 
The strongest indication, however, that aidos and dike do 
not form part of the nature of every man comes at 327c-d, 
and it is here that Protagoras' position is finally clarified. 
The essence of the argument is that, as all flute-players 
are flute-players per se as compared to non-flute-players, 
although within the category of flute-players there may be a 
wide range of talent and ability, so all citizens, although 
they vary widely in Grete and justice, are still just when 
compared to those who do not enjoy a civilized life in a 
political community. Even the most unjust citizen, we are 
told, would appear an expert in justice compared with men 
who had no contact with the institutions of civilization 
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then, men possess a minimal capacity for justice, they do so 
because of their membership of a civi]zed community, not 
because they are men. Protagoras, however, does not envisage 
any race of "wild men" like those of the comic poet, Phere- 
krates (327d), as actually existing, and so the implication 
of the myth, that all men possess a capacity for -ir r&K, TExvj 
because they possess aidos dike does not conflict with 
this statement. The process of civilized life is reciprocal: 
aidos and dike are required in order for cities to exist, 
and membership of a citizen body makes it inevitable that 
one will possess some degree of Aidos and dike. 
68 
On the other hand, Protagoras does attach some importance to 
innate capability (remember fr. B3DK): in the analogy of the 
flute-players (327b-c) it is natural ability which allows 
555 
one musician to excel over his fellows: so, it is implied, 
do men differ in dikaiosyýe according to their physis. 
69 
Antecedent capacity, then, can determine how just one is 
(and, presumably, how much aidos one feels), but not whether 
or not one is just at all. Therefore, whatever this antece- 
dent capacity is (and this is a considerable difficulty), it 
is probably not aidos or dike: 
70 it may simply be a greater 
ability to learn. The fact that Protagoras has allowed for 
innate ability, however, has created difficulties. Some have 
held that while aidos and dike do not exist by nature, the 
ability to acquire them does: 
71 but the ability to acquire 
aidos and dike is a simple consequence of being born into a 
social environment, and if one not brought up in a social 
environment can be said to be vastly more unjust than anyone 
who has been, then obviously natural ability has nothing to 
do with the acquisition of justice. Furthermore, to posit an 
innate capacity for aidos and dik from the qualities 
themselves creates a problem of terminology, for how would a 
Greek differentiate between a capacity for aidos and aidos 
itself, and what would this capacity be called? 
To sum up, then, Protagoras in the Great Speech holds that 
the moral qualities of aidos and dike (sophrosyne and dikai- 
osyn are necessary for the existence of the social and 
political unit of the city, that the qualities are desirable 
as well as necessary (they benefit citizens mutually at 327b). 
and that they are not innate but acquired in the socializing 
process which every member of the community undergoes. 
72 
As a means of promoting justice and virtue, this thesis is 
open to several objections, of which the chief for our pur- 
poses are the following: it is empirically false that every- 
one in a city must be just for the city to survive; 
73 in 
allowing that citizens vary in the degree of their observance of 
justice and in maintaining that, nevertheless, all are mini- 
mally just, Protagoras shows only that a minimum of just 
behaviour is necessary for everyone's good; 
74 
citizens have 
grounds to obey the laws for the good of the city, but not 
for their own good in every circumstance. 
75 The historical 
Protagoras may have had perfectly adequate answers to these 
556 
objections, but if so, they are not to be found in our 
sources. In view of the concentration in the age of the 
sophists on the traditional tendency to identify just action 
and expedient action, the crucial objection which might be 
made is that Protagoras does not relate moral action speci- 
fically to the individual's own advantage, and it is exactly 
this point that is made by Antiphon in criticizing a theory 
of justice which might well be that of Protagoras. 
76 
In fr. B44A Antiphon offers the following definition of 
% Tºý S ll Aws vA , t1 
1, )1 justice: d KKlucuv1 ov V TK w ºý . c' IrOUTEU- 
1 rxt its -wceý&üve-W. This is not, however, a definition to 
which he/h'imself subscribes, 
77 
since he immediately goes on 
to describe how one might treat justice most advantageously 
to oneself, and this entails not obedience to the laws of 
the city in which one lives (the requirement of justice), 
but simply obeying the laws in front of witnesses and obeying 
-rot i- 
v(E 
wj when no witnesses are present. As he goes on 
to explain (col. 1.22 - col. 2.10), justice and law (nomos), 
in his view, have no power to compel other than that of the 
sanctions imposed by other members of the community when 
one's transgressions come to light: 
Tbc vt I fe 1V Vaµwd 
Ehrt OfrK Ta fE -r7S 
f 
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Antiphon, then, is criticizing a view of justice which holds 
that justice is obeying the nomima of one's own city, and 
which relies on a belief that laws and customs are Products 
of agreement. 
79 He is, of course criticizing the definition 
from his own point of view (and so we do have his own views 
here), but he is not putting forward positive doctrine of 
his own: there is no injunction to break the law in secret. 
80 
Several indications suggest that the view of justice criti- 
cized is that of Protagoras: the association of dikaiosyne 
and c Yý MK recalls Prot. 327a, -rwv 
oLi(zc& I k< 4 11, / vau/cý''w\/ 
while the 
/statement 
that laws are ei I rc()Fýr, < suggests arview of 
the origin of law similar to that implied by the Prot. myth. 
557 
Again, the citizens agree to uphold that which their city 
holds just, and this is precisely the arrangement suggested 
by Tht. 167c. 
In his criticism Antiphon singles out two consequences of 
law-breaking, aischune and zemia: it is probable that, in 
using these terms, he wishes to encompass the entire range 
of the term nomos, both codified and uncodified, for while 
aischune (disgrace) would follow conviction for a crime pro- 
scribed by-law, it also naturally follows breach of conven- 
tional morality. 
81 Antiphon seems, in effect, to be sugges- 
ting that' Protagoras' aidos (fear of reproach or disgrace, 
whether resulting from breach of convention or of positive 
law) and dike (sense of justice, "law-abidingness") are not 
sufficient to prevent injustice when the agent feels that he 
can avoid the attention of others: the process of legal 
punishment or social disapproval can be set in motion only 
when society is aware of the transgression, and this kind of 
sanction, when compared with the immediate and painful con- 
sequences of acting against nature (col. 2.10-30)62is, in 
Antiphon's view, inadequate to prevent injustice. We should 
notice that all the stress in this argument is on external 
sanctions, and it is assumed that it is only in fear of the 
sanctions of punishment or disgrace that an individual avoids 
wrongdoing: there is thus a disregard of any personal stan- 
dard of right and wrong, of any subjective form of conscience. 
Further drawbacks of nomos and its failure to correspond 
with Physis are outlined: col. 3-4 of 44A in particular dis- 
cuss the ways in which nomoi hinder nature; col. 5-7 show how 
various people who abide by nomos (both law and custom) and 
justice derive not benefit but harm from doing so. 
83 In col. 
5-7 most of the examples concern legal justice, and how be- 
coming involved in the process of justice can prove more 
harmful than beneficial for all parties, but in col. 5.4-8 
Koti at, rty' $ Kv -rw) rcLVAývs kI KkKOVj a vfas fts D UTvvs Eu 
7i'aL' Wf'W is given as an example of action which is hostile 
to nature. Now, those who would treat well even parents who 
had treated them badly would not do so primarily out of 
558 
obedience to a written nom os, but to an unwritten one, such 





then, does take account of both custom and law, 
85"and 
impli- 
citly suggests that aidos, such as would lead one to honour 
a parent who had shown one no kindness, does not (always) 
contribute to one's own advantage. 
In fr. 44B col. 2 Antiphon actually mentions aidos, again in 
criticism of the restraints placed on nature by convention: 
% S. 01 01 'iO Vs 
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In these difficult sentences the author seems to say that by 
honouring some and not others according to birth people im- 
pose an arbitrary distinction upon themselves-, such as that 
between Greek and barbarian. He sees, then, distinctions of 
class and race as conventional, just as laws and justice 
are, 
86 
and thus as something to be depreciated. It is hardly 
legitimate, however, to conclude from these observations, 
which may be simply practical and have no moral message at 
all, that Antiphon believed in the unity of mankind in any 
humanitarian sense. 
87 The combination 
cllrsL 
ový+tDä rt Koi 
Itüýu. t9. c is poetic, both verbs being roughly equivalent, as 
often in Aeschylus, to a verb of "honouring", and it is per- 
haps significant that, while Herodotos and Thucydides avoid 
sebomai in secular contexts, the same closeness of aideomai 
and sebomai occurs in "Antiphon the orator. "88 
The other papyrus fragment (P. Oxy. 1797, fr. 44DK) does not 
specially concern us: essentially it makes points similar to 
those in 44A 5-7, showing that those who submit themselves 
out of respect for law to the processes of justice often 
receive not support or berrEit from so doing, but harm. In 
addition, three definitions of justice (none of them Anti- 
phon's), 
89 
viz. "not to take the initiative in harming 
others, " "obeying the law" and "neither to do nor to suffer 
harm" are shown to be incompatible. Antiphon shows, then, 
559 
that none of the conventional conceptions of justice which 
he considers can ensure the advantage of those who submit 
themselves to justice. As even the opening lines of 44A 
suggested, Antiphon's criterion is advantage, but, as has 
been amply demonstrated, 
90 this does not necessarily imply 
that he advocated uninhibited gratification of one's own 
desires: to pursue such a course of conduct would for most 
people entail more disadvantage than advantage. Although the 
papyrus fragments give us no indication of how Antiphon felt 
an individual might best pursue his own advantage and avoid 
pain, the quotations of later authors from his work, which 
DK assign to his 7aet fV. uvtnas , show that, in practice, the 
pursuit of advantage is not incompatible with traditional 
morality. These fragments, however, promote action -approved 
by traditional morality because it is prudent, not because 
it is moral. 
91 
Demokritos, 92 like Antiphon, is aware that fear of punishment 
and fear of disgrace are not sufficient to deter all wrong- 
doing, but rather lead some simply to attempt to conceal 
their vices. Unlike Antiphon, however, he maintains that it 
is in the interests of everyone to act justly and honourably, 
and aidos is central to his attempt to prove that this is so. 
In outlook he often resembles both Protagoras and Antiphon, 
but unlike either he has an advanced conception of the indi- 
vidual conscience and an essentially internalized notion of 
what is good for individuals. 
That Demokritos does recognize the inability of external 
moral sanctions to compel and deter in every eventuality is 
shown most clearly by B181: 
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Here Demokritos replaces fear of punishment and disgrace by 
intelligence and understanding, brought about by persuasion, 
560 
the object of which is duty (TO C6*4 ). He implies that. once 
the individual has been persuaded, he will recognize that it 
is not in his own interest to do wrong. 
93 Like Antiphon, 
then, he is aware that nomos alone is insufficient-to prevent 
injustice, and, also like Antiphon, if the _Cpncord 
fragments 
mentioned above (n. 91) are anything to go by, he suggested 
that, even in spite of the inadequacy of nomos, people would 
find it more advantageous to act with restraint. Unlike 
Antiphon, however, he stresses the individual's own appraisal 
of his conduct (implied in ruvt('- and e-trirrn+y) and (as 
other fragments show) appreciates the very considerable 
benefits of nomos. 
94 Fr. B41 is comparable to 181: C(c ä¢ O64) 
äkkic ,. 95 cýica -ro SEcJ oc1crx( G6. cL KýAkucrlý. IVJ and, as B42 shows, 
'I'V cSEod (or 
cEL ) is an object of knowledge: this rein- 
forces the ideas of cvve<<. S and 
c'irtrrgVil in B181 , and the 
importance of intelligence in human action is further 
stressed in B59,77,83 and 182 (11k Wa^ are achieved byp81r. 3 
1 11 96 through 1toV6L , Tic as' i come automatically). 
Intelligence, however, is not Demokritos' only answer to the 
problem of 
iýK6ý Kýýýreýýcc, for intelligence for him is 
primarily moral intelligence, productive of an awareness of 
right and wrong, an awareness which appears as aidos. Fr. B264 
is the most important source here: 
A 
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B84 and 244 express the same idea (using aischunesthai rather 
than aideisthai): 
CWvrov -rrewr"J OCIS; vvts6" /Y EW, rag X1" .d ELeýwrt. 
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Demokritos, then, believes he has found a solution to the 
problem of XKOn` ov%o rK, 1stJ : the individual has his own 
standard of right and wrong and values his own opinion more 
than that of other people. The expression ENVY:, / Ký4e O cc 
561 
relies, as the contrast with TvvS KvIew-1r. vs shows, 
on the use of aideisthai in the sense of fear of reproach, 
and so Demokritos shows himself to be aware of a concept of 
prospective aidos in which self-reproach, rather than fear 
of detection is paramount, and this in turn suggests a 
familiarity with the operation of a subjective sense of guilt 
or remorse. This internalized form of aidos, so expressed, 
is entirely different, as far as we can tell, from that 
envisaged by Protagoras and Antiphon, and it fulfils Anti- 
phon's implied criterion for an effective deterrent against 
injustice, in that it presupposes an awareness that a given 
action will as a matter of course lead to unpleasant conse- 
quences (self-reproach). 
The basis for Demokritos' concept of aidos is to be sought 
in his ideas of conscience and guilt, of which, in turn, the 
basis lies in his atomic theory and its influence on his 
ethics. The effects and manifestations of a guilty conscience 
are described in B174: 
0 IA*V v1 i%S tevc f1rc 
j yos.. tVoS v LKwýK Kau " 
Ký(. t v-rr. ce t(. OVA ýX KtC EL 11- ºý/ac 
E (/ 
wTO(t. I( .4 
R%row 
15 
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ýýýGLKE Illýt t wvr#J KirrtL 
Acting in accordance with justice and popular morality 
(observing CýtKslK KOi wc" 'c) promotes well-being and con- 
tentment, 97 while disregard of justice and failure to do-r^' 
xC eäv' (cf. r fEov , B181,41, 
Aa 
, B42) lead to absence 
of pleasure, fear and self-reproach. This self-reproach must 
be the object of e wuri, J XýSf OoLt . B215 is comparable: 
1<U OS ývº; eo%ý 5ý f_6 rus Kw 
Or B ýc, 3 i7 
h Sl M1s clýt J'F .cu 
"rtokK. 9 Fear here may denote simple fear of punishment, but 
more probably (as the converse of tharsos and athambie) it 
refers generally to uncertainty and worry, the psychological 
disturbance which is the opposite of contentment. Conscience 
of wrongdoing leads to disturbance and fear also in B297, 
but those seem in this case to result from a mistaken belief 
in life after death and are not, therefore, the ineluctable 
consequences of doing wrong. 
99 In B262, however, illegal and 
562 
unjust action is said to have the inevitable consequence of 
an eYK#((öLoV 
100 for the agent. This suggests that injustice 
always involves a loss of contentment. 
101 In spite of this, 
however, recognition of one's misdeeds and the pain caused 
thereby can prove salutery, if it is allied to repentance: 
. P. P. - ý (843) . 
102 
ýIýtýEtOCµýsi(tlK e n- /t. ý ! ý(C oýtt1/ C/ýýOý rt 
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In some respects these passages on quilt and remorse are 
subject to the usual reservations that they may take external 
sanctions into account, but B174 does mention the possibility 
of self-criticism, and if the unpleasant psychological con- 
sequences of wrongdoing are related to the maxim Ew ýTýJ 
eJS CZOAL a definite interest in internal conscience does 
emerge. Unjust action, it seems, always leads to loss of 
pleasure, and naturally loss of pleasure can be manifested 
in a realization that another course of action would have 
been better in the first place; this may engender self- 
reproach, and one who is fully aware both of right and wrong 
and of the unpleasant consequences of doing wrong will fore- 
stall his self-reproach through aidos. The relationship of 
all this to Demokritean physics is suggested by B191, which 
outlines the basis of euthymia in the physical state of the 
soul: 
103 
euthymia consists in moderation of pleasure and a 
well-ordered life (flc <v1re y); excess or deficiency 
causes change and brings about great movements in the soul; 
souls which are moved over great intervals are neither stable 
nor contented (e e«"L); one must therefore limit one's 
desires to what is obtainable and avoid discontent and envy. 
From the other passages we have discussed, it appears that 
wrongdoing causes the kind of instability in the soul des- 
cribed in this passage. 
It seems likely that Demokritos believed that intelligence 
which has been fostered by education or persuasion led one 
to the position of being able to discern both the proper 
means of maximizing one's euthvmia and the kind of action 
whose performance would be inhibited by aidog. 
104 
Certainly, 
like Protagoras, he links aidos and education: 
105 
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i ri ( s. ) 
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Like Protagoras,, then, Demokritos sees saldga as a product of 
different forms of education, and sees a connexion between 
aidos and ae 
106 Education and aidos also require ponos, 
as in B182: TA , ý, 
«/ Kßä .c -ruts ýövoýs ºý 6ý«S 
ýý 




the assertion of Protagoras that arete does not come vcirä röu 
2 .1 Avto/. örcv (ß . 323c). Demokritos also shared with his 
fellow-citizen a conviction that both Physis and education 
contributed to a man's character108 (Prot. B3, cf. Demok. 
B33,183,208); if anything, it is Demokritos who lays the 
greater stess on education (B242, cf. Kritias B9). 
The twin strands which contribute to the development of 
Demokritean man's internal conscience are intellect and 
aidos, and in laying stress on these two factors he does not 
diverge far from the mainstream of Greek thought, nor even 
from Homer, in whose poems "good sense" and aidos are the 
marks of a properly educated agathos. Where Demokritos does 
differ from the mainstream is in his conscious internaliza- 
tion of aidos and his conception of the autonomous human 
being who determines the character of his own actions for 
himself. Thus he denies a role to popular opinion, traditio- 
nally the single most powerful force in Greek ethics. Several 
of the other fragments beyond those already discussed confirm 
this impression. In B48, for example, he claims, i1ttvw4 
kKvýw ö äýýc6ýs ow -rrotFcrocc ýöýoý Homer's heroes, often 
anxious about the criticisms of its kk rfCsJ , would not 
agree. Other fragments stress intentions, rather than results 
or appearances, in a way which is quite novel in its 
explicitness. In B68, for example, good or bad reputation is 
said to result not only from deeds, but also from intentions: 
dose 
tý. es or v17ý KA IK 
ýok s o' I¬ E WV -vexmrc, ýt, ý mlj . 6\-C WV % 
Wy B62 has a similar emphasis: i4ý, c(ýoJ 0v -ro atctKKvl 
öchkK rö 
ýE EýFhEC1/ as does B89: 17. & S °? c 
'; 
ýc(tKwJ) 




Demokritos, then, envisages a world of moral subjects, who 
avoid wrongdoing not out of fear but out of conscience, who 
do not over ; ate public opinion and whose intentions are 
more important than the outward appearance of their actions. 
The question is, how far might his ideas have been accepted 
by society? Certainly his teachings would be unlikely to 
alter the attitudes and beliefs of the majority, but neither 
do they exist in a vacuum. We have already seen, in passages 
too numerous to mention, dating back as far as the archaj. c 
lyric and elegiac poets, that a more subjective standard of 
morality, less concerned with popular opinion, does begin to 
assert itself with increasing frequency. By the end of the 
fifth century, one of the effects of the adoption of such a 
subjective standard seems to have been the dissolution of 
consensus, the consensus to which, hitherto, aidos had been 
the reponse. Antiphon and Kritias would have us believe that 
one need only give in to such aidos as one might feel when 
there is a danger that the transgression envisaged will come 
to light, and this in itself suggests a society in which 
consensus has broken down, in which an individual may not 
have an implicit belief in the worth of the standards of his 
own society. Demokritos, however, attempts to combat this 
dissolution of consensus, and he does so by reasserting the 
importance of aidos. 
The expression e Nvra' ýci 
IJf8Lt has both traditional and radical 
aspects. Most obviously, aideisthai is not normally a ref- 
lexive verb, and when it governs a direct object it normally 
manifests a relationship with the opinions of other people: 
109 
the association, indeed, of aidos with "other People" is both 
frequent and traditional. Any feeling of aidos, however, will 
have its subjective and internal aspects, since even if an 
individual knows that society condemns a given action, it is 
still up to himself to characterize his own conduct as 
belonging to that category; as a psychological response, 
aidos, in order for it to differ, as it obviously does, from 
the simple calculation, can I get away with it, must be 
acquired early in the process of socialization, and from 
that point on, even when outwardly expressed in terms of the 
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fear of criticism, it will operate as an internal state of 
conscience. At the same time, however, awareness of the 
internal aspect of aidos is not always, or even often, 
present in those who declare themselves subject to that 
emotion, and so one can quite readily see how an Antiphon, 
like a whole generation of modern scholars, might assume 
that the traditional asociation of aidos with the judgements 
of others makes it nothing more than a simple reaction to 
the prospect of criticism. Demokritos, however, has a better 
understanding of both aid os and psychology, and recognizes 
that an individual's standards of right and wrong, kalon and 
aischron are often personal ideals to which he is determined 
to adhere, and thus that the aidos which such an individual 
feels is occasioned by the prospect of the breach of this 
kind of internal standard. Many people will have experienced 
E wvr 
1 
, cic$ '(8 cc before Demokritos formulated the expression, 
and while Demokritos clearly does have views on the working 
of the personal moral conscience which are profoundly untra- 
ditional, in respect of his attitude to mss, at least, much 
of the validity of his doctrine is drawn from its awareness 
of the fundamental nature of the concept, even in its tradi- 
tional guise. 
110 
The corpus also contains a number of minor instances of aidos 
etc.. In frr. 218-22 the concept of aischrokerdeia is para- 
mount, although the word itself does not occur (in B218 dis- 
honest wealth brings an oneidos, and kerdos is termed kakon 
in 220 and 221). B53a suggests that those who do act aisc rÖs 
are nevertheless subject to aidos (although not idos of the 
kind recommended by B264) : 'rrdkk 6" 
de wvras TO x rA rs \or&vS 
xCt, rrwv i ricevvr l. In B80 it is said to be aischron to dis- 
regard one's own affairs while meddling in those of other 
people (cf. Kritias B41a) and in B111 the idea that men should 
be worsted by women (elsewhere aischron) is termed hybris 
(cf. B214). In B238 it is said that kakodoxie is inevitable 
for one who seeks to oppose one stronger than himself, 
presumably defeat and the imputation of imprudence can be 
the only outcome. 
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Appendix 1. Plato Gorgias 482d-483c. 
The issues of the compatibilty of morality and self-interest 
and of memos and Physis in this part of the dialogue reveal 
its roots in fifth century controversies, and I wish to dis- 
cuss the passage here primarily because of the importance 
invested in it by Adkins, ill who implies that beliefs such 
as those held by Kallikles here were widespread and influen- 
tial and that they contributed to Athens' moral decline in 
the years of the Peloponnesian War. Earlier in the dialogue 
Polos has agreed with Socrates that it is more , tchron to 
commit than to suffer injustice. This is not a traditional 
belief, though evidence suggests that it was a current one: 
in earlier literature, while it may be undoubtedly aischron 
to wrong others, it is nonetheless clear that for the average 
individual it is a more compelling source of disgrace to 
suffer wrong at another's hands or to fail in competition at 
all. This being the case, Kallikles does have the authority 
of traditional attitude on his side when he objects to the 
formulation (482d-e). He then goes on to offer his interpre- 
tation of the relative roles of nomos and Physis, which he 
sees as mutually exclusive (482e): when Polos said that KcitickV 
was %. %fxt*J than ä, rck-&%, 1loct , he was speaking out of deference 
to nomos, but Kallikles goes on to explain (483a-b) that in 
nature it is that which is harmful which is ' )Lo and that 
it is ^I(MOd vo w to commit injustice (or inflict harm), 
but Kir 
r/ j vfC-c, to suffer it. The definition of Ts ait 
J 
according to nomos he sees as the attempt of the weak to 
defend themselves against the strong112 by imposing laws 
governing human conduct and by praising some actions and 
decrying others (483b-c). 
113 
Kallikles' analysis does have its value: his opposition of 
Physis to nomos in the question of justice does seem to 
answer to something fundamental in human nature, since it is 
surely an observable fact that human beings resent wrongs 
committed against themselves far more than they are ashamed 
of wrongs they have done others. Certainly this is the 
traditional attitude in Greek culture. Furthermore, as 
Kerferd points out, 
114 he does expose the way in which the 
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majority seek to constrain the selfishness of the pre-eminent 
for their own selfish reasons. 
115 
On the other hand, the 
distinction between a, 
iýc'o4 
and ode %(iJ 
tVV (. is not in 
any way traditional, nor is it a necessary consequence of 
the widening of the definition of aischron, as Adkins 
suggests. 
116 
Each society, and each age within a given society, will 
decide what is beneficial or harmful for its own survival. 
In the Greek context, that which is beneficial will be 
aaathon or jcalon and that which is harmful kon or aischron. 
In Homer, failure in battle was considered disgraceful, and 
"considered" is the operative word, for it is popular opinion, 
not on the particular but on the general level, which deter- 
mines what is aischron or disgraceful, and it is popular 
opinion, embodied in the values of society, to which any 
individual who fears disgrace will respond. To say, then, 
that there is a category of aischra which is not determined 
by popular opinion is not traditional at all, neither is it 
traditional implicitly to disregard popular opinion by 
I% 00 designating all non-competitive aischra as . rýýýCýK VV111w : all 
aischra are ocii Cvtv 
V 
Kallikles' distinction, then, is entirely arbitrary, and is 
unlikely to have influenced anyone who had to live in the 
real world, in which others may well criticize one's breaches 
of co-operative standards as aischron, to free themselves of 
the fetters of nomos. While it may be true that people are 
more concerned about being criticized for their failures 
than for their misdeeds, this fact is neither inherent in 
the Greek word aischros nor made more likely by the nomos- 
17 
Physis controversy, as Adkins suvvests. 
1 
Adkins is also reluctant to admit that the distinction pi's jeo 4% 
vöý`/air$K ýü4K occurs only in this passage. 
118 Since this 
is the case, and since none of the other "immoralists" 
(Antiphon, Thrasymachos in Rep. 1) employsanY similar 
argument, it is surely misleading to refer to the "great 
strength of this position"119 and to ascribe to it consider- 
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able influence on the rest of society. Kallikles' distinction 
is, in fact, irrelevant to the mainstream of sophistic 
thought, which holds in general that all moral standards are 
Výýw, not ¢ 
vac-, 
. 
120 This is the position which is influential, 
and, `unlike Kallikles', it does not distinguish between co- 
operative and competitive aischra. 




is largely a red herring. It is perhaps idle to consider, 
but nonetheless interesting, whether Kallikles' statement of 
a category of aischra which exist J ui«c, also presupposes a 
form of aidos which also exists 
vft-t 
. Perhaps he would not 
have been aware of this implication, but he might conceivably 
have argued that one feels aidos naturally at the exposure 
one's 
of own failings, but is schooled by an education in the 
values of society to feel it at breaches of co-operative 
virtues. This is possible, but the obvious objection would 
be that even the reaction to the humiliation of failure is 
a learned response. 
Appendix 2: the Dissoi Logoi. 
The second of the Dissoi Logoff, a collection of sophistical 
commonplaces arguing for and against the relativity of moral 
values, datable to around 400B. C., 
121 is headed -i['tec KxXVV 
I( Kip vü. Two positions are maintained, that kalon and 
aischron are "the same" (2-20) and that they are "different" 
(21-8). The naive and undeveloped terminology has the results 
firstly that the first section, in showing that the same 
action may be both aischron and kalon, assumes that this 
proves they are "the same", and secondly that the reply, 
showing that they are different, disregards the former stress 
on circumstance and exploits the absurdity that the same 
action can be both aischron and melon at once and in the 
same circumstance. The argument that aischron and kalo are 
"the same", as a collection of sophistic arguments for the 
relativity of these values, concerns us more than its oppo- 
site. In this section two forms of relativity are illustrated: 
sections 2-8 demonstrate how the evaluation of an action can. 
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vary according to circumstance; here, an action is kalon or 
aischron depending on where, how and by whom it is carried 
out. Sections 9-18 show how different peoples have different 
standards of aischron and kalon. Many of the examples here 
are from Herodotos, and show how the interest of the histo- 
rian and others in comparative ethnography influenced ethical 
theory: the demonstration that customs differ widely from 
people to people contributes to the recognition of their 
relativity, and, incidentally, to theories of the origin of 
culture in which nomoi are introduced as an advance on 
nature. 
122 For Herodotos, variety in nomoi serves only to 
demonstrate their power in each culture, 
123 
while for others, 
like our present-author, it tends to undermine their force. 
It will be seen that in the first of these categories a cer- 
tain amount of objectivity for -rö Kisyeo'V and irc Kaha' can 
be assumed: it is implied that knowledge of the circumstances 
in which the action was performed will enable one to deter- 
mine whether it was aischron or kalon. This is what Nill 
calls "non-sceptical" relativism. 
124 In the second category, 
it depends on the subjective evaluation of the individual 
community whether an action is aischron or kalon: a calls x 
aischron, but b calls it kalon. This is "sceptical relati- 
vism", 
125 
and corresponds to Euripides' notorious, -r' o/ 
v% 
/ul roirt. Xtw of 
(ö 
c1 (fr. 19N2); It is doubtful, however, 
whether the author of the passage is aware of the distinction, 
since he uses both kinds of argument to prove the one thesis, 
that kalon and aischron are the same: he is more interested 
in the form of his antilogies than in their content. In par- 
ticular, the verses quoted in conclusion to the argument in 
favour of the proposition that kalon/aischron are the same 
suggests that the author believed that differences in the 
nomoi of different peoples were as much differences of cir- 
cumstance as those outlined in 02-8. Having pointed out 
that each people would choose its own kala if all kala were 
collected together (18, suggesting that-To K. 'Xo" becomes so 
by virtue of its being believed so), he quotes a passage 
(trag. fr. adesp. 26 = com. fr. adesp. 1209) which claims that 
it is the kairos which determines whether an action is kalon 
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or aischron. 
126 It seems that it is enough for the anonymous 
author to prove that k and aischron are not absolute. 
Of the examples of what constitutes an aischron or a kalon 
action, none are new or surprising. Example 6 (that it is 
ao for a woman to adorn herself, aischron for a man) re- 
appears as example 15, where the Persian custom that both 
men and women wear make up is contrasted with the Greek idea 
that this is a sc ro. Thus an action seen as non-sceptically 
relative becomes sceptically relative, but there is no sug- 
gestion that the author has worked out the implications of 
this. Significantly, perhaps, example 7 (it is kalon to e3 
-rtoLFW one's friends, aischron to do so to one's enemies) is 
amplified at 3.2 (rc¬ct 
f Ký w tai oiÖcKOu ) which suggests an 
overlap between kalon and dikaion. Indeed several of the 
examples of /adiko, might equally be examples of 
kalon/aischron, especially those concerning proper treatment 
of parents and friends. 
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natural basis for justice -p. 511); Adkins, Man, 115-6 (it 
is recognized that opportunities to pursue one's own advan- 
tage will be few, but Adkins goes on from this to claim that 
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CONCLUSION. 
It seems especially fitting to end our survey with Demokritos 
B264 and the idea of a form of aidos which finds its point 
of reference in the individual's own conscience, for, essen- 
tally, there is very little more which needs to be said on 
the subject of aidos once this fragment is understood. Demo- 
kritos sees aidos as product of the process of education, as 
an instinctive and prospective form of moral conscience and 
as an ally of the intelligence which is required to discern 
one's moral duty, and thus he achieves a perceptive analysis 
of the fundamental nature of the concept. This nature, how- 
ever, is not something new, but rather belongs to aidos even 
in the earliest periods and in the earliest authors which we 
have studied. We should thus be prepared to see that a os 
can at all periods encompass the individual's subjective 
awareness of right and wrong, even if his standards of right 
and wrong happen to coincide with those"of the rest of his 
society. 
It is therefore untrue to say that aidos is nothing like con- 
science. Equally, however, it would be untrue to claim that 
aidos performs the role of conscience in all its applications: 
aidos is frequently more concerned with the judgement of 
others than with the moral character of one's own actions, 
but, again, it must be stressed that, simply because this is 
sometimes the case, there is no need to assume that it is 
always the case. Similarly, aidos is frequently not concerned 
with one's own actions at all: sometimes it connotes simple 
embarrassment at being caught in a humiliating situation, 
sometimes the reaction to the possibility that the actions 
or shortcomings of another will reflect badly on oneself. 
Aidos, moreover, is operative in a wide range of situations 
in which its operation is not primarily moral, but rather 
bound up with standards of politeness, manners and etiquette: 
but even though it is not always moral, there are no grounds 
for claiming that aidos is never moral - when a term enjoys 
a range of usage as wide as that of aidos it is especially 
important to avoid misleading generalizations. 
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Probably the application of aidos which takes us furthest 
from our own ideas of shame or embarrassment is that which 
is normally translated in terms of "respect", where, that is, 
aidos appears to connote not an inhibitory emotion but 
positive regard for another person who, for whatever reason, 
enjoys special status in the eyes of the pidoumenos. 
Presumably the fact that ads is employed in such contexts 
indicates that the Greeks saw a similarity between the 
reaction to, say, the prospect of defeat in battle and that 
which one feels towards a guest, and if the connexion is 
recoverable by us, it must lie in the basic psychological 
and physiological sensation experienced in both these situ- 
ations. One might, for example, blush at the prospect of 
humiliation and in the presence of a person of a certain 
status vis-ä-vis oneself, and it is most probably the sense 
of inhibition, the feeling of self-consciousness or even 
simply of unease which unites both these, and indeed all 
other, applications of aidos. Aidos, then, seems to refer 
fundamentally to a psychiogical reaction and its attendant 
physical symptoms, but clearly the word comes to be used in 
a variety of different applications in which the context 
itself will define its precise meaning. Aideisthai, for 
example, comes to denote the proper response to a suppliant 
or the showing of mercy to a defendant in court, and doubt- 
less there is a sense in which the verb is felt to have a 
special relationship to those contexts. Equally, it may take 
on a variety of connotations as a result of repetition in a 
range of particular applications, of "Pity", for example, by 
virtue of its use in contexts of supplication and guest- 
friendship, or of "honouring" as a result of its use as a 
response to those of special status: neither of. these conveys 
the particular meaning of aidos or aideisthai, but either 
might be an adequate translation in certain contexts. 
Ultimately, however, the use of the terms in these contexts 
will be based on an original recognition of a fundamental 
similarity in the psycho-physical response experienced in 
such situations. 
We have considered a number of theories which argue for the 
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existence of fundamental and wide-ranging differences of 
psychology, culture and moral outlook between the Greeks and 
ourselves: in my opinion, however, no comprehensive theory 
for the differentiation of whole societies one from the other 
is ever likely to be satisfactory, given that all human 
societies resemble each other in some aspects, and differ in 
others. More important for the study of aidos than the 
difference between shame-culture and guilt-culture is the 
difference in scale between Greek society and our own: this 
will account, I believe, for the greater urgency with which 
the average Athenian would consider the opinions of his 
neighbours, for, in the Athenian context, the individual has 
to deal on a more immediate and more significant level with 
those in his immediate environment: one's neighbour is not 
simply liable to spread gossip against oneself, but rather 
decisions taken by him and others like him at the highest 
political level could materially affect one's life. The 
Athenian citizen is much more visible and in much closer 
contact with people whose opinions matter than the average 
modern Briton, who will never see those who make important 
political, legal, financial and even moral decisions about 
his future. Despite the greater anonymity of modern life, 
however, and the greater fragmentation of our society, 
each and every one of us must inhabit some small-scale soci- 
ety, whether it be that of a local community, of a place of 
work or of a profession, in which the opinions of the other 
members are of great significance for ourselves, and it is 
to our experiences in this type of context, rather than to 
political and social ties on a national and international 
scale, that we should look if we really wish to understand 
aidos. If we do, then I am sure that the essence of the con- 
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